Features of the soviet special propaganda in the first period of the German-soviet war on Ukrainian territory (June 1941 - November 1942)

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National University of Defense of Ukraine the name of Ivan Chernyakhovsky (Kyiv, Ukraine)

Features of the soviet special propaganda in the first period of the German-soviet war on Ukrainian territory (June 1941 - November 1942)

Svitlana Pavlovska,

leading researcher Research Laboratory Humanitarian Institute

Анотація

world war propaganda soviet

Особливості соціальної спеціальної пропаганди в перший період німецько-радянської війни на українській території (червень 1941 - листопад 1942). Ідеологічна складова Другої світової війни зіграла одну з головних ролей у протистоянні гітлерівської Німеччини та СРСР. Створення спеціальних структур для політичної пропаганди та роботи над інформаційним продуктом у Червоній Армії проводилися паралельно. Радянський уряд завжди приділяв значну увагу ідейним факторам як під час Першої світової війни, так і в міжвоєнний період. Необхідність відстоювати революційні завоювання передбачала глибоку ідейну мотивацію та постійну готовність залякати іноземне втручання. У СРСР, де панувала більшовицька партія, основним принципом політичної інформації була суто ідеологічна орієнтація. Цілеспрямоване поширення та затвердження у суспільній свідомості відповідних суджень та оцінок стало завданням пропаганди на державному рівні. Пропаганда в тоталітарній Радянській державі повинна була сформувати певну ідеологічну систему і незаперечну готовність людини діяти на основі сформованих ідеалів і принципів. Відновлення в збройних силах РФ спеціальних політичних органів передбачає використання набутого досвіду у різновекторній діяльності Головного політичного управління під час Другої світової війни. У даній роботі розглядаються аспекти організації роботи 7-го відділу, який спеціалізувався на здійсненні інформаційно-психологічного впливу на особовий склад ворожого війська та населення території противника.

Ключові слова: Друга світова війна, спеціальні структури пропаганди в Червоній Армії, спеціальна пропаганда, інформаційнний продукт, вплив на ворога, розкладання ворожого війська зсередини.

Annotatіon

Svitlana Pavlovska,

leading researcher Research Laboratory Humanitarian Institute National University of Defense of Ukraine the name of Ivan

Chernyakhovsky (Kyiv, Ukraine)

FEATURES OF THE SOVIET SPECIAL PROPAGANDA
IN THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE GERMAN-SOVIET WAR
ON UKRAINIAN TERRITORY (JUNE 1941 - NOVEMBER 1942)

The ideological component in the Second World War played one of the main roles in the confrontation between Hitler's Germany and the USSR. The creation of special structures for political propaganda and work on an information product in the Red Army was conducted in parallel. The Soviet government has always paid considerable attention to ideological factors both during the First World War and in the interwar period. The need to defend revolutionary conquests implied deep ideological motivation and constant readiness to intimidate foreign intervention. In the USSR, where the Bolshevik Party was ruling, the main principle of political information was a strict ideological orientation. Purposeful dissemination and assertion in the public consciousness of relevantjudgments and evaluations became the task of propaganda at the state level. Propaganda in the totalitarian Soviet state was intended to form a certain ideological system and the undeniable readiness of man to act based on the formed ideals and principles. Restoration of the armed forces of the RF special political structures involves the use of experience gained in the multi-sectoral activities of the Main Political Administration during the Second World War. In this paper, we consider aspects of the organization of the work of the 7-unit, which specializes in the implementation of informational and psychological effects on the personnel of the enemy troops and the population of the enemy's territory.

Keywords: the Second World War, special structures of propaganda in the Red Army, special propaganda, information product, influence on the enemy, the disintegration of the troops from the interior.

Today, scientific discussions among historians about the real situation in the ratio of forces and means of Germany and the USSR at the beginning of the German-Soviet armed confrontation are not stopped. In modern scholars, there are facts to substantiate a completely different picture of the alignment of forces in comparison with cluttered conclusions regarding the benefits of Hitler's Germany. Thus, Ukrainian historian V. Hrytsyuk in his work "Strategic and front operations of the Great Patriotic War on the territory of Ukraine" proves that the advantages of the forces were not on the German side. The Red Army had a significantad- vantage over the Wehrmacht in terms of personnel, armaments and military equipment. However, Hitler's armed forces have already succeeded in offensive operations on the territory of the USSR. Modern scholars have thoroughly studied the situation of repressive measures against representatives of the military-political leadership of the USSR just before the Second World War. In his research, V. Hrytsyuk concludes that the military-political leadership of the USSR is unable to conduct successful leadership in the first period of the war (June 1941 - November 1942), which led to such a spectacular defeat by the Red Army

At the same time, according to another researcher V. Zharkov: "... despite the irrecoverable losses that the army sustained during the repressions, it nevertheless represented a gigantic military tool of foreign policy of Stalin's leadership"t should be noted that the past century has become the time of the emergence of new information technologies, which gave rise to opportunities andat the same time to the tools for effective impact on the mass consciousness. So during the first period of the Soviet-German war, the command and political authorities of the Soviet armed forces sought to weaken the moral spirit of the soldiers of the enemy army as much as possible, to incline the enemy to captivity and organized capitulation. The solution of these issues involved the forces and means of special propaganda - information and psychological impact on the enemy.

Special propaganda can be characterized as a targeted informational impact on the troops and civilian population of a likely enemy in order to reduce the morale of the enemy and to prepare the public opinion of the civilian population regarding the actions of the Red Army's forces to reduce the loss of lives. Specialized propaganda as one of the directions of the activity of the ideological organs of the Red Army was engaged in separate units. Their appearance became an objective necessity of organizing informational and psychological influence on the personnel and the enemy's population.

In order to understand what was the basis of work in the first months of the German-Soviet war, it is necessary to consider some facts of the organization of this type of activity before. The burning down of the center of war just before the Second World War and the participation of the Soviet troops in hostilities on the Lake Hasan and Khalkhin Gol, in the Finnish War, the inclusion of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina into the Soviet Union, determined the need for appropriate measures to disperse the enemy from the inside and weaken his moral stability. The preparation and implementation of the international tasks of the Red Army required the organization and conduct of a large-scale propagandist company among the population and enemy troops.

Back in 1937, the Political Directorate of the Red Army was renamed the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda. The political departments of the districts and the political departments of the associations have been renamed into administrations and departments of political propaganda.

The work that was conducted in them was aimed directlyat the personnel of the Red Army.

By July 10, 1939, a special apparatus, whose functions included work with the population and the enemy troops simply had not existed. And this very date was the start of a special group of political workers. On July 10, 1939, the People's Commissar for Defense issued an appropriate order No. 0033 "On the Establishment of Newspapers in Foreign Languages in Times of Peace". The order approved a permanent staff of editors and typists in Japanese, Chinese, German, Polish and Finnish for a peacetime of 4 people. Permanent members in Korean, Mongolian, Estonian, Latvian, Romanian, Turkish, Afghan and Iranian languages were approved by 2 people. In total, 24 editors in foreign languages of the probable opponent and allies of the USSR in the future were created.

In the directive of the Political Directorate of the Red Army No. 0202 of July 13, 1939, L. Mehlis warned: "It is strictly forbidden to separate at least one of the employees of the editorial offices and printing houses for use not for their intended purpose"

In the draft directive No. 0205 dated July 29, 1939, the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, L. Mehlis, noted: "... the ideological war with the enemy is an integral part of the work of the Red Army political authorities and must play a huge role in the decomposition of troops and the enemy's rear".

Specialists of the special apparatus received the first experience during the hostilities on Khalkhin-Gol. But the lack of knowledge about the peculiarities of cultural and historical development, the level of education and the mentality of the warriors of Japan and Mongolia, have led to the low effectiveness of postcards. In his study, V. Zharkov, on the basis of studying archival materials, gives the following example: "A prisoner soldier-Mongol told that” the leaflets fell to them, but because of illiteracy, he does not know their content".

All testimonies of prisoners of war were analyzed and, after the end of hostilities, the division for work among the enemy troops for military commissars issued a "Collection of materials from the polls of captured soldiers and officers of the Khing and Manchurian Army". It was during the war period that Khalkhin- Gol was the first to use the station of sound broadcasting, for the maintenance of which a specialdepartment was created. The station was based on four cars and two powerful groups of speakers, hardware studio, power station, etc. Investigating the archives of that time, V. Zharkov cites information that in the "Report on the work of the audio-broadcasting unit on Khalkhin-Gol" it was recognized that: "this station due to its bulkiness and structural flaws (faulty installation, impossibility of continuous work more than an hour) is unfit for work in combat conditions".

In the same 1939, as part of the political department of the 1st Army Group operating in the Khalkhin-Golu area, a division was established for the work of the enemy troops.

Considerable attention was paid to work among the troops and the population of the enemy during the accession of the territories of Western Ukraine in 1939. Only during the first two days of the "liberation campaign" in the operating part of the Ukrainian Front aircrafts were sent to distribute40,000 flyers over Lviv to Polish soldiers, 10,000 leaflets addressed to the population of Western Ukraine in Ukrainian, 10,000 postcards from V. Molotov's speech in Polish, 22 thousand copies of the newspaper "Chervona Ukraina" and 40 thousands of different brochures. In order to influence the population of the Western regions, the central committee of the Communist Party sent various brochures to the front in the Ukrainian language in the amount of 8 million 830 thousand copies.

The political leadership of the Ukrainian Front created newspapers in the Ukrainian language "Chervona Ukraina" with a circulation of 15 to 50 thousand copies, and in the Polish language "Voice of Octanez" ("Voice of the Soldier") with a circulation of up to 50 thousand copies. For all the time, 22 issues of the newspaper "Chervona Ukraina" and 22 issues of the newspaper "Voice of Octa- nezh" came out, which was later renamed "Red Standart".

In 1940, the Main Political Directorate for Political Propaganda of the Red Army established a division of propaganda among the troops and the enemy's population. Later it became known as the Seventh. Such a tumor was dictated by a change in the level of ideological training of the Red Army, almost all of which was in the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks, and was fully controlled by the Communist Party. Previously, on March 21, 1940, the Office comprised 16 people: a boss, a deputy, 9 senior country and army instructors, 2 interpreters, a librarian, a secretary and a typist. From the first days of the existence the leadership was headed by M. Burtsev, who had had experience in organizing activities among the enemy during the Khalkhin-Gol's war

In the face of the growing threat of war and the rapid increase in the number of members, ideological work among the armed forces became a priority. Similar departments were created in the departments of political propaganda of the Baltic, Western and Kyiv special, Leningrad, Odessa, Transcaucasian, Central Asian, Transbaikal military districts and the Far Eastern Front. In the political departments of the fronts, within the designated districts, the branches of propaganda among the troops and the enemy's population were created.

However, in July 1941, the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army was again reorganized into the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army. It was entrusted with the organization of ideological and propaganda struggle throughout the war period. In the Soviet historiography, one can find statements about the cause. From the point of view of the military-political leadership of the country in the beginning of the German-Soviet war of 1941-1945, many commanders did not showrespective courage and consciousness.

On June 24, 1941, the Soviet Information Bureau was established by the Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party and the Council of USSR People's Commissars. The newly formed structure was assigned the following three tasks:

- management of the coverage of international events and the domestic life of the Soviet Union in the press and on the radio;

- organizing counter-propaganda against German and other hostile propaganda;

- coverage of events and military actions on the fronts, compilation and publication of military reports on the materials of the Main Command.

The duties of the Soviet Information Bureau were as follows: publication of materials according to the data of the Main Command and providing information on the course of the war and the work of the Soviet rear to foreign countries; together with the Main Political Department of the Red Army, printed postcards with appeals to the German troops. The Soviet Information Bureau consisted of a military department, a translation department, a department for propaganda and counter propaganda, a department of international life, a literary department, and others. This structure was guided by the work of military correspondents, providing information to the embassies and consulates of the USSR, foreign broadcasters and radio stations, telegraph and news agencies, as well as the media. It should be noted that all materials of the Soviet Information Bureau were censored by the Supreme Commander.

Thus, the structures of special propaganda during the war were the Main Political Administration of the Red Army and the Soviet Information bureau. In order to coordinate efforts and develop the main areas of special propaganda by the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), on June 25, 1941, a decision was made to establish a Soviet bureau of military-political propaganda.

Special propaganda was conducted in accordance with the specific conditions of each period of the German-Soviet war. The leadership of the ideological structures of the Red Army took into account the military-political situation, the moral and psychological state of the troops and the enemy's population, strategic and operational-tactical tasks having been solved by the Soviet troops. The main directions of special propaganda in the first period of the German-Soviet war in June 1941 - November 1942 were as follows:

- clarification of the legitimate aims of the war on the part of the Soviet Union and the disclosure of the unfair, aggressive nature of the war liberated by Hitler's Germany;

- demonstration of the steady growth of the forces of the Soviet Union and the shock of the Red Army and the Navy, the propaganda of the inevitability of the defeat of the Nazi troops and the defeat of German imperialism;

- evealing and exacerbating contradictions both in the Nazi army and in the German rear, as well as between the allies. Demonstration of the growth of the anti-fascist movement among the German-occupied states;

- comprehensive propaganda of the truth about the Soviet Union and demonstration of the anti-popular nature of the Nazi regime;

- propaganda among the enemy troops of withdrawal from the war for the personnel of the German Armed Forces and its allies in the form of individual and collective capture and organized capitulation.These trends were fundamental for general political propaganda and for special propaganda in other periods of the German-Soviet war. Only the accents changed and their specification increased, depending on the conditions that developed at that time.

It should be noted that general political and specialist propaganda explained the same issues. However, general political propaganda relied on facts that relate to the situation in the countries and armies of the enemy as a whole, to the facts of international life moments of general historiographical nature. Special propaganda was based on facts associated with a limited section of the front, with the situation in that military unit or a connection, in which an enemy soldier serves, and to which a specific postcard, broadcast program, or oral transmission was addressed. This propaganda was more concrete, understandable, sensible, designed to directly influence a specific moment, which substantially complemented general political propaganda

Thus, specialists in propaganda focused its efforts on substantiating the thesis of the inevitability of defeating the Wehrmacht by intimidating hostile forces by failures in a particular section of the front and demonstrating the invincibility of the positions of Soviet troops and unions. Discrediting the commanders of individual German units, the call for the transition to Soviet captivity and capitulation. Military-political leadership of Hitler's Germany also paid considerable attention to the information component of the armed struggle. And with the onset of the war on June 22, 1941, a powerful propaganda activity began to open. Measures to implement the information and psychological impact on Soviet citizens and the staff of the Red Army were prepared by the ideological structures of the militarypolitical leadership of Germany in advance. Right by June 22, the German Ministry of Publicity had printed more than 30 million postcards, colored propaganda pamphlets in pocket format in 30 languages of the peoples of the USSR. There were 17 advocacy groups on the Eastern Front. When in the morning, on June 22, 1941, at 3.15 am, German artillery struck fire on objects in the territory of the Soviet Union, leaflets weresent via usage of propaganda shells. The postcards were appealing to the servicemen and commanders of the Red Army. During the first two months of the war, the Nazis spread around 200 million postcards.

From the side of the Red Army ideological struggle with the enemy began with the first days of armed confrontation. During the defensive battles of the Soviet troops, the propaganda among the German soldiers wasaimed at reducing their offensive spirit. For this purpose, the aggressive nature of the actions of the Nazis was revealed. In propaganda texts it was said that Hitler declared an imperialist, aggressive war for the Germans "national" and "folk", which was carried out in order to prevent the attack on Germany from the USSR.

This version was used in the official statement of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, and in the speech of I. Stalin on July 3, 1941. The Bureau of military-political propaganda, on the basis of these guidelines, worked out leaflets for enemy troops. Of the thirty slogans for the soldiers of the Nazi Army, ten were approved. Some of them were mentioned in the memoirs of the head of the Seventh Department M. Burtsev: "German soldiers! Down with Hitler's looty war! Long live friendship between the German and Russian peoples!", "German soldiers! Soviet Russia has not encroached upon and does not infringe on the independence and integrity of Germany. Think about why you shed blood?", "German soldiers! Remember: the destruction of the bloody reign of Hitler and his followers is the only way to peace!".

On June 24, 1941, these slogans were issued with great inspiration. The ideas of these slogans were widely covered in the postcards of the Main Political and Political Directions of the Fronts. In such posters as Hitler's Words and Affairs, "Soldiers are falling, the dowadents of capitalists are increasing," "Herders factories and affairs," the specialists of the political structures of the Red Army revealed the so-called social demagogy of the Nazis”.

In such postcards as “What are you fighting for?”, ` Angriff” lies distractedly” the Soviet Union's attitude to the war was explained and fibs of the `Angriff” paper were disclosed.

On June 27, 1941, the first general political postcard to German Army soldiers was issued and circulated on all fronts. It used the class theme that the aggressive and imperialist nature of the war goes against the class and national interests of the German workers who perish in this war. In the leaflet, Hitler wasdescribed as the main culprit for a war that attacked a German laborer, violating the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In the text of a leaflet addressed to Hitler's soldiers, Hitler was foretold of the fate of Napoleon. It was said that the Nazi leader would also come to his collapse. As a warning, there was information that all 200 million people came to fight against the invader.

In parallel with work on their own information product, specialists of the ideological structures of the Red Army analyzed the propaganda activities of the German military-political leadership, aimed at its own personnel. German soldiers were well-motivated and well-equipped. An illustration of how the most widespread theses of official Nazi propaganda were denied, may serve as a postcard "What do you fight for?", Issued by the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army in November 1941. The text is the following:

«German soldiers!

Perhaps you are fighting Versailles, as Hitler tells you? You are struggling to impose on other nations the worse Versailles. But German imperialists want it. You are fighting against the Soviet Union, the only country that has always been against Versailles!

Perhaps you are fighting for the national interests of the German people, as Hitler tells you? No! You fought for Hitler's wild desire to conquer the whole worldfor the sake of world domination of your own exploiters - Krupp and Goe- ring, Siemens and Rehling. Your actions are directed against the national interests of the German people, because the Nazi war bankruptes Germany, destroys German youth, carries death and poverty to the German people.

Perhaps you are fighting for "German socialism", which Hitler and Leah are lying to you? No! You fight for the worst plutocratic-socialist system set up in Germany by Hitler. You are fighting against a single country of socialism, in which the labor people during the Great Socialist Revolution destroyed the power of the capitalists and landlords.

Perhaps you are fighting for a "new order in Europe", as Hitler tells you? No! You are fighting for the most terrible medieval reaction. The Gestapo is being used by the ax and whip in the occupied countries. You are struggling to turn Europe into a people's prison. By doing this, you increase the power of Hitler's tyranny and further consolidate your own chains.

German soldiers!

For Hitler you are cannon fodder only. He persecutes you for new and new crimes that have nothing to do with, except the death of hundreds of thousands of German soldiers. It forces you to die in the snow and ice of Russian winter. So only the worst enemy of the German nation can act as Hitler does. You fight for a wrongdoing doomed to death. Hitler leads Germany to defeat and distruction. But the German people want to live. They can prevent a catastrophe, liberating their homeland from the obsessive military insanity of Hitler's clique.

Only the overthrow of Hitler will save the German people! Down with Hitler's imperialist aggression war! Turn your weapon against your real enemies, against the Nazis, the criminal perpetrators of the war! Fightfor a free, independent Ger- many!"30.

The text of this leaflet is written in the traditions of communist rhetoric with complex definitions. Such a text is more like a statement at a party meeting of like-minded people who have the data vocabulary and understand the position of the theory of class struggle. It was vain to count on the perception of this postcard by German soldiers. During this period of the German-Soviet war, the Nazi armed forces were well equipped and well-trained. They had an experience of a victorious move in Europe. The preaching of the ideology of national socialism provided German soldiers with a well-defined goal and its justification. It was necessary to expand the living space for the representatives of the Aryan race, to destroy the communist Jews. And thus do not allow the spread of communist ideology in the world. In this Hitler saw his role as a Messiah . So the calls for Soviet cards to join the class struggle against the Red Army the Nazi warriors simply did not understand in the first months of the war. And that's why a slogan of Soviet propaganda like: "Stand. Here the state of workers and peasants!” was not perceived 32.

But we can not say that the measures of special propaganda in the first months of the German-Soviet war were ineffective. If the rhetoric of the class struggle was not taken into account by the target audience, then other forms of information-psychological influence had a greater effect. Thus, in support of the inevitability of the defeat of the German army in the war against the USSR in propaganda, statements by German state and military figures of the past about the need for friendly relations between Russia and Germany and the danger of military adventures against Russia were used. In the leaflet "The Remarks of Frederick the Second”, the following statement was quoted: ”Any hostile army that dared to penetrate Russia and go further Smolensk would undoubtedly find its grave there in prairies.” "When Napoleon heard this prophecy' - he continued further in a postcard - `he was stubborn, but he forgot the offense. His star has rolled in Russia. Hitler will face the same fate"In another leaflet "It's impossible to defeat Russia!" - There are already six state and military figures in Germany (Friedrich II, Clausewitz, Bismarck, Mol- tke, Groner, Metch) about the inadmissibility and futility of the German war against Russia.

An analysis of the testimonies of the first German prisoners of war showed that these historical arguments had the strongest influence on the mood of the soldiers, and especially on that part of the officers who were afraid of the consequences of the adventure against the USSR.

In propaganda materialswell-known historical facts of the defeat of the German army by Russian troops in past wars were widely used. An example can be a postcard called "In the fight for a worthy reason, the Russian warrior is invincible!". It provided historical examples of the defeat of the German army by Russian troops: the victory of Russians over the German knights on Lake Peipsi in 1242, the Battle of Grunwald in 1410, during the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), and during the military intervention in 1918. It ended with a substantiated conclusion: "The Russian warrior won over that he defended his homeland from foreign invaders and led a fair struggle. You see how the Russian warrior is bravely and bravely struggling today. You see his primordial qualities: invincible resistance in defense, insurmountable courage and assertiveness during offensive. Do not overcome the strength of the Russian warrior!».

In the first days and weeks of the war, political bodies in propaganda against German soldiers paid great attention to deface the perpetrators of the war, describing Hitler and his clique. Examples were given of the super profits of the monopolists enriched in the war - Siemens-Shukert, Siemens-Galsk, Krupp. All information was taken from the German economic newspaper "Der docho fol- ksvirt". Among the German soldiers, there were leaflets that screw up the social nature of the fascist state. "What did the Nazi state give German workers and peasants?" - such a question was in one of them. And as a response - "War, death on the front, suffering, the ruin of Germany, the hatred of the whole world to the

Germans. German imperialists and Nazi officials are profits, revenue streams in government and the army. "The texts of these leaflets were broadcasted on radio and sound amplifiers.

In his memoirs, the head of the 7th Division, M. Burtsev, described the process of work on leaflet: "Birth cards, without exaggeration in creative torture. After all, each of them had to confuse the mind and the heart of the deceived people with its content. The appearance, artistic and polygraphic design were important: color, font, set, illustration - all this shook the attention of the enemy soldier, he had a desire to raise the postcard, and lifting up - to read. It was harder to choose the theme of a leaflet, to develop a vital problem for German soldiers and officers. Their presentation should have been brief, accurate and fully justified. Finally, the calls for action should be receptive and accessible to fulfill ... Themes of leaflets arose as a result of a deep and continuous study of the state of affairs at the front, analysis of the political and moral condition of the troops and the enemy's population ... The topic was determined for a short time, maximum for a week ".

The themes of the leaflet were originally approved in the department, then at the bureau. During the maximum period of time, the author needed to create a text. Sometimes, according to M. Burtsev, the text was created in a few hours. Then there was discussion of the finished text of the postcard among colleagues and, if necessary,corrections were made. It was always used to assess the sensitivity of the text of leaflets to German prisoners of war. As a result of such cooperation, the German text was complemented by peculiarities of a verbal nature and was ultimately approved by the bureau of military-political propaganda. It should be noted that a group of artists was created for the decoration of printed matter in the department. In addition to working on texts and printing leaflets, the pressing question was their distribution. Delivered flyers to the enemy's location with the front and army aircraft. For proliferation among the population of Germany-aviation of distant action. As the effectiveness of propaganda and propaganda mines were not high enough, part of the propaganda materials were distributed by scouts in the locations of the enemy. The success of the Soviet special propaganda is evidenced by the order of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of Germany, signed by General A. Jodl on 10 December 1941 "On the fight against hostile propaganda". The document referred to the need: "The unconditional execution of orders in the fight against hostile propaganda, which is the same prerequisite for victory as the execution of any command of command.” In addition to this order, the Nazi command issued a special memorial to the soldiers ”10 commandments against hostile propaganda”.

In July-August 1941, specialists of the ideological structures of the Red Army worked out another genre of leaflets. Information about the state of affairs on the fronts, the rear in Germany and international events began to be issued and distributed. Similar postcards were issued in German, Romanian, Italian, Finnish and Hungarian. The number of such postcards after the transfer of the Red Army to a counteroffensive near Moscow increased significantly. Not only the Main Political Administration, but also the political management of the fronts began to issue leaflets with factual information under the following headings: ”What is happening at home”, "Information from the front”, "International information”.

The use of targeted information on the situation at the front, the difficult situation in the Hitlerite rear, the German foreign policy isolation, the growth of the anti-fascist movement, the resistance in the occupied countries, the contradictions in the Nazi bloc, strengthened the enemy's sense of doubt and defeatism. Since the end of 1941, on November 15, in the Pravda newspaper, 158 prisoners of war of German soldiers were published: ”There are two Germany, between whom there is an underscore abyss. Germany, those who suffer from the magnanimity of the magnates who are ready to sacrifice the best German youth for their own selfish interests. And Germany is the German people, which demands an urgent termination of the war. The German people do not want to become the owners of foreign countries. The German people must be the master of their own country. This can happen only after the overthrow of Hitler. The German people must separate themselves from Hitler and go their own way. ”The appeal of 158 Nazi prisoners of war ended with the words” Get down the war! Down with Hitler! Long live a free and independent Germany»

he political structures of the Red Army proved the content of the ”Appeal” to the enemy forces, distributing it in leaflets and brochures using oral and radio propaganda. In early 1942, in connection with the 9th anniversary of Hitler's coming to power, the Chief Political Office of the Red Army issued a series of leaflets that exposed the essence of the Nazi regime. The following topics were widespread: ”9 years of Hitler's power-9 years of liesto the workers”, ”9 years of penal regime in Germany”, ”9 years of Hitler's power have made the whole world an enemy of Germany"44. And although, again, in these leaflets the rhetoric of the class struggle prevailed, but against the background of the defeats of the German troops near Moscow, such texts could have raised doubts about the invincibility of the Nazis. Attention is drawn to short and delicate letters of the text of the postcards. Account was taken of the fact that servicemen who picked up, read, or kept hostile flyers were punished. Therefore, the names had to bear a certain amount of work on their own in order to form a stereotype of the perception of events related to the corresponding names, events, geographical names.

Another example of convincing argumentation in the propaganda of captivity was the weekly "Front-line Illustration" newspaper in German, issued by the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army. The publication contained a wealth of photographic material about the lives of prisoners of war in Soviet captivity45.

In the spring of 1942, in connection with the preparation by the German command of a "new, decisive offensive", the political structures of the Red Army expanded propaganda among the enemy forces in order to undermine the belief in the success of the offensive. Postcard of the Main Political Department, authored by M. Kalinin: "Germany's Rescue is in the Immediate Termination of the War!" In this leaflet, it was necessary to overthrow Hitler's new offensive in order to prevent the death of hundreds of thousands of people. This postcard ended like this:

"German soldiers! If you want to save Germany, you must end the war sooner. No need to fear the defeat of Hitler, since the defeat of Hitler and his Nazi gang is not a defeat of the German people... Hitler, with the help of his security forces, strangled the people's freedom, strangled the working class and defiled it with war. The popular indignation in Germany is already great, but today it is not yet able to putthe end to the war. You still have the opportunity-it's a capture. For now, this is the only opportunity for every honest German who wants happiness for his people.

Having been captured, you beat the Nazi criminal gang, detached from the hated gang of robbers, bring the end of the war closer. Coming into captivity, you keep the vital population of Germany"46.

Evidence based on the enemy's known forces, on the facts of the front and rear life, as later witnessed by the prisoners of war, aggravated anxiety and suspicion of a new offensive in hostile soldiers and officers. In contrast to the false hostile propaganda of Hitler's Germany's successes, the political structures of the

Red Army issued and distributed a series of leaflets under the names: «Results of the war years», «How many Germans were destroyed by Hitler on the Eastern Front?», «Who will win?», «Why will the Red Army win?» In the texts of leaflets, radio and speech, the following calls for enemy troops were increasingly used:

"The overthrow of Hitler is your only salvation. We are fighting with your aggressive government. We will talk with the workers of the working people with the German people who will take their own share with their own hands. The Red Army has the goal of expelling the German invaders from our country and liberating the Soviet land from the Nazi invaders. There are no such idiotic goals in the Red Army as the extermination of the German people and the destruction of the German state. It would be ridiculous to identify the Hitler clicks with the German people, with the German state. The experience of history shows that the Hitlers come and go, and the German people and the German state remain.

Decide and act, Germans! Keep up to date!

Command of the Red Army! "47

The main problem in working with similar texts was the need for quality translation in order to convey the whole palette of emotional color of the text. Professionals have joined this work. This was even mentioned in the "Theses of the report on printed propaganda among the enemy troops during the 10 months of the Patriotic War" in April 1942. As one of the main shortcomings of propaganda in the spring-summer period, it was used in the texts of Russisma. Bright and meaningful phrases in the original language did not have an adequate translation, and therefore did not bear the real content for the target audience48.

The same document referred to the need for a differentiated approach to the personnel of the Nazi troops49. If the Red Army displayed a picture of a classless society. In the German armies, the officers and ordinary ordinary soldiers were clearly differentiated. Even the military press was issued both for officers and separately for the ordinary staff. Therefore, in the opinion of the leadership of the bureau of military-political propaganda, printed propaganda products need to be rolled separately to officers and ordinary. The purpose of this is not only the impact on different target audiences. Thus, the aim was to set up one military unit against others, and to distrust the officers.

After the defeat of the Soviet troops near Kharkiv in May 1942, German troops launched an offensive in the south, broke through the defense of the Red Army and broke through the Stalingrad area. The rapid advancement of the German troops on the southern direction increased hopes for the victorious and rapid end of the war not only to the Nazis who took part in the offensive, but also to Nazi warriors in other parts of the front. To undermine these hopes of Soviet propaganda, new arguments were needed. In these difficult conditions, special propaganda was used especially by the facts of the rapidly growing heavy strata of the Nazi Army .. "You captured kilometers, but lost divisions. These kilometers will return to our hands, and the divisions will not resur- rect». Short postcards, slogans with similar content on the walls of houses and fences were made by specialists of special propaganda before leaving the Red Army of settlements. During this period, the Wehrmacht's soldiers began to argue about their responsibility for their crimes, fear of meaningless death. This forced them to think about thereason and content of the war. In the summer of 1942, the Council for Military-Political Advocacy at the Chief Political Office of the Red Army determined: “.. .in the near future, the main focus on propaganda to give the growing force and the strength of the Red Army and the entire anti-Hitler coalition, proves the inevitability of the military defeat of Hitler's clique. Special policy propaganda was guided by the Main Political Administration. Since the political management of the fronts and armies was not fully equipped with a printing base during the first period of the Soviet- German war, 80 per cent of the entire circulation appeared to be the Chief Political Guard”

In the first months of the war, the special propaganda apparatus of political forces was formed by the states of wartime. Some formations needed to overcome the underestimation of special propaganda. Control over this type of activity increased.

Since, as already noted, in many political administrations there were no technical possibilities to print agitation materials in foreign languages, they were engaged in studying parts of the opposing enemy and distributed propaganda materials issued by the Main Political Directoratedy after two months of the war, the emphasis in appeals to the enemy soldiers gradually began to change. Firstly, it was not about joining the Red Army, but about being taken prisoner as the only way to save lives and return home alive. Secondly, efforts to undermine the stereotypes of the Soviet captivity were made. Practicing postcards with appeals by prisoners of war from the Germans from facsimile of their true signatures. Often such postcards were issued with a photo of the conditions of stay in Soviet captivity. Postcards with similar material were distributed in those military units where the service of the prisoners of war had been formerly held, whose treatment was used in appeals. This recognition effect contributed to the trust for the text. After all, the photos of those who are in captivity and their story of their captivity were the best evidence of the possibility of surviving in this war and having hope of returning home.

One can say that the call for a captivity as the only way to save lives has become a battle slogan for the Soviet special propaganda of the Red Army during the winter counteroffensive of 1941-1942. It was not easy to assure German soldiers in this. Most of them believed in executions in Soviet captivity. The Soviet political structures paid considerable attention to a weighty argument in favor of Soviet captivity. First of all, the Decree of the Council of USSR People's Commissars on July 1, 1941, No. 1798 on conditions of detention of prisoners in the Soviet Union, was systematically popularized. Since the issuance of the Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 55 of February 23, 2942, all types of printed, oral and radio propaganda have been used to state that "the Red Army captures German soldiers and officers if they are captured and save their lives"54.

Conclusios

The implementation of information and psychological influence on the personnel and the enemy's population has become one of the main directions of the activity of the ideological structures of the Red Army. The objective necessity of carrying out work on the demoralization of the enemy and reducing its willingness to oppose was dictated by the experience of the participation of the Red Army in hostilities before the beginning of the German-Soviet war of 1941-1945.

Formation of the corresponding structures and working out of the algorithm of work took place parole in the conditions of real testing of methods and methods of propaganda influence on a certain target audience.

In addition to the military ideological structures, the Soviet Information Bureau and the bureau of political propaganda have special propaganda. Propaganda was both general political and special. In the first period of the war (June 1941 - November 1942), these two areas coincided in terms of topics, target audience, and methods of implementation of the information product.

The main focus of special propaganda in the first period of the war was to discredit the adversary's progress, to demonstrate their temporary character. After the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops in the winter of 1941 and early 1942, the military-political situation and the possibilities of Soviet propaganda improved considerably.

In leaflets, radio broadcasts widely informed the population and troops of the enemy about the first major defeat of Hitler. There was an explanation that breaking the "lightning war" plan for Germany and its allies means a devastating, protracted war, which will inevitably end with a defeat. Bringing the failure of the Nazi plan of `lightning war', debunking the myth of the invincibility of the German army - these are the main directions of special propaganda during the first phase of the war.

The broadcast of the first period of the German-Soviet war was not at the proper level due to the lack of quality equipment. The state of the German rear and the situation on the fronts during the first period of the German-Soviet war did not contribute to the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda among the enemy. Special propaganda among the troops and the enemy's population was organized by the political organs of the Red Army on the teaching of Marxism- Leninism in relation to the class struggle. The Bolshevik truth about the war, which was based on the Marxist-Leninist system of views on war and the army, was considered as the basis. The Leninist work on the origin and character of the war in the era of imperialism, the developed theories of the proletarian revolution, became the basis for motivating the defense of revolutionary achievements.

The bulk of Hitler's soldiers at the beginning of the war did not understand the true and clear political arguments about the unfair nature of the war on their part, the crime of Hitler's actions, but gradually these arguments fell into their consciousness. areful work on texts, slogans and artwork required the involvement of specialists. Their adaptation took place while working on printed products.

The ideological structures of the Red Army react in a timely manner to changes at the front in an attempt to work ahead in shaping the appropriate perception of events in the minds of hostile soldiers. An analysis of the situation regarding the effectiveness of propaganda and agitation material indicated the need to change the priorities in the formation of the subject. Party-class approaches did not play their role for effective informational and psychological influence on the hostile army.

The necessity of detailed investigation of the matters of mentality, cultural and religious preferences of the Hitler's Army came up. There was an important role of the information about family values and national-socialist training of the warriors.

Thus, the specialists of the political departments of the fronts and armies had to study the enemy units carefully. Much attention was paid to working with trophy documents for their further use in appeals to the enemy. Not immediately the command of all unions meant the importance of working with the enemy and the enemy's population. In the first period of the German -Soviet War prevailed such a direction as work with the enemy. General political and specialist propaganda in this period of the war was often identical, as areas of work with different segments of the target audience have not yet been worked out.

It should be noted that the main role in the success of Soviet propaganda was played by events on the fronts. The success of the Red Army was the best incentive to work with the personnel of the invaders. The need to study the experience of the activity of the radical-red-tape ideological structures in the first period of the German-Soviet war is extremely important. This experience makes it possible to understand the peculiarities of the use of the information product and various channels of communication for the implementation of information and psychological impact on the personnel and the enemy's population. For modern military conflicts, attempts are made to minimize the use of forces and losses. One way of doing this is to organize advocacy and campaign activities aimed at the target audience.

References

1. Baranov, V.P. (Ed.) (2012). Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna 1941-1945 godov: v 12 t. T. 3. Bitvyi i srazheniya, izmenivshie hod voynyi. Izd. dop. i ispr. Moskva: Kuchkovo pole [in Russian].

2. Burtsev, M.I. (1981). Prozrenie. Moskva: Voenizdat [in Russian].

3. Burtsev, M.I. (Ed.) (1971). Politicheskaya rabota sredi voysk i naseleniya pro- tivnika v godyi Velikoy Otechestvennoy voynyi (1941-1945). Moskva: Voenizdat [in Russian].

4. Gogun, A. (2016). Chernyiy piar Adolfa Gitlera. SSSR v zerkale natsistskoy propa- gandyi. Kiev: K.I.S. [in Russian].

5. Gritsyuk, V.M. (2010). Strategichni ta frontovi operatsiyi Velikoyi Vitchiznyanoyi viyni na teritoriyi Ukrayini. Kyiv: Poligraf. dilnitsya Instytutu Istoriyi Ukrayini NAN Ukrayini [in Ukrainian].