US – China trade war in Russian political discourse: strategic opportunities VS. Economic challenges
Evolution of the US-China: structural and economic factors. Trade wars under Trump administration. Russian factor in the US-China confrontation. The origins and effects of the US-China trade war. Russian approach towards the conflict in 2018-2019.
| Рубрика | Международные отношения и мировая экономика |
| Вид | дипломная работа |
| Язык | английский |
| Дата добавления | 14.07.2020 |
| Размер файла | 195,0 K |
Отправить свою хорошую работу в базу знаний просто. Используйте форму, расположенную ниже
Студенты, аспиранты, молодые ученые, использующие базу знаний в своей учебе и работе, будут вам очень благодарны.
The position of Russia regarding China seems to be grounded on the deep cooperation with a very strong emphasis on the importance of following the norms of international law as well as procedures. While not necessarily taking sides, Russia expresses the will to work together with China when the international legal procedures are violated being it tariffs or other measures. Such cautions and balanced position with an emphasis on international norms, leaves Russia room for maneuvering as well as maintaining separate geopolitical independent identity.
On the one hand to work jointly with China similar issues, on the other, maintaining the safe distance from the US-China confrontation without being explicitly an ally or determined by.
Russia seeks to advance its interests. In particular, combine the concept of protectionism and sanctions. Moreover, Russia does not pursue the policy of irreversible support of China: the cooperation is balanced, so that this does not cause serious damage to relations with the West, and most importantly, the prospects for restoration.
Conclusion
The research evaluates Russia's approach towards Sino-US trade war through the lens of balancing strategy of the third-party state in the great power conflict. The global political context was described, as the US-China confrontation is the structural conflict, thus could not be analyzed solely from the economic perspective. The trade war is the outcome product of the strategic confrontation that took a form of trade frictions and could evolve into the other types of conflict. The evolution of Russian attitude towards structural, and presumably long-lasting confrontation, has been described through three tracks: economic, political (diplomatic) and strategic (security). The research focused on Russia's balancing of the three tracks, particularly how close each of them is adjusted to one side of the conflict or the other and why this happens.
The economic strategy expressed by the Ministry of Economic Development towards US-China trade war is neutrality. Russia does not possess the economic resources in order to influence the trade confrontation between the two largest economies yet is at risk of being drawn into. The attitude formulated by President Putin was that Russia does not seek to substitute one trade relations with the other, but naturally they have shifted from the West more towards Asia. Although the trade turnover with China has increased over the last several years, providing for opportunity for Russia to substitute the niche previously occupied by US (like agriculture), the prospects remain unstable, due to the US-China ongoing negotiation over Phase 2 of the deal. Already, to reach Phase 1, China agreed on terms that are likely to complicate Russia's access to the Chinese markets, particularly agricultural. In order to balance Chinese influence and hedge itself from becoming too dependent on Chinese economy, Russia seeks to involve China in the regional projects, like pairing the EAEU and BRI, opening of the Power of Siberia. Although China is now the largest trade partner of Russia, the issue of lack of FDI still remains. Given the uncertain investment climate in Russia since the introduction of sanctions, Chinese business does not risk. Due to the existing risks, Russia is cautious with building the economic ties with China, in order to be able to preserve its independent stand, and not to get too much involved into the trade war between the economic giants.
The political track is skewed closer to China than the economic one. Although the official rhetoric states that Russia and China are strategic partners, the relations between the two are ever closer. From the one point that is due to the historical and cultural proximity. The Western expert community often suggests that China and Russia are cooperating only against the US, thus such tandem is unstable and would fall apart as soon as one normalizes the relations with the enemy, however the countries have signed the Treaty on good neighborliness, friendship and cooperation already in 2001 before any of the two got pushed away from the West. Admittedly, the countries have become closer following the 2014 Ukraine Crisis and 2018 Trump's trade war initiation. Russia is now stressing and promoting the idea that both sanctions against Russia and tariffs against China have the same nature, thus the international community should pay attention to the violations of the international law by some states. Although, as numerously voiced by different Russian politicians, that the countries are not creating alliances against others and are cooperation on the basis of mutually beneficial grounds, the relations are above the simple benefit, particularly between the leaders. Despite such partnership, Russia does not express unconditional support to China when it comes to international issues (being it trade war or South China Sea). Russia, like China itself, strictly appeals to the international law, pointing to the violations and only explicitly voices opinions when the law has been violated. Such strategy allows to support China on the world arena, without risking the relations with others for bias policies.
Strategically or militarily, the relations between the two have also been developing rather fast. Both Russia and China do not wish to be dictated by the outside powers, thus are building order and security in the region while also demonstrating that they would not tolerate the US assertive attitudes. Recent inclusion of PLA in Vostok exercise has signified a new step in the relations of the countries. Russia and China are conducting multiple joint military exercises demonstrating capabilities in different regions, moreover Russia is consulting China on the anti-ballistic systems, bringing much of the concerns to the West. Again, there is a clear rhetoric that Russia and China are not building a military bloc. However, such close cooperation of the two regional powers creates security infrastructure that fosters stability at the regional lever, while outcompeting intrusions from the outside forces.
Work Cited
1. Al Jazeera. (2019). Huiyao Wang: US-China trade War 'unprecedented' and 'alarming'. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2019/12/huiyao-wang-china-trade-war-unprecedented-alarming-191226083040164.html
2. Allison, G. (2017). Destined for war: Can America and China escape Thucydides'strap?. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. [e-reader version].
3. Amadeo, K. (2019). Why Trade Wars Are Bad and Nobody Wins. The Balance, Retrieved from www.thebalance.com/trade-wars-definition-how-it-affects-you-4159973.
4. Baldwin, D. A. (1985). Economic statecraft. Princeton University Press.Retrieved from https://books.google.ru/books?hl=ru&lr=&id=1tgP1Zi7kwwC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=Baldwin+1985+&ots=orElg-yHNu&sig=Dnk2aHw9cweobD7v1vaKJPW-q1s&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Baldwin%201985&f=false
5. Baum, R. (2001). From “Strategic Partners” to “Strategic Competitors”: George W. Bush and the Politics of U.S. China Policy. Journal of East Asian Studies, 1(2), 191-220. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/23417761.
6. Belousov, A.(2019).PomoshnikPutinanazvalriskidlyaRossii v torgovojvojneSShA s Kitaem [Putin's Assistant Named Risks to Russia in US Trade War with China. Forbe. Retrieved from https://www.forbes.ru/biznes/375899-pomoshchnik-putina-nazval-riski-dlya-rossii-v-torgovoy-voyne-ssha-s-kitaem
7. Bespalov, A. (2019). Russia's Turn to the East: Expectations and the Reality. Valdai Discussion Club. Retrieved from https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/russia-s-turn-to-the-east-expectations-and-the-rea/
8. Blanchard, J.&Ripsman, N. (2008). A Political Theory of Economic Statecraft. Foreign Policy Analysis, (4.4):371- 398. Retrievedhttps://www.researchgate.net/publication/229889891_A_Political_Theory_of_Economic_Statecraft
9. Brinkley, J. (2018). Trump's national Security tariffs have nothing to do with national security. Forbes. Retrieved https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbrinkley/2018/03/12/trumps-national-security-tariffs-have-nothing-to-do-with-national-security/#57718eb1706c
10. Brzezinski, Z. (1997). The grand chessboard (Vol. 1). New York: Basic Books.[e-reader version].
11. Bush, W., G. (1999). Governor George W. Bush, "A Distinctly American Internationalism," Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999. Retrieved https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm
12. Carlson, B. (2018). Vostok-2018: Another Sign of Strengthening Russia-China Ties. Not an Alliance, but Defense Cooperation Is Growing. SWP. Retrieved from https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/vostok-2018-another-sign-of-strengthening-russia-china-ties/
13. Central Bank of Russia (2020).Statistikavneshnegosektora [External sector statistics. Retrieved from https://www.cbr.ru/statistics/macro_itm/svs/
14. Chan, S. (2008). China, the US and the Power-Transition Theory: a Critique. Routledge. [e-reader version]
15. Charnovitz, S. (2019). Grading Trump's China Trade Strategy. George Washington University Publications & Other Works. Retrieved fromhttps://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2685&context=faculty_publications
16. China Briefing. (2020). The US- China Trade War: Timeline. Retrieved from https://www.china-briefing.com/news/the-us-china-trade-war-a-timeline/
17. Clinton, H. (2011). America's Pacific Century. Foreign Policy. Retrieved fromhttps://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/cpd/easg/easg_calendar/america27s_pacific_century_2011.pdf
18. CNBC (2020).Trump trade advisor Peter Navarro lists the goals for `phase two' trade deal [Video file]. Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/video/2020/01/16/trump-trade-advisor-peter-navarro-lists-the-goals-for-phase-two-trade-deal.html
19. Congressional Research Service (2019). Annual Report to the Joint Committee on the Library United States Congress Fiscal year 2018. Retrieved https://fas.org/sgp/crs/crs18.pdf
20. Cox, M. (2016). Not just `convenient' China and Russia's new strategic partnership in the age of geopolitics. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 1(4), 317-334.
21. Dmitriyev. S. (2018). Predskazuyemonepredskazuyemayatorgovayapolitika - SShAprotivvsekh // Konturyglobalnykhtransformatsii: politika. ekonomika. parvo [Predictable Unpredictable Trade Policy - USA Versus All. The counters of global transformation: politics, economics, law], Т. 11. No 2. С. 113-132. DOI: 10.23932/2542-0240-2018-11-2-113-132, Retrieved from https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/predskazuemo-nepredskazuemaya-torgovaya-politika-ssha-protiv-vseh
22. Drezner, D. (2019). Economic Statecraft in the Age of Trump. The Washington Quarterly, 42:3, 7-24, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2019.1663072
23. Federal Customs Service (2020) Spravochnyeianaliticheskiematerialy [Reference and analytical material]. Retrieved from http://customs.ru/statistic
24. Frost, F. (1997). United States-China Relations and the Clinton-Jiang Summit. Parliament of Australia. Retrieved from https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/CIB/CIB9798/98CIB07
25. Gabuev, A., Zuenko, I. (2018). The "Belt and Road" in Russia: Evolution of Expert Discourse. Russia in Global Affairs. Retrieved from https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/the-belt-and-road-in-russia-evolution-of-expert-discourse/
26. Gazprom (2020). The Largest Gas Transmission System in Russia's East. “Power of Siberia”, Retrieved from https://www.gazprom.com/projects/power-of-siberia/
27. Georgieva, K. (2019) Decelerating Growth Calls for Accelerating Action. IMF. Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/10/03/sp100819-AMs2019-Curtain-Raiser
28. Gingrich, N. (2019). Trump vs. China: Facing America's Greatest Threat. Center Street. [e-reader version]
29. Gonzбlez, A. &Vйron, N. (2019). Working Paper: 19-13 EU Trade Policy amid the China-US Clash: Caught in the Cross-Fire? Peterson Institute for International Economics. Retrievedhttps://www.piie.com/system/files/documents/wp19-13.pdf
30. Graham, T. (1983). Global Trade: War & Peace. Foreign Policy, (50), 124-137. doi:10.2307/1148284. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/1148284?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
31. Heath, J. (2012).Failing American Workers ad, 2012. [Video file] Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qneUQIiQAR4
32. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=245266&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=371857150&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=False
33. Ignatova, O., Gorbunova, O., Tereshina, O. (2019). US-China Trade War: Russia's Interests. Management and Economics Research Journal, Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337239120_US-China_Trade_War_Russia's_Interests
34. IMF (2019).World Economic Outlook Report, October 2019 Global Manufacturing Downturn, Rising Trade Barriers. Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2019/10/01/world-economic-outlook-october-2019
35. Interfax (2020). EkspertnazvaltorgovoesoglashenieSShAiKitayaperemiriem, a nekoncomvojny.[An expert has called the US-China trade deal a truce and not the end of war]. Retrieved from https://www.interfax.ru/business/691913
36. Jalil, G. (2019). China's Rise: Offensive or Defensive Realism. Strategic Studies, 39(1), 41-58. doi:10.2307/48544287
37. Jian, X. (2014). Rethinking China's period of strategic opportunity. China Institute of International Studies. Retrieved http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-05/28/content_6942258.htm
38. Kapustina, L., Lipkovб, ј., Silin, Y., &Drevalev, A. (2020). US-China Trade War: Causes and Outcomes. In SHS Web of Conferences (Vol. 73, p. 01012). EDP Sciences. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338550900_US-China_Trade_War_Causes_and_Outcomes
39. Karaganov, S. (2017). OtPovorotana Vostok k BolshojEvrazii [From Turn to the East to Great Eurasia]. Russia in Global Affairs. Retrieved from https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/ot-povorota-na-vostok-k-bolshoj-evrazii/
40. Kashin, V. (2019). Neobyavlennyjsoyuz. Kak Rossiya iKitajvyhodyatnanovyjurovenvoennogopartnerstva. [Undeclared Union. How Russia and China are entering a new level of military partnership]. Carnegie Moscow Center. Retrieved from https://carnegie.ru/commentary/80096
41. Kissinger, H. (2011). On China, The Penguin Press [e-reader version].
42. Kissinger, H. (2016). Kissinger's Vision for U.S.-Russia Relations. The National Interest. Retrieved from https://nationalinterest.org/feature/kissingers-vision-us-russia-relations-15111
43. Kremlin. (2001). Dogovor o dobrososedstve, druzhbeisotrudnichestvemezhduRossijskojFederaciejiKitajskojNarodnojRespublikoj [Treaty on good neighborliness, friendship and cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China]. Retrieved from http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/3418
44. Lavrov, S. (2018). IntervyuMinistrainostrannyh del RossiiS.V.Lavrovainformacionnomuagentstvu «Habar» (dlyaavtorskogoproektaM.Bekbaevoj «Epohavozrozhdeniya»), Moskva, 9 dekabrya 2018 goda.[ Interview of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S.V. Lavrov to the Khabar news agency (for M. Bekbaeva's author's project “The Age of Renaissance”), Moscow, December 9, 2018]. Retrieved from https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3438074
45. Li, C. (2016). Accessing U.S.- China relations under the Obama Administration. Brookings. Retrieved https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/assessing-u-s-china-relations-under-the-obama-administration/
46. Liberman, P. (1996). Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains. International Security, 21(1), 147-175. doi:10.2307/2539111. Retrieved https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539111?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
47. Lukin, A. (2019). The US-China Trade War and China's Strategic Future. Survival, 61(1), 23-50. Retrieved from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2019.1568045
48. Lukin. A. & Novikov, D. (2019). Novyemezhdunarodnyeotnosheniya v BolshojEvrazii. Rossijskayastrategiya v menyayushejsyageopoliticheskojdinamike. Ves Mir. [New international relations in Great Eurasia. Russian strategy in changing geopolitical dynamics. The Whole World], pp. 13-15
49. Mearsheimer, J. (2018). “Can China Rise Peacefully?” The National Interest, The Center for the National Interest, Retrieved fromhttps://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204
50. Meltzer, P. J ., Shenai, N. (2019). The US-China economic relationship: A comprehensive approach, Global Economy and Development at Brookings, Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/us_china_economic_relationship.pdf
51. Ministry of Economic Development of Russian Federation (2018). Rossiya vvelakompensiruyushiemery v svyazi s primeneniemSShAdopolnitelnyhvvoznyhposhlinnastalialyuminij [Russia introduced compensatory measures due to the US's application of additional tariffs on steel and aluminum], Retrieved from http://old.economy.gov.ru/minec/press/news/201806072
52. Ministry of Economic Development of Russian Federation (2019). Maksim Oreshkin: prodolzhenie «torgovyh vojn» mozhet privesti k stagflyacii v mirovoj ekonomike [Maxim Oreshkin: the continuation of the "trade wars" may lead to stagflation in the global economy]. Retrieved from https://economy.gov.ru/material/news/maksim_oreshkin_prodolzhenie_torgovyh_voyn_mozhet_privesti_k_stagflyacii_v_mirovoy_ekonomike.html
53. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC (1997). President Jiang Zemin visited the United States. Retrieved https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18030.shtml
54. Morgunov, I. (2013). VystupleniezamestitelyaMinistrainostrannyh del RossiiI.V.Morgulovanazasedanii 27-go Aziatsko-Tihookeanskogo «kruglogostola» po bezopasnosti, Kuala-Lumpur, 5 iyunya 2013 goda. [Speech by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister I.V. Morgulov at a meeting of the 27th Asia-Pacific Security Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, June 5, 2013]. Ministry of International Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.mid.ru/ru/atr/-/asset_publisher/0vP3hQoCPRg5/content/id/106890
55. Movchan, A. (2016). Russia: A diverse arsenal. In M. Leonard (Editor), Connectivity wars: Why migration finance and trade are the geo-economic battlegrounds of the future (pp. 198-203). European Council on Foreign Relations.
56. Navarro, P., & Autry, G. (2011). Death by China: Confronting the dragon-a global call to action. Pearson Prentice Hall. [e-reader version].
57. Neftegaz (2020).Gazprom instructed to proceed to pre-investment phase in Power of Siberia 2 project. Retrieved from https://neftegaz.ru/en/news/companies/538998-gazprom-instructed-to-proceed-to-pre-investment-phase-in-power-of-siberia-2-project/
58. Novikov, D. &Shumkova, V. (2018). Mega?Regional agreements and the struggle for economic order in the Asia?pacific region. Retrieved https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/aspp.12429
59. Observatory of Economic Complexity (2020). Russia. Retrieved https://oec.world/en/profile/country/rus/
60. Office Secretary of Defense (2019). Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019. Retrieved https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf
61. Ozawa, M. (2019). Russia and China: “axis of convenience” or “stable strategic partnership” NATO Defense College. doi:10.2307/resrep19853, Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/
62. Political Communication Lab (2012). Presidential General Election Ads: Obama vs. Romney. [Video file] Retrieved from https://pcl.stanford.edu/campaigns/2012/
63. Putin, V. (2019). Zasedaniediskussionnogokluba «Valdaj» [The meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club]. Retrieved from http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61719
64. Putin, V. (2016). Otvetynavoprosyzhurnalistov. [Answers to questions from journalists]. Kremlin. Retrieved from http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52834
65. Putin, V. (2018). Zasedaniediskussionnogokluba «Valdaj» [The meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club]. Retrieved from http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58848
66. Putin, V. (2019). PlenarnoezasedaniePeterburgskogomezhdunarodnogoekonomicheskogoforuma [Glider meeting of St. Petersburg International Economic Forum]. Retrievedhttp://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60707
67. Putin,V.(2019). Pryamayaliniya s VladimiromPutinym [Direct line with Vladimir Putin]. Retrievedhttp://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60795
68. Putin, V. (2019). Vladimir Putin rasskazal o nochnyhperegovorah s Si Czinpinom [Vladimir Putin spoke about the nightly talks with Xi Jinping]. RG. Retrieved from https://rg.ru/2019/06/07/vladimir-putin-rasskazal-o-nochnyh-peregovorah-s-si-czinpinom.html
69. Rahawestri, M. (2010). Obama's Foreign Policy in Asia: More Continuity than Change. Security Challenges, 6(1), 109-120. Retrieved www.jstor.org/stable/26459473
70. RBC (2019).OreshkinocenilvliyanietorgovyhvojnSShAi KNR naekonomikuRossii [Oreshkin has evaluated the influence of the US- PRC trade war on the Russia's economy].Retrieved from https://www.rbc.ru/economics/15/05/2019/5cdbd17e9a7947f256e9092e
71. RIA. (2019). OtnosheniyaRossiiiKitayavstupayut v novuyustadiyurazvitiya, zayavilShojgu. [Relations between Russia and China are entering a new stage of development, said Shoigu]. Retrieved from https://ria.ru/20190904/1558278988.html
72. RT. (2018). “Lavrov Zayavil. Chto Rossiya Ne NamerenaUchastvovat v TorgovoyVoyneSShAi KNR.” RT Na Russkom, 9 Dec. 2018, Retrieved from russian.rt.com/world/news/581334-rossiya-torgovlya-kitai-ssha.
73. RT. (2018). Lavrov zayavil, chto Rossiya ne namerenauchastvovat v torgovojvojneSShAi KNR [Lavrov said that Russia does not intend to participate in the trade war of the United States and China]. Russia Today. Retrieved from https://russian.rt.com/world/news/581334-rossiya-torgovlya-kitai-ssha
74. Salidjanova,N. (2015). China's Trade Ambitions: Strategy and Objectives behind China's Pursuit of Free Trade Agreements. US-China and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report. Retrievedhttps://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China's%20Trade%20Ambitions%20-%2005.28%2015.pdf
75. Spartak. A., Frantsuzov V. (2019) Sovremennyyetendentsiiiriski v razvitiimirovoyekonomiki. Rossiyskiyvneshneekonomicheskiyvestnik. [Current trends and risks in the world economy growth. Russian foreign economic bulletin], (2). 7-24. Retrieved from https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/sovremennye-tendentsiii-riski-v-razvitii-mirovoy-ekonomiki
76. Stiglitz, J. (2016). Will TPP help to curb china's rise? Medium. Retrieved https://medium.com/@GlobalTradeWatch/will-tpp-help-to-curb-chinas-rise-b0190e86d64c
77. Sun, Y. (2019). Managing the Fallout of the US-China Trade War, Stimson Center. doi:10.2307/resrep20056
78. Supyan.V.(2019). Amerikano-kitayskiyetorgovo-ekonomicheskiyeotnosheniya: prichinykrizisai ego perspektivy. Rossiyskiyvneshneekonomicheskiyvestnik. [US-China trade relations: causes of crisis and prospects. Russian foreign economic bulletin], (9). 23-32.Retrieved from https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/sovremennye-tendentsiii-riski-v-razvitii-mirovoy-ekonomiki
79. Suslov, D. (2019). Novyemezhdunarodnyeotnosheniya v BolshojEvrazii. Rossijskayastrategiya v menyayushejsyageopoliticheskojdinamike. Ves Mir. [New international relations in Great Eurasia. Russian strategy in changing geopolitical dynamics. The Whole World], pp.219
80. Tass, (2019). Lavrov zayavil, chtoSShAstremyatsyarassoritRossiyuiKitaj. [Lavrov said that the United States seek to embroil Russia and China]. Retrieved from https://tass.ru/politika/6906941
81. Tass, (2019). OreshkindopuskaetoslablenietorgovogokonfliktaSShAiKitaya v pervojpolovine 2020 goda. [Oreshkin admits weakening US-China trade conflict in the first half of 2020]. Retrieved from https://tass.ru/ekonomika/7426303
82. The State Council of the PRC (2019). China's National Defense in the New Era. [White Paper]. Retrieved http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html
83. The State Council of the PRC (2019).China's Position on the China-US Economic and Trade Consultations. [White Paper]. Retrieved http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/06/02/content_281476694892692.htm
84. TIME (2018). President Trump Accuses China Of Meddling In 2018 Elections In U.N. Security Council Speech |TIME [Video file]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7olnTIGK2ww
85. Trump, J., D. (2018) Remarks by President Trump at Signing of a Presidential Memorandum Targeting China's Economic Aggression, Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-signing-presidential-memorandum-targeting-chinas-economic-aggression/
86. Tsygankov, A. P. (2016). Russia's foreign policy: change and continuity in national identity. Rowman & Littlefield. [e-reader version].
87. United States State Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (2007). Statement of Chairman Dodd on conclusion of the strategic economic dialogue and banking subcommittee hearing on U.S.- China economic relations. Retrieved https://www.banking.senate.gov/newsroom/minority/statement-of-chairman-dodd-on-conclusion-of-the-strategic-economic-dialogue-and-banking-subcommittee-hearing-on-us-china-economic-relations
88. United States. (2017). The national security strategy of the United States of America. Trump: President of the U.S. Retrieved https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf
89. USTR (2018).USTR Issues Tariffs on Chinese Products in Response to Unfair Trade Practices, Retrieved from https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/june/ustr-issues-tariffs-chinese-products
90. World Bank (2020a). Tracking GDP in PPP terms Shows rapid rise of China and India. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/tracking-gdp-ppp-terms-shows-rapid-rise-china-and-india
91. World Bank (2020b). GDP growth (annual %). (n.d.). Retrieved fromhttps://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG
92. Wray, C. (2018). The FBI and Corporate Directors: Working Together to Keep Companies Safe from Cyber Crime. Retrieved from https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-fbi-and-corporate-directors-working-together-to-keep-companies-safe-from-cyber-crime
93. WTO. (2017). DS515: United States -- Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies. Retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds515_e.htm
94. WTO. (2019). WTO lowers trade forecast as tensions unsettle global economy. Retrieved https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres19_e/pr840_e.htm
95. WTO. (2018). Immediate Notification Under Article 12.5 of the Agreement. Russian Federation. Retrieved from
96. Zeng, J. & Breslin S. (2016). China's `new type of Great Power relations': a G2 with Chinese characteristics? International Affairs 92(4), pp.773-794
97. Zhang, Y. (2018). The US-China Trade War: A Political and Economic Analysis. Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, 31(1/2), 53-74. Retrieved www.jstor.org/stable/26608823
98. Zuev, V. (2019). International Trade at Triple Crossroads. Global Governance in Transformation: Challenges for International Cooperation. SpringerNature, pp.183-200
Appendix
US - China trade war timeline.
|
Time period and context |
The US |
China |
|
|
April - May2017 US and China Presidents meet and initiate 100 days plan to resolve trade frictions |
Initiation of the investigation on the possibility of steel/aluminum trade to pose national threat. China is given access to the US markets to sell poultry. |
US firms are allowed greater access to China's agriculture, energy, and financial markets. |
|
|
February - April2018 Escalation of the conflict with US initiation of investigation on China's policies regarding to technology transfer and intellectual property. First mutual tariffs applied. |
Implementation of `global safeguard tariffs': 30 % tariff on solar panel imports worth $8.5 billion (except from Canada) 20 % tariff on washing machine imports worth $1.8 billion. Filing a WTO case against China for the discriminatory licensing. Tariffs imposed: Chinese products (aerospace, information communication technology and machinery). 25% tariff on all steel imports (except from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, and South Korea) 10 % tariff on all aluminum imports (except from Argentina and Australia). US companies are banned from doing business with ZTE for seven years. |
Tariffs imposed (15-25%) on 128 products worth $3 billion including: including fruit, wine, seamless steel pipes, pork recycled aluminum (retaliatory to the US) Proposed 25 % tariffs on 106 products worth $50 billion including: soybeans, automobile, chemicals Anti-dumping duties of 178.6% on imports of sorghum from the US announced |
|
|
July 2018 Ongoing negotiations. Domestic discussions of the new lists of restrictions. Implementation of the first round of tariffs. |
25% tariff on 818 products worth $34 billion |
25% tariff on 545 products worth $34 billion (in response to the US tariffs). |
|
|
August 2018 The parties exchange preliminary restriction lists and initiate dialogue. The US and China implement second round of tariffs. |
25% tariff on 279 goods worth $16 billion including: semiconductors, chemicals, plastics, motorbikes and electric scooters |
The WTO case initiated against the US for its tariffs on solar panels, claiming that US tariffs have damaged China's trade interests. Introduction of 25% tariffs on 333 goods worth $16 billion including: coal, copper scrap, fuel, buses and medical equipment (in response to the US tariffs). |
|
|
September 2018 US threatens with imposition of new tariffs. The third round of tariffs begin |
10% tariff on $200 billion worth imports from China (subject to further increase up to 25% in January 2019). Tariffs on $200 billion of Chinese goods finalized. |
Retaliatory measures: 5% and 10% tariffs on US imports worth $60 billion. China cancels negotiations and releases the White Paper stating the official position regarding the trade. |
|
|
October - December 2018 US and China officials resume negotiations during the G20 summit in Buenos Aires. The sides agree not to increase tariffs for 90 days |
Refrains from increasing the tariffs previously announced to be increased from 10 % to 25 % on Jan. 1, 2019.Refrains to impose previously threatened tariffs on an additional $267 billion worth goods. |
Temporarily removes additional 25 % tariffs on US autos and 5% tariffs on certain US auto parts for three months. Till then US auto imports are charged usual 15 % tariff rate. China resumes its purchase of US-soybeans. |
|
|
January - May 2019 Ongoing trade negotiations |
25% tariff (increase from 10%) on $200 billion.Huawei Technologies and its affiliates banned from trading with US companies without government approval. |
China announces tariff hikes on US products: 25%, 20%, 10% tariffs for $60 billion worth of imports (increased from 10%,10%,5% respectively). |
|
|
June - August 2019 G20 summit in Osaka. The parties agree to avoid increasing tariffs. Trade war slowdown. |
The ban on trade with Huawei is reconsidered.110 products are excluded from the 25% tariffs. Trump threatens tariffs on another $325 billion of Chinese goods, despite promises following G20 Summit not to. USTR issues an announcement: tariffs on $300 billion worth on Chinese goods to be imposed Sep. 1. China is declared to be a currency manipulator. |
Tariffs of 25%, 20% and 10% (increased by 10%, 10% and 5% respectively) on $60 billion. Announced $75 billion in tariffs on US goods (5% and 10% tariffs on 5,078 US goods). Was a retaliatory tariff to the USTR announcement. |
|
|
September 2019 China and US agree to 13th round of trade talks. Sides start to exempt goods from the lists of goods under tariffs. “Phase 1” deal is announced |
Implementation of tariffs on more $125 billion. Tariff exclusion process for $300 billion of Chinese imports initiated. |
Imposition of additional tariffs on $75 billion, including 5% on crude oil (in response to the US). Complaint against the US over import tariffs affecting $300 billion of Chinese exports. As part of the Phase 1 deal China will: be annually purchasing $40-50 billion worth of the US agricultural products Strengthenintellectual property provsions Issue new guidelines to currency management |
|
|
November - February 2019 China wins WTO case and imposes compensatory sanctions on $3.6 billion worth US imports as the US failed to follow the anti-dumping rules. The US and China talk: tariff rollback. On January 15, US, China signed Phase1 trade deal. |
China's currency manipulator label is lifted. Confirmed commitment to reduce duties by half on $120 billion worth of Chinese products. Tariffs on $250 billion in Chinese products remains. |
Second set of US products to be excluded from additional tariffs. Will purchase additional $200 billion worth of US goods and services over the next two years (above $186 billion purchases in 2017). Halved tariffs on $75 billion worth of US goods. Exempts tariffs on 696 of the US goods. |
Source: Author's own elaboration based on China Briefing (2020)
Graph 1
Source: Author's own elaboration based on The Central Bank of Russia statistics
Размещено на Allbest.ru
Подобные документы
Russian Federation Political and Economic relations. Justice and home affairs. German-Russian strategic partnership. The role of economy in bilateral relations. Regular meetings make for progress in cooperation: Visa facilitations, Trade relations.
реферат [26,3 K], добавлен 24.01.2013Content of the confrontation between the leading centers of global influence - the EU, the USA and the Russian Federation. Russia's military presence in Syria. Expansion of the strategic influence of the Russian Federation. Settlement of regional crises.
статья [34,8 K], добавлен 19.09.2017Forum for 21 Pacific Rim countries that seeks to promote free trade and economic cooperation throughout the Asia-Pacific region. History of establishment Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), speciality of membership, scope of work and structure.
реферат [366,7 K], добавлен 16.01.2012Regulation of International Trade under WTO rules: objectives, functions, principles, structure, decision-making procedure. Issues on market access: tariffs, safeguards, balance-of-payments provisions. Significance of liberalization of trade in services.
курс лекций [149,5 K], добавлен 04.06.2011Natural gas is one of the most important energy resources. His role in an international trade sector. The main obstacle for extending the global gas trading. The primary factors for its developing. The problem of "The curse of natural resources".
эссе [11,4 K], добавлен 12.06.2012Characteristic of growth and development of Brazil and Russian Federation. Dynamics of growth and development. Gross value added by economic activity. Brazilian export of primary and manufactured goods. Export structure. Consumption side of GDP structure.
реферат [778,3 K], добавлен 20.09.2012Research of the theoretical foundations of the concept of foreign trade’s "potential in the sphere of high-technological products", the commodity and geographical structure of Ukraine’s foreign trade in the sphere of high-technological products.
статья [319,0 K], добавлен 21.09.2017The study of the history of the development of Russian foreign policy doctrine, and its heritage and miscalculations. Analysis of the achievements of Russia in the field of international relations. Russia's strategic interests in Georgia and the Caucasus.
курсовая работа [74,6 K], добавлен 11.06.2012Enhancing inter-ethnic conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in 1989, and its result - forcing the Soviet Union to grant Azerbaijani authorities greater leeway. Meeting of world leaders in 2009 for a peaceful settlement on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh.
презентация [730,7 K], добавлен 29.04.2011Крупнейшие азиатские транснациональные корпорации и их деятельность на рынках Центральной и Восточной Европы: China Construction Bank, Toyota Motor Corporation, Samsung Group. Распределение бизнеса электронной промышленности Samsung по регионам.
контрольная работа [32,0 K], добавлен 26.09.2012
