The problem of the democracy deficit in the EU: between the political entity and the market utopia

Currently, we are witnessing how F. Hayek's vision (1939) of a liberal utopia is backfiring. In fact, Hayek believed free access to the pan-European market could be a powerful force for liberalizing the surrounding states and eliminating the democratic `threat'. However, this hypothesis was based on the assumption that the free market model on a continental scale is the most effective without the presence of an efficient authoritarian competitor, such as the current trade relationship with the PRC, which presents a dilemma for the EU. Should they risk being ruined by a more efficient competitor or abandon the project of liberal market freedom? This situation calls for a return to a more practical and territorially defined EU.

When we interpret the EU as a space of liberal freedom, we should mention that most of its member states belong to the Semi-Periphery, which makes them deeply vulnerable to the global redistribution of capital. Moreover, as Arrighi (1986) conducted, after WWII ended and up to the signal crisis of hegemony, the USA pushed other states of the Core to the Semi-Periphery (p. 48).

Our further reflections are based on the assumption that the United States will cease to guarantee security in Europe. That will force European states to take care of themselves.

Thus, we find ourselves in a situation of the primacy of foreign policy when the military support of the economy becomes critical for our analysis. Since `liberal-democratic' practices are possible only in the states of the Core, capable of maintaining its citizens' status (national) identity. If the state cannot mobilize a sufficient amount of power resources, it will inevitably begin to lose control over its periphery, which shortly will lead to its peripheralization and disintegration.

The first and simplest scenario involves the preservation of the status quo of the current European ordoliberal `market' utopia.

The defense of the market utopia or, to be more precise for modern realities, the neoliberal regime of accumulation suggests that there are no problems in the market functioning and that the work of political institutions causes the difficulty.

Firstly, the FRG's dominant position in the EU forces southern semi-peripheral countries like Greece, Italy, and Spain to nationalize private debts to German banks, undermining market fairness. If German or French banks gave out loans without adequate scrutiny, the failure to repay those loans should be their personal problem and not an interstate issue (Woodruff, 2014, p. 38-41).

From this perspective, it is crucial to enhance and strengthen the independence of supranational regulators. This goal can only be achieved through a widespread elite consensus and more rigorous limits on democracy and sovereignty in EU member states. The decision-making process for policy implications and design must become entirely independent of both big businesses and social groups affected by market dynamics. However, when the market utopia loses its utopian nature, it may become evident that it does not align with anyone's interests and is destined to fail.

The attack on the market utopia suggests that the uneven development and different modes of exploitation of the labor force in the EU member states deprive the ideal dimension of the market of meaning. Moreover, suppose we want to overcome the negative effects of the market. In that case, we must abolish the international and interregional division of labor in the EU and worldwide. This approach presupposes the complete destruction of the capitalist status quo and modern civilization as we understand it (Weissenbacher, 2019, p. 193-213).

Next, we should move from ideal concepts to the specifics of real life. Under the conditions of the Chinese cycle of accumulation, we should expect the same relative peripheralization of the Core countries as it was during the heyday of American hegemony, which leads to an increase in material stratification, which in turn seeks to define itself not in class but in ethnic and cultural coordinates. In contrast, exclusive access to material wealth is determined by group identity.

In such circumstances, the EU, as a regional trade and economic organization, conflicts with the interests of major powers such as the PRC, the USA, and others. These powers are undoubtedly political communities capable of protecting their interests, including through military-political means. Furthermore, the absence of democratic institutions at the EU level, apart from the European Parliament, inevitably results in popular discontent being reflected in national elections. As a result, European supranational structures become vulnerable without democratic legitimacy.

Further, it should be noted that this approach institutionalizes the cleavage between Euro-optimists, who benefit from the EU's existence, and marginalized social groups who understand their economic issues not in terms of class struggle but through national identity and sovereignty. These political processes would inevitably encourage various forms of right-wing populism at the individual state level and centrifugal tendencies at the EU level.

This situation is an ideal realization of the prophecy of C. Schmitt, who claimed that the depoliticization of the economy and the ban on interstate wars would lead to the politicization of cultural identities.

Such a scenario is in some way beneficial to the current ruling elites. As a result, behind the talk about sovereignty, identity politics, migrants, and other features of cultural politics, the voters forget about material inequality. They do not encroach on the foundations of a market economy, confirming the correctness of Arrighi's assertion (1990) that in the conditions of the Semi-Periphery parliamentary democracy is possible only if significant social groups are excluded from the political process for ethnocultural reasons (p. 31-35).

One solution to the EU's current problems is the concept of a Europe of Homelands, periodically mentioned by representatives of Hungary, Poland, and various Eurosceptic forces. This concept was first presented by France during the presidency of Charles de Gaulle in the form of the Fouchet Plan of 1961-1962. It proposed that European integration should occur not through strengthening supranational institutions and economic integration but through closer intergovernmental cooperation and creating a military-political confederation.

If implemented, this project would resolve all the political problems associated with the liberal market utopia discussed above. This is due to the disappearance of the single ordoliberal market, which requires us to analyze the internal state of the EU through the lens of international relations theory since we would now be talking about the interaction of genuinely sovereign states.

From the point of view of the theory of political realism, such an `EU' should be considered solely as a mechanism for maximizing the influence of its members in competition with the great powers. However, two significant problems immediately arise here.

Firstly, such a confederation would be a profoundly situational alliance torn apart by all interstate contradictions currently existing in the EU. Only in this case, to realize their interests, local governments would receive the entire set of means necessary for the attack to defend their national interests. Moreover, many European states run the risk of discovering their complete incapacity in the event of a severe conflict with Germany or France.

Secondly, the elimination of supranational European institutions will not cancel the fact that the EU has a clearly defined Core (Weissenbacher, 2019, p. 86-90), primarily in the form of the FRG, and the states of Southern and Central Europe are nothing more than its semi-periphery. In the conditions of the decline of the American hegemony, the FRG, speaking more broadly, the Franco-German alliance, would be forced to compete for control over the Semi-Periphery, at least with the PRC and the USA. Moreover, such competition would be lost in the long term since even a stable Franco-German alliance is inferior in its potential to the genuinely great powers of our time.

Thus, as a compromise version of its implementation, the Fouche plan or the construction of multispeed Europe still needs to solve the current European problems. Consequently, this compels us, within the framework of this article, to revive the specter of European federalism, which speaks of the value of the United States of Europe as a space of peace and democratic virtues. Therefore, we need to clearly define a corridor of tolerance in which individual freedom could be combined with broad popular representation without provoking permanent political instability, forming a system of beacon goals that must be achieved to maintain liberal democracy in the EU.

This state of affairs actualizes the works of C. Schmitt and his concept of the political as a non-economic motive aimed at the preservation and development of the group with which the individuals associate themself. Therefore this forces us to have a much more serious conversation about what way of a good life we consider worthy of practice. This approach opens up great opportunities for us in the field of social engineering, but at the same time pushes us onto the slippery ice of counterfactual judgments, requiring a deep discipline of thought, designed to distinguish between wishful and possible, concepts and reality.

The current situation brings to mind the works of Schmitt and his concept of politics as a non-economic motive aimed at preserving and developing the group with which individuals associate themselves. It prompts a serious conversation about the kind of good life we consider worthy of practice. This approach presents significant opportunities for social engineering, although it contains some risks leading us astray with counterfactual judgments. To navigate this challenge, we need a rigorous discipline of thought that can distinguish between what is wishful and what is possible, as well as between pure concepts and reality.

First of all, it is necessary to draw a clear line between the desire for a `universal' and counterfactual `ideal' that justifies its existence through the fallacy that S. Huntington (1973) calls `Webbism' as “the tendency to ascribe to a political system qualities which are assumed to be its ultimate goals rather than qualities which actually characterize its processes and functions” (p. 35), and the desire for the realization of a clearly defined way of a good life in the territory of a particular polis in specific historical circumstances, indicating the specific goals that must be achieved in order for the policy to function in the form we desire.

The controversy between representatives of both these approaches originates in the discussion between Aristotle and Plato in ancient Greece. Plato (1944) proposed his ideas about the timeless ideal of justice in his work The Republic, creating the idea of philosophical life as a unity of beliefs and practices. Instead, Aristotle expressed the opinion that the state exists to implement its inherent virtues (Aristotle & Jowett, 1885, p. 1) and that there is no single correct political system (Aristotle & Jowett, 1885, p. 108).

However, ideals alone do nothing and are always about making plans. In this case, a full-fledged discussion about the value bases is hardly possible. From the point of view of the social sciences, we can only talk here about the conditions under which certain ideologies gain or lose their prestige, which is beyond the scope of this study and is covered in more detail in our other works (Volskyi, 2020, Volskyi, 2021).

Before proceeding with the formation of a plan, we need to translate political theory concepts into the language of specific social mechanisms that can be both effective and disastrous in specific circumstances. For example, we do not know what communism is in general and whether it can offer better forms of human community than liberal democratic capitalism. However, we know how to build a state with a planned economy and a one-party regime, and we can empirically find out what practice of the good life the inhabitants of this state believe is correct. The same situation is with the `liberal democracy'.

To further develop this idea, it is important to establish the limits and restrictions of the tools we use. Unlike economic or social processes, which are usually continuous in nature, political events such as revolutions, wars, elections, demonstrations, and protests are discrete events that transpire in clear spatiotemporal coordinates (Wallerstein, 2011a, p. 67).

Thus, political science claims to be scientific are always questionable. The number of non-contextual political truths that would be true, both for ancient Sumeria and the modern world, is minimal if they exist at all. Moreover, attempts to find them in order to meet the criteria of `real' scientificity lead to profound intellectual paralysis when we receive an increasing number of phenomenologically correct micro-studies, which are increasingly difficult to correlate with real political problems.

Therefore, `correct' political science is, to a large extent, an applied art (Aristotle & Jowett, 1885, p. 107) that should help us solve practical problems using the `universal' truths of other disciplines. In our case, this is mainly historical macrosociology, which allows us to fit discrete political decisions into a wide spatiotemporal context.

So, for example, Schmitt considered liberal democracy impossible, but only the intellectual abstractions underlying it are incompatible. By formalizing the proper space-time distance between liberal and democratic mechanisms, we could successfully resolve the emerging paradoxes and create more democratic liberalism or a more `liberal democracy,' depending on the historical situation and our goals.

It is necessary to clearly understand that any military-political decisions can only postpone and smooth out economic processes. This is precisely the tragedy of the peripheralized members of the Core or semi-peripheral states. Often they could serve as the examples of brilliant management decisions that end in incredible results, but the inexorable logic of the economic structure nullifies their efforts.

The clearest example of this process is the French Revolution - universal conscription, mass civic nationalism, universal suffrage, and the bureaucratic infrastructure of direct rule. Anyway, at the end of the road, Great Britain became the hegemon of the capitalist world-system, despite its somewhat archaic government structure but also due to its superior economic organization and a dominant position in the international division of labor.

Thus, all the suggestions below should be considered only a temporary solution and an attempt at damage control. If in the second half of the 21st century, we do not witness the rise of a new hegemonic state capable of recreating regional inequality under acceptable conditions of rapid economic growth, or if the productive forces do not develop to such an extent that most of the planet's population can enjoy the standard of living of the Core, then the structure we suggested would collapse under its weight.

To concretize the concept of `liberal democracy,' we shall apply to the EU the concepts of the repertoire of contention and political opportunities structure formulated by Charles Tilly (2006) in Regimes and Repertoires, as well as a concept of political order and decay by S. Huntington's (1973) Political Order in Changing Societies.

According to Tilly(2006), a political regime is a set of stably recurring transactions between elements of one political system (p. 19). The typology of political regimes for this author is defined along two axes: governmental capacity and authoritarianism-democracy (p. 25-29).

Tilly (2006) considered democracy as a political regime in which the government regularly conducts secure consultations with the population about its policies. This is only possible with a high level of governmental capacity, whereby the government can consistently administer social processes and not just sporadically select resources to maintain the military-bureaucratic superstructure (p. 23).

Additionally, the indicator of effective governance is the formation of a modern repertoire of contention. This implies a rejection of violent attempts to achieve particular interests and an appeal to universalist rhetoric when social activity goes beyond narrow group interests and tries to present itself as something generally valid, even if it is not (Tilly, 2006, p. 52-59).

This approach is deeply in line with the position of Huntington (1973), who pointed out that the problem of the functioning of society is not economic development, but the maintenance of political order (p. 1-7). Huntington also emphasized, “The problem is not to hold elections but to create organizations” (Huntington, 1973, p. 7).

The measure of political order is the level of institutionalization of political life (Huntington, 1973, p. 10-12). In the case of rapid change, the absence of stable political institutions leads to the emergence of a praetorian society, where political violence becomes the norm due to the absence of a stable and separate political sphere (Huntington ,1973, p. 195-198).

Also striving for a more differentiated approach, Tilly applied the Aristotelian classification of regimes by the number of rulers and their inner essence, precisely, whether power is exercised in the interests of the policy or the interests of private individuals (Tilly, 2006, p. 18).

Therefore, liberal democracy in this text is understood as a mixed monarch-aristocratic regime, which involves regular and protected consultations with the people (demos) on the implementation of power over them (Tilly, 2006, p. 23). At the same time, the liberal practice of the good life means the use of the modern repertoire of contention in political performance (Tilly, 2006, p. 52-59) and the depoliticization of citizens' private lives. This definition is deeply instrumental and can be challenged since its purpose is not to know the true essence of 'liberal democracy,' whatever it may be, but to avoid the error of 'Webbism' in this work.

It is easy to see that by using the phrase 'liberal democracy,' we are, on the one hand, following Aristotle's precepts and choosing a mixed form of the state as the most stable and healthy. On the other hand, we recognize that the global economic slowdown is causing progressive material inequality. It is necessary to emphasize the distinction between the broad masses of people, or demos, and the privileged minority who adhere to liberal ideals, as well as their difficult-to-reconcile contradictions. Recognizing the problem is the first step toward solving it, while the second step is implementing an institutionalized political solution.

The critical point that is worth paying attention to here is that democracy demands demos as a political entity that embodies the common will of the people, which at the first stage requires the unification of the way of life throughout the EU. Furthermore, such homogenization makes the emergence of universal requirements possible and functions as a modern repertoire of contention on the EU scale.

In the second stage, it is necessary to institutionalize the role of the sovereign (monarch), who derives their legitimacy from the people's will and can serve as a counterweight to the aristocracy. However, it is essential to recognize that whoever holds such a position will inevitably be somewhat susceptible to corruption. Therefore, expecting the sovereign to always accurately represent the people's will or consistently act in their best interests would be naive.

Furthermore, the existence of such a position will lead to the crystallization of the concept of the demos and the demos themselves. Moreover, it will create a point in the EU political system at which the legitimacy of power is based not on money or far-fetched concepts (values), but on the fact of voting for a particular politician. In such a way, the latest would be encouraged to lead their communities towards an 'ever closer union,' thus enhancing the EU's sovereignty against external and internal forces. In turn, this would create a situation where the will of the people within the EU's territory would no longer be an empty phrase.

The third stage inevitably follows from the previous two. Under the conditions of the `Thirty Years' War,' political decisions are inseparable from economic ones. For politics not to revolve around cultural differences and for the will of the sovereign to embody the people's wishes, it is necessary to put the economy at the center of political discussions. This strategy will depoliticize the private life of citizens, thereby giving them the freedom to choose life strategies within socially permitted limits, which in practice could be even more expansive than the current liberal-market 'freedom' against the backdrop of a cancellation culture.

It should be noted that the `return' of the political to the public stage creates an explicit criterion for limiting the elements of the market, which is so lacking in the work of Polanyi, who noted the fact of the Great Transformation but did not give a clear definition of the new state of affairs, limiting himself to a story about the benefits of Christianity for souls.

In this configuration, until the signal crisis of the next hegemonic state, the challenge for economic freedom is to balance the need for competitiveness with other states in the Core and Semi-Periphery while also avoiding the temptation to extend policies and practices that may harm the quality of life. It is a delicate balance, much like navigating between Scylla and Charybdis.

Conclusion

In the first section of this paper, we established that the decline of American hegemony has resulted in slowing economic growth, transforming the EU's external and internal activity into a zero-sum game, and blurring the line between political and economic decisions. This undermines the resilience of the EU, which is based on a liberal faith in market dynamics.

As the level of inequality between the Core and other areas of the capitalist world-economy decreases, we find ourselves in a situation of acute shortage of resources. Thus, this forces us to abandon liberal expansion and begin to rethink liberalism in terms of the Aristotelian good life of a separate polis, which requires us to raise the question of a new institutional design of political and economic processes.

In the second section, we argued that the continuation of the EU as the current ordoliberal 'utopia' or military-political confederation, as proposed by the Fouche Plan, could lead to a potential decline of democratic institutions within its territory and to the peripheralization of its member states.

As an alternative, we proposed the concept of the United States of Europe, based on the idea that a safe social 'liberal' space can only exist within a stable political entity.

In our project, we abandoned such phantasms of liberal thought as the idea of a social contract or an ideal communicative community. In contrast, we claimed that, in reality, the political entity is constituted by the executive branch, specifically by the sovereign's will.

To be truthful, the assumption that a European federation could be created through negotiations between elites and that common interests and living conditions can shape a European populus is the most liberal and optimistic scenario that can be realistic. Since the political and economic alternatives are much more realistic, the decline of Europe and/or Germany will make another attempt to unite a divided Europe with 'blood and iron.' In both cases, we would face a region in which, instead of any form of 'liberal democracy,' there will be a fear of big and small tyrants and the arbitrariness they create.

For this purpose, we attempted to spell out the foundations for a stable institutionalization of such a republic. Furthermore, we translated the concept of 'liberal democracy' from the language of political theory into the language of specific socio-political mechanisms that guarantee the stability of the political regime. As a result, we created a system of goals that need to be achieved in this way.

In our study, we defined liberal democracy as a monarchy-aristocratic regime that regularly engages in safe, two-way consultations with the demos.

This construction assumes the preservation of the `liberal' aspirations of the elite to enrich themselves. However, the key to it is the existence of the demos, without which democracy and the modern repertoire of contention, which implies the possibility of peaceful protest under the slogans of general social benefit, would be impossible.

Demos, as a set of people united by a common interest, could arise only in the case of unification of living conditions, which requires a common social policy throughout the EU and economic convergence of member states. The European Federation should maintain its positions as close as possible to the Core and form a belt of peripheral territories under its control.

In the context of a large, primarily federal state, parliamentary institutions that lack their own political subjectivity cannot adequately express the people's will. This necessitates the creation of a figure of 'monarch' similar to the plebeian tribune in the Roman Republic and a sovereign capable of making decisions in times of state emergency when the political entity's integrity is at risk.

Under the conditions of multicultural statehood, the only way to ensure its stability is depoliticization and neutralization of cultural differences, which means that cultural differences should cease to be a reason to kill and die for them. Therefore, on the one hand, it is necessary to formalize political cleavages along the contradictions between the EU and the great powers of the capitalist world-system. On the other hand, there is a need to politicize economic contradictions concerning the distribution of material wealth between the state's elites, demos, and military-political needs.

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