"The Peaceful Rise" of China: the problem of image and perception in 2000-2019

China represents one of the world largest financial donors to other developing states in Southeast Asia, particularly, rising Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, Philippines bilaterally and through the ASEAN+3, contributing to the development of the infrastructure, technological advancement, tourism and social mobility, and of course trade (Guttal in Guerrero, Manji and Manji , 2008). The scholars, including Brautigam, Xiaoyang, and Xia (2018), argue, that the character of the Chinese aid is different in its core from the Western counterparts, as the aid projects are not backed by the clientelist claims at political or economic reforms, and usually have considerably low interests on loans, which makes China more attractive as a patron. The Chinese government explains the strategy as helping the developing states out, especially with the case of transportation services provision and road construction in rural areas, which makes the relations mutually beneficial rather than favoring only one party of the deal. At the same time, due to the fact that China is frequently accused of lacking transparency in its aid strategies, thus the scholars infer that it is naпve to consider Chinese donorship to Africa to be impartial (Guerrero, Manji and Manji, 2008). The Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa dates back to 1956 and by the end of 2019 accounts for around 900 aid projects, therefore the so-called expansion to Africa had begun earlier than the rise has started to take place and had a Chinese interest at stake ever since. In other words, even though the aid is not aiming at reformation of the recipients and is conducted on favorable terms, China benefits from the process by neglecting the international environmental regulations, labor rights and working conditions provision, as the governments of the majority of African states remain politically fragmented and relatively weak, so are unable to exercise control over the activities of the foreign TNCs on their territories.

During his speech at the opening of the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Summit 2018, President Xi Jinping formulated the core five principles governing the mutually beneficial relations with African states, specifically, noninterference with the domestic politics, noninterference in the chosen national development strategy, no condition-backed aid, no imposition of political conditions, no egoistic self-interest. With this President Xi concluded, that OBORI will thus promote peaceful win-win interrelation and interconnectedness between the continents, as direct embodiment and goal of the contemporary globalized world. Furthermore, Xi has underlined the plan for the eight joint frameworks during the 2019-2021 in the areas of logistics, technologies, green economics (Abegunrin and Manyeruke, 2020). The projects include exhibitions to promote investments to Africa, food, humanitarian aid and health care programs, organization of workshops for youth training, cultural penetration and popularization of African studies, but what is more, the establishment of China-Africa Peace and Security Fund dedicated to the military assistance to the African Union.

Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) proposed by China, initiated as a Ministerial Conference in 2000 and established officially as dialogue platform in 2006. The 2003 Ethiopia Ministerial Conference resulted in Addis Ababa Action Plan 2004-2006. The FOCAC of 2006 proposed the thee-year plan, considering the increase in African exports to China, doubling the aid, institutionalization of the China-Africa Development Fund focused on the investments to Africa. As a result, by 2007 the trade scales with China experienced five-times increase since the beginning of 2000s making China the top trading partner, preceding the EU (Abegunrin and Manyeruke, 2020). The second forum in Sharm el-Sheikh 2009 emphasized China's willingness to cooperate and concessions to write off the debts of some of the developing states, while lowering the interests on the future loans and tariffs on the 95% of the African export. The meeting also stated that China and Africa will work on the food security through the agricultural and technological advancement to ensure the provision of the food supplies. The FOCAC of 2012 further elaborated on the prioritizing agricultural sector, but at the same time has also given the China-Africa cooperation further development in the spheres of energy resources and security, by establishing the China-Africa energy forum to proceed with the efficient resource use and allocation as well as compliance with the international regulations. The meeting in Johannesburg in 2015 was held under the title of the win-win collaboration, emphasizing the common shared goals and challenges of the South-South states, and promoted the technological and educational exchange, industrialization, tackling the issue of unemployment. The scholars notice, that as far as China-Africa tandem represents one-third of the global population, united under the framework of beneficial cooperation it gets the considerable bargaining power on behalf of the developing states, pushing for more favorable conditions of development (Abegunrin and Manyeruke, 2020). Thus, the forum underpinned the principles of solidarity and political sovereignty and noninterference, as well as common security objectives and civil assistance.

Africa represents an extremely resource rich region, providing minerals, such as copper, petroleum, coal, gold, besides oil and gas, as Abegunrin and Manyeruke (2020) highlight, export of coal and petroleum constitute up to 90% of the exports for states, such as Algeria, Libya, Nigeria. As the scholars underline, the resource hunt is vital for the sustainability of the Chinese economic growth and even though the production is under the stage of development and convergence to renewable and green energy sources, it remains dependent on the fossil fuel and around 60% of the crude oil is imported, making China world's second largest oil consumer. Even though, the African region represents around one-tenth of the global oil reserves, China's interest in African oil has been increasing throughout the last decades, as the majority of the Chinese oil import originates from the Middle East, the dependence on the Middle Eastern Saudi Arabia is sought to be decreased, instead shifting to Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea. In addition, from the number of mentioned states, only Angola and Nigeria are OPEC members, which makes their oil extraction subject to the institutional rule, while other states are freer in their energy relations with China. At the same, for Africa oil trade is a necessary means of accomplishing the barter deals with China for developing the infrastructure by that rising the authoritative power of the African leaders, making the regimes more stable and legitimate; besides China and African states have long history of cooperation on elimination of the oppression by the white minorities and Chinese assistance to the liberation movements in Zimbabwe, South Africa, Mozambique during 1960s-1970s.

As ZiroMwatela and Changfeng (2016) argue, the OBORI is aimed at further strengthening the ties with African states, especially with the Northern part of the continent, as the maritime silk road is projected to connect Eurasia to Africa through the Suez Channel, adding Egypt, Kenya to the list of more than 70 states, benefiting from the connection and increased trade and capital scales, as well as employment growth. The area has been majorly dominated by the Western states, therefore the scholars claim that through the OBORI China is going to enhance its influence on the African region by facilitating the regional development not only through resource extraction and investments, as the US and European states had been doing for century, but rather transform it into the mutually beneficial interrelation, based on shared interests in the process.

Chapter 3. Structural realism as constraint on perception

In the following chapter we are going to demonstrate that based on the above examined literature materials and data considering the rise of China, it can be indeed inferred that our core premise is valid and political actions of China during 2000-2019 do not violate the framework of the peaceful rise: during the respective period China did not participate in nor initiated open military conflicts, which according to the Chinese rhetoric correlates with the notion of peace and soft power means. On the other hand, due to the prevailing neorealist logic of the key players on the international arena and a different interpretation of the soft power as an instrument, the perception of the rise politics varies from that of China itself. Thus, regardless of the Chinese propaganda of its peaceful Confucian image, China-threat logic remains intact and leads to counteractions in the form of soft power balancing. Therefore, realism is applicable for the explanation of the origins of hostility with regard to the rising power of the Chinese state and prediction of a probable military conflict, however, as Pan and Lo (2017) underline, structural realism fails to explain Chinese strategy aimed at military diplomacy and its emphasis on the peacefulness and nonaggression, rather than pursuit of a revisionist policy and open challenge of the Western international order (Tammen and Kugler, 2006).

3.1 China's national vision

The reason, why the rise of China keeps provoking anxiety and ambiguity with regard to its future development in the view of the other states, is because the gradual rise to power causes the transition of power capabilities to one pole changing the existing status quo and destroying the established balance of power, pushing other actors towards attempting at its restoration (Nye, 2005). China in turn attempts to publicly endorse the idea of the peaceful rise and mutually beneficial relations contrast to abusive methods of establishing global hegemony - instead, the officials have been stating that Chinese state has never sought to seek world dominance, therefore the anxiety regarding its rise are groundless, as the main instrument of the rise politics and enhancement of the state's position in the system is the soft power. However, the difference in the definitions and perceptions of the soft power itself is critical to the debate, as it lies at the core of the polarization among the party with China itself, which considers the course adopted in 2000s pursued throughout the two decades without considerable violations and digressions, while the other party endorses the position, claiming that the methods used in the actual political actions of China are more on the hard power side, thus provoke security dilemma on behalf of the other actors, including the US, Japan.

Classically, the concept of the soft power and its difference with the hard power has been attributed to Nye (1990), who stated that the soft power is an essence state's ability to influence the other by the means of popular appeal via culture, history, norms. The scholar argued, that the soft power instrument is peaceful in its core, as it is based on the considerations made by the populations of the respective recipient states who are affected, which in turn leads to certain political actions under the mass influence, rather than direct coercion, military or economic, means, sanctions, bribery, which are characteristics of the hard power exercise (Nye, 2008). In case of China, the soft power is defined more broadly, including the economic instruments, aid and investments, as well as diplomacy, therefore, even the trade war of 2018-2019 between China and the US is considered by the Chinese government as compliance with the peaceful rise course, even though the actions of both parties are seemed as relatively offensive by other actors.

Nevertheless, among the Chinese scholars and government officials the predominant position states that the soft power tools, namely the culture, Confucianism, education, as mechanism of restoration of the ancient China power status and authority should be based on the hard power potential that is its economic growth and military capabilities. As described in the Chapter 2 of the paper, the current political tendencies and the idea of the rise course are drawn from the long historical experience of regional leadership and respectful status of ancient and medieval China, lost after the foreign intervention and the colonization, but always intact within the mentality of the Chinese people, seeking international recognition for their state. Similarly, Ding (2010) highlights thus that the parallels between contemporary strategy and the ancient politics are present, and judging from the historical empirical evidence, it can be inferred that, even though the hard power was always considered by the ruling emperors as the means of last resort, they were used in particular cases for the establishment of the tributary arrangements, hence the modern tendencies to use the instruments that can be perceived as more aggressive, including sanctions, price dumping, are characteristic of the Chinese politics ever since the ancient times and are neither surprising to the Chinese government nor considered nonapplicable (Lo and Pan, 2016). It can be inferred then, that regardless of the predominant neorealist approach to perceiving the rise of China, it can be better analyzed through the constructivist paradigm, as it has majorly ideological and normative basis.

Constructivist scholars claim that the power originates from ideas, morals and their perceptions, therefore an ability to influence the other state means the ability to inflect a meaning on an object or a process, therefore largely dependent on the historical circumstances, context and interactions between the people. Thus, according to Barnett and Duval (2005) the definition and application of power goes beyond the conventional military forces and includes the ability to manipulate ideas. With this regard, constructivist approach is more effective in emphasizing the underpinning factors preceding the Beijing consensus and rapid development, as the economic growth and poverty reduction were necessary for the economic system suffering from the inability of the pure planned economy to suffice for a state with respective population density, but more importantly it was the strive to revive the country ending the era of humiliation and regain its former power and authority as a valuable international actor. The idea of a revival was present ever since the national war and communism coming to power, but the means of pursuing the course proved to be not effective, whereas liberalization in the 1980s and consequent reintroduction of the Confucian values and ancient Chinese methods of arranging foreign affairs to the governmental discourse under Deng Xiaoping and more actively since 2000s have resulted in Chinese development path becoming a model pattern for the developing states of Africa and Latin America, representing an alternative to Western type of industrialization (Restall, 2007).

Therefore, increasing number of researchers have started to associate the recent trends in Chinese foreign policy to the revival of the ancient tributary system and its transformation into the neo-tributary one to depict the dynamics of China's interrelations with other regional actors, emphasizing close cooperation and peaceful resolution of the disputed issues, as well as the tendencies to act as a great power and shift politics outside the regional borders. According to Jacques (2012), the principles of tributary system organization are being actively brought back into the discourse and actual political strategy and initiatives, which in the framework of Chinese great power status and possible global hegemony are going to affect the whole international system and establish a new world order, thus the transformation of the ancient pattern into the contemporary one is of particular importance. Therefore, the scholars outline four main implications of the tributary system in the modern political course, namely exceptionalism, cultural inclusivism, economic power, especially trade, and political image entailing legitimacy (Jacques, 2012, Pan & Lo, 2017).

First, Chinese exceptionalism, has been one of the core principles of the ancient tributary system based on the national perception of the Chinese people as the supreme nation surrounded by the barbarians. The scholars notice that even though in the contemporary political discourse the Chinese exceptionalism in its pure form is absent due to multiple nationalist movements and sentiments originating in the mainland China, the concept nevertheless is influencing the political strategy in its pursuit of the great power politics and emphasis put on the responsibility of China as a great power. According to Pan and Lo (2017) this has become evident especially during Hu administration starting from the early 2000s and he's focused on the development of the “harmonious society” with the other states and development based on technology and science. Due to the fact that other former communist regimes have been collapsing it has become vital for China to reposition itself and prove its regime as a legitimate and sustainable one, therefore it entailed international recognition for which power demonstration and reaching the level of the developed states has been the necessary condition. At the same time Chinese government has been always abstaining from convergence to militarism and hard power usage, hence in order to suffice for the explaining peaceful, non-aggressive rise the concepts of soft power were reviewed with regard to the Chinese realities, the cultural basis and historical past, which resulted in a different, China-specific concept of soft power through the means of culture, education, diplomacy and economic progress to simultaneously regain it ever intact great power status and underline the non-aggressive prerequisites of its course, referred to as “China Dream” by Xi Jinping. Zhang (2009) underlines that originating from the tributary system based on the prestige and image, today the official rhetoric emphasizes that China seeks respect similar to that paid to the Middle Kingdom when it was considering itself the center of the civilized world.

Second, even regardless of the ancient focus on the native Chinese as the epitome of culture and civilization, the tributary system encountered inclusivist abilities and promoted education through embracing Chinese culture, language and Confucian values. Through the process of education cultural assimilation was conducted, therefore one of the necessary conditions of becoming a vassal state and paying a tribute to the Middle Kingdom lied in cultural assimilation with the Chinese Hua nation. These can be seen as a direct embodiment of the Chinese soft power used in the contemporary relations with the other states, especially in the examples of propaganda of studying Chinese language, establishment of the Confucius Institutes across the world and organization of the Hanban Department concerned with the promotion and encouragement of the joined educational programs with foreign institutions, exchange students mobility, cultural exchange exhibitions dedicated to the Chinese history, underlining its glory and inherited value. The scholars argue that the system created through the Confucius Institutes results in tight cultural ties between China and other actors based on the studying and embracement of the Confucian values, specifically peacefulness, orientation towards mutually shared benefits, common prosperity (Hartig, 2012).

Thirdly, the economic power has been used to acquire the weight for the Chinese actions and power exercise, in other words, to gain recognition for the Chinese authority. At the same time, exceptional economic performance has been used as an instrument of building cooperative and productive dialogue with both regional powers and global actors - China represents the main consumer market for the neighboring small economies, as well as their major exporter. The free trade zone between ASEAN states and China (ACFTA) is considered the largest FTA, benefiting both China as the member states provide the markets for the Chinese supply. Also, as Roberts (2004) comments, the gravity model is valid in explaining the growing trade flows between China and ASEAN based on the geographic proximity, accessible and efficient logistics and cost minimization. Through the cooperation the state both strengthens its integration with the region and by the means of the ties enhances the recognition as the regional leader, corresponding to the tribute - smaller economies of Cambodia, Laos, Philippines recognize Chinese supremacy, and consequently, gain economic and developmental benefits, making the relations advantageous for both parties. This clearly resembles the ancient tributary system, establishing a hierarchy of powers, but beneficial for the vassals paying tribute and respect, thus, eliminating anxiety and possibility of threat. Contemporary, the mutual institutional binding through arrangements, such as ACFTA, assures cooperation, shared interests and goals, as well as prevents aggressive tendencies in the face of legal penalties (Keohane, 1998).

Besides, the initiatives, including OBOR, are the embodiments of China's great power strategy, aimed at not only connecting continents in a tight economic relationship, but can also considered as an attempt at changing the status quo, as even though the reconstruction and arrangement of the Silk Road practice's costs lie majorly with Chinese responsibilities, the trade route through the territories of the sovereign states as well as the maritime road through the marine sectors divided among states, represent the attempt of China to project its power authority over the others as the will of the regional hegemon and global great power. At least in the Asian region, the accomplishment of the OBORI and actors' consent to it will strengthen and institutionalize Chinese zone of influence officially (Krukowska, 2016).

The last component of the neo-tributary system is considered to be image construction portraying China as the responsible great power based on the Confucian ideology, in particular, benevolence, humanness of the leader. Similarly to what Keohane (2005) proposes as the power of the hegemon to act as the provider of informal institutions that are morals, values, norms, Confucianism used as a core approach to ancient Chinese foreign policy and actively endorsed contemporary states that the legitimacy of the power lies with the recognition and voluntary submission to the heavenly chosen leader whose responsibility is to be concerned with the welfare of the vassals. The principle of legitimization of the higher authorities' power is especially applicable to modern China with regards to the ongoing debate between China and Taiwan, therefore postulation of mainland China as the only recognized official state of the Chinese nation has been of vital importance for decades, which, consequently, has laid the basis for the foreign policy conduct in the direction of securing and enhancing China's image and status. Core factor to pursuing this approach has been the emphasis on the responsibility of China to help other developing states in their progressive advancement and especially organize the conditions of mutually beneficial interregional integration of the Asian states.

All in all it can be seen that due to the common historical past, shared colonial experience, as well as being under the rule of the Chinese dynasties and embracing Confucian values, the regional actors both small and medium states, such as the ASEAN members, as well as rising to the status of a great power India, recognize China's power authority and share the understanding of the peaceful rise politics, hence perceive the phenomenon as a natural pattern of behavior of the state who's official government and people strive to regain the international status, prestige and influence which have been always intact with the Chinese empire but were once lost. Therefore, even though a case like India, who is predicted to clash with China over multiple issues as they share the same goals of developing states, the Indian discourse maintains the position that relations with China should be directed towards increasing cooperation in multiple spheres and that China-threat argument should be eliminated from the rhetoric, as the two states see each other as valuable partners and allies and escalation of conflicts is disadvantageous both for the parties and for the region as whole: being a responsible great power China puts maximum effort into the peaceful resolution of the interregional conflicts.

3.2 Side view on behalf of Others

As Pan and Lo (2017) notice, according to the neorealist logic the rise of China is likely to perceived as a threat to the international security due to several factors. Firstly, it challenges the status quo that has been West dominated throughout centuries and postulates the supremacy of the West over the others. Secondly, the multipolar structure of the current international system enables the rising powers to occupy a zone of influence, however, simultaneously it means that shares of power projections for the existing players and their authoritative status are bound to shrink. Thirdly, Mearsheimer (2001) claims, that the US global hegemony directly depends on the existence of the rising powers, as during the last decades the absolute advantage in terms of military capabilities and economic potential are gradually diminishing, thus making its leadership the matter of comparative advantage in the absence of comparable or outweighing actors.

According to Holsti (1962) the national strategy of a state and its foreign affairs are often conducted on their respective system of beliefs including the national level and the personal belief system of the political leader. Based on the principles of bounded rationality and psychological factor of each individual the distortions in the perceptions are introduced on all levels, therefore the image of the state that it is aimed by the government is usually different from the way all the other actors perceive and interpret it. Hence, the scholar argues that from the constructivist point of view, the escalation of conflicts between the states is rather the misinterpretation of the image and intentions of each other resulting from subjective national moral basis. It can be seen that, though not from the position of the ideological component, structural realism predicts the same scheme. Taking into the account the difference between Western perception of core political principles and concepts end Chinese Asian diplomacy and Confucianism the difference in the political attitudes of regional members and other key actors outside the region is logical. Due to the fact that perceptions differ, no matter how much the principles of peacefulness are going to be endorsed in the rise politics, other great power will still perceive China as an offender and a revisionist state. Therefore, Herrmann (2003) concludes, that in a realist paradigm, image and credibility are necessary for the strategic deterrence. Through accumulation of soft power capabilities, China rises its deterring abilities to contain the balancing on behalf of the US and Japan.

3.2.1 US and Japan: hostility driven relations

China-US relations have always been strained due to the differences in regimes, China's assertive behavior and frequent seemingly violating international norms, as well as Cold War past, therefore there have been multiple obstacles to the development of the dialogue between the two. In the beginning of the 2000s there had been a positive turn in the relations after the events of 9/11, which have changed the US national security priorities and no longer considered China as the main US threat, rather counterterrorism had become the area of cooperation for both, China supported the continuation of US campaign against Iraq. What it more, the states have joined their efforts to solve the problem of North Korea acquiring the nuclear weapons, threatening both regional security and the global one. According to Morrison (2019), during Obama presidential administration the notion of G-2 was coined for the definition of proposed economic cooperation between the two world largest economies in the fields of green energy and environmental issues along the aftermath solutions to the economic crisis of 2007-2008. However, despite the shared goals of containing North Korean nuclear program the issue of cyber security remained unresolved as well as the anxiety on behalf of China lied in the US-Taiwan arms cooperation, as the provision of arms is an indicator of a close alliance. Yet, the US supported the “One China” policy agreeing to the PRC positioning itself as the only legitimate sovereign China, thus retreating its disagreement with the seemed oppression of Xinjiang and Tibet regions leaving the issue with the domestic affairs of the state.

On the other hand, the situation has changed drastically with President Trump in power, beginning with the claims that economic and political wellbeing and stability of America are the national priority to which China imposes a significant obstacle, as well as to exercise of the US power on the position of the world hegemon, bringing up the China-threat argument to national security statements once again. In particular, the most subjectivity and anxiety from the US point of view lies in an assertive policy initiatives of China, which undermine US influence and decisive power on the continental Eurasia and globally, while at the same time Chinese economy surpassed the American, constituting the unfavorable conditions for the development of the domestic economy and creation of a trade deficit. The change in the political attitude towards China and its more hostile perception provoked by the rotation of the political elite has become embodied in the economic rivalry, which in fact went beyond the economic sphere, aiming at destabilizing Chinese power capabilities, undermining its authority by the appeal to cybersecurity and counteracting One Belt One Road Initiative (Morrison, 2019). American refrain from previously accepted “One China” policy seen as retaliation from paying the tribute and recognize the power.

One of the most vivid illustration of the contemporary dynamic between US and China has been the trade war, which as Liu and Woo (2018) argue lies with three main aspects. The first one considers China's violation of intellectual property rights and cyber security as well as incompliance with some of the WTO regulatory measures, as well as claimed artificial RMB value, manipulated by the government. Secondly, as authors claim, one of the directions of Trump's administration has been the revival of the US economy by withdrawal from several bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements, and convergence towards mercantilism, which resulted in tariff sanctions with regard to China. But most importantly, the continuously increasing power of China represents a structural threat to the security of the US, therefore it comes natural to the US to balance China firstly economically, then through the coercive political instruments, including political sanctions against individuals, as well as threat to resort to conventional military and weapons of mass destruction. The war began with the introduction of 8-25% tariff on the imported Chinese goods in the sphere of technologies and industrial supporting equipment as countermeasure to domestic trade deficit, beside IP rights violations, created by China, claiming that exporters have cannibalized the local market leaving limited opportunities for the domestic producers. By the mid-June 2018 additional 10% tariff was introduced on the $200 billion worth goods, provoking a statement from the Chinese government, officially stating that Trump administration has escalated a trade war, replying with the similar tariff measures (Liu, 2020). The consequent US-Chinese actions mirrored each other, including US ban on Huawei products supply to China claiming the devices were used to conduct governmental espionage, while China decreased its share of the US Treasury bonds. By October 2019 the vis-a-vis measures were temporarily frozen due to the US statement concerning the consensus reached on the trade deal with Chinese partners, thus until the end of the year, the situation stagnated (Liu, 2020).

The issue had multiple considerably negative consequences for the Chinese economy, causing decrease in cash flows as well as the depreciation of the national currency. Due to the domestic economic turbulence, the unemployment rates had been reported to increase resulting from job places reduction. As reported by the news agencies at the end of 2019, American economy, especially the industrial production, have suffered considerably, plummeting, which has been attributed to the side effects of the interaction with China. Overall, it can be seen that this empirical evidence supports the thesis in two terms: first, it proves that the declining great power, the US, resorts to balancing the security threat represented by growing Chinese potential, while, secondly, Chinese behavior has been indeed resembling the great power strategy, engaging in the counteractions, as during the period of our interest it has obtained enough capabilities to take part in a costly confrontation with other actors with the involvement of hard economic power, compared to the period of the peaking rise of 1980s, characterized by passiveness towards international relations.

Relations with Japan are driven by similar logic: according to Dreyer (2019), the rivalry over resources and influence maintains despite attempts made by Japanese entrepreneurs to participate in the OBORI. The scholar noticed that China and Japan are trapped in a security dilemma as military exercises and defense enhancement, including by the means of SCO, are seen as threat directed at each other. However, another evident trend is that as the economic growth of China has slowed, Japan has become more benevolent to cooperation, which indicates that China indeed is perceived as a rival, which has to be contained and balanced. The two states share same goal of disarming North Korea, however, whereas Chinese aims are fostered by the necessity to secure the region, Japanese discourse is built upon the US influence and is affected by the US presence on its territory. The hostility owes to substantial extent to the historical past, including Sino-Japanese wars and disputed islands, however the significance of these tensions has diminished throughout the years, whereas growing instability is connected to Japanese anxiety with regard to Chinese military exercises and joint projects in the close proximity to Japanese territory, in the South China Sea, which rises security alerts. Even though the military capabilities display is not an act of deterrence against Japan, the state expresses active opposition, and, as the scholar claims, does so under the pressure of the US. In other words, the first aspect of Japanese version of the China-threat sentiments lie in the fact that Japan has been the regional economic leader for multiple decades, while Chinese economy has surpassed it resulting from Beijing consensus and has become the leader not only in economic terms, but also politically. Secondly, the rhetoric is substantially affected by the US line of argument: being one of the American allies, Japan fosters the idea of necessary balancing and weakening of the emerging great power, threatening the US and allied zone of influence (Chiang, 2019).

The cooperation and dialogue are hoped to be approached from the performance based on the Code of Conduct with regard to the South China Sea. Japan has been reporting multiple cases of Chinese intervention into its waters and space, illegally crossing borders, pointing to China drilling gas in the disputed territories. In response, Japan has conducted joint Japan-US airspace exercises above the South China Sea, as well as displaying its submarines and other arms capable of carrying nuclear weapons. In addition, Japanese officials have been publicly stating that Japan is working on the development of supersonic bombs, which would be the most powerful existing weapon of mass destruction, pointing to its right on the influence in the shared South China Sea. The last white paper on the defense measure was provided in 2015, ending the level of transparency in the Chinese military objectives in the disputed area, therefore Japan often appeals to the noncompliance with code (Sohn & Pempel, 2019).

As Pu in Sonh and Pempel (2019) advocate, under the framework of the “China dream”, contemporary China has been indicating its great power ambitions at altering the global order, and hegemonic power in the region manifested through the establishment of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank beside other initiatives. Yan (2014) adds that due to the historical presence of Chinese hegemony over the region, it comes natural for China to attempt at clearing the Asian region from the presence of Western powers, which directly clashed with US and, consequently, Japanese interests of presence in Asian Pacific. The scholar highlights that inferring from the balance of power theory, neither of the regional actors, including Japan has expressed open balancing, rather Japan has amended its military doctrine engaging in collective defense arrangements with the US, as the historical logic and Eastphalian peace remain intact.

3.2.2 Russia, EU - pragmatic cooperation

The scholars, including Yilmaz and Daksueva (2019), argue that cooperation in the energy sector has been used as an instrument of mitigating possible clashes and disputes on the basis of common energy interests, geopolitical proximity and shared goal of securitization of the region. The scholars that the relations have experienced the progressive turn after the two states have signed the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation (2001) making Russia the major crude oil supplier by the year 2015, pushing toward partnership not only on the energy resources, but also assistance in the development of the Siberian region, wood supply, working on the infrastructure. The cooperation has been embodied in multiple joint plans and projects, including the 25-year period deal on oil export, Chinese shareholders acquiring shares of Russian oil producing companies, as well as joined programs of developing oil basins and gas pipeline construction (Yilmaz and Daksueva, 2019). The scholars put an emphasis on the fact that the energy sector is of strategic importance, therefore it has been nationalized and dominated by the state-governed firms' monopoly, which implies its relative closeness to foreign shareholders, thus the fact that Chines entrepreneurs and businessmen were permitted to invest and buy shares indicates an improving level of trust in Russia-China relations, even though other challenges remain intact. The interaction in the energy sector is beneficial to Russia especially due to the distorted supply chain to Europe resulting from the crisis in Ukraine, while oil revenues make up for the capital losses, for China, on the other hand, convergence to Russia as main oil exporter reduces its dependence on the Middle East and diversifies oil resources with the means of trade with Russia and Africa.

However, the energy cooperation does not completely eliminate Russia's anxiety with the growing power and influence of China, particularly with regard to Central Asia, which has been considered Russian sphere of influence inherited from the Soviet Union. At the same time, as scholars notice, Western sanctions imposed on Russia represent a considerable obstacle to the state economy, however Russia pursuing a great power strategy is conscious of over relying on the Chinese partners, therefore the cooperation is significantly limited, which is evident from the constraints on China's participation in the construction of Power of Siberia gas pipeline. Korolev (2019) argues that the formation of an alliance between Russia and China is determined by rationality and pragmatism, as both great powers share negative sentiments towards the United States and geographic proximity, which makes their relations especially explosive and dangerous both for the continent and the world, thus cooperation regardless tensions is a more favorable strategy. Hence, the states engage in joined military land and marine exercises, Vostok - 2018, engage in joined governance of the marine territories, contributed on reaching the consensus over the division of the disputed islands on the borderline between China and Russia divided by the Amur river (Bolt & Cross, 2018). Along the same lines, Rolland (2019) emphasizes that due to the similar visions of the security in Eurasia and common goals, both states understand the necessity of cooperation - Russian power influence has been declining with the appearance of the rising states, however the region comprising its large zone of influence, China understands that without positive recognition from Russia the regional stability would be destroyed, which will be disadvantageous for the rise political course.

Bolt and Cross (2018) examine the historical prerequisites for the previously strained relations between China and Russia, as until the 19th century Russian Far East was constituting substantial part of Chinese empire, however based on the agreements, considered by China as unfair, Russia has gained the coastal territories making weakened China accept the conditions. Even though by the beginning of 2000s the borderline issues were relatively solved, Russia has been reporting incidents of Chinese farmers intruding into inhabited territories in Khabarovsk region. This not only violates the territorial integrity but instills the possibility of China attempting to get those territories back now that it has gained power. Therefore, Russia remains reserved, as it does not want to become a minor as a partner compared to the capabilities of China. Due to vast territories Russia occupies, the Asian region as a whole is one of the strategic objectives, therefore it strives to engage in its development, however, the factor of other, rising powers and economic distortions, the cooperation with China on these issues is more beneficial as a tool to strengthen ties with China, eliminate tensions, and exercise control over the region, by the means of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Lukin & Yakunin, 2018).

Politically, contrast to the cases of Russia, India, Japan, Europe has been distant from the geopolitical tensions present in all of the other cases therefore the main area of possible cooperation or clash has been global economy and international law violations. According to Deng (2007), the China-EU relations have been gradually progressing in the spheres of economy, education and social migration, however considerable obstacles have been present. Regardless of the signed “All-around Strategic Partnership” in 2003, the issue of embargo on China remained intact as a consequent sanction for the use of arms in the Tiananmen incident. The scholar claims that due to exceptional role played by President Jacques Chirac the EU members have agreed upon the retaliation of the embargo as requested by Hu administration, however the initiative was stopped by mid-2005 under the direct opposition from Japan and US. At the same time, resulting from the military means applied with regard to Taiwanese struggle for independence one of the major challenges in the EU-China relations has become the emphasis on the continuous human rights and international law norms' violation. On the other hand, EU and China constitute major trading partners for each other the volume of trade reaching 19% by the end of 2019, according to Eurostat data. The cooperation is also developed in the sphere of technological exchange, advancements transfer and FDI to China, joint efforts on the Galileo global navigation system has been called one of the most effective EU-China high-tech projects.

Deng (2007) claims that the embargo case has been constituting a good example that reflects a pragmatic nature of EU-China relations as well as indicates the difference in the approaches of the great powers to the raising China, based on historical prerequisites and other factors including, close and beneficial economic ties. The scholar argues that, even though Germany and France representing the great power states under the overall framework of the European Union and being part of a supranational institution, regardless of their own preferences towards more cooperation and more freedom given to China in the selection of political options, were not able to advocate for their decisions, subject to the collective decision of EU as their formal representative body whose political power seems to be considerably limited compared to that of the US and Japan.

As Pan (2012) elaborates, there are conceptual differences between China and EU leading to different interpretations of the same principles of sovereignty, human rights, forming the perception of rise's politics. For China, sovereignty meaning noninterference with domestic affairs and independent agency in the international relations has been one of the guiding principles for the conduct of foreign policy, whereas in the Western part of the world, due to constant manipulation and violation of sovereignty by great powers, the definition and its applicability to the modern international relations have been blurred. In addition, the dominant European powers, Germany, France, being part of the EU arrangement have delegated certain part of their sovereign power to the institution, making them subordinate to common political, economic course, which is hard to comprehend for the Chinese logic. Whereas European states value the international law, intellectual property rights, human rights, China values self-decisiveness of the state, therefore interference with its actions are considered intolerable. Nevertheless, the clash of the perceptions and different values distribution has been outweighed by the beneficial economic interconnectedness, therefore, the clashes have been kept formal but not too rigid. For the EU, as an institution and a global actor, the China-threat lies more in its incompliance with the world order, meaning its legal system, rather than threat to the sphere of influence, as it comes for the US, Japan, Russia, as China has not been voicing out tendencies to incorporate Europe into its zone of influence.

Overall, as researches, including that by Stahl (2017) indicate, while bilateral relations with China show the readiness of the actors to accommodate to a new great power in the world, the format of tripartite relations with China and Africa reflect the inconsistency in the political course in EU and its traditional method of organizing foreign policy as well as inability to reach consensus among all members and act on behalf of their will, rather than be subordinate to the US. There is also lack of communication among the three institutional bodies of the EU, while each of the three favors different approach to China, their joint opportunities at cooperation are considerably limited.

Findings and future implications

Having conducted our analysis we have arrived at objective evidence supporting our hypothesis which states that since 2000s even though the political course of China towards foreign affairs has shifted from certain degree of passiveness which was attributed to 80s and 90s, the actions still correspond to the overall framework of the peaceful rise which includes the absence of escalated open hard power conflicts. The key difference lies in the fact that, for China the rise politics has been not only a way to reach the level of a fully developed state but to regain its authoritative power that it had exercised ever since the ancient times but was deprived from resulting from the foreign intervention and further civil war and reorganization of the regime. In the paper we have shown that, from the point of view of the Chinese government, the aid projects assistance in the development of other economies, cooperation and even recent trade war lie under the overall concept of soft power. It can be seen that the rise politics has been affected not only by the international conditions but also to the substantial degree by the domestic necessity of transformation originating from the historical and ideological prerequisites. Therefore, the Chinese version of its future and direction of political behavior represent a complex combination of both realist perspective in substantial constructivist element, in other words the “moral realism” (Yan, 2014).

Contrary, the majority of global players endorse a more neorealist perspective, According to which China represents a direct threat to the position in the balance of power and by the means of a more active and assertive political actions illustrative of the period of 2000-2019 China acts as a revisionist power attempting to change the status quo, provoking balancing on behalf of the other great powers. The fact that, based on historically outlined political concepts the contemporary perception of such principles as sovereignty and soft power considerably differ for China from those of the Western powers, also contributes to the different perceptions of the rise. This, in turn, creates the basis for introduction of various misunderstandings and misinterpretations, which China tries to deal with through the means of globally promoting the idea of peacefulness which originates from the ancient tributary system built on Confucian humanness and nonviolence.