US – China trade war in Russian political discourse: strategic opportunities VS. Economic challenges

Evolution of the US-China: structural and economic factors. Trade wars under Trump administration. Russian factor in the US-China confrontation. The origins and effects of the US-China trade war. Russian approach towards the conflict in 2018-2019.

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FEDERAL STATE AUTONOMOUS EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION

FOR HIGHER PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

NATIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs

Drozdova Anna Vladimirovna

US - China trade war in Russian political discourse: strategic opportunities VS. Economic challenges

BACHELOR'S THESIS

Field of study: International Relations

Degree programme:

HSE and University of London Parallel Degree Programme in International Relations

Supervisor

Professor

Bratersky M.V.

Advisor

Professor

Novikov D.P.

Moscow, 2020

Content

1. Introduction

1.1 Methodology

1.2 Literature Review

2. Theory

2.1 Evolution of the US-China: structural and economic factors

2.2 Trade wars under Trump administration: theoretical perspective

2.3 Russian factor in the US-China confrontation

3. The origins and effects of the US-China trade war

3.1 Strategic and geoeconomic aims of trade war: the US and China perspective

3.2 From strategic partners to strategic competitors: domestic factor in the US-China relations

3.3 The course and effects of the war

4. Russia's strategy towards the US-China trade war: debates and initiatives

4.1 The impact of the US-China trade war on Russian economy

4.2 Expert and political debates on the US-China conflict

4.3 Cautious balancing: Russian approach towards the conflict in 2018 - 2019

Conclusion

Work Cited

Abstract

trump confrontation conflict china

The issue of the trade war between the United States and China is one of the most acute and warning topics that has gained momentum in the recent years. The purpose of the study is to reveal the behavior of the third-party states in such unstable economic environment. Particularly the study will be focused on the Russian political discourse towards the Sino-American trade war. Russia remains one of the key geopolitical players in the global arena and the confrontation between the two largest world economies certainly provides both opportunities and threats to it. Many researchers have been analyzing the potential political as well as economic impact of the confrontation between US and China, however the further research aims at analyzing underlying differences in attitude of varies institutions of Russian Federation trough analyzing the political discourse. While demonstrating neutrality in the conflict, different strategies may be implemented from the part of Russia considering the positions of different institutions within the country.

1. Introduction

Nowadays, it is hard to imagine a major military conflict to emerge between powerful states, despite that the issue of trade war between the US and China has become especially warning given the might of these economies and an overall economic interdependence. Amadeo (2019), defines trade war as: “when a nation imposes tariffs or quotas on imports and foreign countries relate with reciprocal forms of trade protectionism.” The trade confrontation between China and the US rapidly escalated by spring 2018, when the United States introduced a 25% tariff on steel imports and a 10% tariff on aluminum (Ignatova et al., 2019), followed by a series of reciprocal measures from both parties in varies areas. Given the fact that the conflict is unfolding between the two largest economies, it had a rather destructive influence on the global economy taking into considerations the context economic interdependency. The research question of the paper is to identify the behavioral strategy of the third-party states in the Sino-US trade war with the particular analysis of Russian attitude towards working out strategies to protect itself. In a broader perspective, this will allow for a better understanding of third-country balancing strategies regarding super-power confrontation.

Russia is among key players if not economically but certainly politically. China is the main trade partner of Russia and the trade war should have a direct impact on Russia not to mention the geopolitical importance of Russian relations with China. Relations with the United States, on the contrary, are confrontational in nature, but at the same time they are characterized by a high level of strategic interdependence associated with the need to maintain nuclear deterrence and to engage in tactical cooperation with Washington in different regions of the world. In addition, Russia is interested in lifting or easing Western sanctions, so it seeks to avoid deepening confrontation and drawing into new conflicts with the United States that are not directly related to the sphere of Russian national interests.

This creates a dilemma in Russian policy regarding the Sino-American confrontation. From one perspective, the more trade confrontation and competition between the US and China escalates, the more opportunities in terms of market integration into China Russia will get, and the more dependent China becomes, for instance, on Russian energy resources. On the other hand, however, Russia does not seek to distance itself completely from the West and is under a danger of becoming overdependent on the Chinese economy. In the case of too much dependency on China, Russia may risks losing its geopolitical and economic significance in Eurasia while distancing itself from the West completely. In case the Chinese economy gets hurt from the trade war too much an overdependency on China will weaken Russian economy even more. There is also a concern that if China becomes too strong it will simply absorb Russia both economically and politically. The optimists among Russian analysts prescribe Russia to integrate economically and strategically as the confrontation with the US opens new for opportunities for trade and partnership. Sceptics, on the other hand, are concerned about economic threats: overdependency on oil or gas exports that slows down local production, and the inflow of Chinese goods that will outcompete local producers. The official position of Russia as expressed by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is neutrality. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov outlined that “Russia will not solve its economic problems through participating in this trade war on one side or the other” (RT, 2018). Given all the expressed neutrality regarding this conflict between the US and China, Russia is clearly maintaining more friendly and close relationships with China both economic and political levels in spite the challenges aforementioned.

1.1 Methodology

The methodology used in the research includes discourse analysis of both primary and secondary sources including official government statements of Russia as well as reports of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and interviews of governmental officials and experts in the field. The study will also focus on the official documents released both in US and China regarding the course and actions of the trade war, and will include: White Papers, National Security Strategies, United States Trade Representatives, CIS archive data.The main purpose of the methodology is to reveal how Russia builds its policy as a third-party state in the context of structural confrontation between China and the US. Experts to be analyzed represent both governmental and educational entities: The Department of Trade Negotiations of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of International Affairs, experts in the field from the Higher School of Economics. The statistics used to cover economic projections and consequences of the trade war is derived from: IMF and World Bank reports, Ministry of Economic Affairs of Russia, Federal Customs Service of Russia as well as the Central Bank of Russia.

One of potential limitation of the methodology applied is the inability to separate economic and political strategy from other factors and influencers, since there are multiple variables to the equation, and it is difficult to distinguish the impact solely of the trade war between the US and China, especially with recent beginning of Corona Crisis. Another limitation concerns the statements of the officials, as the sample of the experts may not fully cover the scope of opinions that are present`. The discourse analysis will consider the time period starting from early 2000s in order to grasp the change in the attitude towards China as well as possible opinion fluctuations.

The independent variable of the research in the trade relations of the US and China and the unfolding trade war between them. The dependent variable is Russia's policy towards it: perceptions and policy. Depending on how the trade conflict between the two breaks out, the Russian political discourse as well as policy implementation will change.

1.2 Literature Review

A vast research has been conducted analyzing the consequences of US-China trade. Thus, the behavioral strategy of the third-parity states seems to be understudied. Before analyzing the discourse and strategies of the different institutions of Russia, the context of the evolution of the systemic confrontation between China and the US should be investigated, as it is the direct reason for the trade war emergence.

Over the last decades, China's rapid economic growth brought both concern and amazement. No other country was able to sustain such stable high rate of economic growth and lift so many people out of poverty. Although, China seems to be supporting the multilateral world order, due to which it was able to skyrocket, some countries started to fear that China may behave in an offensive way in order to become a regional hegemon. Mearsheimer, being an offensive realist, warns that China will not and cannot rise peacefully. The argument is built upon an offensive realist thought that as China becomes richer and stronger it will inevitable start to foster its military capacity in order to build up its security, because, according to offensive realists, states are power maximizers that seek to gain as much as they can in order to become a regional hegemon in the best case scenario. Mearsheimer does not insist that the great power competition in Asia will inevitably lead to a direct military clash between the US and China, especially given a nuclear deterrent, but it might with the American presence in the South China Sea. If not militarily, economically there should be a quite evident competition between the two super-powers, that has become more evident in recent years with the trade war escalation. Mearsheimer particularly stresses attention to the problem of economic “coercion” which is rather asymmetric. With all mentioned, Mearsheimer advances an opinion that countries, including Russia, will start to balance China in order to contain it. As there is a miserable chance to isolate Chinese economy and limit its growth, “there is already considerable evidence that countries like India, Japan and Russia …are warried about China's ascendency and are beginning to look ways to contain it.”(Mearsheimer, 2014). In Mearsheimer's view, Russia gets threatened to get coerced, as it has its longest boarder with China and already depends highly on trade with it. The above mentioned, should influence Russia to align with the US to counter-balance China's influence in the region and global economy.

A couple of years have passed since Mearsheimer has written his article “Can China Rise Peacefully”, thus offensive measures were undertaken first from the part of the United States, and China does not demonstrate revisionist attitude in a way Mearsheimer was predicting even to its closest neighbors. Some scholars argue, contrary to Mearsheimer, that China's behavior is better explained through the defensive realist logic (Jalil, 2019). They do not see the conflict between these great powers, moreover, arguing that China benefits from the existing balance of power and seeks to maintain it rather than upset it. The existing world order has given China an opportunity for such rapid growth, considering varies special treatments under the framework of the WTO. China benefits more from multilateralism and economic interdependence, thus any behavior that may distort such advantageous distribution seems to be irrational for China. PRC does not show many of the signs of a revisionist states that tries to distort the status quo. To the contrary, China, as pointed by Jalil (2019), is very engaged and integrated into international community and participates in regional multilateral institutions such as: ASEAN, APEC, SCO, ARF. Jalil further insists that China even stabilizes the region through what he calls “charm offensive” soft power in both diplomatic and economic dimensions. Jalil concludes, that the clash between the US and China is not inevitable and “it is possible to avoid the Thucydides Trap”.

Another approach at evaluating US-China relations is power transition theory which states that a growing power will seek to challenge the existing one, leading to a clash between the two. This approach somewhat close to the offensive realist perspective, however, is also challenged. Chan (2008) provides a critique of a power transition theory application towards China behavior, he argues that to the contrary of the assumptions advanced by power transition theory, confrontation will more likely be initiated by a declining power rather than a rising one. Chan also seems to be sharing the view with Jalil that China is rising in a rather stabilizing way and it is the US that perceives China as threat and works as the destabilizing factor, despite the fact that it does not threaten the US economy thus far. Although, China is dissatisfied with the situation in the South China Sea and this may lead to clashes, generally, it seems to be avoiding involvement into conflict with the US where possible. Chan (2008), also argues, that where clashes do happen, they happen due to the inability of China to avoid US involvement and not due the aggressive Chinese behavior.As Gingrich (2019) puts it: “China is the greatest competitor the United States has had to deal with in its 243 yearlong history”. Chan's logic can be supported if applied to the course of trade war between the countries. As it will be further illustrated in the next chapters of the research, PRC seems to be applying a reactionist policy, mirroring actions and approaches of the US (tariffs had usually been introduced first by the US and China responded with reciprocal measures), while trying to initiate dialogue and settle disputes with the WTO.

Although theoretical approaches give varies explanations to the origins of clash between the US and China the reality is that the world has to deal with the consequences of the trade war between them. Russia stands amid China and the West both geographically and politically, faced with a strategical dilemma. In the recent years, Russia has been developing close strategic relationships with China. According to Cox (2016), although the relations between the two cannot be describes as a military bloc, a strong strategic partnership exists. Both countries seek to get integrated to the international community although are being pushed away, leading to an ever-closer relations between the two. Both Cox (2016) and Gingrich (2019) argue that the trade war between US and China is not insignificant for Russia and it seems to be supporting China. They admit that conflicts with China cannot be regarded in separation from Russia, for Gingrich, the main threat for the US to deal with is the Sino-Russian tandem, with Russia providing China with military and energy recourses and China supporting Russia politically and economically.

Some scholars even argue that the extent of integration and mutual support of Russia and China is seemingly overexaggerated. Ozawa (2019) while admitting some opportunities of Sino-Russian relations outlines some obstacles to their deeper integration and cooperation. Among the challenges is the historic mutual distrust and power asymmetry that mostly alerts Russia in the long run. Historically, there already been a strategic partnership that has ended with the Sino-Soviet split. For Ozawa (2019), the signal of deepening strategic integration will be: “either Russia or China supporting their respective territorial claims. So far, Russia has been reluctant to get involved in China's claims on disputed islands, such as the Senkaku or Diaoyu islands, or in the South China Sea.” Another sign would be mutual support in the international arena, the UN, for instance, that does not always happen. It could be inferred that both Russia and China cooperate pragmatically and do not seem to be creating a strategic bloc. The Western literature often attribute Sino-Russian cooperation to the policy aimed at confronting the US, with Russia being pushed away following the Ukrainian Crisis in 2014 and China by the trade confrontation with the US in recent years, consequently meaning that is temporary, unstable and asymmetrical for Russia. Suslov (2019) seems to be skeptical of such view, arguing that Russia's political and strategic dependence on China is not less than the dependence of China on Russia, as Russia is the only friendly great power in the region, thus if Moscow shifts its policy back to the West, China will be left alone among unfriendly states.

For Russia the trade war may bring certain economic threats and benefits. Ozawa (2019), Ignatova et al. (2019), point to the energy market that China serves for Russia. In 2014 a thirty-year agreement on gas deliveries from Russia to China was signed and in 2019 the Power of Siberia pipeline was brought into operation; Russia will supply 38 billion cubic meters per year to China (Gazprom, 2019). Spartak and Franzusov (2019), on the other hand, are alarmed by the global economic threat caused by the trade war between China and US and argue that global economic destabilization also poses unfavorable conditions to Russian economy. Among those threats are the inability to non-energy exports and production, growing uncertainty in the bilateral deals framed by the US-China trade confrontation, increasing supply of Chinese goods overwhelming the market as a result of US tariff increase on Chinese goods, threatening Russian producers.

Needless to say, that the US-China trade war has a negative impact on the global economic climate. The US has taken the position of negation of multilateral rules and regulation; thus, the apex of the conflict has passed, the issue does not seem to resolve any time soon. Sun (2019), Dmitriev (2018) and Supyan (2019) see the US taking the position against everyone, trying to force the international norm revision through its power and status. The US and China have entered into a new phase of their relationships, as noted by Supyan, with the growth of China fostering an even greater confrontation from the US. In such new reality other states are forced to rethink their policy in order to adapt to the existing climate. This brings the need for cautious balanced policy to be applied by Russia in order not to be caught in the trap both in economic and political terms.

Amid the confrontation between China and the US, Russia is faced with the dilemma as to whether it is more beneficial for it to construct closer relations with China and fill the trade gap that has occurred but, on the other hand, it may suffer more from the further integration with China given the unstable economic environment. The research is expected to reveal the existing inconsistencies and contradictions among different institutions of Russia, thus expressing varies approaches towards tackling the US-China trade war, despite all the official neutrality expressed by Russian officials. The analysis of the expert discourse is expected to demonstrate how the economic strategy given the troubled economic environment is interplayed with the political strategy.

2. Theory

2.1 Evolution of the US-China: structural and economic factors

Over the last couple of years, the escalation of tensions between China and the US have been gaining momentum and have reached its apex in 2018 with turning into a trade war with the imposition of tariffs from both sides. China' economy has been since 1980's with the reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping. Such economic might was warring the international community, thus calling for regulation by certain rules, leading to the acceptance of PRC into the WTO in 2001. China has become the second largest economy after the US and the first in terms of GDP PPP in 2013 (World Bank, 2020a), becoming the US competitor both in economic and geopolitical terms. In order to investigate the reasons behind such rapid unfolding of the trade tensions into trade war it is important to evaluate the structural problems first. Many theorists apply the model formulated as early as by Thucydides to the US-China relations to explain the emerging conflict. While some argue that the war is inevitable (Mearsheimer, 2014), others stress that it could be avoided (Kissinger (2011), Allison (2017). The structural preconditions, however, do not signify that the US-China trade war was solely political in nature. Trade measures have also been adopted regardless the explicit security concerns, likewise, Zuev (2019) asserts that the US started to limit imports of Chinese steel long before the outbreak of mutual tariff escalation. As the degree of strategic confrontation intensified, the trade measures bursted out into a trade war. Before Trump, the US it was perceived that even if the US-China relations are to get spoiled, the trade would not be at risk due to the mutual economic interdependence. The remaining question, however, is why this interdependence did not hedge the trade tensions from escalating into a full-scale trade war that has put the global economy at danger.

Power transition theory can be applied to the current Sino-US relations. The theory stresses upon the fact, that a fast-rising power strive to challenge the existing hegemon's order and establish its own status quo. In the present-day world, economic statecraft may be even more influential than military one, especially given the nuclear deterrent. While power transition concepts tend to explain US-China relations in strategic terms, there are some concepts, focusing on economic aspects.In mercantilist view, countries use their capital might to boost the military as well. Given this logic, the structural problems of the relations between the US and China lie first and foremost in the economy. The economic interest of the two, despite their high interdependence, clash and the redistribution of power occur. Such redistribution is due to the fact that the Chinese economy is growing much faster given the framework of the established relations between US and China and in the world as a whole.

The US order is being challenged by rising China, moreover there can be no assurance that China will rise peacefully and is not a revisionist state, that seeks to undermine if not the entire economic system but certainty the US influence in Asia, where the economic center of gravity is shifting. In fact, given the actions of the current administration to hit first it seems that the US perceives China exactly as a revisionist rising power. This challenges the idea of the power transition theory that a rising hegemon will seek to challenge the declining one. Yet, most likely the effect is the reverse. To use Chan's (2008) logic, the declining power or hegemon seeks to challenge the rising one in in order not to lose the existing preferential position, while yet having might to contain the counterpart as the rules of the system disproportionally favor the dominating state.

Given the fact that China has benefited enormously from the established order allowing it to grow at the average of 9% of GDP annually between 1990 and 2018 (World Bank, 2020b) it has little incentives to revise the existing status quo. However, the distribution of benefits from the exiting order is the inherent source of conflict (Chan, 2008). The US is concerned with how much China gains from the order that is to be benefiting more to the US. The issue of relative gains has become especially important in the relations between US and China. The dominant power perceives it as a threat to its security if the rising power receives more from the existing order, thus the destabilization is to be initiated not by China that will avoid challenging the existing balance in order not to get off the track. Moreover, China has been explicit that it does not seek “hegemony, expansion or spheres of influences” and promotes cooperation and dialogue. (White paper: China's National Defense in the New Era, 2019). Despite such message the US could not be sure of the real intentions. Realizing the danger of such rapid strengthening of China, the US sought to rearrange the relations particularly in trade in order to secure its own position and become less dependent on trade with China, while limiting the ability of China to grow at the same pace. The threatening factor,as Liberman (1996) asserts, was notnecessarily the growth of China over the last decade or so, but the speed and disproportionate gains that China has been acquiring in relation to the US that for a long time has been the main beneficiary of the system it advanced. Chan further proceeds with the claim that such imbalance of benefits galvanizes the state with an “under-allocated” advantages relative to its power to consider going to war in order to improve the share back. Such actions cause states with the surplus of benefits to resist the reallocation which inevitably leads to confrontation with possible escalation to war.

What Liberman(1996) calls as “disproportionate gains” affect the security of states thus encouraging states to rationally weigh the payoffs of cooperation against the possible threats that are caused by the empowerment of other states. There is a longlisting debate over the conditions under which a state will limit or withdraw from mutually beneficial cooperation due to the “disproportionate gains” of the other state. The argument presented by Liberman, that the nuclear deterrent as well as the multipolar interconnectedness in commerce diminishes the threat of war and withdrawal from beneficial exchange between rivals, seems to have been challenged by the recent trade war between China and the US. For Liberman, the only condition that will distort economic cooperation is the “transfer of military technologies or loss of military self-sufficiency”, which did not happen in case of US-China relations. On the other hand, the issue of relative gains starts to be alarming with the rising military threat posed by the partner. Some scholars insist that China, despite its official statements, will not and cannot rise peacefully, as with strengthening of its economy it will also modernize its military capacity.

One of the most prominent supporter of such rhetoric is an offensive realist John J. Mearsheimer, who warns that China will pose direct military threat to the US influence in Asia, insisting that China seeks to become a regional hegemon that will challenge the US not only economically but militarily. Such statements are not groundless as over recent years China has initiated a modernization plan for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to become a “world class” army by 2035. (Office Secretary of Defense, 2019). China possesses the largest navy force in the region including the domestically built aircraft carrier as well as the third largest aviation force in the world. (Office Secretary of Defense, 2019). The US is especially concerned with the situation in the South China Sea and Taiwan as China conducts aggressive policy there and strives to push the US out of the region. According to the Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving PRC, despite the decision of Law of the Sea Convention on the “nine-dash line”, “China continues to use coercive tactics, including the employment of PLA naval and paramilitary vessels, to enforce its claims and advance its interests”. The same report also skeptical about the “peaceful” unification with Taiwan without the use of military force. Thus far, tensions over Taiwan and Chinese claims in the South China Sea did note evolve recently and should be not be expected to serve as a trigger to direct military confrontation between China and the US as both countries retain strong military force and a largely deterred by the nuclear arsenal at the disposal of both. Neither US nor China would seek military cash with each other, in spite of that both are figuring out strategies to spread the influence in the region. Turning back to Liberman's analysis, the military confrontation caused by disproportionate economic gains in a multipolar world is expected to be low even between rivalry states, especially if both are nuclear-armed. The states would use other tools in order to adjust the gain balance to their favor.

The concerns over the issue of disproportionate gains with China did not appear suddenly with president Trump taking office. Over the past decades different administrations have been trying to contain growing China so that it would not pose threats in the future. Politicians in the US are divided into two camps in their affiliation towards measures to address China. Chan(2008) distinguishes the “conservatives” who do perceive China as a rival rising power and “liberals”. The conservatives advocate for containing measures in order to constrain Chinese growth and influence. Liberals, on the other hand, are for engagement policies aimed at including and softly undermining China trough norms established by the US in order to take control over it, which will eventually transform the political system of China. Chan (2008) admits that: “neither group, however, will endear itself to the Chinese because its explicit aim is either to block China's ascent or to undermine the current Chinese system”.The attitude towards China has been fluctuating from efforts to engage China into the US led system of international trade and politics during Obama administration to a more assertive policy of containment which is evident during the current presidency of Trump. Among challenges posed in the Asia-Pacific regions posed to the US are geo-economic and strategic. (Novikov and Shumakova, 2018). The reallocation of wealth in favor of China has led to a diminishing role the United States and loss of political dominance. Consequently, the US has been also losing the military supremacy and influence in the region. The aforementioned challenges have limited the strategic disposition as well as influence of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region and compelled the US to seek non-military foreign policy instruments including, as suggested by Novikov and Shumakova(2018). institution building. One of such institution was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was aimed at responding to both strategic and geo-economic challenges through involvement China into US led international order. Previous lack of involvement of the US in the development of trade standards in the region posed significant threats to the US influence. Preferential status of China in WTO, multiple bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with the key US partners in the region such as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, as well as multilateral trade agreements not including the US, were undermining the US firm's competitiveness and clashed with the interests of the United states. (Salidjanova, 2015).

In order to keep control over the region, the institutional US dominated structure was needed, thus the TPP was to become one. The engagement attempts that were to be manifested through the TPP have failed to reach the desired containment through engagement of China as there were more drawbacks for the US than it could hold. A recipient of Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics Joseph E. Stiglitz was very critical of the TPP from the very beginning, arguing that not only does it not “check on the economic power of China”, but strengthens China's positions in the agreement where it already “has agreements with more than half of TPP partners” allowing for “substantial benefits via generous “rules of origin.” ” (Stiglitz, 2016).The withdrawal from the TPP was one of the first things the newly elected president Trump did, signifying the transition from the engagement to containment policy towards China.

The outbreak of the trade war between world's two largest economies certainly brings turbulence to the global economic and political environment. Given global economic interdependence, the imposition on tariffs brings global uncertainty and investment delays. The US has positioned aside from global trading regulations including the World Trade Organization (WTO) considering that it is “not well-equipped to handle the challenges posed by China's state-led economic system”), posing the world economy main stabilizing organization in a deep dispute-settlement crisis. (González &Véron, 2019).The decision of the United States to introduce national security tariffs on steel and aluminum caused discontent within members of WTO. Several members of the WTO including China, Russia and the European Union requested the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to examine the additional tariffs on steel and aluminum (25% and 10% respectively), but the requests were blocked by the US.(González &Véron, 2019). The tariffs hardly could be related to the issue of national security: “The Defense Secretary James Mattis the U.S. military requirements for steel and aluminum each represent only about 3% of U.S. production” (Brinkley, 2018). Such ignorance of the multilateral trade regulations which were previously pushed by the US, signified that under the current administration the “America First” is explicitly what it is. The measures that were undertaken were to hit the industrial sector and slowdown the Chinese economy, the reciprocal measures were fast to be implemented by China and even Russia destabilizing world trade and economy. October 2019 WTO press release mentioned that “escalating trade tensions and slowdown of global economy” have led the WTO to lower the trade growth forecast more than by half for 2019/2020. The global economic uncertainty caused by the Sino-US confrontation without doubt encourages third party states to be coming up with appropriate measures both political and economic. Russia, being situated amid US and China not only geographically, but also politically, and having strong economic ties with China, also is under threat and has to navigate cautiously both politically and economically.

2.2 Trade wars under Trump administration: theoretical perspective

Having described the structural preconditions for the clash between the United States and the People's Republic of China it is thus crucial to evaluate how such power transition got implemented through trade war and not military conflict or something else. As Thomas Graham (1983) puts it: “talk of trade wars is at least as old as Egyptians and Phoenicians” hence, the economic statecraft policies are not new and are used by countries when other means are not appropriate or threaten the security like in the case with nuclear deterrent for both US and China. Liberman's “disproportionate” gains that were discussed in the previous chapter, could be from the US point of view to be the disproportionate growth of the China as a “high tech superpower” (Zhang, 2018) and the trade imbalances making the US dependent on Chinese imports. From the Chinese perspective, the United States can no-longer be the only decision-making power and it has to deal with the fact that the world is not US-centric, while China is insisting on resolving disputes through negotiations, it will not be afraid of a trade war if necessary. (White Paper: China's Position on the China-US Economic and Trade Consultations2019). Since the origins of power shift are economic in nature as the center of economy shifts from the West towards Asia, and the possibility of direct military confrontation is diminished global multilateralism and nuclear deterrent, hence the power transition took a form of a trade war between declining and emerging powers.

Various attitudes even within the United States itself exist in relation to the effectiveness of trade war initiation. Zhang(2018) argues, that the US would not be able to slowdown Chinese growth in the near future and insists that the current trade imbalance is a structural problem that could not be overcome by such protectionist measures as tariffs. The Chinese development model given the global economic multilateralism and interdependence makes it hardly possible to get influence over by the US without dramatically hitting their own economy. Without China initiating reforms in social safety system, intellectual security and liberation of financial market as well as monetary policy, the concerns of the US could not easily be resolved. Current administration aims at pushing such changes in a rather coercive manner, but China has power and will to resist. For these reasons, economic statecraft taking a form of trade wars may not be as effective in achieving US policy goals, making some scholars to claim that simple tariffs not being backed up by military force would not shift the paradigm of Sino-US relations.

Normally, coercive economic statecraft tools used by one state to make the other undergo the expected political changes are sanctions, but tariffs and other trade restricting measures can be considered ones as well. The tools used are aimed at imposing “enough economic pain” on the target which will “push the regime leader” in order to improve the bargaining positions and ensure compliance. (Blanchard and Ripsman, 2008). In the realism paradigm, however, such attempts are likely to fail as states are unwilling to give up their foreign policy goals for economic reasons and history has seem multiple examples of that like Iran or North Korea, states that were put in a much more severe economic circumstances than US can possibly put China. Nowadays, states could find other trade partners to compensate for the losses if not fully but considerably, thus it is almost impossible to impose sufficient economic pain, but the risks of an alliance creation against the targeting country rises. Although,Baldwin(1985) claimed that: “overall impression one derives from the literature is that economic statecraft is so obviously useless as to raise questions about the good judgment of any policy maker who gives serious consideration to such techniques” there are certain conditions under which it may work to some extent in the absence of other possibilities to pressure targeted states. Literature distinguished relative military power and domestic regime to be key for the successful implementation of economic statecraft. (Drezner, 2019). The great military power asymmetry between the targeting and the targeted country will lead to a greater possibility of compliance. Along these lines, the US does not sufficiently outweigh China in terms of military force, moreover, as Drezner (2019) notes: “as a general rule, great powers do not acquiesce to economic pressure from other great powers, for fear that this precedent would undercut their bargaining position in future conflicts.” As for political conditions, democratic states are also more prone towards accepting economic statecraft, as in contrast to authoritarian regime, capital could not be as easily redistributed as well as public discontent could be suppressed forcefully. Drezner(2019) The is no surprise that introduction of tariffs from the US did not lead to any concessions or political change, as the US has positioned China as rivalry state, the conflicts would logically continue, so China would not disadvantage its bargaining positions by accepting the demands of the US.

Even though, economic statecraft being it conducted in a form of engagement like during the presidency of Obama with TPP, or containment during the presidency of Trump, the US seems to have no other options considering the economic, political and military power China has at the disposal. Despite seeming ineffectiveness in the short run, in a longer run perspective tariffs may lay the path for potential bargaining, which already happens although the terms are not satisfactory for either country. Analyzing the failures of the previous administration to engage China into the regional agreement on the terms of the US, Trump reorganized the strategy. Trump's economic strategy advisor Peter Navarro and Autry (2011)stood in the opposition of TPP, arguing that China poses threat for both US and the world calling it “predatory” economy using the “weapons of job destruction”. With the introduction of Chinese initiatives such as Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) the One Belt and Road to increase and manage investment in the region, along with the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that introduced new rules for trade, challenged the US aims to regulate the regional growth and trade. Navarro and Autry further insisted that rapid military buildup of China is the consequence of its economic growth at expense of the US. Currency manipulation, forced technology transfer, export subsidies and questionable working standards served as the weapons of mass job destruction in the US and manifest the aggressive Chinese economy aimed at undermining the world economic order. The message formulated by Navarroand Autry was that simple engagement was not enough and the US should use more assertive measures that it would no longer tolerate non-free trade policies.

Trump administration shifted its trade policies towards protectionism in order to defend national economic interests. The format of agreements the US now prefers is bilateral allowing for grater possibility for adjusting and regulation. Trade barriers such as tariffs turned to be one of the most popular tools of engagement particularly with China. One of the economic reasons for such stiff policy towards China was the trade imbalance that has been threatening the US. Zhang (2018) noted, with the reference of Trump tweet, that in 2018 the trade deficit accounted for $500 billion per year with another $300 billion of intellectual property theft. Among political reasons, apart from preventing Chinese growing influence in the APR, was to slow down China's pace towards emerging IT superpower, that already challenges US security and domestic sovereignty. In turn, China accuses US in quite similar manner: arguing that it is the US who violates international trade regulations outlined by the WTO applying protectionist measures, while groundlessly accusing China of intellectual theft and RMB speculation.

2.3 Russian factor in the US-China confrontation

Particular focus on the role of Russia in the US-China confrontation has been devoted in this research. Russia being one of the world's as well as regional most significant geopolitical actor is being affected by the ongoing geoeconomic tensions. Being positioned amid Asia and the West, Russia can be characterized as a balancing state between the two. For several centuries, Russia has been swinging its political and strategic affiliations between either Europe or Asia depending on both internal and external factors. According to Tsygankov (2016), Russian foreign policy could be characterized as the struggle between the two schools of thought: westernists and statists. The westernist's approach could be traced back to the times of Peter the Great and is characterized with the stress on Russian similarity with the West. Westernizers are for integration with the West and admire liberal values and equality. During the Soviet Union, the westernist approach was manifested during Gorbachev times: “by introducing the idea of a “common European home,” Gorbachev meant to achieve Russian-European integration based on the principles of European social democracy.” (Tsygankov, 2016). Westernizers sought to integrate Russia into the European community on equal basis and strived for acceptance and understanding. Tsygankov further argues that right after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia was most open to the West and was passionate to prove its affinity to the Western values such as democracy, free market and human rights.

Nonetheless, the unwillingness of the West to accept Russia in the “liberal club” on equal grounds, manifested with the first NATO expansion and Yugoslavia bombing without considering Russia's opinion, inclined the foreign policy towardsstatism. As argued by Tsygankov, statist school is the strongest school of Russian foreign policy, which explicitly values sovereignty, power and stability over democratic values and freedom. Being perceived by the West as a threat and aggressor, Russia started to be more concerned with its safety and power maximization rather than attempts to integrate into European order. The statist approach pushed Russia to turn to the East in order to counterbalance the America centric order. The possibility of Sino-Russian bloc to emerge in order to balance the US was outlined back in the late 90s by such geopoliticians as Zbigniew Brzezinski in his famous book “the Grand Chessboard”. Brzezinski warned that the deadliest alliance for the US would be Sino-Russian, as it will distort the US control of the region, leaving the US out of the most important geostrategic location. Since 2014, the Russian escalation of conflict with the West over Ukraine stimulated Russia to search for even deeper strategic relations with China as both of the countries found themselves as the US main rivals, strictly opposing the US imposed order. Neither Russia, nor China as great powers did not wish to tolerate the dialogue from the position of power, both were open to negotiations with the US, but not solely on the US terms.

The inclination of Russia towards Asia does not signify, however, a complete turnaround from the West. Russia does not seek further confrontation with either US or Europe. In fact, either too close integration with China or extreme much distancing from the West threatens Russia both politically and economically. Nowadays, Russia is faced with the dilemma of how to develop economic ties and cooperation with European countries given the current political environment as well as to strengthen economic relations with Asian partners which could stimulate Russia's growth. China is already the largest trading partner of Russia and the question of balancing the relations in order not to get absorbed by overdependency o Chinese economy is rather acute in the Russian political and economic discourse. According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity (2020), Russian exports to China account for 11% of total exports and import for 20% ($39.1 bn. and 43.8 bn. respectively). Russia remains natural resources export oriented, with roughly 50% of export formed by petroleum (crude oil, refined petroleum and gas). (OEC, 2020). Diversification of the economy and diminishing the dependency on natural resources exports are among greatest challenges posed to Russia. Movchan (2016) points to an increased demand for investment in Russian trade infrastructure needed to securitize Russia's trading positions. Among other sources of growth, Movchan (2016) stresses the importance of “transit role” between China and the EU in addition to “cheap industrial production based on massive import of cheap labor”. Russia has been already creating institutional base for a more balanced and formalized geo-economic environment. Much of hopes for balancing cooperation with China have been laid upon the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which works with China under the One Belt and Road initiative (Lukin and Novikov,2019). During his speech at the St.Petersburg International Economic Forum, Vladimir Putin proposed a wider integrational framework with the participation EAEU and other interested states with whom there are already established close relations, including China. Such messages signal the attitude of both Russia and China to establish independent order in the region excluding the control of the US.

Despite proclaimed neutrality to the trade confrontation between the US and China, the Russian policy towards the conflict shifted to China ever since Russia-West conflict escalation in 2014. Both China and Russia insist that such measures as sanctions or tariffs are aimed at containing their influence and it is just a simple war by other means. In his Direct Line in 2019, Putin voiced that the trade war with China and the increase of tariffs is the same as sanctions, the role of which is to contain the development of China as a global competitor of the US. The president proceeded with the concerns that the same containment policy towards Russia will only unfold, thus the only way to place ourselves in the world is to become more powerful first and foremost economically. Such concerns build the commitment for Russia to establish and develop further the relations in the Asia and particularly with China as the main partner. While varies concerns and doubts exist in both expert and political communities regarding the duration and safety of strategic partnership with China, given that it is largely formed in response to and on the basis of confrontation with the US, there is also little evidence that tensions with the US are soon to be overcome, thus the institutional basis for cooperation in the Asian region would be further developing and strengthening.

In the US National Security Strategy of 2017, Trump has put a specific emphasis on addressing Russia and China: “China and Russia want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests. China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor.” The current US administration has occupied an aggressive stand, arguing that it will “seek the cooperation with the competitors from a position of strength” (NSS, 2017), but neither China nor Russia are ready for such attitude encouraging the US for a dialogue as equals. The US will need to accept the current reorganization of international relations, particularly in Eurasia, due to the assurance of both China and Russia that their sovereignty and interests should be respected and further US centrism could not be any longer tolerated. This does not signify that the countries strive to immediately clash with the US, in fact, both China and Russia are for diplomatic dialogue as the direct confrontation pose threat to global security as it has already shaken the world economic environment.


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