The Consequences of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk for the 1918 UPR in German and Austrian Historiography

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University of Vienna

The Consequences of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk for the 1918 UPR in German and Austrian Historiography

A. Stachel

Abstract

The relevance of this topic is conditioned by the fact that in the history of the Ukrainian revolution from 1917 to 1921, additional aspects are revealed when inspecting the terms of the signed Brest-Litovsk peace treaty between the Ukrainian Central Rada (UCR) and Germany and Austria-Hungary. The study includes an analysis of the circumstances that prompted the Ukrainian leadership to ask for help from the Quadruple Alliance (QA) in February 1918 and conclude a military convention with them. The conclusion of the agreement is a particularly important moment in the history of Ukraine, as it fundamentally affected the future, namely, it contributed to maintaining the country's independence and development. The main purpose of the study is to investigate and analyse the changes that have occurred since the conclusion of the agreement between Ukraine and Austria-Hungary and Germany. The object of research is the process of concluding the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and the subject is the document itself. The following scientific methods were used when writing the paper: structural and functional, dialectical, logical analysis, synthesis, comparative analysis, analysis of scientific literature, and generalisation.

The main results are the analysis of the practical and theoretical consequences of the peace treaty on the fate of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR). The practical significance of the study is that by investigating the mistakes of the UCR in the state creation, it would help to avoid similar problems in the future. During the writing of the paper, statistical data, scientific studies, and historical sources were analysed and scientific works of political figures of that time were reviewed. Important are the works of the chairman of the Central Rada of the UPR Mykhailo Hrushevsky and political and public figure Volodymyr Vynnychenko

Keywords: Ukrainian Central Rada, Treaty of Brest, military convention, Quadruple Alliance, Entente

Анотація

Introduction

Brest-Litovsk peace treaty - is a peace agreement between the UPR, on the one hand, and Austria-Hungary, Germany, Turkey, and Bulgaria, on the other. According to the study by R. Pyrig, this agreement was the first peace treaty during the First World War. Its signing meant that the countries of the Quadruple Union recognised Ukraine as an independent state. However, officially the independence of the Ukrainian People's Republic was proclaimed by the Third Universal of November 20, 1918, by the UCR, which even then wanted to become an active participant in international relations with foreign states. However, such a desire was made impossible due to martial law in Europe [1].

V.D. Bernik in his writings highlighted how the process of signing the treaty took place. At a conference in Brest-Litovsk on December 9, 1917, the Ukrainian Central Rada had the opportunity to conclude a peace treaty with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance. After lengthy negotiations, on February 9, 1918, the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty was signed between the UPR and the countries of the Quadruple Alliance. According to the treaty, martial law in the country was ended, diplomatic, economic, and consular relations were established between the participants, the issue of prisoners of war was resolved, and borders in the west of Ukraine were determined. At the same time, a secret treaty was concluded with Austria-Hungary, according to which a bill was to be submitted to Parliament on the unification of Eastern Galicia and Bukovina into one crown lands [2].

According to most historians, the relevance of this topic is conditioned by the need for a more detailed analysis of the political activities of the UPR, a new understanding of the mistakes of the treaty, and considering the lessons of diplomatic activity of this period for the implementation of the foreign policy activities of modern independent Ukraine. According to S. Alston, the Soviet authorities regarded this conclusion as a conspiracy of Ukrainian nationalists with German and Austrian imperialists. German and Austrian historiography qualified such actions as the victory of young Ukrainian diplomats. Ukrainian history initially described the treaty positively for the future of the country, but over time this assessment became negative. Russian historians call it - a step by tactical success, but by strategic defeat. However, despite such different assessments, the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty was considered an important event for the citizens of the then Russian Empire and Europe. The UPR treaty then influenced many events, including relations between Ukraine and its allies and relations with Russia and the Entente [3].

Given the situation that was developing at that time, most researchers tend to justify the actions of the authorities, namely, changing the political course and concluding an agreement with the QA. The main argument was the hopeless situation in Ukraine. However, after conducting a study, N. Tifonova proved that the Ukrainian authorities themselves created such a situation. This was manifested in the inability to defend what was won by the national revolution, and the severance of diplomatic relations with the Entente. If cooperation continues, the countries participating in the Entente military bloc were ready to support the Ukrainian People's Republic, which would ensure its recognition in the post-war period and further create favourable conditions for the development of statehood [4].

Thus, based on the above, the purpose of this study can be distinguished. During the study, it is necessary to investigate and reproduce the circumstances of the change in the political course of the UPR and the consequences of signing a peace treaty with the states of the Quadruple Alliance. The originality of this study lies in the concretisation and detailed analysis of the miscalculations of the Ukrainian Central Rada, which would help to avoid such mistakes in the development of a modern independent Ukraine. The main task of the study is to analyse and prove that such political activity was a miscalculation of the Ukrainian Central Rada and had harmful consequences for the establishment of Ukrainian statehood [5].

Materials and Methods. The question of the consequences of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty for the UPR interested many researchers, since a detailed study of the topic would help to avoid miscalculations in modern political activity. For a more accurate study of this topic, the following methods were used: synthesis and logical analysis, structural and functional, dialectical, analysis of scientific literature, and the method of generalisation and comparison of the information obtained.

Results

In the winter of 1918, a meeting of the German government was held in the German capital, where it was decided to sign a peace treaty with the Ukrainian People's Republic. On February 9, the Treaty of Brest was signed between representatives of the UPR, on the one hand, and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, on the other [6]. In accordance with Article 1 of the treaty, military operations between the parties were terminated. The second Article established the borders of Ukraine that still existed before the war with Austria-Hungary and Russia. Other articles of the treaty established diplomatic relations between the parties. The UPR pledged to export 1 million tonnes of grain, various cereals, and meat by July 1918. The QA, for its part, was obliged to supply agricultural machinery to Ukraine [7].

At the same time, the Ukrainian People's Republic and Austria-Hungary signed an agreement on the unification of Eastern Galicia and Bukovina into one crown region within Austria-Hungary. Such a declaration had to remain secret, for fear of national contradictions in the Habsburg monarchy. However, the secret could not be preserved. The text of the treaty was published in newspapers, which caused discontent among the Polish part of the population of Austria-Hungary [8].

Modern historians do not have a coordinated opinion regarding these events. Representatives of the Central Powers then very positively assessed the conclusion of the treaty and the then political activities of the UPR in the international arena, which was conditioned by the relevant political and economic circumstances. As noted by German and Austrian historiography, the main purpose of its conclusion was to represent and enter the International Space, establish it as a subject of international relations and international law, end martial law and establish peace, so as to accelerate the process of unification of all Ukrainian lands [9].

After reviewing the works of the then political figures, it can be argued that they recognised this step as a big mistake. The most responsible person who was blamed for everything was M. Hrushevsky. This is evidenced by his written works, in which he foresaw and was aware of the negative results of the agreement [10]. Such a liberation operation gave rise to the German-Austrian conflict, since the German command hindered Austrian-Ukrainian relations, and did not give freedom of action in the zone of their occupation. On March 28, 1918, the high command independently divided Ukraine into occupation zones. The German side got the largest part of the UPR with such major cities as Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernihiv, Novopechersk, and the Crimea, the ports of Mykolaiv, Taganrog, Rostov, and Novorossiysk. The Austrian side received Podillia, Kherson, Yekaterinoslav, and Mariupol [11].

Due to the fact that German and Austrian troops entered the land of the UPR, the Ukrainian authorities were afraid of ambiguous behaviour among the population, so in 1918, the Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Khrystiuk issued a circular to the people's lands, in which he noted: “January 27, 1918, the Ukrainian People's Republic has concluded a democratic, decent, fair peace with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria, without annexation and indemnities. With the help of our captured soldiers, organised in Germany and Austria in corps, Austrian Sich Riflemen - Galicians and German troops, our soldiers are clearing Ukraine of Bolshevik rapists. Order and peace are being established in the state, conditions are being created under which local self-government bodies have the opportunity to start streamlining local life, to fulfil the great and honourable duty that the population has assigned to it. It is ordered that all city, county, volost, and village councils immediately begin active, creative, systematic work to serve the needs of working people” [12].

Unfortunately, his fears have become true. Despite the significant concentration of Bolshevik forces on the territory of Ukraine, the German command allocated a small group to conduct the operation. The troops were supposed to occupy only the southern part of Ukraine along with the capital. Gradually, the number of military personnel on the territory of the Ukrainian State increased. In February 1918, the German military commander E. Ludendorff developed a plan that he would liberate Ukrainian lands up to Kyiv and Dnipro from the Bolsheviks without the participation of Austro-Hungarian troops. However, after a short period of time, the general decided that it was necessary to go further to the Left Bank and clear the territory up to the Donbas. Later, Austrian troops launched an operation in the Odesa direction [13].

Even at the beginning of the negotiations, the German side was interested in economic issues. Germany wanted to get more agricultural products from Ukraine as quickly as possible. Ukraine's goal was to develop the state economy through profitable exports and imports, and not to turn the UPR into a young colony of Germany. There were disagreements between the parties on this issue, and during lengthy discussion negotiations, several agreements were adopted for the supply of products that would satisfy both countries. This tactic of the German command prompted the Council of Ministers to issue a number of resolutions banning the export of certain types of agricultural products and resources. The Germans were not satisfied with some aspects, so they especially made sure that the UPR did not sell bread and other products to foreign countries, especially Russia, Georgia, Belarus, and the Don [14].

German units provided mainly a moral road and drove fear into the Bolsheviks. By the end of April, the Bolsheviks left the capital, and a week later the Ukrainian Central Rada returned to Kyiv. After its return, the UCR began to restore state-forming activities and develop the National Army. The rapid advance of German forces into the interior of the state, which is rich in various food products (especially bread), provoked the appearance of Viennese troops on the territories of the UPR. Emperor Karl called such an invasion “peaceful entry into foreign territory.” Secretary General of Foreign Affairs A.Ya. Shulgin also agreed with Vynnychenko's opinion. While maintaining contact with the Ukrainian delegation in Brest-Litovsk, he was concerned that the participation of the UCR in the negotiations would negate all the achievements of the newly formed UPR diplomacy with the Entente states [15].

In fact, the Germans occupied Ukrainian land. They independently managed some sectors of the economy. Legislative acts that were in force on the territory of Ukraine were issued: military field courts were established, in April 1918, the order of the commander-in-chief of the German army on the sowing of land was issued, and peasants were forbidden to prevent this, they could no longer take more land from landlords than they could process. This policy was explained by the fact that the Germans were afraid that Ukraine would not be able to fulfil the terms of the contract for the supply of the required amount of bread. This fear arose due to the fact that the peasants could not sow a large amount of land on their own [16]. The Germans gave the order to return the landowners' land ownership. The Ukrainian Central Rada considered such activities as interference in the economic affairs of the UPR and called on Ukrainians not to support the political activities of the Germans. This caused a conflict, and therefore, immediately after the expulsion of the Bolsheviks from the territory of Ukraine, German generals dispersed the UCR and began to pursue a policy of subduing the Ukrainian people - they shot the dissatisfied population, and strict contributions were imposed on villages. The overthrow of the UCR was the end of the first stage of the Ukrainian revolution [17].

In general, there is an opinion that there was a conspiracy between Ukrainian nationalists and Germans. This military operation was prepared long before the UCR asked for help from the Quadruple Alliance. And to cover up, the official appeal of the UPR to Germany and Austria-Hungary for military assistance was staged. For the first time, the issue of the need for assistance was considered at a meeting of the Council of People's Deputies held on January 30, 1918. It discussed the progress of negotiations between the Ukrainian delegation. As a result of persistent diplomatic activity, after the proclamation of the Quadruple Universal, the Ukrainian delegation was recognised as representatives of independent Ukraine. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria O. Chernin noted that all participants of the meeting recognise the Ukrainian People's Republic as a free and independent state that is able to conclude international legal treaties. General secretary for Military Affairs M. Porsh noted the difficult situation of the Ukrainian state due to the influence of Bolshevik Russia on it and stressed the importance of providing military and technical assistance. The agreement from the German side came quickly and unanimously. It is important that military assistance from Austria-Hungary was received ambiguously. By the decision of the Ukrainian government, the Austrian army was withdrawn from the territory of Ukraine, but the Germans, Poles, and Magyars were withdrawn from the army. That is, they remained, and the Austrians were replaced by Ukrainian riflemen. There were no objections regarding the Germans. General secretary M. Tkachenko noted that only the German army could liberate Ukraine from the Bolsheviks [18].

In 1918, due to the strong interference of the German side in the economic affairs of Ukraine, non-compliance with the terms of the treaty, and other similar reasons, a strong conflict occurred in Ukrainian-German relations, which prompted the Germans to change the Ukrainian government through a coup d'etat. Although under the treaty Germany was supposed to remain neutral in such matters, it actively participated in the overthrow of the Ukrainian Central Rada and contributed to the establishment of the Hetmanate of Pavlo Skoropadskyi. Here it is important to note that the Hetman's coup was carried out peacefully, since there was no resistance from society and state authorities [5].

In March 1918, the UCR approved the state symbols of Ukraine - the Trident and the yellow-blue flag. A new territorial and administrative division of Ukraine took place. The Russian language was banned, and all military personnel had to learn Ukrainian for three months. Wage labour and private ownership of land were prohibited. On April 29, a regular meeting of the UCR was held at which the Constitution was adopted, which proclaimed that all power belongs to the people, and democratic freedoms were consolidated. The Constitution consisted of 8 sections and 85 articles. Legislative power belonged to the National Assembly, which was elected for a term of 3 years. The National Assembly had the right to elect the Council of people's ministers and the General Court. The population was granted civil and political rights, regardless of gender, age, nationality, etc. [19]. However, these decisions did not have any importance for the development of the state, because the Central Rada could not fully implement the economic articles and this led to a conflict between the Ukrainian and Austro-Hungarian and German sides, which led to the fall of democracy in the UPR and the Hetman's coming to power. All power was concentrated in his hands, but there was a great dependence on the German command. After Skoropadskyi's advent to power in June of the same year, it was felt that the German-Ukrainian crisis was in the past and the process of restoring partnership relations began. Proof of this was the memorandum of G. Eichhorn, in which he described the course of foreign political activity in the Eastern Ukraine. Of all the QA members, relations with Germany developed best [4].

It is worth paying attention to the meeting of the Ukrainian, German and Austro-Hungarian delegations held on January 13, 1918. The main purpose of the meeting was to discuss the issue of the borders of the Ukrainian People's Republic. According to Austrian historiography, both sides wanted to remain in a long-term and peaceful relationship. That is why Austria-Hungary guaranteed the provision of free national and cultural development to the Ukrainian people living on the territory of Austria, and Ukraine - to the Polish minority that preceded it on its territories.

Discussion

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk - is one of the most difficult and painful stages in the history of Ukraine, but at the same time - memorable. At the time of signing the treaty, the internal situation in Ukraine and in the international arena was extremely difficult. The events of that time developed very quickly, which forced Ukrainian politicians to seek salvation in the Central European states.

O. Nazarchuk highlighted the reasons that prompted the UCR to conclude a peace treaty with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance. First of all, this is a threatening situation for Ukraine, which arose due to the entry into its territory of three Bolshevik armies under the leadership of M. Muravyov, I. Kudinsky, and R. Berezin. The Ukrainian Central Rada tried to find a common language with the Entente, but all attempts were unsuccessful. The Entente countries did not recognise the UPR and did not help it. The third reason was the imitation of the Bolsheviks. In Brest, Russia signed a peace treaty with Germany and its allies, and the leadership of the UPR, in order not to lose the support of the Ukrainian army and civilians, was forced to take such a step. At the time of its signing, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was called the Treaty of Brest [5].

S. Pyvovar highlighted a number of favourable circumstances that helped sign the peace treaty: tense relations between Soviet Russia and the countries of the Quadruple Alliance and the food crisis in Austria-Hungary and Germany, which they wanted to solve with the help of the Ukrainian People's Republic [17].

Chairman of the Ukrainian Central Rada Mykhailo Hrushevsky described this event as follows: “the treatise gave Ukraine a worthy and honourable peace, returned it to the Western Ukrainian lands, not only occupied during the war, but also previously torn off from it, like Kholmshchyna, Beresteyshchina, Pinshchyna... having established the exchange of prisoners of war without payment, the exchange of goods for the foundation of the contingent (determining the number of goods that should be brought and exported), the German government immediately began to mobilise and withdraw trained units of Ukrainian military prisoners to Ukraine...” [20].

Volodymyr Vynnychenko also positively assessed the Treaty of Brest in his writings, but he negatively assessed the decisions of Germany and Austria-Hungary to provide military assistance to the UPR. Vynnychenko, as the head of government, was obliged to comply with the decree on conscription of the German army and assistance to internal forces. However, he did not want to take on such responsibility, because in his opinion this agreement would have brought negative consequences and great evil to Ukraine. It was Vladimir who emphasised that the Kaiser's army would bring Ukraine a political, social, and even national reaction [13].

As described by P. Hay-Nyzhnyk, the treaty gave the Ukrainian People's Republic peace and returned those western territories that were not only occupied during the war, but were previously separated from it. The Ukrainian delegation was able to achieve the most favourable conditions during the negotiations. The main thing is that the treaty did not have an imperialist character, that is, it was reached without annexations [11].

According to the study by M. Boitsun, at a conference in Brest on December 29, 1917, the Ukrainian delegation demanded to annex Galicia, Transcarpathia, and Bukovina to its territories or create these territories as autonomy within Austria-Hungary. However, this requirement was rejected [7].

Modern history effectively avoids the fact that the Russo-German negotiations gave the Ukrainian People's Republic a special historical chance to free itself from the imperial yoke. The political activities of the Council of people's commissars actively pushed the Entente to reorient itself to Kyiv, hoping that Ukraine would begin to cooperate with the Don, Romania, the Caucasus, Czechs, Poles, and Slovenes and resist the Austrian-German forces. The policy of the entente, which wanted victory over the countries of the Quadruple Alliance, was quite reasonable and logical. Members of the Entente coalition supported every country that started a war with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance. In turn, the members of the military bloc hoped to benefit from providing such support. Western European countries were actively interested in the emergence of a potential ally and were ready to provide material and financial assistance to Ukraine. However, the Ukrainian leadership reacted rather cautiously and with distrust to such increased interest from Western European countries. Ukraine ignored the desire to help and considered that these were manifestations of the imperialists to use the UPR for their own purposes [21].

For Germany and Austria-Hungary, this agreement primarily allowed to import products and raw materials from Ukraine. According to Z. Steiner, there has been a famine in Austria for almost 3 years, especially in winter, while the situation in Hungary was better, but there was a shortage of food. There were similar circumstances in Germany. When they came to Ukraine, the Germans treated themselves with delicious food and even held parades. The soldiers even sent private gifts for Kyiv residents. Arriving in the capital, German troops quickly established order, so during that period, the number of street crime decreased. But by the end of April 1918, this situation had changed [22].

V.I. Svatko and O.I. Ovcharenko explained that the conclusion of the treaty was quite a complex process, this was conditioned by the fact that Ukraine was considered part of Bolshevik Russia. To sign the agreement, UPR had to withdraw from its membership. This happened on January 22, 1918, after the signing of the Fourth Universal, which proclaimed the UPR an independent state. On February 9, 1918, the treaty was signed when the UCR left the capital. Under the terms of the contract, within six months of 1918, UPR had to supply Germany and Austria-Hungary with 60 million poods of bread, 2,750 thousand poods of meat, 3 million poods of sugar, 400 million eggs, plenty of potatoes, lard, and other agricultural products and raw materials. The Germans also pledged to supply Ukraine with equipment, coal, salt, and other scarce goods, provide weapons and a loan for the UPR in the amount of 1 million karbovanets. Systematic deliveries were regulated by the Economic agreement of the masses of the UNR concluded on April 23, 1918 [8].

According to G. Freud, in a separate peace, Russia's obligations were spelled out. It was supposed to withdraw its troops from the territory of the UPR and stop any activity that is directed against the Ukrainian Central Rada. It should also be noted that after the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the signatory countries pledged to establish diplomatic relations among themselves and exchange authorised representatives. Immediately after the ratification of the treaty, the participants wanted to introduce consulates to each other. On March 16, 1918, the Ukrainian embassy was established in Germany. It was located in Berlin. The first Ukrainian ambassador was Oleksander Sevriuk [14].

Thus, diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Germany were established and legally consolidated on February 9, 1918, in the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, with an Additional trade and economic treaty and the Appeal of the Ukrainian people to Germany with a request for military assistance. The Ukrainian people immediately wanted to establish peace on their land, so the conclusion of a separate peace was an uncontested decision. The desire to become a free state primarily depends on the determination, cohesion, and professionalism of the political leaders who ruled the Ukrainian People's Republic in those important times. Unfortunately, there were no talented political strategists at that time who could, despite the difficult circumstances, assess the situation in Ukraine and prevent such mistakes.

Conclusions

Thus, the study proves that, despite the different attitude of researchers to the conclusion of peace with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance, the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty is certainly a victory for the Ukrainian delegation, since, assessing all the circumstances, there was no other way out. The Ukrainian Central Rada, seeking salvation from the Bolshevik scourge, gave the Ukrainian People's Republic under the occupation of Germany and Austria- Hungary. After the signing of this agreement, Ukraine received recognition in the international arena and was able to become a full subject of international relations. With the help of the Brest treaty, diplomatic relations were established with the Central European states.

After signing the treaty, the Ukrainian Central Rada appealed to the countries of the Quadruple Alliance to provide military assistance in the fight against the Bolsheviks. On February 21, 1928, German-Austrian troops entered the territory of Ukraine. In April 1918, the UPR was completely liberated from Soviet troops. UCR returned to Kyiv again.

With its arrival on Ukrainian soil, Germany actually established an occupation regime. The Germans independently managed certain sectors of the economy, issued their own laws and regulations that were in force on the territory of the Ukrainian People's Republic. The Ukrainian leadership regarded such actions as gross interference in economic life. This caused a conflict between the German command and the Ukrainian Central Rada. The Germans began to move closer to the conservative forces of Ukraine. With their support, the Ukrainian Central Rada was dissolved. On April 29, 1918, the last meeting of the UCR was held, at which the Constitution of the UPR was proclaimed. According to which Ukraine was declared sovereign and independent. These decisions actually had no significance for the future of Ukraine, since a few hours after the meeting, the German command dispersed the Ukrainian Central Rada and contributed to the establishment of the Hetmanate of Pavlo Skoropadskyi, which took all power. With the overthrow of the Ukrainian Central Rada, the first stage of the Ukrainian Revolution also ended.

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