Foreign policy of the Ukrainian state based on the Diary of Pavlo Skoropadskyi

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Odesa I.I. Mechnikov National University

Foreign policy of the Ukrainian state based on the Diary of Pavlo Skoropadskyi

O. Nakonechna

Abstract

The struggle of the Ukrainian people for independence during the war of national liberation of 1917-1921 is an important period in the history of Ukraine and is relevant today. One of the most prominent figures of this period is P. Skoropadskyi, who made many important political decisions during his rule. The then Ukrainian State pursued an active foreign policy, the investigation of which is relevant for historians, for the purpose of a broad and objective study of this period, and for diplomats who, based on the experience of the past, determine the current geopolitical course of Ukraine. The purpose of the study is an in-depth analysis of the foreign policy of the Ukrainian State, based on the memoirs of P. Skoropadskyi. When writing the paper, the following methods were used: analysis, comparison, specification and generalisation of information. Based on the findings of the study, the following conclusions were drawn: the foreign policy of the then Ukraine and the Hetman's government was determined by the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk; most of all, the Ukrainian State cooperated with Germany, which had an impact on the course of internal political processes. The study discussed in detail the activities of the Germans in the context of the creation of the Ukrainian army and land policy. The issue of whether this cooperation can be considered an occupation was also considered. In addition, Ukraine's international relations with such states and regions as Romania, Bolshevik Russia, Crimea, and Kuban were considered. In the course of the study, in addition to the actual material, the opinions and plans of P. Skoropadskyi's foreign policy activities were considered. The paper outlines the ideas of Hetman and creates the basis for further research on the history of external relations of this period. This study also touched upon an important topic that few researchers had previously considered, namely the problem of relations between Hetman's government and the Entente

Keywords: Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, German influence, Hetmanate, Army, Entente

Анотація

О. Наконечна. Одеський Національний університет імені І.І. Мечникова

Тема боротьби українського народу за незалежність у період національно-визвольних змагань 1917-1921 років є важливою сторінкою історії України та є актуальною у сьогоденні. Одним з найвизначніших діячів зазначеного періоду є П. Скоропадський, за часів правління якого було прийнято багато важливих політичних рішень. Тогочасна Українська Держава проводила активну зовнішню політику, дослідження якої є актуальним для істориків, з метою широкого та об'єктивного вивчення цього періоду, та для дипломатів, які опираючись на досвід минулого, визначають сучасний геополітичний курс України.

Метою наукової роботи є глибоке дослідження зовнішньої політики Української Держави, на основі мемуарів П. Скоропадського. Під час написання роботи було використано наступні методи: аналіз, порівняння, конкретизація та узагальнення інформації. За результатами дослідження було зроблено ряд наступних висновків: зовнішня політика тогочасної України та гетьманського уряду визначалась умовами Брест-Литовського мирного договору; найбільше Українська Держава співпрацювала з Німеччиною, яка мала вплив на перебіг внутрішньо політичних процесів. У статті було детально розглянуто діяльність німців у контексті створення української армії та земельної політики. Також було розглянуто проблему того, чи можна вважати цю співпрацю окупацією. Окрім цього, було розглянуто міжнародні відносини України з такими державами та регіонами як Румунія, більшовицька Росія, Крим та Кубань. Під час дослідження, окрім фактичного матеріалу, було розглянуто думки та плани зовнішньополітичної діяльності П. Скоропадського. Дослідження дозволяє ознайомитись з ідеями гетьмана та створює основу для подальших досліджень історії зовнішніх зв'язків цього періоду. Також у цій статті було порушено важливу тему, яку до цього розглядало мало дослідників, а саме проблему взаємовідносин гетьманського уряду з Антантою

Ключові слова: Брест-Литовський договір, німецький вплив, гетьманат, армія, Антанта

Introduction

The period of the war of national liberation is a very important stage in the establishment of independent Ukraine. This period of history is characterised by many important events that influenced the future development of Ukrainian history. One of these stages of the national liberation revolution was the rule of P. Skoropadskyi. During his relatively short time in power (7 months), Hetman's government was able to develop many branches and spheres of activity of the Ukrainian State, one of which was foreign policy. This element occupied a significant place during the rule of P. Skoropadskyi, so the Hetman left many memories of relations with other countries and his foreign policy imperatives. Thus, the study of the foreign policy of the Ukrainian State, based on the memoirs of Hetman, is very important for historians, since the figure of P. Skoropadskyi is ambiguous and debatable, and for diplomats, in order to avoid mistakes of the past and borrow certain ideas.

The study of the history of international relations is always a questionable issue, since it is necessary to carefully study the nature of cooperation with certain countries, and how the government reacted to conducting diplomatic relations with other countries. In the case of studying the period of international relations of the Ukrainian State in 1918, all of the above is relevant. It should be borne in mind that Ukraine was recognised as independent only in 1918, so this year was the beginning of international relations. In addition, considering specifically the Hetmanate, then its foreign policy course was chosen even before its foundation, so the Ukrainian government cooperated the most with Germany. With this in mind, most of the study was devoted to the consideration of relations between Ukraine and the Germans. It should also be understood that the research was carried out on the basis of an analysis of P. Skoropadskyi's memoirs [1], so first of all the problem was to compare his data with reality. In addition, the memoirs are of particular value for the researcher, since Hetman not only gave his assessment of the actions already performed, but also shared his thoughts on the prospects for cooperation with a number of other countries.

The beginning of research on this topic falls on the period of independent Ukraine after 1991, since in Soviet times it was unacceptable to write that Ukraine was a sovereign state, let alone that it conducted an independent foreign policy. It is worth mentioning the historian P. Hai-Nyzhnyk [2], who devoted his activity to the study of the history of the period of the war of national liberation and, to a large extent, the activities of P. Skoropadskyi.

Now many researchers have devoted their activities to the study of this topic. In particular, the study of cooperation between the Hetmanate and Germany is a very popular topic. In this paper, in particular, a reference was made to the study by O. Lupandin [3]. In his study, the author provided a thorough analysis of German activities in terms of grain policy, referring to archival documents. Another researcher who has studied the influence of Germany was I. Romanko [4], who, based on archival documents, considered the history of the development of the armed forces of various political groups during the national liberation struggle. However, this work is more of an encyclopedic reference book than a thorough study. Regarding the foreign policy of the Ukrainian State with other countries, important works are the study by M. Gedina [5], in which the author conducts a thorough analysis of the policy of Romania in 1918. Thus, the author considered the issue of Bessarabia, which was important for Hetman's power, from the position of Romania. Interesting is the study by M. Bar- bulescu [6], who investigated the problem of relations between Romania and Ukraine in 1918. Since this author is a Romanian historian, he represents the opposite Ukrainian position, familiarisation with which is important for this topic. Foreign policy issues were also investigated by S. Gro- menko [7], who investigated the relations of the Ukrainian State with Crimea. The author proved that Crimea is certainly part of Ukraine, based on various arguments.

In this paper, a study of the history of foreign relations between the Ukrainian State and other countries will be carried out based on the memoirs of P. Skoropadskyi. Thus, the purpose of this study will be to determine how Hetman felt about relations with certain countries, and what plans he had for the future. It should be borne in mind that the Hetmanate existed for a fairly short period of time, which is why many plans were not implemented in reality. Most of all, Ukraine's cooperation was conducted with the Germans, so the bigger part of the paper will be devoted to the study of this particular issue. It will also be necessary to consider the terms of signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, since it largely determined the policy of Ukraine.

The relevance of the study is the examination of the struggle of Ukrainians for their independence during the reign of Hetman P. Skoropadskyi and 1917-1921 in general. The originality of the study consists in P. Skoropadskyi's memories and thoughts, and the problems of relations between the Hetmanate government and the Entente, which were not previously investigated.

Materials and Methods

Investigation of Ukraine's foreign policy based on the diary of P. Skoropadskyi is quite complex and deep, so a number of important methods of the theoretical block were involved and the writing process took place during the following stages.

The first stage is characterised by the selection of information. Although the study is based on Hetman's memoirs, this source alone is not enough for a thorough and objective investigation. Thus, it was necessary to find and select a large number of sources that complement and more deeply disclose the information provided by P. Skoropadskyi.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (also known as the Treaty of Brest) was signed on February 9, 1918, between representatives of many countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Table 1

Status of implementation of the plan for the export of products from Ukraine by the Germans

Source: O. Lupandin [3]

The significance of this treaty for research was very important, since its terms established the basic principles of Ukraine's policy in 1918.

According to the sixth article of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Russia pledged to recognise the independence of the UPR (Ukrainian People's Republic) and immediately withdraw its troops from the territory of Ukraine. The text of the peace treaty did not specify any more conditions for one or the other party [10].

However, many researchers note that the terms of the agreement were much broader for Ukraine. In particular, there is an opinion that representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Empire did not want to recognise the independence of Ukraine for a long time, since such conditions were unfavourable for the territorial structure of the Empire. Therefore, during long negotiations, the Austrians agreed to recognise the independence of the UPR in exchange for significant food supplies [11]. foreign policy ukraine hetmansky skoropadskyi

Polish historian S. Gregorz, as a result of the analysis of many factors, claims that this treaty was also very important for the Germans, because in this way, firstly, the war on the eastern fronts was ended, secondly, Germany had influence over the newly created states, in particular, the UPR, and, thirdly, the Ukrainian side was obliged to transfer food on a significant scale [12].

In his memoirs, P. Skoropadskyi does not describe reflections on the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk itself, however, there are passages in which he speaks about the consequences of signing this document. “The Germans were becoming more and more masters of Kyiv. In early March, we were told that the Germans were requisitioning the Calais hotel. The major kindly allowed us to stay for 10 days, and then the hotel was to become their property.” [1]

P. Skoropadskyi began relations with representatives of other countries even before the beginning of his rule. In particular, Hetman describes certain contacts with the Germans in his memoirs as follows: “On April 12 and 15, I saw the Germans again. I laid out my plan directly to them and told them that I was asking nothing of them but neutrality, but if they were very empathetic to me, then I would be very grateful if they somehow prevented the Sich Riflemen, who were then a part that was assigned to protect the board and the Central Council. The Germans did not say anything positive to me, but it was clearly clear from them that they sympathised with me” [1].

Thus, on April 29, 1918, by way of a coup, P. Skoropadskyi gained power and declared himself Hetman. The situation in the state at that time was extremely difficult. The absence of an entire state apparatus, four years of active military operations, the absence of an army and much more were the factors that created difficulties in the policy of the Ukrainian State. In Particular, P. Skoropadskyi in his memoirs cites a dialogue with the then Acting Minister of Internal Affairs O. Vishnevskyi, during which it becomes clear that the entire ministry must be created from scratch [1].

As mentioned above, when signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Ukrainian side undertook to transfer most of its own food to Germany, Austria-Hungary, and other Central Powers, in exchange for guarantees of Ukraine's sovereignty and independence.

This topic was considered by historians quite deeply, in particular during the analysis of many documents, O. Lupandin was able to determine the amount of food that the Ukrainians had to transfer to the needs of the Central Powers [3]. This data can be presented as the following Table 1:

Given the above table, it can be concluded that the plans of the Germans to export food from the territory of Ukraine could not be fulfilled. The difference between planned deliveries and those that were made is enormous.

In his memoirs, P. Skoropadskyi also draws attention to the agricultural issue. Hetman explains why the Germans and representatives of other countries set such high conditions for collecting food [1]. In particular, this is conditioned by the fact that the form of land ownership in European countries and Ukraine is different, and by the efficiency of work of one rural resident. P. Skoropadskyi even provides statistical data, which is presented in the following Table 2.

Table 2

Comparison of the amount of harvest in Ukraine with other countries

Considering the above data, it can be concluded that on the territory of the Ukrainian State, if viewed from the standpoint of the political division of the Russian Empire, the wheat harvest in absolute terms was much higher than in other countries. However, in European countries, one villager produced many times more grain than a resident of Ukraine.

According to P. Skoropadskyi, the Germans were guided by their own experience of growing wheat, which is why they set such a large bar for harvesting in Ukraine. It is also necessary to consider the fact that Hetman provided data for 1912, that is, the indicator that was before the first World War.

Based on the research of M. Neibherm, who considered the situation in Eastern Europe, a large number of Ukrainians died on the battlefield, and many rural farms were destroyed. Given this, the yield on the territory of Ukraine as of 1918 was significantly less than in 1912. However, the Germans did not pay attention to this aspect, and still set a high bar for collecting grain products [13].

Thus, despite the fact that the Germans did not comply with the norm for grain collection, but it was necessary to implement it, they resorted to the introduction of a grain monopoly. In his memoirs, P. Skoropadskyi mentions this step as a fundamental mistake. He claims that the introduction of a monopoly on bread did not give any results to the Germans, since they could not collect any more, but they angered most of the peasantry [1].

Another important policy issue of P. Skoropadskyi was an army. The Hetman worked all his life in the military field, so he understood how important this element was in the context of building a strong and independent state. P. Skoropadskyi had big plans to create a combat-ready Ukrainian army, but this was prevented by a number of factors, including foreign policy.

German influence extended not only to the agricultural sector, but also to the defence capability of the Ukrainian State. In his memoirs, Hetman recalls this as follows: “When I first talked about the formation of the army, general Groener said to me: “Why do you need an army? We are here, so your board is safe. In terms of your northern borders, you can rest easy: we will not allow the Bolsheviks” [1]. P. Skoropadskyi also notes that he was very confused by this dialogue, and the only thing he could do was start forming a volunteer division.

Subsequently, the Germans still allowed the Hetman to develop the Armed Forces. In particular, after a meeting with Kaiser Wilhelm in September 1918, an agreement was reached on a joint Ukrainian-German offensive against Soviet Russia. “After my return from Berlin, the formation of a special corps began, the purpose of which was to attack the sovietdom” [1]. Thus, it can be noted that relations between the Ukrainian State and Soviet Russia were hostile and preparations were being made for a direct confrontation.

In his research, P. Hai-Nyzhnyk focuses on this visit of the Hetman to Germany. The historian claims that the meeting was caused by the failures of the German troops on the Western Front, which is why they needed support from the Ukrainian State. In general, the researcher states that this event was positive for Ukraine [2].

However, it is worth noting that there were also difficulties there, since P. Skoropadskyi planned to create an army of 310 thousand people, and wanted to start recruiting volunteers in November 1918, but under pressure from the Germans, this plan was postponed to the next year. Thus, the actual number of the army was 65 thousand people [4].

Figure 1. Comparison of the actual number of armed forces of the Ukrainian State from the planned one

Based on this diagram, it can be stated that the German influence on the policy of P. Skoropadskyi was quite powerful, since under this influence the actual number of the army was several times less than planned by the Hetman.

During the period of March-November 1918, there were about 350 thousand German and Austrian military personnel on the territory of Ukraine. It was quite a significant number of people, so the Germans also left their memories of these events. In particular, E.M. Remarque describes the episode when, after the surrender of Imperial Russia, soldiers from the Western Front were relocated to the former Eastern Front.

Thus, it can be argued that German influence on Ukraine was very powerful, but this was not an occupation, since the Ukrainian State retained sovereignty, and allowed the Germans to carry out certain actions on its territory in accordance with the treaty.

In the course of analysing many archival documents, researcher S. Gromenko determined that an important course of foreign policy for P. Skoropadskyi was south-eastern, namely, the territory of the Crimea and Kuban. Despite the fact that at that time there were fewer representatives of Ukrainian nationality in Crimea than others, this territory was very important for the Ukrainian State. The Hetman planned to create a combat-ready fleet that would strengthen Ukraine's position in the foreign political arena, and due to which it would be possible to conduct trade with other states. Thus, P. Skoropadskyi pursued a policy aimed at annexing Crimea to the Ukrainian State [7].

Hetman's quote about this territory is important: “Ukraine cannot exist without owning Crimea, it would resemble torso without legs. Crimea should belong to Ukraine, under any conditions, it does not matter whether it will be a complete merger or broad autonomy, the latter should depend on the desire of the Crimeans themselves. But we need to be completely protected from hostile actions on the part of Crimea. In the economic sense, Crimea, in fact, cannot exist without us” [1].

Thus, P. Skoropadskyi had many views on this issue, so he considered the possibility of full annexation or autonomy. In addition, Hetman draws attention to the will of the Crimeans themselves, which shows a certain level of democracy in relation to this territory.

Regarding the Kuban, the Hetman said the following: “We have established completely friendly relations with the Kuban and the Black Sea region. There were proposals to conclude an alliance, or even more, that the Kuban should become part of Ukraine on autonomous rights. I really wanted it, but I thought I should not rush it” [1].

British historian I. Armour claims that P. Skoropadskyi tried to establish friendly relations with the newly formed Kuban State, since it was in a similar situation with Ukraine. It is also worth noting that a large number of the Ukrainian population lived on this territory and institutions of the Cossacks were established, so it can be assumed that the Hetman of Ukraine was a certain collector of land, the purpose of which was to restore a strong and great state [14].

At that time, the territory of Bessarabia was included in the Black Sea region, so based on the Hetman's memoirs, it can be stated that friendly relations were also established with this region. In addition, a large number of ethnic Ukrainians lived in this territory, who supported joining the great Ukrainian State [1].

On the other hand, Romania was also interested in the territory of Bessarabia. Thus, this region became a problem that caused hostility between the newly emerged Ukrainian and Romanian states, which needed mutual assistance. At that time, Romania pursued its policy, relying on the help of the Entente, just as the Ukrainians relied on the help of the Germans. Thus, it can be seen that there was a certain confrontation between the Hetmanate and the Entente [12; 13].

In November 1918, the Hetman's reign was coming to an end. At this time, P. Skoropadskyi acknowledged the defeat of the Germans and considered the possibility of cooperation with representatives of the Entente, if appropriate proposals were made from this side, but there were no such proposals and, accordingly, cooperation was not implemented [1].

Thus, the Ukrainian State has managed to establish diplomatic relations with many countries in a fairly short period of its existence. Regarding P. Skoropadskyi and his foreign policy imperatives, it cannot be said that he was a supporter of a certain country and imitated it in everything, because analysing his memoirs, the Hetman was a sincere patriot of Ukraine and his main goal was to defend the actual Ukrainian interests.

Discussion

The period of P. Skoropadskyi's rule is important not only for the history of Ukraine, but also for the history of many other countries. At this time, the Ukrainian State gained significant influence and developed diplomatic relations with its neighbours. Given this, this period became the object of inquiry by many historians from different countries, who often put forward different opinions regarding the foreign policy of the Ukrainian State in 1918.

First of all, the study considered the topic of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, signed on February 9, 1918, as the basis of Pavlo Skoropadskyi's foreign policy, which will come to power in a few months. The significance of this treaty is high, since its signing caused strong changes in the territory of Eastern Europe, so many historians were engaged in its research. One of such historians was V. Mejersky. The researcher claims that the signing of this agreement provided for the occupation of the territory of Ukraine by German troops. This opinion is erroneous, since, as discussed in the paper, the text of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk clearly states that the UPR should be recognised as an independent state [16].

As mentioned above, the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the recognition of Ukraine's independence by the Central Powers provided for the conclusion of certain agreements with these states. First of all, these agreements provided an opportunity for Germans and Austrians to collect Ukrainian grain for their own needs. The same opinion is shared by V. Dornik, who claims that the goal of the Germans was not the occupation, but to collect Ukrainian resources for their own needs, and also in his study, the researcher proves that this operation was a failure. The same opinion was stated in the paper, however, for comparison, it should be noted that V. Dornik makes a very small number of references to the memoirs and diaries of Ukrainian politicians, which indicates an insufficient level of objectivity of his study [17].

The topic of the presence of German troops on the territory of the Ukrainian State was considered by a large number of researchers who presented many opinions and evidence that it was an occupation. Thus, for example, this was the leading idea of the study by L. Lannik. This researcher claims that the period of stay of the Germans on the territory of Ukraine in 1918 was the first occupation

of Ukraine. Thus, the researcher hints that the second occupation was the period of 1941-1944 during the Second World War, and it is identical to 1918. However, it is worth noting that these two periods are completely different both in view of the external political situation and in view of the internal political situation on the territory of Ukraine. In addition, as already noted in the paper, the period of stay of Germans in the Ukrainian State during the rule of P. Skoropadskyi, because, firstly, they recognised the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and, secondly, the Germans did not interfere in internal political affairs, except for issues of Agriculture and the army [8].

The opposite of the opinion that the presence of German troops on the territory of the Ukrainian State was an occupation is the opinion about the Germanophilism of the government of the then country and P. Skoropadskyi in particular. One of the authors who holds this opinion is D. Hamlin [9]. The opinions of this researcher are based on the fact that the future Hetman lived in Germany all his childhood. In addition, the cooperation during 1918 and the meeting with Kaiser Wilhelm are proof that P. Skoro- padskyi was impressed by the German ideals and means of conducting political governance of the state. However, as it was noted in the study, Hetman's policy plans often contradicted German intentions, in particular, in the context of creating his own Ukrainian army, as well as P. Skoropadskyi spoke negatively about the actions of the Germans in the context of grain policy. A very important point is that the Germans obtained the right to influence Ukraine even before the approval of the Hetmanate. In addition, P. Skoropadskyi in his memoirs directly states that he is not a Germanophile and his main goal is the development of a strong Ukrainian State [1].

The topic of German influence on the creation and development of the Ukrainian army is also very popular among many researchers. However, this topic was most fully revealed by N. Baranovska. The author examines the history of the creation of the armed forces during the rule of P. Skoropadskyi using a large number of sources, which indicates a high level of objectivity of the mentioned study. Thus, it was considered how the Germans initially denied plans to create a large army by the Hetman, but later gave permission for this. It is also considered that the Ukrainian government, together with the German one, feared the attack of the Bolsheviks and considered them the greatest enemy. The same opinions were expressed in this study, however, the above-mentioned researcher does not refer much to the memoirs of P. Skoropadskyi, as a result of which, his future plans were not considered [18].

Many opinions were expressed by Romanian historians on the issue of Bessarabia. As noted in this paper, the Bessarabian region was the cause of the confrontation between Ukraine and Romania. Thus, until now, historians of these countries hold opposite views. One of such historians is M. Barbulescu [6]. The researcher claims that the actions of the Ukrainian authorities in relation to Bessarabia were aggressive. The historian also claims that the majority of residents of this region were against joining the Ukrainian State. However, as already noted in this paper, based on the nemoirs of P. Skoropadskyi, at that time,

Ukraine and the Black Sea region, including Bessarabia, developed friendly relations. In addition, the majority of the population of this region at that time were Ukrainians by ethnic composition [5].

Other regions that were promising subjects of international relations with the Ukrainian State were Crimea and Kuban. Direct relations between Ukraine and these regions did not have time to develop, but their perspective became the basis for creating many studies with different positions. In particular, the view of E. Maudsley, who in his global study on the “civil war” in Russia mentions the territories of the Kuban and Crimea, is of interest. Thus, the researcher claims that the inhabitants of these regions were against joining the Ukrainian State [19]. Considering the Crimea, this is partly true, since the Ukrainian ethnic group was the minority, and P. Skoropadskyi considered the annexation of Crimea more for economic and military-political reasons. Although the study expressed opinions that the Tatars, who made up the majority of the population of Crimea, supported the idea of joining Ukraine, this still remains at the level of assumptions. As for the Kuban, in this case, the situation was completely different. Firstly, the majority of the ethnic composition of this territory, at that time, was made up of Ukrainians, secondly, in this region, there was a system of Cossacks that was favourable to the Hetman's state, and thirdly, P. Skoropadskyi in his memoirs recalled that very friendly relations have developed with this region and there have already been conversations about joining the Ukrainian State. All this was said in the study, but it is also worth adding that P. Skoropadskyi, as an officer of the Russian army, collaborated with the Kuban people for quite a long time, and his style of clothing was characteristic of this region, which also indicates the proximity of the Kuban people to the Ukrainian government [20].

Thus, it can be argued that the Ukrainian State for a short period of its existence was able to conduct a fairly active foreign policy. Most of all, cooperation was shown in relations with Germany, but contacts were established with many other countries and regions.

Conclusions

The Ukrainian State during its existence in 1918 pursued an active foreign policy with neighbouring states, as P. Skoropadskyi recalled in his memoirs. Skoropadskyi gave it a lot of thought. A thorough analysis of these memories allowed the study to achieve its purpose, that is, to determine the course of the foreign policy of the Ukrainian State.

During the study, a number of the following conclusions were made:

- The foreign policy of the Ukrainian State was focused on Germany, since the latter had a significant influence under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Thus, this factor was significant in the policy of Ukraine.

- Despite the intense activity of Germany on the territory of Ukraine, P. Skoropadskyi was not a supporter of it.

- In his memoirs, the Hetman left many of his views on the future foreign policy activities of the Ukrainian State.

P. Skoropadskyi had significant geopolitical ambitions, which consisted in the reunification of all Ukrainian territories. This aspect is quite interesting, as it shows Hetman's patriotism and the seriousness of his intentions. In particular, his plans included:

- Annexation of Bessarabia as an important part with a large group of ethnic Ukrainians.

- Annexation of Crimea, considering economic and military interests, and based on a democratic approach to the indigenous population, that is, the Tatars.

- The annexation of Kuban, considering the cultural proximity of this territory to the Ukrainian State, and the views of the Hetman in particular.

In addition, during the period of its existence, the Ukrainian State has made enemies. In particular, it was Romania, the conflict with which arise on the basis of the Bessarabian issue, and Bolshevik Russia, which posed a

threat to Ukraine's independence. Moreover, at that time, Romania was under the patronage of the Entente, so on the one hand, there was a hidden hostility between the Hetmanate and the specified geopolitical alliance, and on the other hand, P. Skoropadskyi in his memoirs noted that he was ready to cooperate with the Entente.

Thus the following topics require more in depth consideration:

- Conflict between the Ukrainian State and Romania on theissueofBessarabia,inordertoimprovemodernrelations.

- Relations between the Hetmanate and the Entente, since there were different arguments on this issue.

- Annexation of Crimea and Kuban to what was then Ukraine. This issue has been rather neglected from the Ukrainian standpoint, so it requires further investigation.

References

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