Freedom of Assembly in Non-Democratic Regimes: Shifts in Policing Methods to Peaceful Protest as an Indication of Political Regime Change in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus

Policy Response to Freedom of Assembly in Belarus

Unlike the regimes of Russia and Ukraine which have undergone a regime change and this shift has translated into actionable policy change, Belarus has not undergone any observable regime change and thus, in line with the observations of the other case studies, its predicted should have limited to no change in protest legislation.

Similar to many other post-soviet states, freedom of assembly is enshrined in the Belarusian Constitution. “Article 35 of the Belarusian Constitution” affirms that assemblies, rallies, street marches, demonstrations and pickets shall be guaranteed by the state if they do not disturb law and order or violate the rights of other citizens of the Republic of Belarus. Although freedom of assembly is a constitutionally protected right, the control and regulation of this is determined primarily by “The Law on Mass actions No 114-Z” with the subsequent sentencing guidelines set out in within “The Code of Administrative offence of the Republic of Belarus” (Cis-legislation, 2019).

The Law on Mass Actions No 114-Z Law No 114-7 has also been translated in some source as The Law on Mass Events but will hereinafter only be referred to as The Law on Mass Actions.  introduced in 1997, establishes the legal procedure for `mass action' as outlined in Article 35 of the constitution (Law of the Republic of Belarus, 2015). In brief, this law stipulates the legal requirement for organising a protest and the punitive measures the state can introduce for individuals who have violated the law. Of particular importance is Article 15 establishing that if a `mass action' causes damage or negatively impacts the rights and legitimate interest of other citizens, the political party, trade union or other organising organisation can be dissolved (Law of the Republic of Belarus, 2015). Despite since 1997 no new law having been introduced, the Belarusian state policy on freedom of assembly has experienced some development in the form of the continuous amendments to the Law on Mass Action. The ten amendments introduced since 1997 highlight how responsive the Belarusian state is to potential threats to the stability of its regime. Unlike Russia or Ukraine that have in the past introduced brand-new laws that introduce broad and sweeping powers to mitigate against protest events, the amendments found in Belarus are typically introduced in response to a single issue and thus represent a far less dramatic shift in the state policy. In 2015 an amendment was introduced that prohibited participants of mass action to wear masks or other items that may shield their identity. In 2016, the law was again amended to prohibit participants of mass action to carry explosives and ammunition (Law of the Republic of Belarus, 2015). Interestingly, this was not in response to any domestic incidents but instead a reflection of the protest tactics used during the Euromaidan protests in neighbouring Ukraine.

In 2012, the Venice Commission and the OSCE ODIHR published a joint opinion (Right of Assembly, 2012) in the review of the Law of Mass Events and found that the current state policy does not comply with international standards on Freedom of Assembly (OSCE, 2010). They affirm that currently there is excessive overregulation of the procedural criteria to organise a mass action. Additionally, the joint opinion found that the legal framework is ambiguous towards a state's affirmative duties to uphold and facilitate the right to freedom of assembly leading to administrative authorities exploiting this ambiguously and the increased discretion awarded to them to restrict the ability to organise or participate in mass assemblies.

Whilst the Law on Mass Actions No 114-Z is the single legal framework that sets out the restrictions or conditions for mass assemblies, the code of administrative offensives sets out the punitive measures the state can introduce for breaching the law (Right of Assembly, 2012). For example, Article 23 outlines the punitive measures a state can take if an individual has breached the law, including fines and detention. In 2017 it was recorded that three cases were brought against the organiser of peaceful assemblies, of which two of the organisers were sentenced to 15 days of detention, which is the strictest punishment that can be given. The state does not only limit punishment to event organisers but additionally targets participants and independent observers. In Belarus just participating in unsanctioned mass action, even if peaceful, can warrant arrest and prosecution and even if the arrest procedure isn't initiated at the time of the protest, many mass action participants are arrested and subsequently charged with administrative responsibility as participants of an unauthorized protest, days or week after the original event. Additionally, human rights observers who have historically been permitted to conduct independent monitoring of protest events have increasingly been restricted in their ability to monitoring and report on the state's commitment to freedom of assembly, through mass arrests prior to the start of the protest (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2017).

Similar to the consolidation of right to freedom of assembly, the Belarusian state policy of restricting peaceful protest has extended to almost all forms of political participation. For example, the use of referendums to implement policy change is accessible to the general public but similar to the organisation of protests, are heavily regulated by the state. The state introduced a self-funding policy for any individual or group that proposes the referendum but additionally introduced a control on the maximum amount of financial contributions. The purpose of this policy is unclear other than to restrictive the inciting group from raising the required funds to meet the state's financial criteria for referendums (Viasna, 2019).

In summary, what we observe is that the Belarusian regime has a clear and consistent policy to limit political participation and protest. As previously stated, even during periods of liberalised policing response to peaceful protest, the state still enacts a policy of restriction and repression by arresting and charging protest participants once the event has concluded. A number of recommendations have been directed at Belarus to improve their policy on freedom of assembly. This has constantly included amending their notification-based principle of holding peaceful assemblies; reducing the threshold for the responsibility of event organisers and removing unreasonable restrictions placed on the venues of mass events, but yet there has been a limited change.

As the Belarusian case demonstrates, there is an intrinsic link between protest policing and legislative response to the overall regime dynamics. Unlike the previous case studies that observed both a clear shift in policing and policy response to peaceful protest, that indicated a subsequent regime shift, the Belarusian case did not indicate either, and as predicted did not experience a shift in the regime dynamics.

Findings of the Regime Focusing Events and the Corresponding Shifts in Policing Response and State Policy Towards Freedom of Assembly

Seen to be a watershed moment within recent history, the Bolotnaya square protests of 2011 to 2013 was concluded to be the protest cycle that best corresponds with a change in state policy towards freedom of assembly, a shift in policing methods to peaceful protests and a change in overall regime dynamics.

Specifically, May 6th, 2012, of the Bolotnaya Square protests was indicated to be the single event in which the shift in policing methods can be observed. On May 6th the policing response to peaceful protest changed from a response generally compliant with international standards to one that prioritised tactics of mass -arrest and indiscriminate violence.

This corresponding change indicated by the shift in policing tactics on May 6th was reflected in the change in regime dynamics within Russia from Hybrid regime to Authoritarian Regime, and additionally the introduction of amendments to the Law on Assemblies, Rallies, Demonstrations, Marches and Pickets and the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the restricted and constrained the rights to participate in peaceful protest.

In Ukraine, the Euromaidan protest of 2013-2014 was concluded to be the protest cycle that best reflects a corresponding change in regime dynamics, a shift in policing methods to peaceful protests and a change in overall regime dynamics.

Specifically, the events of 29th and 30th of November when the Berkut police violently attacked a small group of peaceful protest is seen to be the single event in which the shift in policing response to peaceful protest can be observed.

This corresponding change in overall regime dynamics and state policy was observed by the shift from a hybrid regime to an authoritarian regime and subsequently through the fraudulent introduction of the so-called `dictatorship laws'.

In Belarus, there was a distinct absence in focusing event that could be identified to correspond to a change in overall regime dynamics and a change in state policy towards freedom of assembly.

It was identified that the Belarusian regime implements a verity of measures to mitigate against the likelihood of large protest events occurring including through the development of a client-patron relationship between the state and its workers, and through extensive bureaucratic hurdles that are in place to limit protest organisation.

Conclusions on the Regime Focusing Events and the Corresponding Shifts in Policing Response and State Policy Towards Freedom of Assembly

In conclusion, within both Russia and Ukraine, we can observe a change in policing behaviour towards peaceful protest that corresponds to the previously identified period of regime change. Furthermore, through examining the legislative response towards freedom of assembly we can further confirm that the corresponding shift in policing behaviour and overall regime dynamics also corresponds to a change in state policy.

This allows us to conclude that there is an intrinsic relationship between a states overall regime dynamics and their response and actions towards freedom of assembly. Through examining all three case study countries we can affirm that during a period in which a state has shifted from a hybrid regime towards an authoritarian regime, this change corresponds to the use of a more enforcement-based policing strategy as shown within Russian in the May 6th Bolotnaya Square Protests and again during the Euromaidan protests on 29th and 30th of November. As demonstrated with the introduction of either amendments or new additions to the state legislator, the change in regime dynamic towards authoritarian governance further corresponds to the implementation of restrictive policies.

5. Analysis of Changes in Freedom of Assembly Legislation

Having previously identified that the presence of a change in policy within Russia and Ukraine coincided with both a change in policing response to peaceful protest and a broader shift in regime behaviour, it is subsequently important to understand how this change came about. As the current understanding of policy change dictates that during periods of regime stability or crisis, the tools and process of policymaking differs (Thomas and Grindle, 1990), the discussion within this chapter will be underpinned by a broader theoretical reflection upon the unique regime characteristics of the countries under study.

Policy Cycle in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes

A number of analytical tools may have been utilised to study the process of policy change within Russia and Ukraine but due to the nature of the respective political regime, this research was constrained to a tool suited to studying policy change within non-democratic states. Thus, due to this criterion, theories such as the punctuated equilibrium theory that have been explicitly designed to be used in western consolidated democracies was not suitable. Thus, upon reflection, the policy analysis tool of the policy cycle has been chosen due to its applicability to both democratic and non-democratic regimes alike. Whilst the policy cycle is applicable within these case studies, as I shall demonstrate the nature of policy change within many non-democratic regimes means that there is often a delineation from the traditional conception of the policy cycle that has been historically proposed.

Agenda Setting: Problem recognition and issue selection

The agenda-setting stage is typically observed to be the first process within the policy cycle and increasingly scholars have recognised the importance of this stage and its influence over policy outcomes. This stage is formed through the amalgamation of two distinct processes; the process of identifying a social problem and the subsequent selection of this problem by the state to receive an intervention (Jann and Wegrich, 2007).

Within a democratic society, the agenda-setting stage can arise through the engagement with the plurality of political opportunities that exist within the state. There are a variety of factors that may hinder the ability to enter an issue into a governments agenda, including institutional or procedural limitations or intense competition within the policy formulation process (Hammond and Miller, 1987; Miller and Hammond, 1990; Tsebelis, 1995; Kim, 2008). Despite these limitations, within a democratic society, the state should seek to facilitate participation in what is seen to be the most crucial factor in defining a state's national agenda (Kingdom, 1995).

Even within the first stage of the policy cycle, a difference can be observed between the behaviour within democratic and non-democratic regimes. The continued consolidation of rights and freedoms within non-democratic regimes means the outside engagement with the agenda-setting process is severely limited. Issues that are not aligned with the policy agenda already developed by the state have a very limited chance of being included in the national agenda, this is unless the problem emerges as a threat to the regimes current stability (Chan and Zhao, 2015). Subsequently, this means that often in non-democratic regimes any participation from outside policy actors at the agenda-setting stage occurs through force, whereby an issue is coerced into the agenda because without recognising or addressing the issue, the regime's stability and legitimacy may come under threat (Lodge and Hood, 2002). One example of this is through the mass mobilisation of a countries population regarding a single policy issue. In both democratic and non-democratic states, this form of political engagement is an effective way to influence the policy agenda (Cobb et al., 1976; Birkland, 1997), but the impact of mass mobilisation on non-democratic regimes is even more salient due to the complex and often fearful relationships that authoritarian states have with protest and dissent.

Policy Formulation and Decision-Making

After the agenda-setting stage is completed the policy formulation and decision-making process then occurs. The policy formulation and decision-making stages of the policy cycle occurs when the proposed achievable objective of the policy is defined, and any other divergent policy actions are considered.

Within this stage in a consolidated democracy, the state spends time gathering and analysing information relevant to the new policy direction (Lindbloom, 1968; Wildavsky, 1979) whilst members of the ministerial bureaucracy and state civil servants spend time developing relationships with members of the broader policy sphere to engage with and help formulate the policy (Dogan 1975; Heclo and Wildavsky 1974). Authoritarian regimes operate through a highly centralized decision-making structure, where `strategic demand' is formed through a single main decision-making centre (Belyaeva, 2019). The policy formulation and decision-making stage are further complicated within non-democratic regimes because even when a centralized decision-making core has been established, the regime often implements a strategy that determines who and how a regime can be criticized (Alagappa, 1995). This results in the production of an asymmetric knowledge base (Gandhi and Lust-okar, 2009; Truex, 2014) whereby members of the state bureaucracy can only deliver information that is already complimentary to the opinion and decision of the regime.

Legitimisation

Following the policy formulation stage comes the process of legitimisation. Legitimization occurs both internally within the state structure and externally within the public arena. The legitimization of a policy can be affirmed through a range of methods. One such method is the use of procedural legitimacy, whereby through the implementation of rule-based mechanisms or the use of a legalistic framework such as parliamentary approval, judicial implementation or through the mandate of the executive branch. For procedural legitimisation to be effective, the policy must be implemented and constrained through mechanisms that meet both the constitutional and legal requirements of the state (Carr, 1993). Importantly legal implementation of the policy provides the policy with key attribute associated with a legitimate policy: the state-wide application of the policy, the obligation to obey and the right of the state to use coercion to achieve compliance (Carr, 1993).

Secondly, this stage occurs when the bureaucratic ranks attempt to ensure that the new policy has broad support and establishes that the policy is both legal and authoritative. In non-democratic regimes where there is not a broad acceptance of the democratic characteristics of the state, the regime may seek to implement other strategies of legitimisation to court public opinion. Some regimes may use a process of hyper personalism, by which the qualities, charisma and personality of a leader are used as the source of legitimacy (Weber, 1968,1980; Nelson, 1984). This form of legitimization seeks to place an individual as a central component to a nations unity, prosperity and stability (Issacs, 2010) and thus when presenting the policy to the public seek to exploit centrality of the leader to the decision-making process. For example, within Russia, the iconography of the Putin regime has become a central claim to legitimacy (von Soest and Grauvogel 2015) and through developing a historical narrative of past successes, leadership capabilities and expertise of the regime and Putin, the state can pre-emptively legitimize policy decisions.

Policy Evaluation

One of the more final stages of the policy cycle is the evaluation. Traditionally this stage of the cycle is understood as the process of assessment in which public policy is assessed to see if it was successful in achieving its stated objective. If the policy did not have the desired effect that this stage will seek to understand what can be done to address the policy shortfalls (Howlett 2015). David Nachmias (1979) further explains this process policy as “the objective, systematic, empirical examination of the effects of ongoing policies and public programs have on their targets in terms of the goals they are meant to achieve”. Despite the conventional understanding of the policy cycle dictating the importance of the evaluation stage, Ingram and Mann (1980) argue that the process of evaluation can be highly subjective as often the goals of a policy are not clearly articulated during the policy development or implementation stage.

This stage of the policy cycle indicates that inherent to some policy systems there is a `feedback loop' but as demonstrated throughout this section, not all policy systems are the same, so within some cases, this form of evaluation may not be fully operationalised or may only result in minor changes to the original conception of the policy (Pierson, 1993). Due to the information asymmetry that exists within many non-democratic regimes and the limited opportunity to provide critical or contradictory information, there may not exist an opportunity to undertake a full evaluation of the policy.

Policy Change Towards Freedom of Assembly in Russia

Using the policy cycle, we have already established how policy change can be implemented within both non-democratic regimes but pertinent to this study, it is also important to reflect more specifically on the identified focusing events of the regime change in Russia and Ukraine. Within Russia, it has already been established that the change and amendment to the Law on Assemblies, Rallies, Demonstrations, Marches and Pickets corresponds to the events of the Bolotnaya Square protest on May 6th. This amendment shifted the Russian state's policy on freedom of assembly from a policy that was seen to be generally compliant with international standards to a policy that many believed was now in contradiction and thus warrants further exploration into how this policy change came about.

The anti-regime sentiment and the continued mass mobilisation of the Bolotnaya Square protests, especially on the eve of Putin's inauguration can easily be assumed to be the defining moment that caught the attention of the state and warranted that the actions of the protest received and intervention by the state. The mobilising frames of the protest that have already been discussed within chapter 4 focused on the integrity of the elections and thus the legitimacy of Putin's tenure as head of state thus forcing the state to take action. Current research suggests that when a regime is forced to take notice of an issue then the response and intervention that is developed is more restrictive or repressive than other policy responses.

Once the agenda had been set then the process of policy formulation and decision making occurs. Traditionally this would enable a range of policy options to be articulated but due to the construction of the Russian state in which the hegemonic dominance of the regime is supported by bureaucratic and civil servants loyal to the regime (Olson, 2000), this may not have fully occurred. As the Russian state bureaucratic network does not allow for dissident voices or for contradictory information to be raised and the additional urgency of for the state to address the protests, it can be assumed that the policy formation and decision-making stages were not fully complete.

Once the policy to further limit the ability to protest was formulated, the state sought to use a range of legitimisation strategies to support and defend this action. Arguably one of the most commonly used legitimisation mechanisms is the procedural legitimisation mechanism (Scmidt and Wood, 2019) in which the regime implements policy through a popular vote in the state legislative body. The regime ensures it can continuously maintain procedural legitimacy by dominating the political arena through a process of limiting the potential participation of opposition groups. One way this was achieved is through the implementation of the so-called `municipal filter' that effectively limited all oppositional candidates through mandating all candidates standing for the role of the governor must first court the support of 5-10% municipal deputies (Belyaeva, 2019). Due to the overwhelming number of United Russia supporters as a municipal level, this filter works by effectively excluding all non-aligned candidates (Nagornykh, 2017). This means that the regime can effectively ensure that all policy objectives can be implemented through a popular vote in the state legislator to which it effectively controls. Even with an overwhelming dominance within all aspects of the political sphere, the regime ensures to maintain control over its party members and elected officials. A distinct absence of any ideological basis of the current dominate party of United Russia allows the party to align itself with whatever policy decision the regime seeks to establish. Furthermore, through providing access to political careers, state patronage and other resources Belyaeva, 2019) the regime develops a party of loyalists, who if they attempt to wavier from the pre-determined policy direction set by the regime will have these benefits withheld and will, in essence, be punished. Both the strategies of ensuring that the United Russia party is the single dominating party within all aspects of the political sphere and developing a system to limit dissent from within the party, the regime can ensure that all policy initiatives are voted on appropriacy and passed within the state legislative body.

The regime attempted to develop a narrative that the protesters were illegitimate and did not represent the concerns of the Russian public as the protesters were not genuine and in fact paid or encouraged by foreign governments, including by America's Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton (The Guardian, 2011). The regime also attempted to define the motivations of the protests as to undemocratically oust the regime and in effect lead a civilian coup against Putin, referencing the colour resolutions that had taken place over the past 20 years. In a statement, Putin exclaimed `the recipes used regarding weaker states fraught with internal conflict will not work with us. Our people, the citizens of Russia, will not let this happen and will never accept this” and later states that “in simple terms, takeovers are instigated and financed from the outside” (Demirjian, 2014). Through this narrative, the regime attempted to `other' the protesters and depicted them as dangerous and a threat to national security and thus became the preluded for the implementation of more restrictive and repressive policies that would limit the ability for the protesters, who have now been established to be dangerous, to mobilise in the future.

The evaluation stage is one of the final stages of the policy cycle to take place. Looking at the policy response of the Russian state towards freedom of assembly, we can see that there was a continuous and progressive implementation of subsequent policies after 2012. This shows that in part the policy direction of the state was affirmed and therefore implementing restrictions onto the freedom of assembly was evaluated to be consequential to that policy decision. As previously stated, the Russian regime is supported by a network of bureaucratic loyalists and furthermore all opportunities for criticism are heavily restricted. Thus, if true, it could be assumed that the ability to conduct a full evaluation of this policy would have been limited.

Policy Change Towards Freedom of Assembly in Ukraine

Having already demonstrated the suitability of the policy cycle to analyse policy change within Russia, it is, therefore, important to carry out the same exercise to subsequently understand the process of policy change within Ukraine. As demonstrated within a previous chapter, the events of the Euromaidan protests were seen to be a focusing event that corresponded to a change in state policy towards freedom of assembly and indicated an overall shift in regime dynamics. Introduced on January 16, 2014, the so-called `dictatorship laws' was an internationally condemned policy change that prohibited blocking government buildings; allowed trial in absentia and extended amnesty to individuals who have committed crimes against protesters. After two months of protests and a clear shift in policing response, the introduction of this policy decisively highlighted Ukraine's descent into authoritarianism.

Prior to the implementation of the new policy, a number of violent skirmishes between police and protests occurred with continued escalation. The growing number of participants and the shift of mobilisation frames towards an overtly anti-government sentiment forced the regime to take notice and forced the protests onto the national agenda.

The so-called dictatorship laws were formulated by MPs Vadym Kolesnychenko and Volodymyr Oliynyk from the ruling Party of Regions (Marples and Mills, 2015). In the 2012 parliamentary elections, the party held 41.56% of the seat share and thus became the dominant political party Marples and Mills, 2015). The party had a very strong ideological base and claimed to be the only party to upholds the rights of ethnic Russians and speakers of the Russian language in Ukraine. It's possible that this overt ideological base hindered the policy formulation stage, as the bureaucratic elite that supported the party would have in part been constrained to provide advice that meet the ideological objectives of the party.

Having previously assessed that the Ukrainian Regime could be distinguished as a hybrid regime, it was still forced to contend with democratic elements of the state. Thus, it could be argued that therefore one of the only available legitimation strategies available to the Ukrainian regime was the process of procedural legitimisation. As the ruling party did not have total dominance over the state legislator but still had to ensure the policy could be passed through the legislator to be seen to be authoritative and legal, and subsequently ensure that the right of the state to use coercion to achieve compliance with the new policy. Highlighting the continued descent into authoritarianism, the regime attempted to pass the law through a process that violated a number of legal requirements including instituting a system of voting by raising hands. Observing diplomats reported that the required majority of 226 votes was not established and only 100 to 140 hands were raised (Marples and Mills, 2015). As engaging with the state legislative body was the only available route to legitimatise a change policy, the regime was forced in part to engage with it, but the actions demonstrated whilst trying to pass the policy further indicates the un-democratic characteristics of the regime at this time.

The package of ten laws was subsequently repealed on January 28 by an overwhelming majority of MPs. The evaluation stage concluded that therefore the policy was not legitimate and that the stages of the policy change were flawed.

Conclusion on Policy Change Towards Freedom of Assembly

We conclude that through using the policy cycle, we can observe the diverging methods of policy agenda setting, policy development and evaluation within democratic and non-democratic regimes. We affirmed that in consolidated democracies, the state should help facilitate outside engagement with the agenda-setting stage. Still, non-democratic state alternative seeks to exclude outside influence during almost all of the policy stages. Furthermore, the construction of non-democratic states limits not only the agenda-setting stage but also the policy formulation and policy evaluation stage. Non-democratic regimes tightly control feedback mechanism within the state, and contradictory or critical information of the regime's activities are often not able to be articulated. Therefore, we can conclude that policy change in many non-democratic regimes is characterised by centralised decision making, a network of loyalist bureaucrats and the exclusion of the public.

As demonstrated by the examples of both Ukraine and Russia, their shift in regime dynamics toward an authoritarian governance systyle corresponded with a change in policy towards freedom of assembly. In Russia, we observed that the shift towards authoritarian regime dynamics corresponded to the introduction of an amendment to Law on Assemblies, Rallies, Demonstrations, Marches and Pickets. In Ukraine, this shift in regime dynamics was observed to correspond to the introduction of the so-called `dictatorship laws'. In both examples, this corresponding policy change resulted in the consolidation of rights and freedoms.

We can observe that the continued mass mobilisation in both Russia and Ukraine, and the subsequent challenge to the legitimacy and hegemony of the respective regimes, as the reason that caused the protests to be `selected' as a problem to receive an intervention to the state. Furthermore, Russia and Ukraine were observed to use a process of legitimisation that relied heavily on the process of procedural legitimisation when implementing the new policy in response to the waves of protest. In each country, the regime sought to uses the pretence of democratic state mechanisms to ensure that the policy behind passed is seen as valid, authoritative and furthermore can if necessary be enforced through coercion.

6. Protest Event Analysis

The primary data collection method used to determine and analyse the modes of policing response to peaceful protest within this thesis will be Protest Event Analysis (PEA). The Protest Event Analysis has been used across all three case study countries to produce primary data to assess my hypothesis, and thus an explanation of both the methodology of this research tool and an analysis of the results will be provided.

Protest Event Analysis Framework Methodology

The primary data collection method used to determine and analyse the modes of policing response to peaceful protest will be Protest Event Analysis (PEA). PEA is a research tool typically used within social movement research to identify, assess and codify the unique features of a protest. Typically, PEA uses media such as newspapers or police reports, but as outlined within the methodology section, due to the limitations of these methods I shall alternatively be using publicly available video footage to conduct the protest event analysis. Whilst traditionally, PEA is used to identify protest behaviour, I have attempted to further develop this research framework and apply it to the actions of the police The development of the Protest Event Analysis Framework was additionally aided by a three-month long internship within a human rights monitoring organisation in the Balkans. This framework was developed and tested during protest monitoring activities within Bosnia and Turkey.. Across the protest events between the years of 2007 to 2019 within the case studies of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus a framework was developed to codify the presence of unique behavioural features into 26 variables For further explanation on the variables and their description see Table D.4. . The codification of these 26 behavioural variables has been achieved through analysing 61 hours 23 minutes of video footage from a total of 40 protest events across 12 years.

Ultimately, the results of the protest event analysis accumulate in one of four typologies being prescribed to the policing response within the protest event; underenforced, accommodated, over-enforced, violently over-enforced. This is achieved through identifying one of three classifications of policing behaviour; non-violent behaviour, aggressive or enforcement behaviour, and violent or over-enforced behaviour. Each classification is thus given a score that reflects how violent the police behaviour is with non-violent behaviour resulting in a score of 1; aggressive or enforcement-based behaviour resulting in a score of 2 and violent or over-enforced behaviour resulting in the maximum score of 3. Thus, the accumulation of these scores then provides the typology.

A final accumulated score of 0 to 5 typically reflects a protest in which the police did not engage with the arrest procedure or use force against protesters and is provided the typology of underenforced. An underenforced protest is highlighted through behaviour that does not restrict or infringe on the right to freedom of assembly.

A score of 6 to 8 consequently indicates that the protest was accommodated, a policing strategy first defined by Smith (2012) that reflects a visible non-violent police presence that prioritises protest under-enforcement but may engage in arrests.

A score of 9-12 indicated an over-enforced protest typology that is achieved though some features of aggressive police behaviour including the use of arrests. Within an over-enforced protest, the use of violence may be present, but this is not systematic.

The highest attributed score of 13 and above is attributed to a violently over-enforced protest typology. Reflective of the policing strategy first identified by Waddington (1999) the police often use tactics that instil fear within a crowd and use paramilitary crowd control tactics including baton strikes to the head and snatch and grab arrests.

In addition to protest event analysis being used to quantify the number of unique features of policing behaviour within protest in the three countries of focus, I have also sought to reflect on the nature of arrests and violence present. Thus, in addition to identifying the typology of protest I have additionally used the 61 hours, 23 minuets of video footage to identify how the police interact with protest participants during the arrests procedure or when using violence or coercion, and ultimately if this interaction is indiscriminate or targeted. Within this paper targeted arrest and violence is defined as an instance where, due to the unique behaviour of the individual protesters the police select them to be targeted for arrest or coercion, whereas alternatively, indiscriminate targeting makes no desirable effort to distinguish between the activities of the protesters.

Protest Event Analysis Moscow

Through conducting protest event analysis on the case study of Russia we can make a number of clear observations regarding the methods of police response to peaceful protests and subsequently its relationship with a states regime dynamics.

As indicated within chapter 3 and 4, Russia experienced a change in regime dynamics in 2012 that corresponded with a shift in methods of policing response and a change in state policy towards freedom of assembly. The change in regime dynamics is demonstrated through the states shift from an hybrid regime to an authoritarian regime.

The results from the protest event analysis conclude that during the period of Russia's hybrid regime the policing response to peaceful protest was overwhelmingly defined as accommodated and underenforced. Therefore, during the periods of Russia's hybrid regime the policing response was non-violent and often did not engage in the arrest procedure. Furthermore, as demonstrated in Table 1.A. the engagement tactics of the police were defined as targeted, meaning that the police or other law enforcement made attempts to distinguish between protest participants and thus an individual's own unique behaviour and potential breach of law was the grounds for arrest.

Subsequently, after the identified regime change to an authoritarian regime in 2012, the conclusions of the protest event analysis indicated a change in methods of policing response. During Russia's authoritarian regime the policing response to peaceful protest was overwhelmingly defined as over-enforced or violently over-enforced. Additionally, we can observe that the methods of policing engagement was indiscriminate. This means that within protests during Russia's authoritarian period the police or law enforcement made no discernible effort to distinguish between protest participants and enacted a sweeping tactic of arrest or repression across the protest as a whole.

What this demonstrates is that there is an observable difference in the methods of policing response to peaceful protests between Russia's hybrid regime period and its authoritarian regime period. Through using the research method of protest event analysis we can affirm that within Russia the differences of the policing response between regimes is reflected in the level of policing repression and the type of policing engagement with protests in Russians authoritarian regime receiving a more repressive and indiscriminate response then protests during the hybrid regime period.

This consequential shift in policing method between regime typologies is further affirmed through the observation of emerging unique policing behaviour after the regime change occurred. Tactics unique to the policing response within the authoritarian regime include snatch and grab arrests and baton strikes to the head and face. The escalation of violence that characterised the policing response within authoritarian regimes is demonstrated by the emergence of the new policing tactics that prioritise fear, intimidation and violent attacks on protest participants.

Protest Event Analysis Ukraine

Through the analysis of protest events in Kyiv, we can further affirm the relationship between regime dynamics and methods of policing response.

As previously established, Ukraine experienced two shifts in the regime. The first shift in regime occurred in 2010 when Ukraine shifted from a flawed democracy to a hybrid regime and the second change occurred between 2013-2014 that briefly shifted Ukraine into an authoritarian regime during the events of the Euromaidan protest.

Across the scope of study on Ukraine, there is no observable difference between the methods of police response during periods of the regime designated as a flawed democracy and as a hybrid regime. During periods of Ukraine's recent history designated as either as a hybrid regime or as a flawed democracy the overwhelming majority of policing responses to peaceful protest were designated to be underenforced, with only one policing response to a peaceful protest being attributed the typology of over-enforced as shown in Table 2.B. This shows that a clear and consistent policing strategy that priorities policing behaviour that does not restrict on the ability to participate in a peaceful protest or infringe upon the right to freedom of assembly. Across the periods of Ukraine's hybrid regime or period as a flawed democracy there was consistently no observable instances of arrest or violence and thus the mode of police engagement was understood to be therefore be targeted and not indiscriminate.

Alternatively, in 2013-2014 when Ukraine emerged into a duration of authoritarianism that coincided to the Euromaidan protest cycle, a shift occurred in the policing response as shown in Table 2.B. Within this brief period of authoritarian new tactics of a paramilitarised policing response emerged that reflected the states new policy of using violence and force. These new emergent tactics included the use of water cannons and flash grenades. These tactics are typically seen as a proportional response to violent disorder, but in addition to these tactics, the Ukrainian law enforcement started to use tactics of forced undressing and public humiliation, violent beatings directed at injured and compliant protest participants, and attacking uniformed medical personnel. Despite the violent protest tactics used within some periods of the Euromaidan protest, this type of abusive policing practice by the state would be considered an infringement of international law The use of forced public undressing of protest participants before they are paraded in front of law enforcement officers who took photos with the victims is clearly an infringement of European Convention of Human Rights Article 3 on the prohibition of torture and other forms of ill, inhumane and degrading treatment. . The use of these new paramilitary style policing tactics emerging within the period of authoritarian regime is reflected in the policing response typologies and the engagement methods attributed to protests held within this time. The protest typology during the period was overwhelmingly designated as violently over-enforce, with the policing engagement being observed to be indiscriminate.

As demonstrated a clear and decisive change in the policing methods to peaceful protest occurred during the shift between hybrid regime and authoritarian regime. This change was represented by the emergence of new paramilitarily enforcement techniques, the use of an over-enforcement policing strategy and the use of indiscriminate targeting of protest participants.

Protest Event Analysis Belarus

The democracy monitoring indices previously cited within chapter 3 indicate that within Belarus between the periods of 2007 and 2019 no clear or observable shift in regime dynamics occurred. Thus, due to the singularity of the regime dynamics the hypothesis would suggest that there would be limited changes in the policing response to peaceful protests.

Within Belarus, the data shows an interesting observation that despite the regime is continuous the policing response to peaceful protest has brief periods that do not match the expected response within an authoritarian regime.

Reflecting upon the policing tactics used across the protests in Belarus, we can clearly observe that paramilitary tactics such as snatch and grab arrests were commonly used as illustrated in Table 3.C. Interestingly, within Belarus this tactic is not synonymous with any policing response typology and was observed during protests characterised as both over-enforced and under-enforced. There were no periods during the study on Belarus in which a new emergence of policing tactic was observed, and even though there were minor changes in policing response this did not correspond to an incipient policing repertoire.

Summary of Findings

Through the extensive analysis of protest events in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus as shown in Table, 1.A, 2.B and 3.C. we can conclude that there has been a number of important findings.

We can affirm distinct differences between the methods of policing response to peaceful protest within authoritarian regimes and hybrid regimes. Within hybrid regimes, the method of policing response to peaceful protest is characterised by the use of underenforcement or accommodated policing techniques, alternatively within an authoritarian regime the methods of policing response are characterised by the use of enforced of violently over-enforced policing.

Additionally, we can see a difference between the modes of engagement within the respective regimes. In hybrid regimes, the engagement strategies are characterised by targeted engagement whilst in authoritarian regimes, it is indiscriminate engagement.

Furthermore, to the change in behaviour, when a regime shifts towards authoritarianism, we observe the emergence of new policing repertoire. This repertoire frequently uses paramilitary-style policing techniques such as the snatch and grab arrests and baton strike to the head.

Conclusion on Protest Event Analysis

In conclusion, as demonstrated by the findings, the protest event analysis has yielded some interesting observations. As demonstrated, we can conclude that policing response in authoritarian regimes is different from that within hybrid regimes.

Within the periods of hybrid regimes shown in Ukraine and Russia, the methods of policing response were consistently observed to be under-enforced or accommodated. This reflected a policy towards freedom of assembly that prioritised the facilitation of protests through the limited use of arrests and an absent of violent police actions. Interestingly, this policy of state facilitation is also shown during periods when Ukraine is designated to be a flawed democracy, leading us to conclude that the respect for basic civil liberties apparent in flawed democracy is additionally observed in part within hybrid regimes. This may additionally indicate that despite hybrid regimes being defined partly by the level of pressure they apply on political opposition (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019) they still respect and adhere to their international obligations toward facilitating the right of freedom of assembly.

Alternatively, as demonstrated throughout the data collected through the protest event analysis framework, we can further affirm that the methods of policing response within authoritarian regimes is clearly distinguishable from hybrid regimes. One of the foremost defining characteristics of policing response in authoritarian regimes, as demonstrated across all three case studies, is the indiscriminate targeting of protest participants and the over-enforced policing response. The state policy towards freedom of assembly in authoritarian regimes has through the continued use of paramilitary policing tactics, evolved to a policy that aims to spread fear and constrict the ability to peacefully protest. As shown within the case of Belarus, paramilitary policing techniques may not always be synonymous with violent repression, as the use of snatch and grab arrests were found across over-enforced and under-enforced but are staple of the authoritarian response to peaceful assembly. What this does alternatively demonstrate is that the arrest and subsequent collection of data on individuals who are willing to show public dissent against the regime is often more valuable to the regime than simply attempting to disperse a protest as soon as possible.

As shown within both Ukraine and Russia, a corresponding emergence of new policing tactics occurs when the respective regime shifted towards authoritarianism. Through reflecting on the policing behaviour in the Belarusian regime that has consistently been attributed as authoritarian, we can affirm that the new tactics are correlated to the shift in regime dynamics, and not instead reflective of a broader development within policing practice. As paramilitary policing techniques were present since 2007 in Belarus but did not emerge in Russia and Ukraine for up to 7 years later until these countries shifted into an authoritarian regime, it's therefore understandable to conclude there is a relationship between the emergence of paramilitary policing techniques and the shift into an authoritarian regime. Furthermore, when we observe the shift back away from authoritarian regime characteristics in Ukraine, these paramilitary policing practices were no longer observed within the policing response to peaceful protest.