Language as Eigenform: Semiotics in the search of a meaning

Any indication, of course, is a reference to something external to language. At the same time, this indication might be performed exclusively within the framework of the system of notion (language) and only by means of this system. In the world in itself, differences between a tree compared to a `tree' do not exist. This differentiation between the inner `apple' and the external apple are generated by the system itself and correspondingly inside it, for all that the tree is understood as part of the external world [34]. Notwithstanding its `external' character, this `object' still remains part (or another side) of the differentiation, the creator of which is the system of notation itself (language). In this sense, the external world belongs to the system as part of a differentiation generated by the system itself.

50. Such a model is possible because the `signified' to which the `signifier' refers acts as a `signifier' itself, i.e. in order to have a meaning it should have the status of addressing. Any “signified is also in the position of a signifier” [35, p.37]. In the system of the language, where only immanent connections are given, all relations are maintained by the movement of mutual references. However, the `signified' exists because there is a movement of a referential network of signs. The `signified' as a specific effect is peculiar to the notation itself as it is built into the replacing system of the language, which has been mentioned above. In this system, each element possesses meaning because it can be replaced by another. However, in such a movement of notation, retention in a constant, identical state is impossible since the condition for having a meaning serves as its `displacement', that is, its representation via another sign [5, p. 120]. This brings it closer to Kaufmann's `signifying shift', as each name -- sign) can always be used repeatedly under the guise of the signified.

It is here that the most important principle of recursion becomes essential for maintaining the Eigenform. Mutual referentiality does not simply involve going around in a circle, such that the signified and the signifier remain the same. It occurs according to the recursion model -- with a multiplication of references, where each new sign takes the place of the signified in a new cycle of notation. Graphically it might be depicted as follows:

But is it not possible to reach a finite number of steps in notation, come out towards the world and point at the thing itself? Is it not possible to point at a real dog, for example, as something that founds and gives true grounds for a sign? However, on the one hand, to say so is to introduce an unjustified abundance into the system of notation -- even if there were no dog in the world, we would be able to talk about it. However diligently we appeal to the thingness, bringing together language and reality, we risk missing each other at their closest point. Their crossing is unattainable; as soon as the thing is named -- `This is a dog' -- we find ourselves in the system of language. In order to understand, we should follow from one concept to another, subordinated to language's differentiation. But left unnamed, `the dog' would simply not exist -- there might be something else, but not the `dog') [36, p. 67-68].

In general, and on the whole in semiotics (whether in Saussure or Peirce), reality is considered as thought and accessible solely in the form of signs. Peirce introduces the concept of reiteration (the analogue of Spencer-Brown's condensation) [37], where the appearance of reality is a reiteration or processing of used signs (tokens). Barthes radicalizes this approach, insisting on the fact that signs have no referents whatsoever [21]. The sign itself -- simply due to the fact that it is the unity of two sides, the signifier and the signified -- cannot have an external side, and indeed does not have any external referents in the sense suggested by Barthes. One can pay attention to the signified or the signifier, but this differentiation itself cannot have any contradictions, or in other words, the external referent of this differentiation will be an uncertain space (see the second axiom of SpencerBrown, where uncertain space turns out to be the consequence of the delimitation (marking) of the boundary itself or the differentiation of the differentiation). In this sense, one can talk about the endless approaching of the `thing', which is always deposited [35]. Even if certain things are beyond the boundaries of language, we can but endlessly approach them, producing ever new and new iterations and reiterations. This is how the Eigen- form reveals itself: it pre-sets its internal, as well as external; however, in spite of this pure simulativity, such a fold generates a productive ontology [7]. It turns out to be `alive'. As a result of such self-arrangement, the world knows about itself. The world arranges itself in language, which is the world. Or the world generates language, which generates the world, which can be read backwards -- language generates the world, which generates language. Hence we get the Uroboros image -- the best illustration of the Eigenform. In this context, this means that whilst language shapes the world, language itself appears in this world as belonging to the world and in this sense not forming a meta-reality.

When we bracket the `real' or `extra linguistic' dimension, the signifier might have the unrestricted freedom of notation. Unrestricted by the imperatives of a reference, it is possible to communicate. The major part of these communications will be communications about communications, as Luhmann states [38]. It is only possible to attribute meaning to an object inside the structure of difference, i.e. within the boundaries conditioned by the system itself. The signified is then an `object' that constitutes the notion itself by means of an indication of the `external world'. One is able to talk about this world only when running an internal circle of notation, `making a loop'. Each circle of this loop is a certain meaningful communication (from micro- to macro-formations), which constitute reality in integrity -- always meaningful in language.

Conclusion

The points made here agree with those made by Foerster: we are unable to know what reality is beyond language. In a certain sense, I have also tried to show that the question of `reality external to the language' can be eliminated due to its being unproductive and basically pointless. We are by nature the inventors of ourselves; we construct our reality and our meaningful surroundings, which is principally always already ours. There is nothing `external' to language, or, more correctly, the external of language is the other side of the internal.

Signs make systems of communications possible, as well as systems of consciousness due to the fact they make self-separation, self-isolation, and closure of the said systems possible, where their separation from the rest of the world is understood as the second external side of the sign [19, p. 87-94]. It is true that this cognitive world, inaccessible to the stated systems, might be comprehended as a form of chaos, as the place where differentiations and boundaries have not been made as yet -- as `wild' when it comes to our understanding of primitive societies, like a transcendental god or noumenal world when it comes to philosophy; and it might be even considered a primary singularity in modern scientific interpretations. But all things considered, this world cannot serve as a referent of communicatory signs.

Thus, language is our own Eigenform par excellence. A constant recursion creates an always-arranged world of experience, where the signifier and the signified make up an inseparable unity. According to Foester, everything said is said by the observer (as there is no observation without an observer). Descriptions are always self-descriptions. We applied this model to language, defining the stance taken by the language to the world.

Underlying this model is the problem of meaning, and in particular, the problem of how signs acquire their meaning. As we have seen, in order for a thing (e.g., `tree') to be recognized as a subject, we need to apply language (the system of observation-notation). We cannot say that the language and the world are independent from each other. On the contrary, if we consider them to be mutually referential, we can offer a more coherent model. The principle of the relation between the signified and the signifier will help with this. We can therefore maintain: 1. The ideal (inner-language nature of the signified) and

The differentiated (inner-language) nature of any procedure of notation. Everything that happens in the process of notation happens inside language. However, this `inside' also has its `external side' -- the world itself, which is meaningful to the degree to which it appears to be notified. Its form is a whole and is represented by two sides -- signs and things, sentences and facts, which cyclically or mutually referentially create and support each other.

Thus, language is the Eigenform in a philosophical sense -- it creates the world in itself and through itself. The signified mutually and referentially refers to the signifier, graphically reminding us of Escher's hands or two sides of a sheet of paper. However, their mutual referentiality does not simply form a circle, where the signified and the signifier remain the same. It forms a model of recursion -- a multiplication of references, where each sign appears to be in the place of the signified in the new cycle. Strictly speaking, as a result of such a scheme, the world must appear, which, if we look closely, is always the result of notation-comprehension. The world = the signified world.

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