Intifada: uprising beyond the palestinian-israeli conflict
Intifada - a concept referring to legitimate rebellion against oppression that was first applied to describe the rebellion of the socialist and communist parties in Iraq. Analysis of the features of background to the palestinian-israeli conflict.
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Intifada: uprising beyond the palestinian-israeli conflict
Alisa Shishkina, Georgy Shishkin
HSE University; Institute for African Studies, RAS
Abstract. This paper is devoted to the study of the phenomenon of the Palestinian intifada in the wider context of the theoretical understanding of the socio-political] protests in the Middle East. The complexities of socio-economic and political prerequisites for the emergence of protest actions, as well as their dynamics are analyzed in this article from a comparative angle. The authors conclude that the first and second Palestinian intifadas fit into the broader context of protests in the Middle East bearing similar motives to those events that led to the Arab Spring uprisings.
Key words: Middle East, fitna, socio-political protests, Arab-Israeli conflict, intifada
Recent studies (Lifintseva et al. 2015; Shishkina & Issaev 2017) showed that in the context of the Arab Spring, one can re-actualize the Arab-Muslim political traditional concepts related to certain phenomena of social and political life. Thus, in particular, concepts such as fitna (distemper) or fauda (chaos), and the characteristic features of fitna, which are becoming permanent, can be traced not only to Arab countries, but in essence also, to the events of 2013-2014 in Ukraine. The socio-political effects of these protests such as their spontaneity, fragmented opposition, lack of recognizable leaders, etc. are only intensified with the development of the Internet and the emergence of opportunities to coordinate protesters in a relatively non-government-controlled environment (Lifintseva et al. 2015).
At the same time, it is possible to single out a few events in recent decades, which were of trans-border nature, but for which the word usage in the research literature was limited to specific countries, such as Palestine and Israel. Moreover, these events were characterized by the features of the above phenomenon. In this particular case, we refer to the term intifada, which traditionally describes the events that took place in the Middle East in 1987-1993 and 2001-2005, mainly in the framework of the conflict between Palestine and Israel, which manifested itself in the two Palestinian intifadas (Rigby 1991).
The term “intifada” derives from the Arabic root “nafada”, which means to shake, startle, restore or recover (Darweish 1989). Intifada is seen as a concept referring to legitimate rebellion against oppression and was first applied to describe the rebellion of the socialist and communist parties in Iraq against the Hashemite monarchy in 1952 (Rey 2013).
The concept of the intifada is also associated with a series of strikes and demonstrations in Sudan in 1964, protests in Western Sahara (1999-2004), events in Lebanon after the assassination of Rafik Hariri in 2005, etc. However, realistically, the intifada is understood as a liberation movement of the people of Palestine (Peretz 1990; Pratt 2007, etc.), which was reflected in the two uprisings in 1987-1993 and 2000-2005 (Mazen 1996).
Background to the conflict
intifada palestinian israeli conflict
In 1917, during the First World War, the British Empire gained control of Palestine, and later, at the conference in San Remo, Britain legitimized its Middle Eastern mandate. This included the lands of Jordan in the territory of Palestine after the rejection of the Balfour Declaration (which assumed the creation of preconditions for resettlement of the Jewish people in their historical homeland) by Winston Churchill (Reguer 2020), who gave most of the territory of Mandatory Palestine to form the new Emirate of Transjordan, to be ruled by King Abdullah, son of Hussein. Despite this, the emigration of the Jewish people continued, as a result of which the Jewish population increased by 3 times by the middle of the 20th century. As Benjamin Netanyahu, the former Israeli Prime Minister, wrote, “just against the background of the growth of the Jewish population in the region in the middle of the 20th century, the term "Palestinians" began to refer specifically to the Arab population living in this territory, before that period the same term "Palestinians" did not have an ethnic meaning” (Netanyahu 1996).
A major escalation of the Arab - Israeli conflict began after the Second World War. Against the background of the growth of the Jewish population in the region, opposition to this process in the form of violent actions by the Palestinian Arabs intensified. In connection with the tense situation in the region, Britain in 1947 decided to abandon its territorial mandate, stating an impossibility of resolving the contradictions between Jews and Arabs (United Nations 1949). The United Nations, previously, already in its second session, tried to resolve the problem in the Palestinian region. The UN prepared a plan for dividing the region into two states: Arab and Jewish (United Nations 1947). However, the Jewish population of Mandatory Palestine adopted this resolution, whereas the LAS (League of Arab States) and the Supreme Arab Committee of Palestine (the political body of the Arabs during the Mandatory Palestine) expressed their disagreement with such a scenario (Ahron 2002).
On May 14, 1948, the formation of the state of Israel was declared (Shevelev, Kryzhko 2019), which entailed a declaration of war on Israel by the League of Arab States, thereby starting the first Arab - Israeli war. After a year, it led to an armistice, because of which most of the region's lands came under Israeli control. Jerusalem was divided between Transjordan and Israel, the Gaza Strip came under Egyptian control, and the West Bank came under the control of Transjordan (Palestinian Affairs Division of the UN Secretariat (1978-1990) 2012). Thus, later Transjordan put forward claims to unite Arab Palestine with Transjordan, completing the annexation of the West Bank. All this led to the emergence of disagreements between Jordan (the name of Transjordan after the annexation) and other members of the LAS, after which the issue of creating an Arab state was deleted from the agenda (Haddad & Hardy 2003).
The status quo persisted in these territories until the Six Day War from June 5 to 10, 1967. When Israel gained control of east Jerusalem, it pushed Jordan back across the Jordan River and drove out the troops of Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Thus, in the course of this war, the entire territory of the once-mandated Palestine came under Israeli control (Cohen 1985).
Earlier, in 1964, the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) was created in Kuwait. The PLO and its supporters, represented by the LAS, did not recognize the creation of Israel, and later, in 1967 and 1968, they decided on the "Three No" (no peace, no recognition and no negotiations with Israel) and the Palestinian Charter, which declared the basic principles of the PLO's attitude to Israel, including the elimination of its state formation (Eban 1992).
It is the PLO that continued to play the key role on the part of Palestine in this conflict.
The PLO also later (1968) included Fatah, the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (officially existing since 1965), the head of which was Yasser Arafat, who became the head of the PLO, a year later.
In 1974, the PLO received observer status with the UN, and by the end of the 1980s it accepted de facto the borders that were formed in 1967 (Berzak 2013).
Intifada: The Conceptual Framework
The role of the intifada in the development of the PaLestinian-IsraeLi conflict has been evaluated differently by different researchers. Perhaps the largest group of studies was devoted to understanding the intifada as an ethnopolitical conflict. For example, Yakimova (2015) and Alimi (2007) stated that the intifada is a massive Arab resistance against the Israeli occupation. It should be noted that researchers tried to label each new round of Palestinian-Israeli affairs as an intifada to facilitate the analysis of events. However, the intifada has its own distinctive characteristics, which change and manifest themselves depending on the factors that currently determine Palestinian-Israeli relations (Yakimova 2015). Alimi broadened the understanding of the intifada through the lens of collective action taken up by Palestinian factions that have continuously managed to mobilize the majority of Palestinians in the occupied territories (Alimi 2007). Peretz (2019) remarked that the intifada is not a large-scale popular uprising but a revolt that unifies the people, in addition to economic, political, and social changes. It has an important distinguishing characteristic of processing the unity of the people at a fundamental level, despite the origin, place of residence, social status, gender, etc. (Peretz 2019). Khalayla (2014) considered the intifada as an ethnopolitical conflict, however, the main focus was shifted to peaceful manifestations, that were not associated with the intifada in the public sense because the media did not give them adequate attention.
There are studies that do not consider any distinctive features of the term intifada. Such a technique is used, as a rule, to give the titles for articles in a “Middle Eastern” context. For example, in the article "Yemen: A Social Intifada in a Republic of Sheiks" (Abu-Amr 1988), the word "intifada" is mentioned only in the title, while the word "uprising" is used throughout the text.
In theory, one can single out another group of works focusing on the Islamic factor in the intifada. These include the works of Paz (1992), Araj (2012), Sharifulin (2017), and others. Ganor (2011), for example, analyzed the processes of radicalization of second and third generation Muslim migrants in Europe, comparing the prerequisites of their conversions to radical Islam with those observed in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip on the eve of the first intifada. Ganor concluded that despite the different context, both the cases showed the significant role of social processes and generational conflict in exacerbating the situation.
In the context of the study on the Islamic factor, it is also worth highlighting an expanse of work representing an approach to the study of the instability in the Middle East through the prism of Islam, and specifically through the re-actualization of concepts such as fitna, fauda, thaura etc. (Zelenev 2015; Isaev & Shishkina 2017).
As for the socio-political prerequisites for the emergence of the intifada, it is worth highlighting the work of Hilterman (1991), Barber (2001), Caruso and Gavrilova (2012), Bomung (2012), etc., in which the role of factors such as youth guided political violence, mobilization of the population, influence of religious groups, etc. to escalate the conflict, is discussed.
For this study, the section of articles describing the state of the society on the eve of the intifada in terms of socio-demographic and political characteristics is of particular interest, as they bear pronounced similarity with the factors determining other sociopolitical conflicts in the Middle East. For example, during the events of the Arab Spring and other events various researchers analyzed the factors of demographic transition and the role of the media, etc. in similar contexts (Winkler (1998) and Urdal (2004), Vasiliev (2017), Dolgov (2012), Korotaev (2012), Sukhov (2013), Savateev (S2012), Karjakin (2014), Khondker (2011)).
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the assumption that the intifada as a sociopolitical conflict can be entered into the broad context of protest actions in the Middle East, going beyond the local confrontation between the two states. It should be noted that researchers have attempted to place the intifada in a meta-context (see, for example, Ivanov 2005; Grachikov 2015; Shapovalov 2015), but in this study we are dealing mainly with the influence of foreign policy dynamics, problems of international terrorism, etc. rather than considering the characteristics of modern socio-political movements.
First Palestinian Intifada: Socio-demographic analysis and prerequisites
Following the methodology of analyzing socio-political instability in the Middle East in terms of some socio-demographic characteristics (see, for example, Korotaev et al. 2012), the available statistical data and relating it to the study of the intifadas, we analyzed GDP per capita, perception index corruption, poverty rate, unemployment rate, and several other demographic factors in this study.
Thus, we studied the dynamics of GDP per capita in Palestine from 1970 to 1987, the period before the beginning of the first intifada, in which a cohort of young people were actively involved in the events (Fig. 1). The figures for Egypt are given as a comparison with the status quo on the eve of the Arab Spring.
Figure 1. GDP per capita in Palestine on the eve of the first intifada and in Egypt on the eve of the events of the Arab Spring
intifada palestinian israeli conflict
Figure 1 shows that GDP per capita in Palestine increased from 1970 to 1987 by about 6 times. Despite a slight decline in the period from 1981 to 1985, it can be seen that during the intifada, the most tangible growth in GDP per capita was recorded. As a comparison, the GDP growth in pre-revolutionary Egypt showed a noticeable increase before the conflict, which indicated the presence of complex causes of instability which were not directly related to the pace of economic development. It is worth mentioning here that in the course of the Arab Spring, economic factors as such could not become catalysts for the outbreak of protests in other countries, such as Tunisia, Libya or Syria (Goldstone 2002; Howard, Parks 2012). This allows us to conclude that various combinations of potentially destabilizing factors can be considered as direct causes of socio-political destabilization. In each country they were different, but the triggers for the start of massive anti-government demonstrations were mostly “domestic” cultural, communicative and generational factors.
According to the World Bank (The World Bank 1993), a significant reduction in the level of poverty was recorded before the period of intifada in Palestine. During this 19701987, an increase in the percentage of consumption of household commodities such as electricity, drinking water, refrigerators and washing machines was increased from 30% to 75%, from 15% to 67%, from 11% to 71%, from 23% to 38%, respectively (Fig. 2).
Figure 2. Dynamics of poverty in Palestine, 1970-1987
Thus, it can be noted that despite the rate of poverty decreased, an increase in sociopolitical instability could be observed with the breakout of the first intifada. This fact can be considered as confirmation of the theory that the grounds for the socio-political destabilization in the Middle East countries of the recent decades lie not in economic indicators as such (Korotayev et al. 2012), but to a greater extent in the accompanying demographic processes, which will be discussed below.
The unemployment rate in Palestine in 1987 collected by the Israeli statistical bureau recorded the unemployment rate in the Palestinian territories at 3.5% (The World Bank 1993), although, according to Abu Shokor, the factual unemployment rate stated was 20% (Abu-Shokor 1995). According to Ackerman (2001), on throughout the first intifada, only 13% of Palestinians with higher education were employed by profession. Thus, the high level of unemployment, among people with higher education, contributed as one of the factors for instability.
To study the demographics, the birth rate and death rate in Palestine before the first intifada should be considered first (Fig. 3).
Figure 3. Dynamics of fertility and mortality in Palestine on the eve of the first intifada
The graph shows that during the time interval of interest, the mortality rate, along with the birth rate decreased. However, from 1965 to the early 1970s, the highest birth rate was recorded, indicating the formation of an increased share of young people in the total population of Palestine by the beginning of the first intifada. Indeed, by 1987, the population aged 15 to 24 comprised of a significant part of the total population of Palestine (Ennab 1994) (Fig. 4).
Additionally, it is worth observing the steady increase in calorie intake per person from 2,300 in 1975 to 2,750 in 1987 (The World Bank 1993). Thus, these trends can be characterized as a scenario of demographic transition distinguished by an improvement in sanitary standards, an increase in living standards, a sharp drop in the mortality rate with a slow decline in the birth rate, which ultimately lead to an increase in the proportion of young people in the structure of society. In such a case, the youth bulge is exemplified by an increased percentage of young people in the total population. If dissatisfied with their social position and experiencing difficulties in finding a job, thus becoming potentially prone to radicalism (Korotaev 2012: 28-76). Therefore, the unemployed, ablebodied youth throughout the first intifada constituted as one of the main segments in the demographic structure of Palestinian society. Comparing the socio-demographic parameters in Palestine during the first intifada and the Arab revolutions, for example, in Egypt, similar traits such as the fall in poverty and ending with the presence of educated young people who were dissatisfied with their social status can be witnessed. It is also worth noting that all this was accompanied by heightened social tensions due to Israel's policy of settling the occupied regions, almost continually ongoing in that period (DIIS Report 2012) and heating up the social situation within the region (Xavier 2000).
Figure 4. Population pyramid of Palestine, 1987
Of course, in this particular case, there was also a whole spectrum of political reasons for the uprising. In addition to the Palestinian resentment after losing the ability to create their own state, the defeat of the Arab League in the Six Day War (CohenALmagor 1991: 12-40) and the 1978 agreement between Israel and Egypt at Camp David are worth mentioning. After this agreement, the autonomies were created in the territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, this process was scrapped Later. The first Palestinian intifada, therefore, was not a planned operation by various social groups, but was a spontaneous outbreak, and a preconditioned phenomenon that resulted in a popular uprising.
Dynamics of developments in the first Palestinian intifada
The formal reason for the start of the intifada was that in a huge refugee camp in the city of Jabaliya, the Gaza Strip, on December 9, 1987, an Israeli army van hit a truck with Palestinian workers, of whom 4 were killed and 10 were injured. Rumors quickly spread that the reason was a planned revenge for the murder of an Israeli businessman. On December 9, workers' and youth protests began with throwing stones at the Israeli patrol cars. In response, the Israeli guards open fired at the protests killing a 17-year-old Palestinian youth fueling more protests (RIA Novosti 2010) and mobilizing the Palestinians more strongly.
The word "intifada" appeared a few days after the incident, during the distribution of leaflets by the Hamas group on December 11 in the Gaza Strip and December 14 in the West Bank, containing a call to join the uprising. The word "intifada" was used in them to denote the mass demonstration. Interestingly, after such a spontaneous popular uprising, which did not fade at the very beginning, the previously divided Palestinian groups such as Fatah, PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), DFLP (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and PCP (Palestine Communist Party), which together constituted groups within the PLO, were able to take control over it. They acted together developing and mobilizing the intifada. The nonviolent protest was set apart by rejection of Israeli goods, commercial riots, tax refusal, withdrawal of Palestinians from the police, and organizing of clandestine schools and markets in squares in response to Israel's closure of schools and shops (Peters, Newman 2013). It can be noted that in comparison to the beginning of the uprising, during which the agenda was rather blurred, a single agenda for the consolidation of the uprising was proposed, which was reflected in the slogan “Justice, Freedom, Peace”. This was widespread among the West Bank Palestinians at that time (Shapovalov 2015).
In 1989, after two years of protests, the Israeli military suppressed the main forces of the intifada resulting in the discontinuing of the movement (RIA-Novosti 2010). As a result, a new wave of violence began, where the strategy of non-violent protest was quickly ceased. Despite this, this intifada has become the epitome of struggle and hope for the Palestinian people, with its largely non-violent characteristics (Alimi 2007). The first de jure intifada ended in 1993 with the signing of the Oslo agreements (Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements 1993; Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 1995).
Second Palestinian Intifada
The second Palestinian intifada began seven years after the de jure end of the first one, in 2000. Despite the large-scale uprising that preceded it some indicators of economic development such as GDP per capita significantly increased (Fig. 5) with a slight drop before the second intifada in Palestine during the period of 1993-2000 (in this case, as in the analysis of the first intifada, Egypt's GDP on the eve of the Arab Spring is taken to compare rates growth).
Figures 5. GDP per capita in Palestine on the eve of the second intifada and in Egypt on the eve of the Arab Spring
According to the World Bank, the level of poverty was estimated at 21% before second intifada (Ajluni 2003:64-73) indicating an increase in the values for this indicator compared to the levels throughout the first Palestinian intifada. Moreover, in the period from 1996 to 1998, unemployment rates fell to 10%, but in the year before the intifada, from 1999 to 2000, the rates increased to 17.5% (International Monetary Fund 2020). Thus, the increase in both poverty and unemployment coupled with the aftermath of the first uprising, powered the rising of the second intifada.
Furthermore, in the period from 1980 to 2000, high birth rates were recorded with a stable decrease in mortality leading to the emergence of a youth bulge by the beginning of the second Palestinian intifada. Thus, by 2000, people aged 15-29 accounted for 44% of the total Palestinian population (Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2019).
Besides demographic and social reasons, political motives for the start of the second Palestinian intifada include the failure of the Camp David talks on the status of East Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, as wells as unjustified expectations from the Oslo agreements (Peters, Newman 2013), and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon in 2000, which was perceived as a victory for Hezbollah by the Arab states.
Dynamics and results of the second intifada
The foundation for the study on the second intifada is the divergence of opinions about its immediate origin. Thus, according to one version, by visiting the Temple Mount, Sharon provoked Muslim Palestinian believers, while the other version states that the uprisings began spontaneously. Nevertheless, there is also a version stating that the second intifada was planned by Arafat (as confirmed by interviews with the Fatah and Hamas elite (Rubin 2003), and his widow (The Jerusalem Post - Israel News 2012)). After the failure of Camp David, Palestine began to prepare for a possible future intifada, but Israel also understood that containing new waves of aggression is a must otherwise it could lead to indignation similar to when Sharon visited the Temple Mount without considering consequences for his act (appearing with a thousand guards and the subsequent declaration that the Temple Mount belongs to Israel Although it is Located in East Jerusalem, which the Palestinians consider their territory.). However, the element of spontaneity in these events cannot be denied, as Fatah called for an uprising only after Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount (BBC 2004), where he was greeted by protesters who pelted stones at the police after he left (Cohen 2014).
The day after the call for uprising, riots resumed with renewed vigor in the old part of Jerusalem after the Friday prayers. Four Palestinian youths died during the riots on the same day resulting in a confrontation with the Israeli police. Over the next couple of days, riots, which gained momentum in the border areas, spread throughout the West Bank and to the Gaza Strip.
The conflict dragged on for 5 years. The second intifada was marked by extremely elevated levels of violence. Indeed, the Palestinians took to organizing suicide attacks, (there were 56 of them, and more than half were organized by Hamas), bombings, rocket attacks, etc. The targets were always different, from military checkpoints to civilian ones like shopping centers. Israel, on the other hand, chose a strategy of "overwhelming force" and pitched in tanks, Apache helicopters and F-16 bombs against the Palestinians (Peters, Newman 2013). During the second intifada, a reduced number of non-violent actions were also observed. However, they could not brand the intifada as non-violent as the overall picture was described as violence in response to violence, a tactic followed by both sides during the conflict. This high level of violence was characteristic of radical Islamic movements, which gained great popularity in the aftermath of the first intifada (The Wall Street Journal 2009).
Officially, the second intifada never ended since no agreement was signed to end it. After its peak in 2002, the intifada began to decline, and in 2004 the leader of the Palestinians Yasser Arafat died (RIA-Novosti 2013) and the Prime Minister of the PNA Mahmoud Abbas took his place (RIA-Novosti 2013). During Israeli special operations in Spring 2004, the Hamas leaders Ahmed Yassin and his successor Al-Rantisi were killed in two consecutive months (March and April). The second Palestinian intifada has exacerbated the divisions within society and led to even greater economic losses, without the slightest success in `shaking off Israeli military occupation. However, only two years after the passing of Arafat, Israel ended its settlement presence in Gaza and TsahaL withdrew unilaterally from the area.
Palestinian fitna
When comparing the socio-demographic situation throughout the first and second Palestinian intifada, there is a significant similarity in the dynamics of GDP per capita (in both cases, stable GDP growth was recorded) and the unemployment rates (in the year before the start of both the first and second intifada a fairly high level of unemployment, mainly among young people, was traced). This can be largely explained by the fact that young people, dissatisfied with their social status and unemployment, the negative effect of which turned out to be stronger for them than the positive aspects of economic growth, became combustible material for the outburst of political discontent in the described situation. Perhaps the most significant difference in this case is the level of poverty that began to rise after the first intifada and, among other things, contributed to the more violent nature of the uprising.
The similarity is also observed in the transition of demographics with a decrease in the death rate and a gradual decrease in the birth rate. Meanwhile, the percentage of young people in the society remained at a fairly high level during both the intifadas with the young people between the age of 15-24 accounting for 48% of the population during the first intifada, and 44% during the second intifada. Thus, a youth bulge was seen during both intifadas.
In addition to similarities in both intifadas, there were significant parallels with other uprisings in the Arab world, in particular in relation to the events of the Arab Spring. This can be seen in the already mentioned comparison of both Palestinian intifadas and protests in Egypt. Thus, for instance, in all these cases the growth of GDP per capita; relevant demographic trends and a trend towards high youth unemployment (however, there is an important difference: in the case of the Arab Spring that it was about predominantly educated youth, where in the case of Palestine it is more of a working youth) was noted.
Thus, it can be argued that, according to socio-economic and demographic data, both Palestinian intifadas had several prerequisites for the start of an uprising, which could not be reduced solely to factors of political confrontation between the two communities around disputed territories.
As for the beginning of the first and second Palestinian intifada, similar elements were reported. This included the "active phase" of both uprisings that lasted for about 2 years and then reached its peak, after which it was suppressed by the forces of Israel and faded. By comparing the triggers to the beginning of the first and second intifada, it can be noticed that the dynamics of the Palestinian intifadas differed dramatically. For example, the first one was caused by a lethal accident with several dead Palestinians. A spontaneous uprising broke out after the funeral next day. The reason for the second intifada was the visit by then Israeli opposition politician Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount (which includes the Al-Aqsa Mosque complex), located on the territory of East Jerusalem, with the subsequent declaration that the Temple Mount is the territory of Israel, although the Palestinians consider it the territory of their state. In this case, both the religious and the political aspects can be considered triggers for the intifada.
The “active phase” of conflicts also demonstrated differences in the first and the second intifada. The first intifada was characterized by non-violent methods, while the second, on the contrary, was characterized by violence from both sides during the conflict. However, it should be noted that the spontaneity during the beginning of the uprising was a characteristic of both the first and the second intifada, after which both the intifadas were given a manageable disposition by some Palestinian politicians. It is also worth comparing the slogans and mobilization processes. For example, the slogan of the first intifada “Justice, Freedom, Peace” is fundamentally different from the violent slogan of the second intifada “Death to Israel, death to America”. In this case, one can trace the acquisition of the features of violent political actions by the intifada. This is confirmed by the processes of mobilization, namely, in the transition from spontaneous mobilization and the tactics of complete denial of Israel to mobilization associated with Islamist groups and the use of suicide bombers.
Moreover, in this case, it is worth turning to the term fitna, or strife, as a rule, arising spontaneously and having a non-violent nature (Zelenev 2015: 27-33), and depending on how the fitna develops, it can turn either into thaura (revolution) (Shishkina, Isaev 2017), or into fauda (anarchy). Fauda is characterized by the scenario of inqilab (armed uprising) that is determined by the violent nature of actions, not only from the side of the rebels, but also by the forces suppressing the uprising (Zelenev 2012: 8-12). Zelenev notes in his works “at the beginning of the fitna, there is a local conflict, after which people begin to gather in places of natural gathering” (Zelenev 2015). For example, people begin to gather in public squares, after which the further development of events determines the path fitna will take. This article has shown how certain characteristics of the intifada might correlate with these fitna scenarios.
Conclusions
In conclusion, it should be noted that the wave of socio-political instability in the Arab world, erupted into a series of conflicts starting at the end of 2010 with the events of the Arab Spring, re-actualized some approaches to understanding and studying protest movements in the Middle East. A broader view has emerged for the interpretation of mass demonstrations and protests in the Arab world. Retrospectively, the Palestinian intifadas, which at the time of their inception were mostly associated with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and were considered narrowly regional in nature do fit into the broader context of protest movements in the Middle East, both in terms of the totality of socio-economic prerequisites, and the dynamics of the spread of protest moods.
Thus, the beginning of the protests in the case of the intifada can be characterized precisely as fitna, especially in relation to the first intifada. Therefore, its "active phase" can be attributed to fitna, which grew into thaura, but at the same time the first intifada did not have a pronounced Islamic factor, in contrast to the second intifada. The second intifada, which at the beginning, Literally within the first two weeks, could be described through the concept of fitna, then grew into fauda and inqilab, since it had a pronounced violent nature of actions from both the parties involved in the conflict.
Taking into account the above approach to inscribing certain protest actions in the context of Middle Eastern political culture, one cannot but mention the Palestinian-Israeli crisis of 2021. Without going deep into a detailed analysis of these events and consideration of the question of whether they can be characterized as the third intifada within the framework of this article, we note only the most significant characteristic of the confrontation in May 2021. Thus, the conflict since its beginning on May 6 was violent and included such forms of confrontation as clashes with the police using stones, firecrackers and heavy objects by the Palestinians and flash noise grains, tear gas and rubber bullets by the Israeli police, the storming of the Al-Aqsa mosque, as well as airstrikes (Global Conflict Tracker 2021; Kingsley, Kershner 2021; Murphy, Taylor 2021). And in this case, we can more confidently attribute these events to the term inqilab rather than fitna or fauda.
This article is an output of a research project implemented as part of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2021 with support by a grant of the Russian Science Foundation (project No. 18-18-00254 “Quantitative analysis and forecasting of risks of socio-political destabilization in the countries of the Afrasian Instability Zone”).
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