How could husserl’s theory of the bodily self-constitution of the ego help bridge the explanatory gap?

A crucial component of our train of thought was that according to Husserl one can only conceive of a particular phenomenon in a concrete manner by considering the wider web of meanings and other phenomena in which the phenomenon in question is embedded. Constitution means to follow the a priori necessary connection between phenomena and meanings “A priori” here means not only formal a priori like “there is no father without at least one child,” but also material a priori, so, judgments like “there is no colour without extension” (cf. Husserl, 2002a, II, 134).. Furthermore, it is Husserl's opinion that certain phenomena, especially those that are connected to perception and the appearance of physical reality, necessarily carry an indication to extra-mental transcendence in themselves. In his eyes, if we abstract from the indication to transcendent reality in those phenomena, we just do not have their concrete, proper meaning, we only have an abstract, inadequate, impoverished aspect of them See footnote 32 earlier..

Concerning consciousness as such and ego, Husserl believes that these phenomena necessarily, intrinsically, and in an a priori way imply a wide, coherent context of other phenomena. We just do not have their adequate, proper conception without that wider web. For example, we can imagine a sheer visual image without a perceiving subject or visual organs, or we can also imagine an animate experiencing locomotive as Husserl did in Ideas III (Husserl, 1980, 104), or a speaking, feeling, experiencing teapot as in Disney cartoons-but in Husserl's idea these would have just been inadequate conceptions of phenomena that we wantonly ripped out of their wider context. In Husserl's view, a subjective conscious capability refers to other subjective capabilities: it indicates a whole system of mental structures and abilities. This system refers to a whole way of life in a physical world, and thus also implies physical embodiment (Korperlichkeit), and not just the experience of embodiment (Leiblichkeit). “Concrete consciousness” means that a subject's mental sphere can only be conceived of as concrete, as an organic, coherent system of mental capabilities, structures, and contents, which refer to their embodied, corporeal aspect, and a concrete way of life in the external, physical world. It is an illusion to think that we can grasp an individual mental capability or experience on its own, independently from everything, from other mental capabilities and experiences, embodiment, and transcendent reality, in a phenomenologically full, adequate and accurate manner. Especially according to the later Husserl, in the 1930s, if we think we did so we did not pay enough attention to the phenomena themselves In the 1930s it was Husserl's opinion that we cannot suspend or “put out of play” („Aufer Spiel setzenf a whole world-horizon or world-context without re-enacting or re-establishing a new world-horizon or world-context (cf. Husserl, 2008a, 251-258). (“The apodictic certainty of my hu-man-bodily being as part of the apodictic certainty of the Being-foundation of `world.' Rejection of the Cartesian skeptical attempt.”).

We attempted to show that the self-constitution of the ego, the process through which the transcendental ego conceives and apperceives itself as an embodied, flesh and bone human person in the world, as a partly empirical and physical entity, cannot be entirely arbitrary, not even in a priori terms. This process has a priori necessary features, which also has certain, distinguishable layers. The transcendental ego necessarily constitutes itself as an organic subject with an organic body, whose organs enable it to have access to, and to perform different actions in, the world, and the constitution of the organic body also embraces the constitution of a “central organ” whose constitutive role is to coordinate the functioning of all other organs, and integrate them into a coherent system. In Husserl's opinion, even the constitution of an animate, experiencing subject cannot entirely be contingent.

In this regard, it was of fundamental importance for us how empirical, natural scientific knowledge can be used under the phenomenological reduction, in a phenomenologically legitimate way. Regarding this, we emphasized two strongly related motifs. Firstly, the idea of “double phenomenological reduction” which--in our read- ing--could be used to phenomenologically clarify and re-integrate empirical findings under the phenomenological reduction. Secondly, we claimed that at a certain point of phenomenological investigations the difference between ideal and real or motivated possibilities could be relativized. At first look it might appear that this is a fixed and immovable difference. An ideal possibility is that which does not contain a logical contradiction and could be imagined in general. Such as an experiencing locomotive, a speaking, singing, and dancing teapot, or an experiencing, feeling subject without a body (such as a ghost). A real or motivated possibility is motivated by experiences-- such that the sun will rise tomorrow again. The boundaries however, between ideal and real possibilities are not entirely fixed, and especially genetic phenomenological analysis could help us revising them See footnote 38.. Motivated possibilities could disclose their a priori, necessary features under a closer phenomenological analysis, and they could reinterpret in a phenomenologically legitimate manner, as having partly ideal moments, and could partly be considered as ideal possibilities See footnote 45..

We tried to make it plausible that these considerations could make a substantial contribution to handling the problem of explanatory gap, particularly from a phenomenological viewpoint, in a twofold way. Epistemologically, through the internal, immanent analysis of subjective experiences, one can systematically unfold and map the peculiar context of other immanent phenomena and meanings, and one can identify and follow up the indications in these experiences to structures of embodiment and transcendent reality. In this manner, this immanently oriented, Husserlian project could orient empirical research into the essence of consciousness and its bodily basis. Ontologically, one can also use Husserl's assumptions on mind-body relationship, and one can also articulate a standpoint concerning this latter matter, depending how seriously one takes Husserl's idealistic commitments From time-to-time Husserl makes statements that explicitly indicate that Husserl could be con-sidered as a whole-hearted dualist. He speculates about the immortality of the transcendental ego, he refers to the transcendental ego in terms of a “transcendental substance,” which is absolutely independent from the material body, and also from physical, natural reality itself. (Husserl, 2006b, 176-177). It would be the topic of another essay to have a closer look at how Husserl attempted to justify such claims.. This latter problem, however, is a topic of another study.

Acknowledgements: First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to my two reviewers. Their helpful, encouraging, and supportive remarks really helped me to make a significantly improved version of the original manuscript. I also would like to say thank you very much to Christoph Durt, Todd Feinberg, Samuel Fawcett, Jon Mallatt, and Jeffrey Yoshimi.

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