Captain jacques margeret: a remarkable huguenot soldier in Russia’s time of troubles

When the second pretender Dmitrii's camp broke up at the end of 1609, Margeret and other Tushinite dignitaries were faced with the unenviable choice of either submitting to the hated Tsar Vasilii or entering into negotiations with King Sigismund III of Poland-Lithuania, whose forces were then invading Russia. Not surprisingly, the Tushinites chose to negotiate with the Poles and offered to support King Sigismund's son Wladyslaw as tsar once Shuiskii was overthrown. Sigismund treated the Tushinite dignitaries as honored allies and promised that, as tsar, his son would protect the Russian Orthodox Church and use the Tushinite lords as a directing staff for Russian affairs. Sigismund also promised them vast estates. In negotiations with the Poles, the Tushinite lords insisted on retaining serfdom (no right of peasant departure) and enforceable measures to prevent greedy favorites of Tsar Wladyslaw from poaching their peasants. All those demands were met by King Sigismund and are clearly reflected in the grants given to Captain Margeret [36, p. 406; 114, p. 83]. It is almost certain, therefore, that Margeret joined Polish service in February 1610 along with dignitaries such as Mikhail Saltykov ²⁰. When the Polish government finally issued land grants to the former Tushinite lords, Captain Margeret received two votchina estates and one pomest 'e estate at about the same time Mikhail Saltykov and his son Ivan M. Saltykov received theirs ²¹ [3, p. 408-409]. Margeret's votchina grants unambiguously outlawed vykhod and vyvoz. The status Captain Margeret enjoyed at this time was higher than that of most other military officers. The larger votchina estate assigned to him by Sigismund III was over 1000 square kilometers in size, larger than most Russian nobles ever dreamed of possessing. The powers granted to Margeret to retain his peasants were unprecedented, and they have drawn comments from scholars. No one, not even the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church (let alone a mere boyar) was permitted to poach Captain Margeret's peasants ²² [3, p. 409-410].

Jacques Margeret entered Polish service in 1610 with the consistent goal of ousting the usurper Shuiskii [73, p. xix-xx; 99, p. 61]. If he is criticized for choosing to support Prince Wladyslaw, that same criticism should apply to Filaret Romanov. Sometime after the Tushinite lords declared their support for King Sigismund's son as tsar, Margeret joined the Polish army that invaded Russia to topple Tsar Vasilii and put Prince Wladyslaw on the tsarist throne. It is likely that Captain Margeret accompanied Ivan Saltykov's forces that joined up with the Polish army not long before the battle of Klushino in June 1610. The commander of the Polish army, Hetman Stanislaw Zolkiewski, immediately put Margeret to work as a lieutenant of another former Tushinite officer, Pan Piotr Borkowski, who commanded the foreign mercenaries in the Polish army [78, p. xiv; 114, p. 86; 130, p. 263-265]. Margeret soon distinguished himself in Polish service.

Hetman Zolkiewski's army of 7,000 men was on a collision course with a Russian-Swedish army of 30,000 men commanded by the Swedish general Jacob De la Gardie. Zolkiewski tried to even the odds by prying loose disgruntled mercenaries in Tsar Vasilii's army. French deserters told the Polish general about the low morale of the tsar's foreign troops (who had not been paid in six months) and about the possibility of additional defections by their comrades. Zolkiewski sent Pan Borkowski and Captain Margeret to negotiate quietly with middle-ranking commanders of foreign troops in the tsar's army. Those officers were offered generous terms of surrender, including safe passage to leave the country or employment in the Polish army. Borkowski and Margeret were spectacularly successful, contributing directly to the defection of nearly 3,000 French, English, Scottish, and German mercenaries during the battle of Klushino, leading to a decisive Polish victory [43, p. 68-69; 47, p. 143-144; 71, p. viii-ix; 85, p. 493; 114, p. 8788; 116, p. 605; 119, p. 117-118; 123, vol. 2, p. 4647; 125, p. 127-128; 130, p. 264, 266-267; 131, p. 75-81]. Possibly due to Margeret's skilful diplomacy, the first to defect were 600 French cavalrymen [19, p. 134-135, 201, note 98; 104, vol. 14, p. 220-222]. The battle of Klushino opened the path to Moscow for Zolkiewski's army and doomed Tsar Vasilii. For the final assault on Moscow, Mikhail Saltykov was given command of 2,000 mercenaries who had surrendered at Klushino and chose to enter Polish service. It is likely that Saltykov asked Margeret to command a cohort ofthose foreign troops [116, p. 606; 123, vol. 2, p. 46-47; 130, p. 267].

By the time Zolkiewski's army reached Moscow, the boyars had already deposed the unpopular Tsar Vasilii. No doubt influenced by the presence of the Polish army, the boyars pledged support for Prince Wladyslaw on the condition that he convert to Russian Orthodox Christianity. That decision was unpopular throughout Russia and led to unrest in Moscow. Many ordinary Russians considered the boyars in the governing “council of seven” (including Mikhail Saltykov) to be traitors. As unrest grew, the “council of seven” became so fearful of their own people that they took the drastic step of inviting Zolkiewski's army into Moscow to help restore order. At that point Zolkiewski thinned out his forces by dismissing most of the mercenaries who had joined his army after the battle of Klushino, paying them off with money withdrawn from the tsar's dwindling treasury [36, p. 409-413; 88, p. 103; 130, p. 268-269]. That left approximately 7,000 soldiers to garrison Moscow and protect the pro-Wladyslaw “council of seven” and its supporters. To strengthen the garrison, Zolkiewski created an elite brigade of 950 of his best foreign troops under the command of Piotr Borkowski and his lieutenant, Jacques Margeret. Pan Borkowski led the 150-man cavalry company, and Captain Margeret led the 800-man infantry regiment [123, vol. 2, p. 46-47; 130, p. 269, 271]. Before Zolkiewski returned to Poland, he installed Aleksander Gosiewski as the military governor of Moscow. Gosiewski worked closely with the “council of seven,” especially Mikhail Saltykov. To maintain order in Moscow, Captain Margeret also worked closely with Saltykov. As unrest grew, Gosieski imposed a harsh “military dictatorship” on the capital. Saltykov, the most visible boyar and Gosiewski's chief collaborator, soon became a more hated figure than the Polish general [36, p. 413, 417-420; 114, p. 106; 130, p. 268-270, 283-289].

The Moscow garrison was unpopular and suffered from low morale. The soldiers were not paid for many months, received inadequate provisions, and grew increasingly hungry [19, p. 166-167; 119, p. 122, 125]. As their frustration and anger grew, soldiers in the Moscow garrison contacted soldiers in Polish occupation forces elsewhere in Russia. Many of them were also suffering and on the verge of quitting. In early 1611, a delegation of soldiers traveled from Moscow and elsewhere to Sigismund Ill's siege camp near Smolensk to demand back pay from the king. Fed up with delays and excuses, soldiers of the Moscow garrison warned Sigismund's advisors that if they did not receive the money they were owed by April 1611, they would abandon Moscow or elevate to the tsar's throne whichever boyar was willing to pay them [68, s. 84-85]. King Sigismund was financially embarrassed at that time and unable to pay his soldiers. He solved his problem by authorizing the withdrawal from the tsar's treasury of funds and precious objects to be given as salary to his unpaid soldiers. Sigismund's instructions specified the sums to be paid, and the king insisted on strict accounting and proper paperwork [16, p. 459]. The shock of being confronted by disgruntled soldiers may have convinced King Sigismund's staff to speed up delivery of the generous land grants promised to members of the “council of seven” and Captain Margeret. Those long-awaited grants were awarded in April and May 1611 [3, p. 403-411].

Prince Pozharskii claimed that Captain Margeret “shed Christian [i.e., Russian] blood” while in Polish service [116, p. 605-606]. There is no denying it. In fact, Margeret's bravery, cunning, and relentless assaults on insurgent positions were largely responsible for suppressing the March 1611 Moscow uprising. In the months leading up to that insurrection, several disparate groups gathered together to oppose the pro-Wladyslaw government in Moscow. News of the approach of those patriot forces stirred the capital's population into action. By February 1611 Mikhail Saltykov and the “council of seven” were denounced almost daily by large crowds who barricaded the streets and occasionally rioted. Gosiewski ordered strel 'tsy units to disperse the crowds, and he concentrated his troops and ordnance in the inner city and Kremlin. Uncoordinated assaults on the Kremlin were easily driven off by elite harquebusiers under the command of Captain Margeret [5, s. 408; 36, p. 414-418; 114, p. 121-126; 130, p. 270-272].

In early March 1611 Pozharskii's insurgent forces approached Moscow and began to infiltrate the city. On March 19, a major effort was made to liberate the capital from the hated Poles. An initial encounter between cavalry from the Moscow garrison and insurgents in Kitaigorod led to severe Russian losses followed by an impetuous Polish advance into Belyi Gorod. There the Poles encountered stiff resistance from barricaded Muscovites reinforced by Pozharskii's soldiers with harquebuses. The insurgents drove the Polish cavalry back into Kitaigorod, pressing them so hard they were forced to retreat all the way to the Kremlin wall.

Conrad Bussow, an eyewitness, described the scene [19, p. 161-162]:

“If there had not been in the fortress a regiment of musketeers hired from among the Germans and other nationalities, and also the Poles, not one of the five thousand lancers would have been left alive on that day...When the Poles had been so ingloriously repulsed by bullets and arrows back to the gates of the fortress, and had been seized by great fear, the captain of the foreign troops, Jacques Margeret, at the eighth hour, according to our reckoning, sent out into Nikitsk street three companies of musketeers, altogether numbering about four hundred men. This street, which is about a quarter mile long, had many intersections, where about seven thousand Muscovites were crouching behind the barricades or in the trenches and inflicting heavy losses on the Poles. The four hundred musketeers, in the name of the Lord, attacked the [Russians] behind the first barricade, and their volley was so effective that the Muscovites fell like sparrows before buckshot. ... The soldiers set about them with their rapiers as fiercely as dogs, ... [and] returned looking like butcher's apprentices. Their rapiers, hands, and clothes were covered in blood, and they were a gruesome sight. They had destroyed many Muscovites but had lost only eight of their own soldiers.”

The martial skill and bold tactics of Margeret's harquebusiers inflicted thousands of casualties and inspired the Poles to launch a counterattack that drove the insurgents almost completely out of Kitaigorod [89, p. 507; 123, vol. 1, p. 238240; 130, p. 275-276; 131, p. 123-124].

During the early morning hours of March 20, Pozharskii's forces again approached the Kremlin and began to fortify their advanced positions in preparation for a frontal attack. Significant forces were also stationed along the wall between Kitaigord and Belyi-gorod to shoot at the Poles and support the planned assault.

Once again, Conrad Bussow described the scene [19, p. 162-164]:

“But Captain Jacques Margeret employed a fine stratagem. He let them complete their redoubt and guard it. Since the ice on the Moskva was still firm enough, he led his men out through the water-gates of the fortress onto the river and so, could attack to left and right at will. ... Captain Jacques Margeret proceeded along the ice with his soldiers, along the White Wall as far as the fifth tower, and then skirted the city and re-entered the city gates, being at the rear of the enemy, who had not expected any danger from that quarter and had kept the gates open for their friends who were behind other barricades or in the redoubts. Thanks to this the Russians lost, since they were defending the forward redoubts more strongly than the gates in their rear. Unexpectedly for them, in an instant our men attacked the redoubts and quickly came upon them, slaughtering all who were in them, setting fire to the redoubts ... our soldiers also went over to the other bank of the Moskva and there set fire to the redoubts and all the houses they could reach. No war cries or bells could help the Muscovites. Our soldiers were aided by wind and fire, for wherever the Muscovites fled they were followed by wind and the flames ... Towards midday there was not the slightest resistance; neither were any Muscovite soldiers anywhere to be seen. So, in the course of two days the great metropolis of Moscow, having a circumference of more than four German miles, was reduced to dung and ashes, and nothing remained except the imperial fortress and its suburb, which were occupied by the king's men, and some stone churches.”

Between 7,000 and 10,000 insurgents were killed during the uprising. Prince Pozharskii was seriously wounded and forced to retreat, delaying the liberation of Moscow for another year and a half. That undoubtedly influenced the extremely negative views of Captain Margeret found in Pozharskii's correspondence during 1612-1613 [68, s. 87; 116, p. 605-606; 130, p. 276-280]. Not surprisingly, some Russian and Soviet historians blamed Margeret for the fire that destroyed much of Moscow [123, vol. 1, p. 238; 130, p. 280]. Although he played a decisive role in the battle, there is no evidence that Margeret made the decision to burn the outer city. Sources on the subject are contradictory. Some place responsibility for the conflagration on ordinary soldiers setting fire to enemy positions during the battle. Other sources claim that Gosiewski made the decision to burn the city or that Mikhail

Saltykov and the “council of seven” instigated it at the request of rich merchants who feared the consequences of an insurgent victory [19, p. 164; 36, p. 418-420; 130, p. 276-280; 131, p. 123-124].

Captain Margeret remained in smoldering Moscow with the beleaguered Polish garrison for another six months. He and Borkowski made occasional forays to keep roads in the area open, and in August they linked up with and escorted Polish troops bringing much-needed food supplies to Moscow [130, p. 282]. By then, Margeret had concluded that the fiction of “Tsar Wiadysiaw” was just a cover for the brutal conquest of Russia by Sigismund III. Margeret was well aware that Patriarch Germogen had urged all Russian Orthodox Christians to resist the Polish conquest of their country or face the prospect of being forced to convert to Roman Catholicism. At some point, Huguenot Margeret decided to oppose the conquest of Russia by Catholic Poland's “Jesuitking.” In late 1611 some Protestant soldiers deserted the Moscow garrison and offered their services to the Russians [80, p. 292; 130, p. 291292]. Margeret chose a different path but with a similar goal in mind.

Prince Pozharskii accused Captain Margeret of robbing the tsar's treasury while he was in Polish service [80, p. 283; 111, col. 326; 114, p. 155-156, 170; 116, p. 605-606; 130, p. 282290]. The accusation is unfair, but it is understandable. Kremlin records include documents showing that Margeret frequently withdrew precious objects from the tsar's treasury from September 1610 to August 1611 [80, p. 265273; 111, col. 232-236, 241-245, 251-253]. Contrary to the conclusions of some historians, however, those documents were not composed by angry Russians tabulating the theft of the tsar's treasure. Instead, they were written during the period of Polish occupation by scribes following King Sigismund's orders to keep detailed and accurate records of all payments made to soldiers in the Moscow garrison. Because Margeret served as paymaster for his elite infantry regiment, he made periodic withdrawals from the tsar's treasury to pay the salaries of 800 elite harquebusiers as well as his own salary [9, p. 319; 16, p. 459; 80, p. 265-270, 273, 340, note 2; 130, p. 268-269, 283-289; 131, p. 102]. As instructed, Margeret carefully recorded all his withdrawals and signed for them. Margeret's elite harquebusiers received high salaries (approximately 40 rubles), but they were not paid in cash. Instead, they were paid in valuables and precious objects taken from the Kremlin treasury and Tsar Vasilii's properties [36, p. 413; 80, p. 265-269, 285, 289290; 111, col. 222-248; 130, p. 285]. The sight of hundreds of foreign mercenaries carrying off the tsar's treasure must have infuriated Russian patriots, but it was not robbery. Margeret's men were paid in precious objects simply because there was no ready money left in the tsar's coffers by the time Shuiskii was deposed, and Zoikiewski took much of the remaining gold with him when he returned to Poland-Lithuania [80, p. 265-266; 81, p. 168;88,p.103;119,p.95-96; 130, p. 268269, 283-284]. The Kremlin treasury still contained many precious objects such as gold cups and a great many pearls [68, s. 85]. Soldiers in the Moscow garrison were not pleased to be paid with precious objects instead of money. Frustrated and bored foreign troops not infrequently used pearls as ammunition and fired them randomly at ordinary Muscovites going about their business [19, p. 166]. In a real insult to the Russians, someone cut Ivan the Terrible's “unicorn-horn” imperial staff into small pieces and gave them to the mercenaries as part of their salary. Decades later, the Russians were still complaining about the loss of the tsar's precious unicorn-horn staff ²³ [73, p. 37, 133, note 115; 80, p. 290; 91, p. 190; 104, vol. 14, p. 117; 111, col. 235-236, 243].

Captain Margeret's annual salary (September 1610-August 1611) was 300 rubles, about half that of Pan Borkowski and about three times that of a Kremlin bureaucrat (d'iak). Margeret's Soviet biographer, Givi Zhordaniia, mistakenly claimed that he took precious objects from the Kremlin treasury worth 1800 rubles as his salary. Zhordaniia failed to notice that the figure 1800 rubles included expensive gold objects taken not by Margeret but by boyar Fedor Sheremetev [80, p. 265-273, 289-290; 111, col. 232-236, 243; 130, p. 283-284, 289-290]. As a member of the “council of seven,” Sheremetev was responsible for sending precious objects and expensive furs to King Sigismund. Most of what he withdrew from the treasury was destined for the king of Poland, not Captain Margeret. Nevertheless, the “council of seven” had been charged by Sigismund to distribute rewards to the heroic defenders of Moscow, and some of what Sheremetev withdrew may have been intended as a reward for his “to- Bapbi^” Margeret. Kremlin treasury records clearly indicate that Margeret's salary of 300 rubles was paid with small gold crosses encrusted with precious stones. That was a practical choice; small crosses were easy to transport and sell. It is possible that Sheremetev also gave Margeret his reward for heroic service at this time. If so, that reward almost certainly consisted of loose pearls. Kremlin records show that Sheremetev and his “TOBapbi^” withdrew pearls valued at 986 rubles [80, p. 267-268; 111, col. 234-235; 114, p. 155156, 170]. Why would Captain Margeret choose pearls as his reward? His father probably taught him that they were a sound investment. Pearls were easy to carry and easy to sell, especially to Russians. Russian lords and ladies wore lots of pearls [73, p. 31, 37].

In October 1611 Captain Margeret and four hundred of his elite harquebusiers escorted Mikhail Saltykov and other boyars to Poland-Lithuania for a meeting with King Sigismund. Charges that Margeret once again “abandoned” Moscow, perceiving the hopelessness of the Polish position, are completely false. Margeret's correspondence in this period makes it clear that he actually feared Sigismund III would prevail in Russia [104, vol. 14, p. 225-226; 130, p. 283284, 293]. The charge that Margeret robbed the Kremlin treasury (again) on his way out of Moscow is also false. Saltykov ordered Margeret's harquebusiers to load a wagon with precious objects from the tsar's treasury to be delivered to King Sigismund as a gift [111, col. 326; 114, p. 170-171]. When the embassy arrived in Warsaw, Captain Margeret was warmly received by King Sigismund, who commended him for his heroic defense of the Moscow garrison. It is quite possible that Sigismund summoned Margeret from Moscow to seek his expert advice. The king appointed Captain Margeret to his royal council where plans for the conquest of Russia were being developed. Margeret learned that serious efforts to maintain the Moscow garrison were to be followed in 1612 by a major campaign to subdue Russia led by King Sigismund himself. Margeret had very different plans, however, and he soon found an excuse to resign from Sigismund's council ²⁴ [116, p. 606].

Margeret departed from Warsaw in late 1611 determined to do all he could to frustrate Sigismund III's plan to conquer Russia in 1612. Knowing that quick action was necessary, Margeret looked around for the best available opportunity open to him. His attention was immediately drawn to the court of the Elector of Brandenburg, Johann Sigismund (r. 1608-1619). There a former regimental commander in the elector's army, Baron Adrian Flodorf, was permitted to quietly launch a private venture to provide mercenary soldiers to Russian forces resisting Polish aggression. To avoid embarrassing the elector, Flodorf moved his base of operations out of Hohenzollern territory to the free imperial city of Hamburg [90, p. 110-113; 130, p. 291-292, 303-304, 309, 319-320]. In January 1612 Margeret joined Flodorf in Hamburg ²⁵, and they began recruiting soldiers for Russian service [130, p. 322]. Margeret wrote to the insurgent Russian government expressing his sincere desire to help them fight against Sigismund's planned invasion. He promised to provide them with soldiers by early Spring 1612 [49, p. 125-126; 80, p. 301]. Not surprisingly, Margeret did not receive an answer. Flodorf's efforts to raise troops for Russian service also ran into difficulties, including competition from Swedish recruiters and the hostility of the Dutch government [119, p. 125126; 130, p. 319, 322]. In late January 1612 Margeret wrote to John Merrick, chief agent of the Muscovy Company, expressing great concern about King Sigismund's planned invasion of Russia. He told Merrick that without foreign troops to help them, the Russians would almost certainly lose [104, vol. 14, p. 226].

In June 1612 Baron Flodorf and a company of ninety soldiers of various nationalities appeared in north Russia. They were received with honor and puzzlement by Arkhangelsk authorities. When they approached the provisional government of Prince Dmitrii Pozharskii with an offer to help expel the Polish army from Russian soil, they were flatly turned down. Pozharskii feared that Flodorf and his men were scouts for some foreign power intent on seizing Arkhangelsk just as the Russians were at last successfully reorganizing themselves and making plans to liberate Moscow. A major reason for rejecting Flodorf's offer was that, before the mercenaries arrived, Pozharskii had received a warning from the Swedish general

Jacob De la Gardie that Flodorf's goal was to seize Arkhangelsk. At about the same time Flodorf showed up, Pozharskii received another warning about a foreign threat to Arkhangel'sk, this time from a mysterious Frenchman named François Lesquaire who was linked to Dutch opponents ofFlodorf's mission²⁶ [116, p. 604-607; 130, p. 329-330, 338-339, 345-350, 358-359]. Those two warnings might have been sufficient to cause Pozharskii to reject Flodorf's offer of assistance, but seeing Margeret's name listed as a colonel in Flodorf's letter to the Russians was simply too much for Pozharskii. Although his wounds from the failed attempt to liberate Moscow had healed, Pozharskii definitely continued to fear Margeret as an opponent. He was especially concerned about possible cooperation between Margeret and cossack commander Ivan Zarutskii that might disrupt Pozharskii's renewed effort to liberate Moscow. Pozharskii was utterly convinced that Margeret was an “evil” Catholic mercenary soldier determined to seize Arkhangelsk for Sigismund III and the pope. Fearing the worst, Pozharskii ordered the reinforcement of Arkhangelsk to stop Margeret from re-entering Russia and seizing that vital port. He also ordered the honorable detention of Flodorf and his men and an immediate investigation into their relationship to Captain Margeret [34, p. 208-210; 73, p. xxi- xxii; 99, p. 47-48; 116, p. 606; 123, vol. 1, p. 239240; 124,p.253-254, 282-284; 130, p.302-307, 310, 316-317]. Some Russians criticized Pozharskii's denunciation of Margeret and regarded the Frenchman as an honorable soldier whose reputation had been unfairly ruined by Swedish propaganda [38, p. 364, note 29, 375; 66, p. 141].

Denied an opportunity to help the Russians liberate Moscow, Margeret looked for another way to frustrate King Sigismund's ambition to conquer Russia. In his January 1612 letter to John Merrick, Margeret expressed his intention to travel to England to consult with Merrick. Iurii Limonov has suggested that Margeret became an agent of Merrick and the Muscovy Company at this time [77, p. 14-16; 104, vol. 14, p. 226]. That is possible. Margeret had known John Merrick for over a decade, and his correspondence shows genuine concern for the fate of the Muscovy Company. In any case, Margeret knew that Merrick and his associates greatly feared the consequences of a Polish-dominated Russia, and he knew their concerns were shared by King James I (r. 16031625). James had provided Baron Flodorf with a passport to show the Russians, and Merrick actively helped Flodorf interact with officials in north Russia [34, p. 210-212]. James began seriously contemplating direct English intervention in Russia in 1612. During that summer Merrick held conversations with “principal and eminent” Russians concerning the possibility of James establishing a protectorate over north Russia [65, p. 249]. Merrick returned to England in late fall 1612 filled with enthusiasm for the project. Muscovy Company merchants seized the opportunity and became strong supporters of intervention in north Russia. During the winter of 1612-1613, James also received proposals from former military officers who emphasized the fabulous riches that would flow to the king if he established a protectorate over north Russia. Intervention also received strong endorsement from ardent Protestants such as the Archbishop of Canterbury who adamantly opposed Poland's attempt to capture Russia for the CounterReformation. Royal Navy officials expressed support for intervention in order to secure strategically important hemp cordage. In spite of some grumbling by members of his Privy Council, James made up his mind to pursue the project by late April 1613 [31, p. 291-294, 297-299; 34, p. 222].

At about the same time King James made up his mind to proceed with the protectorate scheme, he received a letter from Captain Margeret that strongly encouraged him to intervene in Russia and outlined “how to undo the intrigues and plots that the popes have always supported in order to set foot in Russia by means of the King of Poland”. Margeret described the desirable traits a general should have to succeed in establishing an English protectorate over north Russia [32, p. 104-107; 80, p. 496]:

“Therefore, Sire, Your Majesty according to my judgment could begin the enterprise in this way: make a levy of some three thousand men and have them embark under the leadership of a general fit for such an enterprise - one who is wise, of good judgment, and who would have in mind the honour and the service of Your Majesty and not his own gain. Above all, he should not be obstinate but rather one who is prompt to seek advice and who can easily and quickly accommodate himself somewhat to the ways of the country. ... Also, Your Majesty, your army having entered the country will in case of necessity always be able to get help from His Lordship Prince Radziwill by land, and this at any hour needed without great expense.”

Margeret's list of the desirable traits needed in a successful general sounds like a good selfdescription, and his letter has the feel of a job application. Depending on when James received Margeret's letter, the king of England may have been for a brief time a conscious rival of newly- elected Tsar Mikhail Romanov. In his letter Margeret mentioned Mikhail's election but urged James to proceed with intervention in part because many Russians resented the domination of the Zemskii Sobor by Cossack supporters of Mikhail Romanov. It is possible, therefore, that James and Merrick learned of Mikhail's election from Margeret's letter but wished to determine just how secure the new tsar was on his throne before abandoning the project altogether²⁷ [31, p. 297300; 32, p. 99-102, 105].

In spite of efforts to keep James's protectorate scheme a secret, by the time John Merrick arrived in north Russia in June 1613, the English project had been detected by the French, the Dutch, the Poles, the Swedes, and the Venetians. Russian authorities received several warnings about pending attacks on Arkhangelsk by the English or other nations [31, p. 301-302; 34, p. 225-226; 130, p. 299, 329-331, 353-355, 358367]. During the summer of 1613 Framois Lesquaire reappeared in Russia and once again denounced Flodorf and his mercenaries for having designs on Arkhangelsk. This time Lesquaire also claimed that the English intended to seize the rich Solovetskii monastery and were receiving aid from Sweden. Flodorf and the English merchants responded to those accusations by loudly denouncing Lesquaire as a liar and a Polish spy [2, p. 4-5; 37; 80, p. 10-11, 306-313, 316-319, 323, 325-326; 130, p. 332, 352-357]. During summer 1613 General De la Gardie also wrote again to the Russians accusing Flodorf of secretly planning to seize Arkhangel'sk. De la Gardie emphasized Flodorf's friendship with the “evil” Polish agent, Jacques Margeret [49, p. 127-128]. Nervous Russian authorities secretly interviewed the Dutch merchant Isaac Massa who warned them that the English were indeed planning to seize

Arkhangel'sk. Prince Pozharskii and newly- elected Tsar Mikhail reacted swiftly to these Swedish and Dutch provocations. Arkhangel'sk authorities were instructed to prepare for a naval assault with siege equipment directed by Captain Margeret [73, p. xxii, 98, note 34; 130, p. 359-367].

Russian authorities interrogated the English merchants about the Muscovy Company's connection to the evil Polish henchman Margeret. As a result, Merrick and his associates felt an urgent need to distance themselves from Margeret. In a diabolically clever move, they reworked information from various sources, including Pozharskii's 1612 decree denouncing Margeret, to fabricate a secret report to the Russian government about the arrival in Arkhangel'sk of Margeret's spies. According to the secret report, three Germans disguised as merchants brazenly displayed and tried to sell to the Russians precious objects that Margeret had stolen from the Kremlin treasury. The secret report urged Russian authorities to search for Margeret's (phantom) spies and to prepare for a siege by Russia's enemies. When asked to comment on the threat, John Merrick urged the Russians to fortify Arkhangel'sk before it was too late [80, p. 306-308, 316-319, 323, 325-326, 334336; 130, p. 330-331, 362-367]. The Russians did fortify the port, but they suspected Merrick was not being honest with them. They also suspected that Captain Margeret was somehow involved in the English plot even though they still believed him to be a bloodthirsty Catholic henchman of Sigismund III.

In one of his first acts of diplomacy, Tsar Mikhail (r. 1613-1645) sent ambassadors to England to announce his accession and to make discreet inquiries about possible ties between the Muscovy Company and the evil Captain Margeret who had killed many Russians, robbed the Kremlin treasury, and now plotted to seize Arkhangel'sk [49, p. 125-128; 80, p. 495; 130, p. 313, 327-332]. The Russian ambassador's questions almost certainly made King James uncomfortable. Tsar Mikhail also sent ambassadors to France to warn King Louis XIII (r. 1610-1643) that Margeret was an enemy of Russia involved in a nefarious plot to seize Arkhangel'sk [130, p. 333-347, 355-357, 359-361]. Bitter memories of Captain Margeret also convinced Tsar Mikhail and his advisers not to hire any more French officers unless - ironically - they were Huguenots [45, p. 169-170; 48, p. 10-11; 93, vol. 1, p. 429-434; 97, p. 30, 354; 106, p. 169-175; 123, vol. 1, p. 180]. Despite Russian paranoia, Margeret was sincerely committed to stopping the Polish conquest of Russia. He was certainly not acting as a doubleagent for Sigismund III, as Zhordaniia suggested [130, p. 293-379]. Tsar Mikhail and Prince Pozharskii were wrong about Margeret's intentions, but who could blame them? By 1612 Margeret really did appear too compromised, and he undoubtedly suspected that he might no longer be welcome in Russia. That is probably why “Colonel Margeret” prudently remained behind in Hamburg waiting for a letter of reassurance from Flodorf that never arrived ²⁸ [90, p. 113].

What had Huguenot Jacques Margeret been doing since the failure of Flodorf's expedition? In his January 1612 letter to Merrick, Margeret mentioned that he hoped to return to France [104, vol. 14, p. 226]. If he did go home, it was only for a brief visit. In his letter to King James, Margeret mentioned that “Prince Radziwiff” was willing to ride to the rescue if things went wrong during an English invasion of north Russia. His reference to “Prince Radziwiff' explains what happened to Captain Margeret. Sometime during 1612 he entered the service of Janusz Radziwiff (15791620), an immensely wealthy Lithuanian magnate and prince of the Holy Roman Empire who was the chief protector of Protestantism in Eastern Europe. Prince Radziwiff worked closely with Johann Sigismund, the Elector of Brandenburg, and as Polish intervention in Russia deepened they did what they could to stop King Sigismund from conquering that country. Not surprisingly, they frequently turned for help to their good friend James I of England [31, p. 288, note 42; 40, p. 11, 27, 141-142, 151, 246, 251, 270, note 88, 289, note 106]. Janusz Radziwiff was horrified by Sigismund III's success in Russia, and the Polish government in turn kept a watchful eye on him as a possible threat to its conquest. In 1609 Sigismund accused Prince Radziwiff of plotting to assassinate him, and frequent contact between Radziwiff and King James was regarded with deep suspicion by the Polish court [14, s. 295-296; 40, p. 27, 139]. Janusz Radziwiff was extremely knowledgeable about Polish intervention in Russia, and he kept James and Johann Sigismund well informed about it. At some point Prince Radziwiff met and hired Captain Margeret, who may have accompanied him to England in December 1612 to meet with King James. At that time James was filled with excitement about the possibility of establishing a protectorate over north Russia [20, p. 470; 40, p. 289, note 107]. Radziwiff discussed the English project with Margeret and encouraged him to write a letter to James offering support and expert advice. As Prince Radziwiff's protégé, Captain Margeret was taken seriously by the king of England.

Captain Margeret remained in Janusz Radziwiff's service from 1612 until Radziwiff's death in 1620. Margeret served as Prince Radziwiff's trusted lieutenant, resident Russia expert, intelligence officer, military affairs adviser, financial affairs adviser, bailiff, and general fixer. Captain Margeret and Prince Radziwiff got along very well. Both men were energetic soldiers, devout Calvinists, admirers of Tsar Dmitrii, and determined foes of Sigismund

III. By the time Margeret entered his service, Prince Radziwiff was already undermining Sigismund's efforts to conquer Russia by supporting the cause of thousands of unpaid soldiers returning from previous campaigns there. Large bands of these disgruntled veterans wandered across Poland-Lithuania from 1612 to 1614, robbing Polish gentlemen, “overtaxing” peasants and shopkeepers, and interfering with ordinary revenue collection. Known as “confederates,” they seriously disrupted King Sigismund's recruiting efforts for military campaigns in Russia. Prince Radziwiff secretly subsidized hundreds of confederate commanders, distributing 500 zloty to each colonel and 300 zloty to each captain. That cost Radziwiff an astonishing 180,000 zloty, but the strategy paid off. It helped force Sigismund to delay invading Russia from 1613 to 1614 [6, s. 255-259; 25, p. 2]. Radziwiff hired Captain Margeret in part to help deal with the logistics of subsidizing hundreds of confederate officers. Margeret was the right man for the job; he knew many of the confederate officers personally. At the same time Janusz Radziwiff was helping confederate officers, his younger brother, Krysztof Radziwiff (1585-1640), led the opposition in the Polish Sejm (parliament) to Sigismund's efforts to conquer Russia. Senator Radziwiff succeeded in getting the Sejm to deny funding for Sigismund's planned invasion of Russia in 1613 [80, p. 410, note 10; 123, p. 102-107].

Janusz Radziwill regarded Captain Margeret as a “faithful servant” and valuable asset. Margeret proved to be an excellent intelligence officer, often working closely with the staff of the elector of Brandenburg. Radziwill sent him on several missions to England to confer with King James about the condition of Protestantism in Eastern Europe and to gather information and documents for Radziwill's archive [80, p. 403-405, 407-408; 89, p. 507-508, 508, notes 6-7; 119, p. 125, 144-145, 191-192]. When King Gustav II Adolf (r. 1611-1632) of Sweden lifted the siege of Pskov in October 1615 and began negotiating a peace treaty with Tsar Mikhail, many Protestants in Poland-Lithuania (including Radziwill and Margeret) celebrated. Hostility to Sweden for grabbing Russian territory and supporting the usurper Tsar Vasilii quickly gave way to strong support. Protestant subjects of Sigismund III began providing the Swedish government with reliable intelligence about Polish military plans and operations. Prince Radziwill and Captain Margeret concluded that the best way to protect Protestants in Poland- Lithuania and elsewhere in Eastern Europe was to support the king of Sweden as the champion of international Protestant resistance to the Counter-Reformation. In late 1615 Margeret secretly contacted his old nemesis, the Swedish general Jacob De la Gardie, with an offer from Janusz Radziwill to provide Gustav Adolf with up-to-date intelligence and expert military advice for use against Sigismund III. General De la Gardie was extremely pleased and told Swedish Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna that Captain Margeret should receive a secret pension. King Gustav Adolf gave Margeret a very expensive gold chain as a reward for providing useful information about military matters. Over the next several years Margeret provided the king of Sweden with valuable reports. Gustav Adolf declared that his collaboration with Prince Radziwill and Captain Margeret was one of “mutual advantage” [89, p. 509-511, 509, note 8, 511, note 10]. Perhaps at the prompting of Janusz Radziwill, in 1617 the Swedish government secretly reached out to Janusz's younger brother, Krzysztof, another highly visible champion of Protestantism; but Krzysztof Radziwill rejected the Swedish overture and remained faithful to Sigismund III [43, p. 116].

By 1619 Captain Margeret had developed a wide network of contacts, and he shared military, diplomatic, and political information with King James and other Protestant rulers. By then Margeret was also providing information to the French government; Catholic France had recently become an invaluable ally in Protestant Europe's struggle against the Counter-Reformation. Margeret became a close friend of the French ambassador to the Holy Roman Empire, who relayed Margeret's information to the future Cardinal Richelieu, who in turn put it to good use [13, p. 91-94, 98; 71, p. xix-xxi, xxvi; 98, p. 18288; 130, p. 347]. Margeret's correspondence in this period shows that he had become a trusted financial adviser to Janusz Radziwill and had many influential colleagues in Poland-Lithuania, Brandenburg-Prussia, the Palatinate, and elsewhere in Germany. Margeret was comfortable dealing with treasury officials and bankers, and he still maintained an interest in the fur trade [13, p. 91-98, 124-26; 71, p. x, xix, xxvi; 80, p. 395-403]. During summer 1620 Prince Radziwill sent Margeret to England with gifts for King James, including fine horses and nearly- extinct “Ure-oxen” (aurochs) that still thrived on Radziwill's vast estates in Lithuania [80, p. 403405, 407-408; 119, p. 191-192]. Janusz Radziwill died in December 1620. Captain Margeret dutifully continued to serve Radziwill's widow, Princess Sophia, and her baby son, Boguslav. He accompanied them to England where they could live without fear under King James' protection. Margeret returned to Lithuania by June 1621 and reported to Janusz's brother, Krzysztof Radziwill, who was by then the commander of the fortress of Riga. Krzysztof treated Janusz's “old lieutenant” with courtesy and respect, and he authorized reimbursement of the hefty expenses Margeret had incurred while escorting Princess Sophia to England [89, p. 508].

Jacques Margeret had faithfully served Prince Janusz Radziwill for eight years. At that point he could have retired to a life of leisure, as some historians mistakenly concluded [71, p. x, xxi, xxvi; 72, p. 6]. Instead, Huguenot Margeret saw it as his duty to continue fighting against Sigismund III and the Counter-Reformation. Tired of being on the sidelines, he looked for an opportunity to serve once again as an active-duty field officer. In early August 1621, Margeret crossed the frontier into Livonia and headed directly to the camp of the Swedish army preparing to attack Polish-controlled Riga. King Gustav Adolf warmly welcomed Captain Margeret, immediately promoted him to the rank of general, and gave him command of thousands of soldiers about to lay siege to Riga fortress. Gustav Adolf launched his attack on August 17, 1621. The “enemy” commander of Riga fortress was, of course, Prince Krzysztof RadziwiH, who must have been very surprised to receive an intelligence report about Swedish forces that mentioned the arrival of a new senior officer, “the Frenchman Margeret commanding the infantry” [43, p. 102104; 89, p. 511; 105, p. 42]. Vastly outnumbered and outgunned, RadziwiH honorably surrendered Riga after only a few weeks. It is doubtful that Prince RadziwiH and General Margeret ever met during the siege.

King Gustav Adolf's capture of Riga “began the stunning series of victories” that turned Lutheran Sweden into a great power and helped put an end to the Counter-Reformation [43, p. 103]. Jacques Margeret played an important, even heroic, part in the early history of that international Protestant success story. After the siege of Riga, however, Margeret disappeared from the historical record. We do not know if he died in battle, followed Gustav Adolf into Germany, or returned home to France. Future researchers will almost certainly find additional information about Jacques Margeret. Interest in the remarkable Huguenot soldier and his important book is strong and growing, and there are still many relevant documents waiting to be examined in European archives ²⁹.

NOTES

1 I dedicate this essay to my friend and colleague, Igor Olegovich Tyumentsev, who has taught me more about the Time of Troubles than anyone except Ruslan Grigor 'evich Skrynnikov. I also wish to take this opportunity to thank Hanna Mazheika, Fabienne Queyroux, Pierre Gonneau, and Mark Heleniak for their assistance on this project.

2 [76; 78]. I have not seen the second edition of Sostoianie Rossiiskoi Derzhavy, but a third edition was published in St. Petersburg in 1859. Ustrialov also published his translation of Margeret's book in part 3 of his collection offoreign accounts (1831-1834) [121], Margeret's account appears in vol. 3. The second edition of Skazaniia sovremennikovwas published in 3 vols (1834-37) [122], with Margeret's account appearing in vol. 3. The third edition of Skazaniia sovremennikovwas published in 2 vols (1859) [123], with Margeret's account appearing in vol. 1. All references to Skazaniia sovremennikov o Dmitrii Samozvantsein this essay are to the third edition [123].

3 The title page implies that the editor,

1.1. Borozdin, was the translator, but Nikolai Ustrialov is identified as the translator on page 8 of the introduction.

4 J.T. Alexander, “Translator's Introduction” [101, p. xii].

5 Catherine Depretto published a positive review in 2010 [24]. Maureen Perrie published a positive review in 2009 [96].

6 Oleg Nozdrin mistakenly wrote that Jacques Margeret became a soldier only after being accused of being a Huguenot [89, p. 505].

7 Margeret refers to the battle as the battle of Agria, mistakenly placing it in 1595 [69, p. 2; 73, p. 11; 85, p. 479].

8 Captain Margeret's contemporaries referred to him as “Jacques,” “Jacob,” “Jakob,” “Iakov,” or “Iacobus.” Even Berelowitch admits there is no record of anyone ever calling him “Étienne” [8, p. 457-458; 19, p. 54; 21, vol. 14, p. 492; 22, vol. 16, p. 348; 71, p. iv, viii; 80, p. 265, 274-276; 81, p. 83-84, 117; 98, p. 193-194; 108, livre 2, p. 154; 112, col. 116; 123. vol. 1, p. xii].

9 Guillaume Margeret's younger brother, Chrétien Margeret, is referred to as Captain Margeret's “uncle” in the “Privilege du Roy” of the second edition of Margeret's book [70, p. 177]. See also “Genealogicheskaia tablitsa roda Marzheretov ”[80, p. 465-466].

10 More than one historian has been confused by the sub-title of Margeret's book. Richard Hellie and William Reger thought Margeret was serving in Russia during the 1590s based on the sub-title of Margeret's book [46, p. 169, 357, note 77; 107, p. 236]

11 Some historians mistakenly claimed that Margeret served as captain of Tsar Boris Godunov's bodyguard [9, p. 301, 313; 55, p. 20; 123, vol. 1, p. 237-238].

12 Pushkin's literary license allowed him to move the battle from Dobrynichi in January 1605 to Novgorod Severskii in December 1604.

13 Jacques-Auguste de Thou and Jean Richer erred in claiming that the first company of Tsar Dmitrii's bodyguard was composed of 100 Frenchmen. Their error is repeated by André Berelowitch [9, p. 313, note 62; 21, vol. 14, p. 492; 108, livre 2, p. 154].

14 Nazarov implausibly suggested that Margeret was not ill on the night of the assassination but skipped the tsar's wedding and left Moscow to visit one of his estates [85, p. 482-483].

15 Chevreul incorrectly claimed that Margeret was financially ruined by Tsar Dmitrii's assassination, implying that Margeret was forced to return to France to make a financial recovery [71, p. iv]. That appears to have been a misreading of de Thou [21, vol. 14, p. 504].

16 Use of a scribe is suggested by inconsistencies in orthography within Margeret's book, by inconsistencies in spelling between the book and Margeret's later writings, and by occasional digressions and asides in Margeret's narrative [33, p. 12, 208, note 55].

17 Perhaps the most compelling evidence that Margeret prepared a rough draft of at least part of his book before returning to France is the sudden break in the text between Margeret's narrative of recent Russian history and the middle section of the book that describes the tsar's government, military forces, state revenue, the Russian Orthodox Church, and Russian society and culture [69, p. 8(v), 29(v); 73, p. 20, 52].

18 Friedrich von Adelung mistakenly claimed that Margeret borrowed material from Sigismund von Herberstein's famous account of Russia published in the mid-sixteenth century; his error was repeated by later scholars [1, s. 22; 4, p. 29-30; 61, p. 202-230; 102, p. 140-141, 146].

19 Without realizing it, the editors of Sostoianie rossiiskoi imperiimade use of the original copy of Estat de l 'Empire de Russiethat Captain Margeret presented to Henri IV in 1607. The book's cover is richly adorned with fleurs-de-lys and Henri IV's coat-of-arms, and the title page bears the stamp of the old Royal Library. The editors mistakenly claimed that the presentation copy was owned by the Margeret family and was not deposited in the royal library until 1668. They also jumped to the conclusion that handwritten corrections in the margins of the king's copy were made by Margeret personally [80, p. 8-10, 23-24, 36, note 40].

20 Jacques Margeret's relationship with the Saltykov family has been underappreciated. Margeret may have been a close associate of Mikhail Saltykov and his son Ivan. They served together as early as 1603. All three participated in the campaign against the pretender Dmitrii. Russian sources accused Mikhail Saltykov of treason for sabotaging the siege of Kromy; Margeret's book is the only source that does not condemn Saltykov. Like Margeret, the Saltykovs remained loyal to Tsar Fedor until he was overthrown. Mikhail Saltykov worked in the Posol 'sky prikazwith Margeret's expert informant, Afanasii Vlas'ev. The Saltykovs and Captain Margeret opposed the usurper Vasilii Shuiskii and served “Tsar Dmitrii” in Tushino. Margeret accompanied Mikhail Saltykov and other Tushinite dignitaries when they traveled to the Smolensk siege camp of Sigismund III to offer their loyalty to “Tsar Wladyslaw” and to negotiate for land and peasants. Margeret and the Saltykovs participated in the battle of Klushino and the march on Moscow. Margeret and Mikhail Saltykov worked together in the pro-Wladyslaw government, and they received generous votchinaestates at the same time. Margeret accompanied Mikhail Saltykov to Warsaw in 1611 when they were summoned by King Sigismund III [36, p. 185188, 197, 210, 394, 406, 409, 413; 62, p. 60-61, 71; 73, p. 66, 158, note 217, 159, note 224; 80, p. 365, note 54; 100, p. 254-256, 264; 118, p. 1-3; 123, vol. 2, p. 46-47; 130, p. 250-251, 267].