Акционеры и менеджеры: конфликт интересов в российских корпорациях

Проблема согласованности интересов собственников и менеджеров корпораций. Анализ западных моделей эффективности финансового управления. Совершенствование методики оценки качества финансового менеджмента корпорации для предотвращения агентских конфликтов.

Рубрика Менеджмент и трудовые отношения
Вид статья
Язык русский
Дата добавления 11.08.2020
Размер файла 148,3 K

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13. Djankov S., La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A. The Law and Economics of Self-dealing // Journal of Financial Economics. 2008. Vol. 88. №3. P. 430-465.

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15. Duvanskaya N.A., Sverchkova O.F. Features of Adaptation of International Financial Reporting Standards in the Russian Commercial Organizations // International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues. 2016. Vol. 6. P. 68-73.

16. Emilsson L.M., Classon M., Bredmar K. CSR and the Quest for Profitability - Using Economic Value Added to Trace Profitability // International Journal of Economics and Management Sciences. 2012. Vol. 2. №3. P. 43-54.

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21. Jensen M. Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function // Journal of Applied Corporate Finance. 2001. Vol. 14. Iss. 3. P. 8-21.

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23. La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., Vishny R.W. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance // Journal of Financial Economics. 2000b. Vol. 58. №1-2. P. 3-27.

24. La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer F. Law and Finance After a Decade of Research // Handbook of the Economics of Finance. 2013. Vol. 2. P. 425-491.

25. La Porta R., Lopes-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., Vishny R.W. Law and Finance // Journal of Political Economy. 1998. Vol. 106. №6.

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27. Macpherson C.B. Property, Mainstream and Critical Positions. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978.

28. Murphy K., Jensen M. CEO Bonus Plans: And How to Fix Them: Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper. 2011. №12-022.

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13. Djankov S., La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A. (2008) The Law and Economics of Self-dealing. Journal of Financial Economics, 88, 3, pp. 430-465.

14. Drucker P.F. (1965) The Future of Industrial Man: A Conservative Approach. New York: New American Library.

15. Duvanskaya N.A., Sverchkova O.F. (2016) Features of Adaptation of International Financial Reporting Standards in the Russian Commercial Organizations. International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 6(S1), pp. 68-73.

16. Emilsson L.M., Classon M., Bredmar K. (2012) CSR and the Quest for Profitability - Using Economic Value Added to Trace Profitability. International Journal of Economics and Management Sciences, 2, 3, pp. 43-54.

17. Fox M.B., Heller M.A. (1999) Lessons from Fiascos in Russian Corporate Governance. New York University Law Review

18. Generalova N., Soboleva G., Sokolova N. (2016) Adoption of IFRSs in Russia: 22 Years of Accounting Reforms. Journal of Eastern Europe Research in Business and Economics, 2016, pp. 1-10.

19. Jensen M. (2005) Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity. Financial Management, 34, 1, pp. 5-19.

20. Jensen M., Meckling W. (1976) Theory of the Firm. Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 4, pp. 305-360.

21. Jensen M. (2001) Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 14, 3, pp. 8-21.

22. La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A., Vishny R.W. (2000a) Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World. The Journal of Finance, 55, 1, pp. 1-33.

23. La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., Vishny R.W. (2000b) Investor Protection and Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 1-2, pp. 3-27.

24. La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer F. (2013) Law and Finance After a Decade of Research. Handbook of the Economics of Finance, 2, pp. 425-491.

25. La Porta R., Lopes-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., Vishny R.W. (1998) Law and Finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106, 6.

26. La Porta R., Lopes-De-Silanes F., Shleifer A., Vishny R.W. (1997) Legal Determinants of External Finance. Journal of Finance, LII, 3.

27. Macpherson C.B. (1978) Property, Mainstream and Critical Positions. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

28. Murphy K., Jensen M. (2011) CEO Bonus Plans: And How to Fix Them. Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper, no 12-022.

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