Indexical and sequential properties of criticisms in initial interactions: implications for examining (im) politeness across cultures

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The University of Queensland, School of Languages and Cultures

Gordon Greenwood Building, Union Road, The University of Queensland

Indexical and sequential properties of criticisms in initial interactions: implications for examining (im) politeness across cultures

Michael Haugh and Wei-Lin Melody Chang

St Lucia

Abstract

Cross-cultural studies of (im)politeness have tended to focus on identifying differences in linguistic behaviour by which speech acts are delivered, which are then explained as motivated by underlying cultural differences. In this paper, we argue that this approach unnecessarily backgrounds emic or cultural members' understandings of (im)politeness. Through a comparative analysis of criticisms in initial interactions amongst Taiwanese speakers of Mandarin Chinese and amongst Australian speakers of English, we draw attention to the way in which similarities in the locally situated ways in which criticisms are delivered and responded to (i.e. their sequential properties) can mask differences in the culturally relevant meanings of criticisms (i.e. their indexical properties) in the respective languages. We conclude that cross-cultural studies of (im)politeness should not only focus on differences in the forms or strategies by which speech acts are accomplished, but remain alert to the possibility that what is ostensibly the same speech act, may in fact be interpreted in different ways by members of different cultural groups.

Keywords: (im)politeness, speech act, criticism, initial interaction, (Australian) English, (Mandarin) Chinese, cross-cultural pragmatics

Аннотация

Индексальные и последовательные свойства критических замечаний в начале коммуникации: подходы к изучению (не)вежливости в кросс-культурном аспекте

Майкл Хо и Вей-Лин Мелоди Чанг Университет Квинсленда, Австралия Gordon Greenwood Building, Union Road, St Lucia, Australia

Кросс-культурные исследования вежливости и невежливости обычно нацелены на выявление различий в вербальном поведении, проявляющихся в реализации отдельных речевых актов, которые затем объясняются основными культурными различиями. В этой статье показано, что данный подход излишне опирается на эмический взгляд на (не)вежливость, т.е на ее понимание носителями данной культуры. Посредством сравнительного анализа критики в начальной фазе общения тайваньских носителей китайского языка и австралийских носителей английского языка мы обращаем внимание на то, как сходства в способах выражения критики и ответов на нее (то есть их последовательные свойства) могут скрывать различия в релевантных для культуры значениях критики (то есть различия их индексальных свойств) в соответствующих языках. Мы пришли к выводу, что межкультурные исследования (не)вежливости должны не только выявлять различия в формах и стратегиях, с помощью которых реализуются речевые акты, но и учитывать то, что якобы одни и те же речевые акты на самом деле могут быть по-разному истолкованы членами различных культурных групп.

Ключевые слова: (не)вежливость, речевой акт, критика, начальная фаза взаимодействия, австралийский английский, китайский (мандарин), кросс-культурная прагматика

Introduction

Studies of (im)politeness across languages and cultures have generally focused on identifying differences in (linguistic) behaviour that are then explained as cultural differences, with much of this work in cross-cultural pragmatics focusing on requests, apologies, compliments and compliment responses (Sifianou & Garces-Conejos Blitvich 2017: 584). Brown and Levinson's (1978, 1987) politeness theory has long been a popular vehicle for these kinds of cross-cultural (im)politeness studies, in large part because that is what Brown and Levinson's theory was designed to do. While the discursive turn in (im)politeness research has subsequently challenged the validity of Brown and Levinson's approach (Eelen 2011; Mills 2003), such critical work has not provided a clear alternative way forward for studying (im)politeness across languages and cultures (Grainger 2013; Sifianou & Garces-Conejos Blitvich 2017). This has led to a return to a neo-Brown and Levinsonian stance, in which the same theoretical tools (positive and negative face, face-threatening acts and so on) are deployed with discourse data, as opposed to the utterance-based analyses found in Brown and Levinson's original.

This has, in turn, reinforced the view that cross-cultural studies of (im)politeness are about identifying differences in (linguistic) behaviour, which are then explained as motivated by underlying cultural differences.

One problem with this approach, however, is that it under-estimates the extent to which the same (linguistic) behaviour can have different meanings for members across languages and cultures. This point was already noted in passing by House and Kasper (1981) in their concluding remarks of a comparative study of “complaints” in English and German.

From an etic standpoint, then, the behaviour of the German speakers may well be considered impolite by reference to an English norm; however, from an emic standpoint, which is the one we would prefer here, one would simply claim that the differential behaviour displayed by the German and English speakers may be a reflection of the fact that the two cultural systems are organized differently, and that, e.g., a level 6 complaint in the German culture is not necessarily comparable to a level 6 complaint in the English culture, because the value of each is derived from the value it has relative to the remaining levels, and their frequency and modality of use in the particular cultural system (House and Kasper 1981: 184).

It follows from House and Kasper's comparative analysis that although British and German speakers of English may readily understand a “complaint” is being made through a particular form, they may not be aware that the (im)politeness value of that “complaint” is likely to be different depending on the cultural background of the speaker. The point made here by House and Kasper (1981) arguably has important implications for both cross-cultural and intercultural studies of (im)politeness. In the case of cross- cultural studies of (im)politeness, we have the problem of ensuring we are actually comparing like with like. House and Kasper (1981) claim that while the same form may deliver the same speech act across two languages, its so-called “(im)politeness value” may differ. In other words, the indexical value of analogous syntactic forms is different across English and German. Comparing the same forms therefore does not amount to comparing the same thing. In the case of studies of (im)politeness in intercultural settings, the potential for “hidden misunderstandings” (Carbaugh 2005) is clear, given the same form may have different indexical values unbeknownst to those participants.

In recent years researchers have shifted from the emic-etic distinction to making a distinction between first-order participant and second-order analyst understandings of (im)politeness (Watts, Ide & Ehlich 1992; Eelen 2001). In much of this work, participant understandings are treated as essentially synonymous with emic (or cultural members') understandings, and analyst (or scientific) understandings are treated as synonymous with etic (or cultural non-members') understandings. In short, the emic- etic distinction has been more or less reconstrued as a distinction between first-order participant and second-order analyst understandings. A move that was advocated by Brown and Levinson themselves in their introduction to the 1987 reissue of the original 1978 publication.

An underlying theoretical question this raises for (im)politeness research is whether the emic-etic and participant-analyst distinctions actually encapsulate the same thing. There has been some debate about this by (im)politeness researchers (Haugh 2012; Kadar & Haugh 2013; Spencer-Oatey & Kadar 2016), in part, because there are different extant definitions of the emic-etic distinction (Headland, Pike & Harris 1990). The emic-etic distinction can be made with reference to participants, systems or both. When the emic-etic distinction is applied to participants (i.e. cultural members/insiders versus non-members/outsiders), it is invoked as grounds for interpretation by analysts. When the emic-etic distinction is applied to cultural systems (i.e. culture-internal versus culture-comparative orientation), it is invoked as grounds for theorisation by scientific observers. In other words, the emic-etic distinction can be conceptualised in two distinct ways with respect to participants and analysts.

Figure 1 Theorising perspectives on talk and conduct

These perspectives are, of course, necessarily interlinked in that analysis presupposes theorisation of some sort or another (even if that theorisation is only tacit), while theorisation presupposes analysis of some sort or another (even if that analysis is only introspective in nature). Different researchers place varying emphasis on these different possible perspectives and how they might be formally interlinked.

In this paper, the overall aim is to examine the role of emic or cultural members' understandings in studies of (im)politeness across languages and cultures. We attempt to do this through the lens of a speech act that has not received much attention to date in (im)politeness research, namely, criticisms. We examine criticisms, specifically other-criticisms, in initial interactions in which participants are getting acquainted. The advantage of this type of data is that in such settings the relational history of the participants is transparent to the analyst. The culturally relevant meanings of criticisms (i.e. their indexical properties), and the locally situated ways which they are delivered and responded to (i.e. their sequential properties), are thus equally accessible to both participants and analysts.

We begin, in the following section, by briefly discussing prior research on criticisms, before going on, in section 3, to introduce the dataset in question and outline our methodological approach. We next report, in section 4, on our comparative analysis of criticisms in initial interactions amongst Taiwanese speakers of Mandarin Chinese versus criticisms in initial interactions amongst Australian speakers of English. Building on this comparative analysis we argue, in section 5, that while these criticisms may have similar sequential properties, they nevertheless have distinct indexical properties. In short, we claim that while the criticisms are delivered and responded to in similar ways by the participants in both languages, from an emic (i.e. cultural members') perspective the evaluative and relational import of these criticisms is not the same for speakers of these two languages. We conclude by briefly discussing the implications of our study for cross-cultural (im)politeness research.

Prior research on criticisms

The act of criticism involves pointing out some kind of fault (i.e. weakness, failing, misdemeanour or mistake) for which a party is presumed to be responsible, and expressing disapproval of that fault (Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online 2019; Oxford English Dictionary Online 2019). In short, “to negatively evaluate a person for some act or quality for which that person is deemed responsible” (Pillet-Shore 2016: 54). In some cases, the speaker also implies that the criticised target should do something to remedy or address that fault (Nguyen 2008: 45; Pillet-Shore 2015: 375).

Researchers have often studied criticisms together with complaints, accusations, reproaches, and the like without differentiating between them (e.g. D'Amico-Reisner 1983; House and Kasper 1981; Malle, Gugliemo & Monroe 2014; Morris 1988). However, conflating these acts is arguably problematic. From a speech act theoretic perspective, while all these different actions constitute assertions of some kind of fault -- or offence, transgression or wrongdoing etc. -- on the part of the referent, they can nevertheless be distinguished on semantic grounds (Vanderveken 1990; Wierzbicka 1987). From an interactional perspective, participants in interaction can be shown to display investment in discerning between these acts as well. Pillet-Shore (2016), for instance, points out that one can criticise without complaining, and draws attention to systematic ways in which participants may orient to this distinction in parent-teacher interviews.

In (im)politeness research, criticisms have generally been treated as a face- threatening act (Brown & Levinson 1987: 66), which can thus be used as an impoliteness strategy (Bousfield 2008; Culpeper 2011, 2015) Criticisms can, of course, be delivered within a non-serious or joking key or frame, in which case they are regarded as a means of showing solidarity or intimacy (Brown & Levinson 1987; Leech 1983).. For that reason, criticisms are claimed to be prototypically delivered via off-record strategies, including through hints, presuppositions, understatements, tautologies, contradictions, irony, rhetorical questions and over-generalisations (Brown & Levinson 1987: 213--226). They also note, in passing, that criticisms can be implied through soliciting accounts or reasons for some state of affairs for which the addressee is held responsible (pp. 128--129; cf. Bolden & Robinson 2011). The focus in (im)politeness research has largely been on criticisms that are delivered to prompt some kind of action or change on the part of the target. Brown and Levinson (1987) claim, for instance, that “the construction of hints for other FTAs not requiring H[earer] to perform some act -- for indirect criticisms, for instance -- involves complex processes beyond the scope of this paper (and, indeed, beyond our present understanding)” (p. 215).

A survey of empirical work on criticisms to date suggests that little has changed in that respect. While there have been a number of studies of criticisms that are designed to suggest or even require that the fault in question be redressed, we still know very little about criticisms where the aim is to insult or wound the target (Tayebi 2018). Empirical studies have focused for the most part on examining criticisms in institutional contexts, including in appraisal meetings in which supervisors are evaluating work performance (Asmub 2008; Copland 2011; Schuer 2014; Tracy & Eisenberg 1990/91), in feedback sessions where academic work is being evaluated (Li & Seale 2007; Nguyen 2008), or in parent-teacher interviews in which students' work is being reported upon (Pillet-Shore 2015, 2016). In such contexts, criticisms are licensed by the roles of participants in those settings. However, while criticisms may be licensed in such settings, they are nevertheless invariably treated as sensitive, dispreferred and face-threatening social actions. Participants have been shown to orient, for instance, to the fact that criticisms can cause hurt feelings (Copland 2011), convey expectations that the target will do something to remedy the fault (Pillet-Shore 2015), pass (unwelcome) moral judgment on others (AsmuB 2008), or display claims to have expertise or knowledge about the target that may be resisted by the latter (Pomerantz 1984).

Less frequently, criticisms have been examined in interpersonal, everyday contexts (e.g. Lang 2018; Tayebi 2018; Tracy, Van Dusen & Robinson 1987), although such studies have relied, for the most part, on fictional data, field notes or diary reports, with the exception of early work by Pomerantz (1984) on assessments in naturally occurring conversations. The latter notes that in everyday conversation criticisms are typically delivered with a dispreferred action or turn shape (if at all). To the best of our knowledge, then, there are very few studies that have examined how criticisms arise and how they are responded to in everyday, interpersonal interactions, and even fewer that attempt to compare criticisms across languages and cultures, despite Brown and Levinson (1987) acknowledging that the extent to which criticisms are considered face-threatening can vary across cultures.

In the following sections, we attempt to begin to redress that gap through reporting on a case study in which we compared criticisms arising in initial interactions amongst Taiwanese speakers of Chinese with those arising in initial interactions amongst Australian speakers of English.

Data and method

Our collection of criticisms was assembled drawing from two different corpora. The first is the Australians Getting Acquainted (AGA) corpus, a collection of eighteen audio-recordings and associated transcripts of initial interactions amongst Australian speakers of English (approximately five hours in total) (Haugh 2011). The second is a subset of the Mandarin Conversation Dialogue Corpus (MCDC), a collection of ten audio-recordings and associated transcripts of initial interactions amongst Taiwanese speakers of Mandarin Chinese (approximately eight hours in total) (Tseng 2004, 2008). Ten conversations were selected from AGA in order to match the gender and age pairings in the ten conversations taken from MCDC. The 10 interactions from each corpora consisted of the same sets of gender pairings (4 same-gender; 6 different gender pairings), and the same sets of age pairings (7 similar age; 3 different age pairings). Both corpora employed the same protocol implemented by Svennevig (1999): it was explained to voluntary participants that they were being recorded for the purposes of studying communication, but no specific topics to talk about were given to them.

Our analysis began by jointly identifying putative instances of criticism in the comparative dataset in cases where we agreed that a negative evaluation of the other interlocutor was readily inferable. This was accomplished through listening to the entire recording of every interaction. For the purposes of this exercise we define a criticism as an instance in which a speaker negatively evaluates the conduct or character of their co-present interlocutor, that is, indicates disapproval of the conduct or character of the addressed recipient (Pillet-Shore 2016: 54) Criticisms can be other-directed or self-directed. As the term self-deprecation is commonly used in the literature to refer to self-criticisms, we use the term criticism here in the way it is normally used by researchers to refer more specifically to instances of other-criticism, unless it is important for our analysis to draw attention to that distinction..

In excerpt (1), for instance, Natalie assesses Gary's enunciation as unclear in lines 201--202 (the turn in question is marked with an arrow in the transcription below).

(1) AGA09: 7:10

G: they'll hate me HA HA ha [ha ha]

N: ^ [we:ll I-] you weren't really

enunciating very clearly there I have to sa(h)y°he he°

(0.8)

N: .hh [but ]

G: [what] did they want us to do

Assessments are defined as “utterances that offer an evaluation of a referent with a clear valence (e.g. as good, bad, outrageous, tragic, or funny)” (Stivers & Rossano 2010: 9; cf. Couper-Kuhlen & Selting 2018: 283). In other words, assessments are positive or negative evaluations of a person, third party, external object or situation arising through current or past participation in joint activity (Goodwin & Goodwin 1992; Pomerantz 1984). Assessments can implement a range of different actions depending on the target and valence of the assessment, including compliments, selfpraise, self-deprecations and criticisms or reproaches (Couper-Kuhlen & Selting 2018; Edwards & Potter 2017). In the above case, the assessment implements a criticism as Natalie is negatively evaluating Gary's current enunciation, and shows disapproval (due to the trouble this will cause for those who will be later transcribing their conver- sation) Just prior to this excerpt they have been talking about how their conversation will be boring to listen to for the transcribers (data not shown).. She orients to the sensitivity of this criticism through interpolated aspiration and laughter at the end of the turn in question (Shaw, Hepburn & Potter 2013).

After identifying potential instances of criticism, we then closely examined the sequential environments within which these criticisms arose through reviewing the recordings, and closely transcribing the instances in question using conventions from conversation analysis (Jefferson 2004). In the case above, the (serious) other-criticism in question arises in response to a (joking) self-criticism by the prior speaker. However, we found through detailed sequential analysis of our set of candidate examples that criticisms in initial interactions are more typically implemented via barbs or teases, rather than through explicit negative assessments.

A barb is a criticism in which a negative evaluation of other is implied, rather being explicitly delivered through a clearly valenced adjective (e.g. wonderful, good, awful, boring, unclear). In other words, the criticism is made available through inference to the recipient rather than through what is explicitly said. Prior to excerpt (2), Natalie has been prompting Gary to ask her some questions. He responds by claiming he has no questions to ask her.

(2) AGA09: 8:00

G: U:M I haven't got any questions to task you

actually.

(1.1)

N: -- tyou must be fun at parties. Hhh

G: #don't like parties#

Natalie responds, in turn, by assessing Gary as someone who must be “fun” at parties (line 349). In this case, however, it is clear that she is being sarcastic and implying the opposite, namely, that he would not be fun at parties. In so doing she implies that he is a poor conversationalist, and possibly a boring person. The implied criticism here thus consists of a barb about his character. Notably, Gary responds to this barb by claiming he does not like parties (line 350), thereby undermining the relevance of Natalie's barb for him (cf. Haugh 2011: 178--179) This is subsequently developed by Gary into an account (see example 10)..

A tease is an (ostensibly) playful or jocular mocking jibe or taunt directed at another party. It is thus another way of criticising others, albeit one in which the teaser can disclaim responsibility for this criticism through claims to have been “just kidding”, “only joking”, “just teasing” and so on (Haugh & Pillet-Shore 2018). In excerpt (3), Gary is talking with Emma about how traditional Chinese culture has been pushed aside in modern China

Gary describes this as a real tragedy (line 180). However, after a gap in which Emma does not affiliate with his assessment (line 181), he subsequently suggests they“just move on” (line 182). This occasions a tease in lines 183--184 by Emma that Gary has “been around too long” (i.e. that he's overly jaded or cynical), which prompts shared laughter (lines 185--186), a repeat of the tease by Emma (lines 186--187), and subsequent laughing agreement from Gary (line 188). In this case, the criticism that Gary is overly jaded is treated, ostensibly at least, as non-serious by both participants.

Comparative analysis of criticisms in initial interactions

A number of key findings emerged from our comparative case study of criticisms in initial interactions amongst Australian speakers of English and Taiwanese speakers of Mandarin Chinese. First, despite being characterised as an inherently face-threatening act (Brown & Levinson 1987), criticisms were nevertheless found to arise in initial interactions amongst both Australian and Taiwanese participants. However, only instances of barbs were found to occur across both datasets. It was also evident that criticisms are treated as dispreferred actions in initial interactions by both Australian and Taiwanese participants. Second, there were two formats through which criticisms are commonly delivered: assessments and account solicitations. Third, criticisms can target either the character or the conduct of the other party. We now move to discuss, in turn, each of these findings in more detail.

Criticisms and responses to criticisms in initial interactions