China's Belt and Road Initiative amid Obama's negligence and Trump's pessimism

Notwithstanding such threatening perceptions, some American scholars believe that it's a grave miscalculation to rally against China's BRI, which could provide economic benefits for the countries [Kamphausen 2017]. Gal Luft, co-director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS),recommends US to participate in BRI, since he believes that US engagement in this initiative will help to tackle with the poverty in the Asia. Furthermore, it would also help American companies to have access to the markets which are difficult to reach [Darger 2017].

Similarly, as Susan L. Shirk, an expert on Chinese politics and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State during the Clinton administration, notes, US should not oppose with China's regional initiatives such as BRI, rather encourage China “to channel its ambitions into economic and diplomatic initiatives” and prevent its aggressive military ambitions [Koo 2016].

As a result, US participation and presence in BRI would not only provide an opportunity to enjoy the potential and long-term benefits of BRI, but also enable Washington to monitor and avoid any aggressive behavior that China may pursue. Considering its vast economic and strategic scopes, BRI could offer US and China an opportunity to tackle with some global issues such as financial crisis, terrorism, poverty and infrastructure gap, thereby building up the mutual trust that has been absent in Sino-US relations.

Considering all the above-mentioned issues, it should be taken into consideration that “having a bigger economic footprint does not necessarily translate into greater political influence” [Grabow 2017]. US could identify the convergent and divergent areas in SinoUS relations, within the framework of BRI and thereby taking the best strategy as to how approach this initiative.

From Barack Obama⁹s Negligence to Donald Trump's Pessimism

After the proposal of BRI in 2013, the Obama's administration received it coldly. In fact, during his tenure there wasn't any congressional hearing to deal with BRI. The same is true for US-China Economic and Security Commission expected to monitor economic and security aspects of US-China relations. Even in some cases US sought to deliberately undermine this initiative [Luft 2017]. However, former Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken, mentioned that US would welcome BRI on the condition that it is fully compliant with international standards and norms, but if it's not, the initiative “could actually undermine the very goals it's seeking to achieve” [Blinken 2015], which implied that there was deep distrust of China and its initiatives in the Obama administration - albeit his acknowledgement of China's global responsibility in establishing prosperity and peace in the world. Thus it should come as no surprise that the Obama administration dismissed BRI out of hand and was not sanguine to participate in Chinese initiatives. Alek Chance ascribes the roots of this pessimism and uncertainty to the following factors. Firstly, China avoided explaining clearly the future plans and motivations behind its initiatives and policies which aroused deep concerns of Americans. Secondly, US regarded BRI as “an element of a broader strategic competition”, which prevented both Americans and Chinese from identifying areas of cooperation in this initiative, and finally, China's assertive behavior in the South China Sea, which suggests that China gives high priority to its national interests and low priority to the interests of other countries in the region, which is in marked contrast with Beijing's claim of “win-win cooperation” in its initiatives such as BRI [Chance 2016].

On the contrary, under the Trump's administration, BRI has occupied a prominent place in US China policy. Taking an ambivalent posture towards BRI, the Trump administration sent its Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, Matthew Pattinger to the 2017 BRI Forum in Beijing [Smith 2018]. Gradually, US approach regarding the viability of this initiative in establishing development and connectivity underwent a considerable change. For the first time in October 2017, James Mattis, former U.S. Defense Secretary, stated that US was seriously concerned about BRI. In fact this initiative faced a barrage of criticism for its standards, intentions and plans under Donald Trump administration. At the 2017 Atlantic Council-Korea Foundation Forum, Rex Tillerson criticized BRI on the ground that it violated international norms and rules and replaced them with their own precepts [Tillerson 2017], which casted serious doubt on the fundamental principles and priorities of BRI. Similarly, during a hearing before US Senate, Mattis mentioned that “In a globalized world, there are many belts and many roads, and no one nation should put itself into a position of dictating `one belt, one road' ”. This stance was also echoed in Senator Gary Peters from Michigan who considered BRI as a strategy “to secure China's control over both the continental and maritime interests, in their eventual hope of dominating Eurasia and exploiting natural resources there” [On OBOR… 2017]. In fact, strategic and geopolitical ambitions of BRI are of great concern to the Trump administration. According to the report released by U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in 2018, BRI would justify China's overseas military presence which could pose serious security problems for the US and its allies beyond China's maritime periphery [Report to Congress… 2018].

In response to China's BRI and its pervasive influence in international economy and global infrastructure development, the Trump administration announced plans to reform US “development finance institutions” and support “private sector investments” He also asked International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to “dedicate greater resources to largescale infrastructure projects” [Kliman 2018]. In this vein, the Trump administration seeks to establish and deepen cooperative ties with its allies and partners to deal with the challenges BRI might pose [President Donald J. Trump's Visit to Japan… 2017].

In sum, it seems that the Obama administration didn't take any practical measures to deal with BRI and chose a policy of negligence towards this initiative. Lack of references to BRI in its policy documents regarding Sino-US ties signals the inertial qualities of Obama's strategic policies towards BRI. Barack Obama had a holistic view of Chinese initiatives including AIIB and BRI, and refrained from focusing exclusively on them since he assumed them as US China policy in General. Furthermore, the Obama administration pinned its hope on Pivot to Asia, and expected that it would strengthen US alliance system, a factor that Barack Obama thought would contain the rise of China in general and its initiatives in particular. On the other hand, since Donald Trump assumed power, he has concentrated on strategic challenges and competition in US-China relations and explicitly questioned the desirability of BRI which could pose serious challenges to the US in every economic and geopolitical domains. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Trump administration looked at BRI pessimistically.

Conclusion

The paper contributes to the ongoing debate about the role of BRI in Sino-US relations by investigating Barack Obama and Donald Trump's China policies in general and their perceptions of BRI in particular. It also shows that although Americans are cognizant of the important role of BRI in international order, and its potential benefits to the US, they still receive it coldly. Hence, the future participation of US in this initiative remains under a cloud of suspicion. In fact, both Barack Obama and Donald Trump seem uncomfortable to play in a game whose rules are set by China. Casting suspicions on Chinese initiatives, Barack Obama and Donald Trump contend that China does not act within international acts and precepts. As a result, they tend to engage with China selectively on the areas that are more to the benefit of US.

The paper also suggests that US China policy is heavily influenced by “realist camp” and “liberal camp”. On the one hand, cooperating with China is considered as a threat to US primacy. Thus BRI is perceived as a means of challenging US in economic, political and strategic spheres, which set the stage for President Trump's zero-sum and unilateral China policy that has been strongly favored by economic issues. With saying this, it is hardly likely that US and China could establish cooperative ties against the backdrop of BRI. Unlike Barack Obama, Donald Trump tends to develop a strong strategic response to BRI. A prime example is his proposal of FOIP which seeks to deal with rise of China in general and BRI in particular.

While Donald Trump's FOIP seeks to follow US interests in Asia-Pacific region on a country-by-country basis which highlights the commitment to bilateralism rather than multilateralism, Barack Obama's Pivot to Asia sought to suggest big vision of America's regional policies in Asia-Pacific region to maintain US primacy in the region.

On the other hand, the “liberal camp” in US administration promotes establishing cooperative ties with China, and displaying China as a responsible state that could play significant role in the global affairs. This camp believes that Beijing's integration in international system would contain and balance the rise of China. Seeking middle-ground in his China policy, Barack Obama completely resorted neither to tough measures of “realist camp” nor soft measures of “liberal camp” In other words, he sought to strike a balance between his soft and tough policies to deal with China. On the one hand, there were some key figures in his administration, such as Jeffrey A. Bader and Evan Medeiros, who advocated increasing cooperation with Beijing and integrating it into international system - albeit its increasing power [Larus and Hargis 2017]. On the other hand, Barack Obama haunted with the current strategic distrust between US and China, which has been existed in Sino-US trajectory since Nixon administration. This mentality, thus guided him to take conservative stances toward Beijing. The existence of deep strategic distrust in Sino-US relations, lack of transparency in specifying the future objectives of BRI, and considering Chinese initiatives as a strategic competition convinced Obama to dismiss BRI.

Regarding the importance of BRI in US-China relations, the paper reiterates that US China policy since the inception of BRI is premised on a combination of cooperation and competition. Analyzing the initiative to identify such elements could help US and Chinese decision makers to manage frictions and strategic rivalry in their relations.

From a policy perspective, this study has some key takeaways. US authorities need to be pleased with China's attempts at shouldering global responsibility of establishing peace, security and prosperity, epitomized by BRI. Moreover, US hawkish policies vis-avis Beijing would merely pave the way for hardliners in CCP to extend their influence in China's foreign policy, which makes establishing constructive and amicable relations too difficult. Collaborating with China within the framework of BRI, US would have an eye on the rise of China and enjoy the economic and strategic benefits accruing from the development of this global initiative. China does not exclude US from participating in this initiative, which could be understood from Chinese heavy emphasis on the inclusiveness and openness of BRI. In order to avert potential crisis in their relations with China's BRI, US authorities could have a second thought on their decision of not to take part in this initiative. Global infrastructure gap, for instance, is a natural place for US and China to work together. BRI could be a perfect mechanism to meet this demand and need throughout the developing and developed countries.

The road to eventual success of BRI will be long and bumpy. It looks good on paper but could become costly on the ground. Chinese leaders thus need to prioritize transparent diplomatic engagement to allay current mistrust regarding their foreign policies and initiatives.

References

1. Abdollahpour B. (2018), “An Iranian Perspective on the Belt and Road Initiative”, China Daily European Weekly, September 11, available at: www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201809/11/WS5b971c4aa31033b4f465551c.html (accessed July 19, 2022).

2. “Advance Policy Questions for Admiral Philip Davidson, USN Expected Nominee for Commander, U.S. Pacific Command” (2018), in US Senate Committee on Armed Service, available at: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Davidson_APQs_04-17-18.pdf (accessed July 11, 2022).

3. Bader J. A. (2018), “US-China Relations: Is It Time to End the Engagement?”, in Brookings Institution, available at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/FP_20180925_ us_china_relations.pdf (accessed July 8, 2022).

4. Blinken J. A. (2015), “The United States and Central Asia: An Enduring Vision For Partnership And Connectivity in the 21^st Century, an Address by Deputy Secretary Antony Blinken”, in Brookings Institution, available at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/2015 0331_central_asia_blinken_transcript.pdf (accessed August 13, 2022).

5. Borger J. (2018), “Trump accuses China of meddling in midterms, citing Iowa newspaper ad”, The Guardian, September 27, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/sep/26/ trump-china-beijing-election-midterms-interference-claim (accessed July 8, 2022).

6. Brunnstrom D. and Martina M. (2015), “Xi Denies China Turning Artificial Islands into Military Bases”, Reuters, September 25, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-chinapacific/xi-denies-china-turning-artificial-islands-into-military-bases-idUSKCN0RP1ZH20150925 (accessed June 10, 2022).

7. Buckley C. and Wee S. (2018), “Responding to Trump, China Plans New Tariffs on U.S. Goods”, The New York Times, March 22, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22/ world/asia/china-trump-retaliatory-tariffs.html (accessed July 14, 2022).

8. Cavanna Th. P. (2018), “What Does China's Belt and Road Initiative Mean for US Grand Strategy?”, The Diplomat, June 5, available at: https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/what-does-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-mean-for-us-grand-strategy/ (accessed July 19, 2022).

9. Chance A. (2016), American Perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative: Sources of Concern and Possibilities for Cooperation, Institute for China-America Studies, Washington, DC, available at: https://chinaus-icas.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/American-Perspectives-on-the-Beltand-Road-Initiative.pdf (accessed June 6, 2022).

10. Chen D. (2018), “The Indo-Pacific Strategy: A Background Analysis”, ISPI (Italian Institute for International Political Studies), June 4, available at: https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/indo-pacific-strategy-background-analysis-20714 (accessed July 11, 2022).

11. Cheng S. W. (2015), “China's New Silk Road: Implications for the US”, Yale and the World, available at: https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/chinas-new-silk-road-implications-us (accessed July 17, 2022).

12. Clinton H. (2011), “America's Pacific Century”, Foreign Policy, October 11, available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/ (accessed June 29, 2022).

13. Coats D. (2019), Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, available at: https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf (accessed July 17, 2022).

14. Colback L. (2020), “How to navigate the US-China trade war”, The Financial Times, February 28, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/6124beb8-5724-11ea-abe5-8e03987b7b20 (accessed July 14, 2022).

15. Cordesman A. H. (2017), “President Trump's New National Security Strategy”, in Center for Strategic & International Studies, December 18, available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/president-trumps-new-national-security-strategy (accessed June 17, 2022).

16. Cronin P. (2017), “Trump's Post-Pivot Strategy”, The Diplomat, November 11, available at: https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/trumps-post-pivot-strategy/ (accessed July 19, 2022).

17. Cronk T. M. (2019), “Esper: Russia, China Want to Disrupt International Order”, in US Department of Defense, September 6, available at: https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/ Article/1954110/esper-russia-china-want-to-disrupt-international-order/ (accessed July 11, 2022).

18. Darger C. (2017), “China's Belt and Road Initiative: An Opportunity for the United States”, in The Atlantic Council, October 4, available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/china-s-belt-and-road-initiative-an-opportunity-for-the-united-states (accessed July 16, 2022).

19. “Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next Century: An Address by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson” (2017), in Center for Strategic & International Studies, October 18, available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-our-relationship-india-next-century-address-us-secretary-state-rex-tillerson (accessed July 19, 2022).

20. Dodwell D. (2018), “Tillerson's final warning on Belt and Road financing only proves China's influence on the rise”, South China Morning Post, March 23, available at: https://www.scmp.com/ business/global-economy/article/2138539/tillersons-final-warning-belt-and-road-financing-onlyproves (accessed July 13, 2022).

21. Dollar D., Hass R. and Bader J. A. (2019), “Assessing U.S.-China relations 2 years into the Trump presidency”, in Brookings Institution, January 15, available at: https://www.brookings.edu/ blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/15/assessing-u-s-china-relations-2-years-into-the-trump-presidency/ (accessed June 12, 2022).

22. Ebeling R. M. (2018), “Economic Armaments and China's Global Ambitions”, in American Institute for Economic Research, August 22, available at: https://www.aier.org/article/economicarmaments-and-chinas-global-ambitions (accessed July 10, 2022).

23. Economy E. C. (2019), “US-China Relations at 4©–”, The Diplomat, January 01, available at: https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/us-china-relations-at-40/ (accessed June 13, 2022).

24. Economy E. C. (2018), The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese States, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York.

25. Feng D. (2020), China's Millennium Transformation: The Belt and Road Initiative, World Scientific Publishing, Singapore.

26. Friedberg A. L. (2005), “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?”, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 7-45.

27. Funabashi Y. (2018), “Toward a free and open Indo-Pacific”, The Japan Times, May 10, available at: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/05/10/commentary/japan-commentary/towardfree-open-indo-pacific/#.W9R£XWgzbrV (accessed July 24, 2022).

28. Gang D. (2020), “Why isn't the BRI a strategy of China?”, Global Times, January 22, available at: https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1177706.shtml (accessed July 11, 2022).

29. Garrison J. and Wall M. (2016), “The Rise of Hedging and Regionalism: An Explanation and Evaluation of President Obama's China Policy”, Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 43, Issue 2, pp. 47-63. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00927678.2016.1166892 (accessed June 22, 2022).

30. Geddie J. and Aravindan A. (2018), “Pence says `empire and aggression' have no place in Indo-Pacific”, Reuters, November 15, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean-summit-pence/pence-says-empire-and-aggression-have-no-place-in-indo-pacific-idUSKCN1NK084 (accessed July 19, 2022).

31. Ghiasy R. and Zhou J. (2017), The Silk Road Economic Belt: Considering Security Implications and EU-China Cooperation Prospects, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, available at: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/The-Silk-Road-Economic-Belt.pdf (accessed July 6, 2022).

32. Glaser B. and Billingsley B. (2012), “US-China Relations: US Pivot to Asia Leaves China off Balance”, Comparative Connections, Vol. 13, Issue 3, pp. 29-42, available at: https://cc.pacforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/1103qus_china.pdf (accessed July 19, 2022).

33. Gnanasagaran A. (2017), “Between `Indo-Pacific' and `Asia-Pacific' ”, The Asean Post, November 18, available at: https://theaseanpost.com/article/between-indo-pacific-and-asia-pacific (accessed July 19, 2022).

34. Grabow C. (2017), “Responsible Stakeholders: Why the United States Should Welcome China's Economic Leadership”, in Cato Institute, October 3, available at: https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/responsible-stakeholders-why-united-states-should-welcome-chinas#full (accessed July 5, 2022).

35. Hart M. (2015), “Assessing American Foreign Policy Toward China”, in Center for American Progress, available at: https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/29160020/ HartSFRC-testimony.pdf (accessed July 19, 2022).

36. Hass R. (2018), “Principles for managing U.S.-China competition”, in The Brookings Institution, August, available at: https://www.brookings.edu/research/principles-for-managing-u-s-chinacompetition/ (accessed June 7, 2022).

37. Ikenberry G. J. (2008), “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 23-37.

38. Jia X. (2018a), “US Indo-Pacific strategy is not what it appears to be”, in China Institute of International Studies, June 9, available at: https://www.ciis.org.cn/english/COMMENTARIES/2020 07/t20200715_2589.html (accessed July 20, 2022).

39. Jia X. (2018b), “Toward a free and open, but also inclusive and cooperative `Indo-Pacific' ”, in China Institute of International Studies, June 12, available at: https://www.ciis.org.cn/english/ COMMENTARIES/202007/t20200715_2591.html (accessed July 20, 2022).

40. Johnson C. (2016), President Xi Jinping's `Belt and Road' Initiative: A Practical Assessment of the Chinese Communist Party ' Roadmap for China ' Global Resurgence, A Report of the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies, available at: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/160328_Johnson_PresidentXiJinping_Web.pdf (accessed July 10, 2022).

41. Kamphausen R. D. (2017), “Development Finance in Asia: U.S. Economic Strategy Amid China's Belt and Road”, in The National Bureau of Asian Research, November 15, available at:

42. https://www.nbr.org/publication/development-finance-in-asia-u-s-economic-strategy-amid-chinas-belt-and-road/ (accessed July 16, 2022).

43. Keohane R. O. (1984), After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

44. Kliman D. (2018), “The Geostrategic and Military Drivers and Implications of BRI”, in Center for a New American Security, January 25, available at: https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/ files/Kliman_USCC%20Testimony_20180119.pdf (accessed July 24, 2022).

45. Koo G. (2016), “Q&A: China expert Susan Shirk updates her view of Sino-US relations”, Asia Times, March 3, available at: https://asiatimes.com/2016/03/qa-china-expert-susan-shirk-updatesher-view-of-us-chinese-relations/ (accessed July 7, 2022).

46. Lampton D. M. (2007), “The Faces of Chinese Power”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 1, pp. 115-127.

47. Larus E. F. and Hargis Sh. (2017), “U.S. President Obama's China Policy: A Critical Assessment”, TEKA of Political Science and International Relations, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 7-29. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/teka.2017.12.2.7

48. Li C. (2016), “Assessing U.S.-China Relations under the Obama Administration”, in Brookings Institution, August 30, available at: https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/assessing-u-s-china-relations-under-the-obama-administration/ (accessed June 19, 2022).

49. Liu X. (2015), “New Silk Road is an opportunity not a threat”, Financial Times, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/c8f58a7c-ffd6-11e4-bc30-00144feabdc0 (accessed July 11, 2022).

50. Liu W. (2018), “The Belt and Road Initiative: A Bellwether of China's Role in Global Governance”, in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 10, available at: https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/09/10/belt-and-road-initiative-bellwether-of-china-s-role-in-global-governance-pub-77204 (accessed June 18, 2022).

51. Lofflmann G. (2016), “The Pivot between Containment, Engagement, and Restraint: President Obama's Conflicted Grand Strategy in Asia”, Asian Security, Vol. 12, Issue 2, pp. 92-110. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2016.1190338

52. Luft G. (2017), “US Strategy toward China's Belt and Road Initiative”, in The Atlantic Council, October 4, available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/us-strategy-toward-china-s-belt-and-road-initiative (accessed July 3, 2022).

53. Mastanduno M. (2020), “A grand strategic transition? Obama, Trump and the Asia Pacific political economy”, in Turner O. and Parmar I. (eds), The United States in the Indo-Pacific: Obama's Legacy and the Trump Transition, Manchester University Press, Manchester.

54. Mitchell A. W. (2018), “Anchoring the Western Alliance”, US. Embassy in Finland, June 5, available at: https://fi.usembassy.gov/anchoring-the-westem-alliance-june-5-2018/ (accessed July 17, 2022).

55. Mitrovic D. (2018), “China's Belt and Road Initiative: Connecting and Transforming Initiative”, in Yu C., Song L. and Huang L. (eds), The Belt & Road Initiative in the Global Arena: Chinese and European Perspectives, Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore.

56. Mori S. (2019), “US-China: A New Consensus for Strategic Competition in Washington”, The Diplomat, January 30, available at: https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/us-china-a-new-consensusfor-strategic-competition-in-washington/ (accessed June 2022).

57. “National Security Strategy” (2010), in The White House, available at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed June 22, 2022).

58. “National Security Strategy” (2015), in The White House, available at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf (accessed June 22, 2022).

59. “National Security Strategy” (2017), in Historical Office. Office of the Secretary of Defense, available at: https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/NSS2017.pdf7verzCnFwURr w09pJ0q5EogFpwg%3d%3d (accessed August 1, 2022).

60. Nikkei (2010), China Criticizes US Military Report as Impediment to Closer Relations: Resumption of Exchange Now Difficult, August 8, available at: http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASGM18038_Y0A810C1FF1000/ (accessed June 10, 2022).

61. “No Time for the Dalai Lama” (2009), The Wall Street Journal, October 6, available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704471504574449420327844600 (accessed August 1, 2022).

62. “On OBOR, US backs India, says it crosses `disputed' territory.: Jim Mattis” (2017), The Economic Times, October 4, available at: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-andnation/on-obor-us-backs-india-says-it-crosses-disputed-territory-jim-mattis/articleshow/6093 2827.cms (accessed August 1, 2022).

63. Parker J. (2017), “What Is China's Belt and Road Initiative?”, The Economist, May 15, available at: https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/05/14/what-is-chinas-belt-androad-initiative (accessed June 18, 2022).

64. Pence M. (2018), “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration's Policy Toward China”, in The White House, October 4, available at: https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/ (accessed July 8, 2022).

65. Peng Y. (2013), “Xunqiu zhongmei yatai liangxing hudong”, Guoji anquan yanjiu, No. 1, pp. 55-66. (In Chinese).

66. Pillsbury M. (2020), A Guide to the Trump Administration ' China Policy Statements, Hudson Institute.

67. Pompeo M. (2018), “Remarks on `America's Indo-Pacific Economic Vision' ”, in US. Embassy & Consulate in the Republic of Korea, July 30, available at: https://kr.usembassy.gov/073018secretary-pompeo-remarks-on-americas-indo-pacific-economic-vision/ (accessed July 14, 2022).

68. “President Donald J. Trump's Visit to Japan Strengthens the United States-Japan Alliance and Economic Partnership” (2017), in The White House, November 6, available at: https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-visit-japan-strengthensunited-states-japan-alliance-economic-partnership/ (accessed July 24, 2022).

69. Rapp-Hooper M. (2016), “Counterbalance: Red Teaming the Rebalance in the Asia-Pacific”, in Center for a New American Security, November 14, available at: https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/counterbalance-red-teaming-the-rebalance-in-the-asia-pacific#fn1 (accessed June 29, 2022).

70. “Remarks by David Malpass, Under Secretary for International Affairs, on the U.S. and Latin America: Partnering for Mutual Growth, Transparency, and the Rule of Law” (2018), in US Department of the Treasury, February 2, available at: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/ sm0413 (accessed July 15, 2022).

71. “Remarks by President Obama and Vice President Xi of the People's Republic of China Before Bilateral Meeting” (2012), in The White House, February 14, available at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/14/remarks-president-obama-and-vice-president-xi-peoples-republic-china-bil (accessed June 22, 2022).

72. “Remarks by President Trump at APEC CEO Summit | Da Nang, Vietnam” (2017), in The White House, November 10, available at: https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-apec-ceo-summit-da-nang-vietnam/ (accessed July 18, 2022).

73. “Remarks by President Trump at Signing of a Presidential Memorandum Targeting China's Economic Aggression” (2018), in The White House, March 22, available at: https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-signing-presidential-memorandum-targeting-chinas-economic-aggression/ (accessed July 8, 2022).

74. “Remarks with Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, and Australian Defense Minister Marise Payn” (2015), in US Department of State, October 13, available at: https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/10/248180.htm (accessed June 10, 2022).

75. Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2018), available at: https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-09/Executive%20Summary%20 2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf (accessed July 14, 2022).

76. Rolland N. (2018), “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission”, in The National Bureau of Asian Research, January 25, available at: https://www.nbr. org/publication/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-five-years-later/ (accessed July 10, 2022).

77. Ruan Z. (2014), “Meiguo `yatai zaipingheng' zhanltie qianjing lunxi”, Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, No. 4, pp. 4-20. (In Chinese).

78. Saunders P. C. (2014), “China's Rising Power, the U.S. Rebalance to Asia, and Implications for U.S.-China Relations”, Issues & Studies, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 19-55.

79. Shattuck Th. J. (2018), “How China Dictates the Rules of the Game”, in Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 25, available at: https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/07/how-china-dictatesthe-rules-of-the-game/ (accessed July 15, 2022).

80. Shepard W (2016), “The New Silk Road Is Not Chinese, It's International”, Forbes, October 14, available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/10/14/regardless-of-what-beijing-says-the-new-silk-road-is-not-chinese/?sh=10b0fa955ec2 (accessed June 11, 2022).

81. Shi J. and Churchill O. (2018), “US competes with China's `Belt and Road Initiative' with US$113 million Asian investment programme”, South China Morning Post, July 30, available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2157381/us-competes-chinas-belt-and-roadinitiative-new-asian-investment (accessed July 22, 2022).

82. Smith J. M. (2018), “China's Belt and Road Initiative: Strategic Implications and International Opposition”, in The Heritage Foundation, No. 3331, August 9, available at: https://www.heritage. org/sites/default/files/2018-08/BG3331_2.pdf (accessed August 1, 2022).

83. Storey I. and Cook M. (2018), “The Trump Administration and Southeast Asia: America's Asia Policy Crystalizes”, ISEAS Perspective, No. 77, available at: iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_ Perspective_2018_77@50.pdf (accessed July 22, 2022).

84. Sun W. (2012), “Asia pivot targets Beijing”, The Global Times, November 22, available at: www.globaltimes.cn/content/745991.shtml (accessed June 29, 2022).

85. Sutter R. (2010), US-China Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present, Rowman & Littlefield, London.

86. Sutter R. (2019), “ISSF Policy Series: Sutter on Trump's China Policy: Bi-partisan Hardening, Uncertain Resolve”, in H-Net: Humanities & Social Sciences Online, January 17, available at: https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/3569933/issf-policy-series-sutter-trump% E2%80%99s-china-policy-bi-partisan (accessed June 13, 2022).

87. Sutter et al. (2013), Balancing acts: the U.S. rebalance and Asia-Pacific stability, Sigur Center for Asian Studies, Washington, available at: https://www2.gwu.edu/~sigur/assets/docs/BalancingActs_Compiled1.pdf (accessed June 29, 2022).

88. Swaine M. D. (2018), “Creating an Unstable Asia: the U.S. `Free and Open Indo-Pacific' Strategy”, in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2, available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/02/creating-unstable-asia-u.s.-free-and-open-indo-pacific-strategy-pub75720 (accessed July 23, 2022).

89. Thorne D. and Spevack B. (2017), Harbored Ambitions: How China's Port Investments Are Strategically Reshaping the Indo-Pacific, Center for Advanced Defense Studies, Washington DC.

90. Tillerson R. W. (2017), “On `Meeting the Foreign Policy Challenges of 2017 and Beyond' ”, in U.S. Embassy in Indonesia, available at: https://www.state.gov/secretary/20172018tillerson/ remarks/2017/12/276570.htm# (accessed August 1, 2022).

91. Tiezzi Sh. (2018), “Another US-China Dialogue Bites the Dust”, The Diplomat, October 2, available at: https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/another-us-china-dialogue-bites-the-dust/ (accessed June 28, 2022).

92. “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” (2015), in Belt and Road Portal, March 30, available at: https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ qwyw/qwfb/1084.htm (accessed July 10, 2022).

93. Wang J. (2012), “Zhongguo diyuan zhanlue de zai pingheng”, The Global Times, October 17, available at: http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2012-10/3193760.html (accessed June 10, 2022). (In Chinese).

94. Wang Y. (2015), “China's `New Silk Road': A Case Study in EU-China Relations”, in Amighini A. and Berkofsky A. (eds), Xi's Policy Gambles: The Bumpy Road Ahead, ISPI, Milan.

95. Wang Y. (2016), The Belt and Road: What Will China Offer the World in Its Rise, New World Press, Beijing.

96. Wang Y. (2017), China Connects the World: What Behind the Belt and Road Initiative, China Intercontinental Press, Beijing.

97. Wang Y. (2018), “Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press”, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, available at: https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceom//eng/zgyw/t1540928.htm (accessed July 22, 2022).

98. Watanabe T. (2017), “US Engagement Policy toward China: Realism, Liberalism, and Pragmatism”, Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, Vol. 2, Issue 2, pp. 3-24. DOI: https://doi.o rg/10.1080/24761028.2013.11869060 (accessed July 29, 2022).

99. Wu X. (2018), “New Phase of the United States' China Policy under the Trump Administration”, China International Studies, Vol. 71, pp. 5-24.

100. Wuthnow J. (2018), “From Friend to Foe-ish: Washington's Negative Turn on the Belt and Road Initiative”, in The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, May 21, available at: www.theasanforum.org/from-friend-to-foe-ish-washingtons-negative-tum-on-the-belt-and-road-initiative/ (accessed July 17, 2022).

101. “Xi says ready to boost China-U.S. ties from new starting point with Trump” (2017), Xinhua, available at: www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-04/07/c_136190556.htm (accessed June 10, 2022).

102. Xie T. and Page B. I. (2010), “Americans And The Rise Of China As A World Power”, Jo-urnal of Contemporary China, Vol. 19, Issue 65, pp. 479-501. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1067056 1003666095

103. Yidaiyilu (2019), available at: https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/info/iList.jsp?cat_id=10037&cur_ page=1 (accessed June 5, 2022).

104. Zhou J. (2017), “Are the Conflicts between the U.S. and China Manageable?”, Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 1075-1108.

Ðàçìåùåíî íà Allbest.ru