Louis Mallet in the crosshairs of "The Times": criticism of actions of the British diplomacy in Constantinople at the beginning of the First World war

Ostrorog drew attention to the circumstances that were reported to the Greek ambassador. When Germany's entry into the war became known in Constantinople, he wrote, an urgent meeting of the Cabinet was called there. Enver Pasha declared a resolution about immediate accession to the Central Powers, but all the ministers opposed. Enver achieved only partial mobilisation to strengthen the defence³⁹. Most of the Turkish Cabinet, Ostrorog explained, and also Vizier and Sultan were against war (Vizier and some ministers even threatened to resign) because the Ottoman empire had already been exhausted by the Italo-Turkish and Balkan wars⁴⁰.

This is why Germans had to make an effort to enhance Enver's position. They began to misinform their allies in neutral states that Romania was about to join Berlin and Vienna, that the French front was broken, the French army was trapped and France was about to be defeated⁴¹. Leon Ostrorog summarized that on 4 August Germany just provoked Greece to join the Central powers⁴².

Mallet's position was also echoed by the former minister of Great Britain Edward Grey (in 1917 this position was occupied by Arthur James Balfour). Furthemore he was consistent with the understanding of his employee's steps both in 1914, after diplomatic defeat of Entente in Constantinople, and also in 1917, after published criticism of “The Times”. On 4 December 1914 Grey sent his gratitude to Mallet and noted that the war was initiated by German and Turks, and the desire of His Majesty Government was to postpone the rupture as long as it was possible. The course chosen by Mallet, according to Grey's words, was fully consistent with views in London⁴³. On 5 October 1917 Grey wrote: “Sir Louis Mallet's defence of his own action and of our diplomacy at Constantinople in the first weeks of the war is both able and true”⁴⁴.

The former foreign minister also agreed with the position of Leon Ostrotog⁴⁵. However, unlike Ostrorog, who considered that Willhlem II's words to Teothocis were just a provocation, Grey showed more foresight and suggested that the treaty did exist. Grey thought that it was signed by Enver Pasha with Germany someday in August 1914, despite there were ministers in Turkish government, who were against the war with Entente⁴⁶.

Grey substantiated the moderate position of British diplomacy. If London would like to have a war with the Ottoman empire it would be declared immediately after transferring “Goeben” and “Breslau” to the Turkish fleet, but the Admiralty, the War Office and the India Office opposed it. Therefore, the aim of the Foreign Office was to do everything possible to avoid immediate casus belli. British diplomats had to prevent the war, and in case when “Turkey were already committed hand and heart to Germany” to postpone the beginning of the war as long as possible. Grey also supported Mallet by taking attention to the necessity to make obvious to public Ottomane but not British initiative to begun the war, and to the factor of large number of Muslim in India and ^Egyp^t47.

Grey also wrote about accusing Mallet of shortsightedness, which eventually led to war: “We failed to prevent war. Could we have prevented it? Obviously not, if Turkey was already committed irrevocably to Germany in 1914”⁴⁸. The only solution Grey saw was to kill Enver Push, but “in my judgement Enver and his friends belonged to the class of those who assassinated, whereas the Grand Vizier and his friends belonged to the class of those who are assassinated”⁴⁹, that is the moderate part of the Ottoman government was not able to use such methods. The only thing that could change the mind of Enver Pasha himself was a large military success of Allies, but at that moment they were defeated in Mons and Tannenberg and Germans captured Antwerp. At the same time, “the Miracle of Marna” did not make the desired impression on Turks⁵⁰. Therefore, as Mallet, Grey also supported the point about the influence of the situation on the front lines as a justification of the position of British diplomacy.

In general, Grey had appreciated Mallets actions: “Sir Louis Mallet's part at Constantinople may [...] fairly be compared to that of a general, who with inferior forces and guns is ordered to hold a position as long as he can and to make the best fight he can, even if he knows the position to be untenable. A general [...] might not necessarily expect to be acclaimed as a victorious hero, but he would at least expect sympathy, and would surely be justly surprised and indigent if he were denounced as a fool for having fought at all [...] He did this under exceptional difficulties and no one could have done it with more skill and success”⁵¹.

Thus, Mallet's position was unanimously supported by the rest of the diplomats. At the very least, processed sources do not mention anybody who expressed another point of view.

It is necessary to find out how reasonable were the arguments of the article of “The Times” and figures that supported Mallet. First l, reference should be made to characteristics of Louis Mallet in historiography. Marian Kent wrote that Mallet, unlike his predecessor and acting at the beginning of the war dragoman Andrew Ryan, tried to find a conciliation with Turks by goodwill⁵². David Fromkin noted that Mallet sympathized to Young Turks and his reports to the Foreign Office were too optimistic⁵³. These characteristics of Mallet correspond to assessments in the article of “The Times”.

Some correction of the moderate image of Mallet was made by analyzing his telegram to Edward Grey on 6 September 1914. In this message he wrote that while a single German officer stays in the Ottoman empire, Mallet will treat the least as a German protectorate⁵⁴. So, in contrary to his benevolence, Mallet seemed to be completely categorical about the foreign policy of the Ottomans.

The answer to the question “Did Said Halim tricked Louis Mallet and the rest of Entente's ambassadors”, looks difficult. On the one hand, Vizier had signed the treaty on 2 August⁵⁵. On the other hand, it is known that he was against of buying of “Goeben” and “Breslau” by the Ottoman empire, which might provoke the war⁵⁶. Ostrorog's words above are about Said Halim's adherence to neutrality. That was also reflected in Morgenthau's memoirs, where he wrote that Vizier was upset because of the attack of Russian ports by “Goeben” and “Breslau”⁵⁷.

Detailed characteristics of Said Halim's views were described by Ahmet Seyhun in his dissertation. Vizier was sure that safety for the Ottoman empire was possible only in union with the Great Powers. Said Halim's plans included rapprochement with France, but the least was rejected the proposition about alliance (made by Djemal Pasha in July 1914), so Vizier considered that Entente itself led the Ottoman empire to German's hands. Said Halim, however, at the beginning of the conflict believed that the time had not yet come for the Ottoman Empire to enter the war, and he really tried to delay the rupture with Entente as long as possible. He really, as Ostrorog wrote, threatened to resign⁵⁸.

The situation with Said Halim looked paradoxical. He, as a person who signed the German-Turkish treaty on 2 August 1914, for which three years later Louis Mallet was criticised, kept same course as Foreign Office and especially Mallet itself -- to avoid declaring war as long as possible. It is also important to pay attention to Said Halim's motives. He considered the French diplomat's rejection but not the Foreign Office's actions, as it was written in 1917 in “The Times”, as a justification for joining the Central Powers.

Mallet and Grey, answering on “The Times” charges about too indecisive and too short-sighted politics, drew attention to problems of India, Egypt, defense of Suez channel and the factor of British Muslim subjects. Indeed, in this period both Grey and Kitchener were strict about achieving if not neutrality of the Ottoman empire then avoiding the conflict with it as long as possible. Kitchener insisted on postponing the rupture with the Ottoman empire at least for the moment when colonial troops from India would get to Suez⁵⁹.

The importance of Muslim factor is also shown by meeting of British Cabinet of 1-3 September 1914. At the meeting, the First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill proposed to send a fleet to Dardanelles immediately (these days a well-known avanture with “Goeben” and “Breslau” was going). The Cabinet, however, supported Kitchener, who was opposite. For forcing the Straits, he thought, it was necessary to involve 60 000 troops, but British soldiers were needed in France, while using Indian troops, according to war minister's belief, was dangerous because of a threat of Muslim uprising in this country⁶⁰.

Mallet's statement that the situation in Constantinople was under German and headed by Enver Pasha Young Turk triumvirate control also matched the reality⁶¹.

In the end, we consider “The Times” charges as unjust. Even if it is possible to agree with Mallet's views' characteristics as too optimistic, he acted within the constraints of the situation and got the results that were possible under then conditions. He bought time for preparing British armies in Egypt and for evacuation of British subjects from the Ottoman empire.

It is difficult to say what journalists of “The Times” were guided by while preparing the article: looking for sensation or willingness to rightly denounce short-sighted, according to their point of view, diplomat. The publication with criticism of Mallet's diplomacy also says about the difference of perception and interpretation of foreign policy by ordinary citizens. It is also clear that the article accuses Mallet that he did not manage to get the British win in Constantinople, but does not mention under which circumstances he was forced to act, and which consequences were possible in case of involving more radical measures. Unlike it, Mallet's and his colleagues' contraargumentation is based exactly on understanding the situation and its prospects. However, such details are lost in the press and public perception of events, which is summarized to black-and-white thinking about events as wins or losses. But instead, it should be agreed with Mallet, the affairs in Constantinople were incomparably more difficult than it was seen by journalists.

Sources

1. A Mortifying Disclosure. The Times. August 24, 1917. P. 7.

2. TNA (The National Archives of UK). FO 800/206. Notes by Count Ostrorog. Communicated by Lord Murray, 3 September 1917. F. 303 recto.

3. Heller J. Sir Louis Mallet and the Ottoman Empire: The Road to War. Middle Eastern Studies, Jan. 1976. Vol. 12. No. 1 (Jan., 1976). PP. 36-37.

4. Morghenthau H. Secrets of the Bosphorus. London: Hutchinson & Co. 1918.

5. Grey E. Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916. Volume II. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company. 1925. P. 352.

6. A Mortifying Disclosure... P. 7.

7. A Mortifying Disclosure. P. 7.

8. Айрапетов О.Р. Участие Российской империи в Первой мировой войне (19141917): 1914. Начало. Москва: Куликово поле, 2014. С. 327; Trumpener U. Turkey's Entry into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities. The Journal of Modern History. Vol. 34. No. 4 (Dec., 1962). P. 369.

9. §eyhun A. Said Halim Pasha: An Ottoman Stateman and An Islamist Thinker (18651921). Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies McGill University, 2002. PP. 154-156; Heller J., Sir Louis Mallet... PP. 6, 37.

10. A Mortifying Disclosure... P. 7.

11. TNA. FO 800/206. Lord Grey of Fallodon to the Private Secretaries, 5 October 1917. F. 257 recto

12. A Mortifying Disclosure... P. 7.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

^{15. 15}Ibid.

16. ' TNA. FO 800/206. Lord Grey of Fallodon to the Private Secretaries. F. 257 recto.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Heller J., Sir Louis Mallet., P. 8; TNA. FO 800/206. Lord Grey of Fallodon to the Private Secretaries. F. 257 verso.

23. TNA. FO 800/206. Lord Grey of Fallodon to the Private Secretaries. F. 257 verso.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., F. 258 recto.

26. Trumpener U. Turkey's Entry into World War I. P. 375.

27. TNA. FO 800/206. Lord Grey of Fallodon to the Private Secretaries. F. 258 recto.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Morgenthau H. Secrets of the Bosphorus. PP. 88-89.

32. TNA. FO 800/206. Lord Grey of Fallodon to the Private Secretaries. F. 258 recto.

33. TNA. FO 800/240. Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople summarising Events leading up to Rupture of Relations with Turkey, and Reply thereto, 20 November 1914. P. 722.

34. TNA. FO 800/206. Sir L. Mallet, 29 August 1917. F. 297 recto.

35. TNA. FO 800/206. Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Drummond. F. 298 recto.

36. TNA. FO 800/206. Sir L. Mallet, 1 September 1917. F. 300 recto.

37. TNA. FO 800/206. Communicated by Lord Murray, 3 September 1917. F. 303 recto.

38. Ibid., FF. 303 recto -- 304 recto.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid., FF. 305 recto -- 306 recto.

41. Ibid., F. 305 recto.

42. Ibid., FF. 307 recto -- 308 recto.

43. TNA. FO 800/240. Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople summarising Events leading up to Rupture of Relations with Turkey, and Reply thereto, 20 November 1914. P. 725.

44. TNA. FO 800/206. Enclosure 2 in letter from Lord Grey of Fallodon to the Private Secretaries, 5 October 1917. F. 311 recto.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Kent M. Kent, Marian (Ed.). The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire. London: Frank Class, 2005. P. 167.

54. Fromkin D. H. A Peace To End All Peace, The Fall Of The Ottoman Empire And The Creation Of The Middle East. New York, 1989. P. 44.

55. Grey E. Twenty-Five Years... P. 182.

56. §eyhun A. Said Halim Pasha. P. 156.

57. Ibid. P. 159.

58. Morgenthau H. Secrets of the Bosphorus. PP. 81-82.

59. §eyhun A. Said Halim Pasha. PP. 159-162.

60. Grey E. Twenty-Five Years. P. 170; Готлиб В.В. Тайная дипломатия во время Первой мировой войны. Москва: Соцэкгиз, 1960. С. 74-75.

61. Машевський О.П. Проблема Чорноморських проток у міжнародних відносинах (1870 р. -- початок 1920-х рр.). Київ: «Аквілон-Плюс», 2010. P. 565.

62. За Балканскими фронтами Первой мировой войны. Отв. редактор В.Н. Виноградов. Москва: Издательство «Индрик», 2002. С. 37.

References

1. Ajrapetov, O. (2014). Uchastie Rossijskoj imperii v Pervoj mirovoj vojne (19141917): 1914. Nachalo. Moskva: Kulikovo pole [in Russian].

2. Fromkin, D.H. (1989). A Peace To End All Peace, The Fall Of The Ottoman Empire And The Creation Of The Middle East. New York: Henry Holt & Co [in English].

3. Gottlieb, W.W. (1960). Tajnaja diplomatija vo vremja Pervoj mirovoj vojny. Moskva: Sotzekgiz [in Russian].

4. Grey, E. (1925). Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916. (Vol. 2). New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company [in English].

5. Heller, J. (1976). Sir Louis Mallet and the Ottoman Empire: The Road to War. Middle Eastern Studies, 12/1, 3-44 [in English].

6. Kent, M. (1996). The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire. London: FRank Class [in English].

7. Mashevs'kij, O. (2010). Problema Chornomorskih protok u mizhnarodnih vidnosinah (1870 r. -- pochatok 1920-h rr.). Kyiv: Akvilon-Plus [in Ukrainian].

8. Morgenthau, H. (1918). Secrets of the Bosphorus. London: Hutchinson & Co [in English].

9. §eyhun, A. (2002). Said Halim Pasha: An Ottoman Stateman and An Islamist Thinker (1865-1921). Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies McGill University [in English].

10. Trumpener, U. (1962). Turkey's Entry into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities. The Journal of Modern History, 34/4 [in English].

11. Vinogradov, V. (Ed.) (2002). Za balkanskimi frontami Pervoj mirovoj vojny. Moskva: Indrik [in Russian].

Размещено на Allbest.ru