Theoretical foundations of Russian imperalism as a danger to the constitutional order of Ukraine and world order

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Oleksandra Push senior lecture, at King Danylo University

Theoretical foundations of Russian imperalism as a danger to the constitutional order of Ukraine and world order

Roman Lutskyi PhD (Law), Professor, Director of the Research Institute at King Danylo University

Анотація

Науково-дослідного інституту імені Академіка Івана Луцького ЗВО «Університету Короля Данила»

Теоретичні основи російського імперіалізму як небезпеки конституційному ладу україни та світовому правопоряку

Луцький Роман Петрович, доктор юридичних наук, професор, директор

Пуш Олександра Михайлівна, старший викладач кафедри перекладу та філології ЗВО ««Університету Короля Данила»

Мета. У статті аналізуються причини, передумови, геополітичні та геоісторичні цілі агресії Росії проти України. З'ясовано реакцію Заходу на російську геостратегию реваншу. Доведено, що гібридна війна породила глибоку кризу світової системи безпеки, яка ведеться з лютого 2014 року, коли почалася російсько-українська війна. Російська Федерація, порушивши норми та принципи міжнародного права, двосторонні та масштабні угоди, анексувала Автономну Республіку Крим та Севастополь.

Методологія. Методологічну основу статті складають сукупність світоглядно-філософських, наукових засад і підходів та спеціально-наукових методів пізнання міжнародно-правових явищ і геополітичних процесів, що відбуваються у світі. Самостійне використання цих методів забезпечувало можливість вирішення поставлених завдань серед яких головним являється доведення загрози Росії міжнародному правопорядку. На основі чого було зроблено фундаментальний висновок про те, що путінська Росія повинна розпастися як імперія для того, щоб був відновлений світовий закон і порядок.

Результати. Росія без оголошення війни напала на Україну і знову поставила під сумнів міжнародний порядок в Європі, починаючи з 24 лютого 2022 року, коли лідер російської держави оголосив про початок ««спеціальної військової операції» щодо України. Її метою він назвав ««демілітаризацію» країни. Збройні сили Російської Федерації почали обстрілювати міста України та її військову і цивільну інфраструктуру по всій території нашої держави. Передувало цьому божевіллю 21 лютого 2022 року, коли президент Росії Володимир Путін визнав незалежність Донецької та Луганської народних республік.

Проте російсько-українське протиставлення має глибоке історичне коріння. Поглинення України та її людських ресурсів -- одним з ключових завдань розвитку проєкту російського імперіалізму. Сучасний процес формування та розвитку путінської Росії завжди супроводжувався війни з Україною. Росія мала на меті знищити нашу молоду державу. Історія взаємовідносин українського та російського народів -- це літопис воєн, визвольних змагань українців та послідовної політики русифікації та асиміляції нашого народу.

Ключові слова: право, міжнародне право, Путін, Росія, агресія, війна, помста, світовий правопорядок.

Abstract

Purpose. The article analyzes the causes, preconditions, geopolitical and geohistorical goals of Russia's aggression against Ukraine. The reaction of the West to the Russian geostrategy of revenge has been clarified. It has been proven that the hybrid war which has been going on since February 2014 has created a deep crisis in the global security system. The Russian Federation, having violated the norms and principles of international law, bilateral and large-scale agreements, annexed the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol.

Methodology.The methodological basis of the article is a set of philosophical and scientific principles, approaches, and special scientific methods of understanding international legal phenomena and geopolitical processes taking place in the world. The use of these methods provided an opportunity to solve the tasks and the main task is to prove that Russia threatens international law. On this basis, a fundamental conclusion was drawn that Putin's Russia must disintegrate as an empire in order to restore world law and order.

Results: Russia attacked Ukraine without declaring war and again called into question the international order in Europe on February 24, 2022, when the Russian leader announced the launch of a "special military operation" against Ukraine. He called its goal the "demilitarization" of the country. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation began shelling the cities of Ukraine and its military and civilian infrastructure. The recognition of the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics by Russian President Vladimir Putin preceded this madness on February 21, 2022.

However, the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation has deep historical roots. The absorption of Ukraine and its human resources is one of the key tasks in the development of the project of Russian imperialism. The current process of formation and development of Putin's Russia has always been accompanied by war with Ukraine. Russia aimed to destroy our young state. The history of relations between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples is a chronicle of wars, the liberation struggles of Ukrainians, and a consistent policy of Russification and assimilation of our people.

Key words: law, international law, Putin, Russia, aggression, war, revenge, international law and order.

By illegally occupying the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, carrying out an illegal armed invasion of Donetsk and Luhansk regions in 2014, the Russian Federation, according to a statement from the Ukrainian Foreign Mi nistry on the 42nd anniversary of the UN General Assembly, launched unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine. In doing so, it not only violated the latter's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, but also threatened international peace and security in general [12, p. 5].

Politicians, diplomats, experts and scholars are trying to understand: why did this happen, how could a war between "brotherly nations" break out, forcing the official Kremlin to challenge the world order of this century? How did Russia, the guarantor of Ukraine's territorial integrity, dare to violate the fundamental principles of international law and the bilateral peace and friendship agreements signed between them? Why Russia - the successor to the USSR in international obligations - demonstratively despises the Helsinki Accords of 1975, which established the principle of inviolability of borders and territorial integrity of countries [13, p. 78].

The security system of international relations, the system of confrontation and interaction was formed by the leaders of the "Big Three" as a result of the defeat of Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan. It was based on the division of key regions of the planet into spheres of influence adopted by the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, and introduced bipolar existence. The collapse of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union radically changed the geopolitical map of the continent and created a fundamentally new balance of power on the planet, demonstrating that in history there aren't any conditions for a world system which can be set once and forever. The realities of the Cold War have been replaced by the shaky balance of a post-bipolar planet with fundamentally new challenges, tangible threats, and a distinctly conflicted environment [1, p. 288-289].

At the same time, the euphoria in the West from the above changes gave rise, as O. Sushko noted, “to the traumatic syndrome of defeat on the other side of the geopolitical swing - in Russia. And we have understood its consequences only recently when the "brother" suddenly came to visit” [14].

Ignoring the previous security system, according to L. Chekalenko and M. Vasilieva, led to uncontrollable chaos, destruction of economic potential, human casualties, and catastrophe of civilizations, dragging Ukraine into a hybrid war. The Russian factor of influence came to the fore, which started a new round of world redistribution. Russia has taken advantage of the weakening of the European security factor, the deep dependence of European integration on Russia's raw materials, the gradual withdrawal of the United States from processes taking place on the continent, and Russia has taken advantage of the hub of Washington's unrealized geostrategic interests in the Middle East and Africa. Such changes on the Eurasian Chessboard have given official Moscow a chance to enter an open window of opportunity, as it has done regarding Ukraine [1; p. 286].

It should be noted that back in 1997, Russian political scientist O. Dugin intimidated his compatriots by saying that the existence of Ukraine within its borders with the status of a "sovereign state" was tantamount to a "terrible blow" to Russia's geopolitical security, equivalent to "invasion of its territory." and therefore the continued existence of "unitary Ukraine is unacceptable." According to him, the territory of the latter should be divided into several zones that correspond to the range of geopolitical, ethnic and cultural realities. And further: "The Ukrainian problem is the main and most serious problem facing Moscow." [2; p. 304-305].

It is known that V. Putin, like O. Dugin, perceives Ukraine's independence as something anomalous and temporary and does not even hide it. Quoting his words to President George W. Bush after the NATO summit in Bucharest in early April 2008 has already become a textbook: "You understand, George, that Ukraine is not even a state! What is Ukraine? Part of its territory is Eastern Europe, and part, and large enough, we gave! "

Unfortunately, as O. Volovych noted, it is unknown how the owner of the White House responded to this to the Russian leader. Most likely, he remained diplomatically silent, not wanting to spoil relations with his "friend Vladimir". And now it is obvious that the flirtation of many world leaders with Putin further increased his imperial ambitions. To some extent, this line of "avoiding sharp corners" in relations with Moscow was continued by Obama at the beginning of his presidency, when in 2009 he called for a "reset" of relations with Russia [21, p. 20].

According to G. Perepelytsia, the tendency of the global system of international relations to multipolarity has created favorable conditions for Kremlin leaders to regain the status of world power, without which they cannot imagine the fut ure of their country. The reintegration of the post-Soviet space and its complete absorption by Russia had to be the first steps in this direction. "Without Ukraine, solving such a strategic task did not make sense," he said. "In the conditions when Ukraine abandoned reintegration projects and expressed its intention to sign the Association Agreement with the EU, the force scenario became the only way to realize such a strategic task. The military occupation of Ukraine and the elimination of its statehood would give Russia the opportunity to absorb the entire post-Soviet space" [10, p. 371-372].

By launching hybrid aggression, the Putin regime pursued a dual global goal: a geostrategic goal is to destroy the current world order of Western domination on the planet and return the status of a "great power" to Russia; geohistorical one is to return the world to the reality of the middle of the last century ("zones of influence", "struggle of systems", "balance of power and balance of interests", etc.). That is to revise the lost Cold War of the USSR.

It must also be acknowledged that a unipolar world has not been formed, and an effective system of multipolarity has not emerged. International politics is characterized by a vacuum of global power. The United States no longer has enough influence, and in some cases, the will and desire to solve urgent problems. As a result, the world system is becoming increasingly difficult to control, and countries with geopolitical ambitions are provoking conflicts in order to reform the universe of the international hierarchy [5].

Summarizing the situation in the world security system, A. Hrytsenko made the following conclusion: "The former powerful West Pole has become blurred, unconsolidated and ineffective in decision-making on a global scale, and it is because of internal contradictions, policy of isolation, lack of adequate responsible leadership. Decades of peace and prosperity after World War II weakened the West's vigilance, turned Western alliances and armies into paper bureaucracies, lowered the motivation for proper defense funding, and created the illusion that military aggression could be repulsed through negotiations. Finally, it is clear that the current system of international security is incapable of controlling the situation on the planet and guaranteeing peace, even when the key players seem to have agreed and acted together.” [6]. geopolitical crisis war security

The Kremlin's rulers, in turn, have taken full advantage of this by creating a long period of time in order to form a military nuclear state with an unpredictable foreign policy. And what is more important they consider nuclear weapons to be not only the tool to deter a nuclear attack but also to prevent a possible defeat in a conventional war and even a guarantee of sovereignty.

It should be emphasized that during the escalation of the hybrid war, the ideological version was singled out, the key point of which was the ideology of the "Russian world". L. Shklyar, for example, saw it as a "program of revanchism", because it was based on claims, if not to direct domination, then at least to dominance within the geography of Russian culture, language, Orthodox religion, and even just when there were citizens of Russian origin in neighboring countries. According to him, this ideology is aimed at legitimizing the right of the Russian Federation to act as a patron of other states if they have areas of Russian culture that use the Russian language and profess Orthodoxy. And since Ukraine has these features, many politicians and ideologists of the neighboring country do not imagine the territory of the "Russian world" without Ukraine, which they imperially call "Little Russia" [13, p. 8].

"Still, there is the key idea in the attitude of Russians towards Ukrainians, towards Ukraine, which is fateful for us, Russians," Russian publicist O. Shiropaev wrote. "For Ukrainians, Russia is also important, but only as a point of repulsion, which helps to realize their Ukrainian identity. For Russians, Ukraine, on the other hand, is a point of constant attraction, jealous attention, an object of absorption as something "originally their own" and which should be transformed according to their own pattern and similarity... I must say that only in words Russians are always ready to recognize that Ukrainians are a people, but pay attention: "fraternal" people. Behind this cunning formula lies the firm belief that we, the Russians and the Ukrainians, are ONE people called to live in the same state with the capital of Moscow [16].

According to some authors, in the former Soviet Union, the ideology of the "Russian world" actually looks like a special operation to cover up the Kremlin's version of the Nazi concept of Lebensraum (living space), the domination of the political system of the Russian Federation, its oligarchic and corrupt capital and the anti-liberal concept. Its practical implementation is clearly demonstrated by the example of the annexation of Crimea.

The rhetoric of "reviving Russia as a great state" is growing and it is the rhetoric of a state that "returns its lands" instead of losing them as it was under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, a state that protects Orthodox Russians in Ukraine from "Bandero-fascists" and the "Kyiv junta". It is also the rhetoric of a state that opposes fierce pressure and criticism from the hostile West, and other irrational ideologies. All the above-mentioned have caused a wave of pseudo-patriotic feelings and Crimean euphoria and have provided massive support for the Kremlin leadership from the Russian population.

The report from the European Council on Foreign Relations published in November 2014 said: “In March 2014 Europeans woke up in Vladimir Putin's world, where borders can be 109 changed, international institutions are powerless, economic interdependence is a source of danger, and predictability is a duty rather than an advantage... Russia's invasion of Ukraine has forced the EU to recognize that instead of its gradual spreading across the continent and eventually to the entire planet, its idea of a European order has collapsed. Just as the break-up of Yugoslavia put an end to European order during the Cold War, the Crimean crisis marked the end of the post-bipolar European order. " [17, p. 30-31].

On March 18, 2014, addressing both chambers of the Federal Assembly "on the occasion of the annexation of Crimea", the Russian president formulated the main theses of the "Putin's doctrine": the balance of power on the planet has changed; the weight of the West in world politics is declining; international law is not a dogma, but it is a set of options from which the Kremlin will choose those which benefit it; countries are divided into strong and weak; the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the latter is a field of agreement of the strong; the time has come for radical change, Russia is a separate state, it is a civilization with its unique values, which will try to shape its own rules of the game in international politics [22].

Later, on December 18 of the same year, Putin adopted a new military doctrine on the main external dangers of the country which included "the establishment of regimes adjacent to Russia, whose policies threaten Russia's interests." Thus, official Moscow seeks to "legitimize" the possible future expansion of Russian territory at the expense of neighbors. For example, among the key tasks of the Russian Armed Forces in peacetime is "the protection of citizens outside Russia from armed attacks on them." Even abroad, Russian-speaking citizens living there have the right to the military protection of the Russian Armed Forces. It follows that at the official regulatory and legislative level, the Russian leadership, in fact, consolidates the legitimacy of the deepening and continuation of hostilities in the Donbas [7, p. 13].

Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine as a logical conclusion to the geostrategy of revenge, which has long been developed by the Kremlin authorities, witnessed the crisis of the modern system of international security.

Unable to carry out global competition by economic, political and diplomatic means, official Moscow, according to G. Perepelytsia, having created the doctrine of "Russian peace", engaged in the destruction of the world order. Evidence of this, in his opinion, is the discrediting of virtually all institutions of international security, ignoring the agreements that were the basis for the post-bipolar world: the rejection of the principles of the Final Act signed in Helsinki in 1975 by 35 states; viewing the borders on the continent; the rejection of the Belovezhskaya agreement of the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus in 1991, which can be regarded as a refusal to recognize the state sovereignty of post-Soviet countries; non-acceptance of NATO and EU enlargement to the East, incitement of radical pro-Russian parties in Central and Western Europe; neutralization of the Visegrad Four through the formation of a group of pro-Russian countries; a gross violation of more than 300 international treaties and conventions, the UN Charter and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, etc. Thus, the current government of Russia seeks to create a situation of global chaos and establish a new order with its rights and on its conditions. Hence, the scenarios for establishing a new world order depend on the results of the Russian-Ukrainian war. "This means," he stated, "that being located between East and West, Ukraine is in danger of losing its state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The battle for Ukraine will determine the end result of this geopolitical struggle, as Ukraine's accession to the European or Russian space will determine the further expansion of the sphere of domination of one of the subjects, either to the West or to the East. By joining Ukraine, Russia can expand its further geopolitical invasion to Central Europe and impose its own regulatory force on Western Europe. Thus, modern Russia has a historic chance to seize Europe, as the Soviet Union did in 1944-1945, it can change the balance of power in relations with the West and restructure the entire geopolitical space of Europe in its favor, review the results of the Cold War and reestablish itself as the main geopolitical power in Europe and Eurasia. " [10, p. 304-305].

Pointing out that the Russian aggression against Ukraine has become the apogee and embodiment of the level of degradation of the world security system, modern authors, however, draw attention to the complexity of the conflict in and around Ukraine. In particular, V. Filipchuk claims that, in fact, we need to talk about three different conflicts: geopolitical (between Russia and the West), bilateral (between Ukraine and Russia) and intra-Ukrainian conflicts that emerged simultaneously on the same territory. In his opinion, this conflict is unlike any other, as the country, which was invaded and whose territorial integrity was violated, received direct security guarantees from all states which are the permanent members of the UN Security Council. However, this conflict takes place within the framework of European security, which was considered the most stable regional security architecture. Despite the clear failure of the OSCE and other international organizations to stop it, restore peace and punish the aggressor, the main figures in the international arena are reluctant to review the principles of the current European security architecture, make it more efficient and reliable. In addition, there is a clear asymmetric and hybrid conflict. Russia is the aggressor which publicly denies its participation in it, and its actions include both traditional military methods (the seizure of territories and their official annexation), and non-traditional methods in the political, economic, information spheres, and terrorism is one of them. Considering all this, we can call it a hybrid aggression [3].

It is no exaggeration to say that the responsibility for destroying the old world order lies not only with Russia but also with Western countries that "missed" its aggression against Ukraine (and in 2008 against Georgia). In particular, according to some sources, the vast majority of Western media immediately after this event suddenly became "blinded" about who is the aggressor and how to call the occupying forces, inventing some new terms instead, the only meaning of which is "not to call it Russian aggression."

As you know, on February 28 and March 11, 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, hoping for the exclusive validity of the guarantees of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, appealed to the guarantor states (according to the Memorandum on Security Guarantees in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) with a request to fulfill its obligations under its provisions and take all possible measures to stop aggression, preserve independence, sovereignty and modern borders of Ukraine. At the same time, the Ukrainian parliament suggested the UN Security Council to convene meetings to consider Russia's actions, and the parliaments of guarantee states and international organizations to send special monitoring missions to observe the situation in Ukraine. However, the signatories of the Budapest Memorandum could not even gather for a joint meeting; The UN General Assembly only managed to discuss and adopt statements of a recommendatory nature; UN and OSCE monitoring missions were not allowed into the Crimean by Russian occupation forces; in Donbas, OSCE observers became hostages of separatists and Russian special forces.

The West's strategic and mental unpreparedness for security crises can also be explained by an underestimation of Russia's revanchism syndrome, Ukraine's role in Russia's expansionist policy, and how far official Moscow is willing to go in defending so-called Russia's "key interests". The West didn't believe that Kremlin leaders would dare to use force directly against neighboring countries. Even the large-scale "Serdyukov" reform carried out in the Russian Armed Forces, as well as the presence of strategic nuclear potential, were not perceived as such that could turn this state into a threat to European collective security. Hence, as S.Tolstov noted, 111 the United States and the European Union, having demonstrated in March 2014 a complete inability to stop the escalation of international political conflict, took mainly tactical measures. The latter provided for the introduction of phased economic sanctions against Russia in order to keep its leadership from escalating the conflict and persuade it to comply with international law. In other words, in the strategic context, the leaders of the United States and European countries did not see Russia's aggression against Ukraine as a critical threat to the stability of NATO and the system of Western alliances and did not rule out the possibility of returning to the previous status. As for the refusal of Washington and London to fulfill the guarantees of Ukraine's territorial integrity, according to the Budapest Memorandum, it was not initially considered a political defeat, as Ukraine was not a NATO member or an important US ally outside the North Atlantic Alliance like Japan, South Korea, Australia, Israel, but a non-aligned state. For example, in early 2016, the former US President Obama stated that "Ukraine is not a member of NATO, so it will be vulnerable to the Russian invasion, no matter what we do."

However, in February 2015, Western politicians, returning to the events of the first months of the previous year, were forced to admit the following: "During the protests that erupted in early 2014, which eventually led to the overthrow of the pro-Moscow government of Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine became the first country in Europe where protesters died with EU flags in their hands.” The West, as many in Kyiv are convinced, betrayed Ukraine [18, p. 165].

Recently, the concept of solving the security problems of the Ukrainian state has become clear in Western and Ukrainian elite circles. It is as follows: official Kyiv de facto accepts the annexation of Crimea; allows elections in Donbas before taking borders under control, which, in fact, means the reintegration of the occupied territory on Russian terms; it also means that official Kyiv promises the Kremlin "neutrality" or "non-alignment", refuses to join the North Atlantic Alliance or conclude any binding agreement (and neutrality means renunciation of a key part of sovereignty that is the right to determine allies in the field of security and defense). Although, as you know, as of spring 2014, Ukrainian had a "non-aligned" status and has not officially announced its intention to become a future member of NATO, and Ukraine had very strong international legal ties with Russia since the signing of 1997 and extended in 2012 "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation." However, this did not deter the northern neighbor from annexing Crimea and invading Donbas [8, р. 296].

The economic sanctions imposed by the European Union and the United States after the annexation of Crimea and in view of the war in eastern Ukraine are effective, but they also have a negative impact on Western economies. That is why there are voices in Europe in favor of ending them. This is due to the significant dependence of the continent's economies on Russia. Many European companies work in its market and it brings significant revenues to their budgets and social programs. The Kremlin's propaganda is able to make many prominent foreign politicians, public figures be their allies, and some media spread "the correct version" of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. However, the aggressor must be stopped. Ukraine is not the ultimate goal for Vladimir Putin, just as Czechoslovakia was not the ultimate goal for Hitler. The imperialists have no ultimate goal at all, especially since they now have a nuclear "button" [20, р. 14]. "For Russia, the conquest of Ukraine is a step towards rebuilding the world order in its own interests, a necessary precondition for further attack on Europe, an example of intimidation of the disobedient, and not the last self-sufficient goal," said S. Nemyrych. Kyiv is fighting first and foremost for its future, but by winning this campaign and gaining the resources of Ukraine, Russia will become much more confident and aggressive. Everyone will see a really different Russia. The West will have to stop it not on the Seversky Donets and the Dnieper, but on the Bug and the Vistula, if not on the Oder. And not only Ukrainians will pay with their lives but Europeans too. So, it is much more rational to help Ukraine. And this should be realized by everyone in Europe and North America" [9].

Recent events on the continent confirm that Moscow's "hybrid war", as a form of an aggressive solution to its own geopolitical problems, is not limited to Ukraine, but, changing its forms, extends to new theaters of war. Thus, V. Gorbulin singles out three similar large-scale "hybrid operations": Syria (Turkey), the European Union, and Ukraine. "We should note the ability of Russia to find successful solutions (but strategically incorrect)," he said, "it should be understood that not only Ukraine and the Baltic states, but all of Russia's CSTO neighbors and Europe are in the direct 'hybrid threat' zone." As part of its "hybrid strategies" and course to anarchize the global security space, Russia can be expected to consciously deconstruct a number of "frozen conflicts", especially in Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and other regions. Putin has already expressed his readiness to support Serbia in its position in Kosovo" [4].

Western countries are now characterized by a lack of geostrategic “red lines” that would outline possible limits of actions concerning the spheres of influence of the Russian Federation. As a result, their policy is increasingly being driven to the operational and tactical level of political-diplomatic negotiations and political-administrative projects, where the Kremlin is traditionally stronger. It should also be emphasized that the current global security crisis has a fundamentally different character than the Cold War. The current situation is much less structured and defined, and world problems are not limited only to the relations between the West and the Russian Federation, unlike the second half of the last century, when the confrontation between the USSR and the USA, the WTP and the NATO was the axis of the world system of international relations. Dramatic events in the Middle East, the outbreak and development of fundamentalism, the spread of international terrorism, IDIL, the control of the South China Sea, the migration to the EU countries, etc. affect the interests of Europe and the US much more than Russia's actions on post-Soviet territories and show that the threatening period of the global systemic crisis is approaching.

A dangerous feature of the current situation was the blur of differences between external and internal threats. The hybrid war carried out by Russia in modern interstate conflicts is aimed at the destruction of the societies against which it is conducted, at the suppression of will there. Its central object is the public and institutions, not the armed forces. In addition, it has a complex and multi-dimensional nature. Military equipment here can play both a key and a secondary role. More often it is the latter, because, as we know, "they aren't here." The illusion of peace, as well as the active use of weak and vulnerable places of societies and states, are important instruments of a hybrid war. At the same time, the Russian mass media openly consider scenarios of the likely military clash of the Russian Federation "with the aggressive NATO bloc" without excluding the use of nuclear weapons. Moscow threatens to use the most effective lever to achieve its goals (oil and gas supply) and thus blackmails the peoples of the world.

The issues of the hybrid war and its consequences were, alongside others, on the agenda of the last most representative and authoritative Munich security conference in the world. Assessing its results, O. Sushko raised a question: “Are we dealing with the fact that the West is not aware of the full range of threats and possible ways of overcoming the security crisis, is it only frightened and uncomfortable and we should not expect a clear and realistic program of action in the near future?” [14]. 

Conclusions

Thus, Russia's military aggression against Ukraine (the so-called “special military operation” of February 24, 2022) demonstrated its contempt for international law, jeopardized the foundations of the security system formed in the post-war period, created its 113 deep crisis, and ended with the logical “geostrategy of revenge” starting a new round of redistribution of the world.

That's why, you can call Russia "a geopolitical monster" and its imperial ambitions are the threat to the international law and the safety of the whole world. The aggressor country has been neglecting people's life for centuries. This country killed, deportated, made the genocide acts, committed war and humanity crimes, and they are being done now. It's not enough just to free Ukraine from the Moscow horde. We need to end the existence of the empire of evil. In order to do this the world has to support us and enslaved people must rebel and defend their independence.

References

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3. Filipchuk, V. (2016). International Peacekeeping and the War in Eastern Ukraine: Is There a Recipe for a Peaceful Settlement? Mirror of the week. Ukraine, 17. (in Ukrainian)

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