Countering Covid-19 as a tool for hybrid influence of Russia and Chins on regional subsystems of international relations: European and Asian dimensions

On February 20, 2020, China called on ASEAN countries to show solidarity in preventing the spread of the coronavirus outbreak. It should be noted that in early 2020, Beijing was severely criticized by both world powers and Southeast Asian countries for the ineffectiveness of overcoming coronavirus infection in the country. COVID-19 has caused some problems to China in its realization of the BRI. While ASEAN, as an institutional mechanism, supported China's position, not all member states of the community at the bilateral level immediately did the same actions to China. In particular, Cambodia and Laos continued the practice of “open doors” and allied relations with China. However, in early 2020, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand imposed a ban on the movement of citizens and tourist travel to China and the entry of Chinese citizens into their territory [53].

However, such unilaterally measures did not affect the collective institutional mechanism of China's cooperation with ASEAN. The ASEAN Summit on Coronavirus Disease (April 14, 2020) agreed to create a reserve of necessary medicines for rapid response to emergencies, as well as not to close their markets, continue trade and investment with China [54].China and Singapore in early June 2020 agreed on working of high-speed lanes to facilitate important business travel between the two countries during the global pandemic [55].

It can be argued that China's actions in the format of “mask diplomacy” have results and became more effective. However, China does not stop at modernizing the mechanisms and tools for implementing its foreign policy in the post-coronavirus era.

Xi Jinping's speech at the World Health Organization meeting on May 18, 2020 is a good example. Chinese leader promised that:“China would make the coronavirus vaccine a “global public good” that would be available, especially to developing countries, after its development and testing in China” [56].

In this aspect, the so-called “vaccine diplomacy” is gaining weight. China and some of its leading pharmaceutical manufacturers have begun talking about providing the region with access to the Chinese vaccine against COVID-19. In particular, on August 24, 2020, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang promised the lower Mekong countries (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Myanmar) the priority access to vaccines produced by Chinese companies. Cooperation between the Chinese state campaign “Sinovac” and the Indonesian company “PT Bio Farma” on the development and of the vaccine, which is currently being tested in the country, has already begun.Such activity of China is explained not only by the strategic nature of the Southeast Asia region, but also by the actions of the United States as a competitor in it. For instance, Duke University and the American pharmaceutical company Arcturus have announced a partnership with Singapore to develop another vaccine (known as Lunar-Cov19). Note that on April 22, 2020, the US State Department launched the “US-ASEAN Future Health Initiative” [57].

So, states are increasingly beginning to use “vaccine diplomacy” as a tool to influence international relations, the foundations of which were laid in early 2020 in the so-called mask diplomacy

The results of opinion polls also motivate the expansion of China's influence in the region under the aim of combating coronavirus infection. According to the Russian Scientist O. Korolev, the results of a poll conducted in 2020 by one of the leading think tanks in Southeast Asia - ISEAS (Singapore) are interesting. It was mentioned that: “85.4% of respondents said they were concerned about China's political and strategic influence in Southeast Asia. Finally, when were asked about choose between the United States and China - 53.6% of respondents preferred Washington” [58]. Such results clearly demonstrate the growing level of distrust of ASEAN countries over Beijing, and the issue of security (South China Sea dispute) in this case plays an important, if not decisive, role.

Such data from opinion polls for the first half of 2020 have already marked changes in China's reaction. At the online meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in September 2020, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said: “We have shared our experience, helped each other and put the epidemic in our countries under control”. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stressed China's readiness to renegotiate Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea [59].

Chinese actions are not accidental under the dynamics of the regional environment.In 2020, the Trump administration accused China of using the pandemic to advance its demands, and in April called on Beijing to stop its “provocative actions.” It is worth noting that the United States has taken a clearer position on the legal basis for China's claims in the South China Sea. On July 13, 2020, US Secretary of State M. Pompeo issued an important statement in support of the 2016 Arbitration Court ruling. M. Pompeo announced: “The world will not allow Beijing to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire. America supports our allies and partners in Southeast Asia” [60].

On August 26, 2020, the US Department of Commerce blacklisted 24 Chinese state-owned companies involved in the construction of seven artificial Chinese islands in the Spratly Islands. Note that, since December 2019, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines have submitted verbal notes to the UN rejecting China's position on the “nine lines” and China's claims to “historic rights” in the South China Sea are incompatible with the UN Convention on International Maritime Law 1982 (UNCLOS). ASEAN's stronger position on countering China in the South China Sea in 2020 is due to the intensification of US policy in this area. In particular, on June 1, 2020, the United States sent a letter to the UN rejecting China's claims for shipping in the South China Sea as inconsistent with UNCLOS [61, p. 4-5].

As a result, in a telephone conversation between Xi Jinping and Vietnamese President Nguyen Phu Trong on September 2020, the talks on the settlement of the South China Sea issue and a new round of talks were emphasized [62].

However, despite the pandemic and China's efforts to help them counter COVID-19, ASEAN countries have become more assertive. In particular, on October 16, 2020, the President of the Philippines R. Duterte approved the request of the Energy Agency to lift the ban on oil and gas production in the South China Sea. In recent years, the Duterte administration has been negotiating with China on possible joint explorations involving Filipino and Chinese energy companies. However, no agreement was reached, largely due to territorial issues [63].

In addition, the aggravation of relations between China and the United States in the South China Sea in 2020 will have an impact on the situation in the region of Southeast Asia in 2021, which will most likely be determined at the regulatory level after the presidential election in the United States.

Therefore, the foundations of China's policy in Southeast Asia to counter COVID19 can already be seen as a background for more active involvement. According to Ngeow Chow-Bing, Director of the Institute for Chinese Studies (University of Malaya, Malaysia), sub-regionally, after COVID-19, China is likely to reorganize the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism (LMC) in such way: “...China will include health care in the cooperation agenda. In addition, another sub-regional group is Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines / East ASEAN-Growth Zone (BIMPEAGA), where China is a development partner will be modernizing too”. In turn, according to the scientist, China's investment in pharmaceutical and medical production facilities in Southeast Asia will take an important role as an instrument of Chinese policy in the region [64, p. 17-19].

Conclusions and parallels in the implementation of the hybrid influence of Russia and China global pandemic russia china

Thus, Russian practical implementation of the coronavirus pandemic for its narrow foreign policy purposes confirm the preservation of the imperial component in Russia's foreign policy strategy as decisive. It should be noted that the country-leader of the democratic world seeks to unite its allies on the basis of common values: observance of human and civil rights and freedoms, free market economy, compliance with the law of actions of both government and citizens, political pluralism, freedom of religion, etc. In contrast, the Russian Federation in its “unifying” efforts combine economic aid (and clearly not for the benefit of its own citizens) with a force scenario, which could be either a hybrid war or a threat of using force. As a result, Russia professes an appropriate model of behavior in the international arena as “placating” its actions by aggressive information propaganda. Moscow is striving by all means to camouflage its true goals and positioning itself as a “peacemaker” and a “benefactor” or guarantor of peace agreements. There is a strong interconnection of the foreign policy course with the domestic political narratives of the Putin regime.

It is worth pointing out that the use of COVID-19 in China's foreign policy in Southeast Asia seems to be quite effective given Beijing's ambitious plans to achieve world leadership, which can be regulated by the following characteristics. Firstly, consistent implementation of the concept of “community of common destiny” in the Southeast Asia region and theoretical justification for achieving political goals through the prism of the “Belt and Road Initiative” by China. In particular, the implementation of the “Silk Road of Health”. Secondly, involvement of the Southeast Asia region as an object of “mask diplomacy” in the format of bilateral cooperation - providing financial and logistical assistance to the countries of the region, which is implemented by both the Chinese government and non-governmental organizations. In addition, there is a privileged approach to the distribution of such assistance on bilateral base - countries of Lancang-Mekong sub-region and the countries of the growth zone. China-ASEAN cooperation at the institutional level allows Beijing to lobby its own national interests in the economic sphere and build dialogue with organization. Thirdly, the conflict in the South China Sea can be described as a “hard power” of China, but economic cooperation with ASEAN, the socio-humanitarian sphere of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the countries of Southeast Asia as a “soft power”.

As a result of the study, certain parallels can be drawn in the use of the global pandemic as a tool of foreign policy of Russia and China in the regional dimension (Russia-Europe and China-Southeast Asia).

Note that Russia and China use quite different tactics in the implementation of foreign policy strategy in regions that are close to their geopolitical location, but the purpose of such assistance is common. Both Russia and China can be characterized as states that have political regimes with special worldviews, tools and mechanisms for policy implementation. Both states have leaders who are quite charismatic and pursue a purposeful policy internally and externally as well. The existing political regimes in the states can be defined as hybrid.

Both Russia and China use pandemic influence to lobby their own national interests - to reduce tensions or “distract” from conflict situations. In particular, the issue of energy transportation (development of “Nord Stream-2”) is acute for Russia in the relations with Europe. This issue becomes urgent in the context of the sanctions regime against Russia by European states and the EU as a result of Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. China also has contradictions with the Southeast Asian countries in the format of the South China Sea dispute.

In the second half of 2020, both Russia and China begin to use “vaccine diplomacy”, which is a tool for spreading their influence and affirming a positive image. Such interaction can be investigated as the spread of its influence on a bilateral and multilateral basis. It is necessary to say, Europe and Southeast Asia have reached a high level of regionalization. In Europe - the functioning of the European Union, and in Southeast Asia - the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It should be noted that neither Russia nor China are member states of these integration groups. However, China has close cooperation with ASEAN in the ASEAN - 3 format. The Russian Federation cooperates to some extent with the EU, but the dynamics of such cooperation has slowed down due to Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014.

Prospects to make a deal and agreements on the sale of domestically produced vaccines in the respective regions can be seen as the use of “soft power” and the possibility of raising image by Russia and China.

Note that the use of hybrid influence (“hard power” and “soft power”) on neighboring regions by both Russia and China may be justified as a means of “deterring” US action in these regions, which are strategically important for Washington and in which the United States has allies, and, in turn, is an additional destabilizing factor in the regional system of international relations.



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