Russia over the last 15 years has directly or indirectly conducted several cyber-attacks in different countries for different purposes. One of the most aggressive and coercive one was conducted in 2009 in the country of Kirgizstan. Russia allegedly shut the entire country's internet down in order to coerce the Kirgiz government for them to close the US military base present in their country (Jeangиne Vilmer, Escorcia, Guillaume, Herrera, 2018). In a similar vein, Russia is suspected to have cyber-attacked Estonia in 2007, which resulted in the paralysis of Estonian media and governmental websites for 3 weeks. Cyber-attacks are also used by Russia as a mean to obtain information that will have an impact over an event. For example, in 2015, Russia attacked the party of Emmanuel Macron and sucked thousands of emails from the party officials to later transfer them to the website Wikileaks which then released it to the public (Jeangиne Vilmer, Escorcia, Guillaume, Herrera, 2018). Of course, the most well-known cyber-attack/kompromat operation is the hacking of the democratic national committee during the American presidential campaign of 2016. Like in France, the information gathered was ultimately transmitted to WikiLeaks to share it to the public. Less well known is the fact that the Republican national committee has also been allegedly attacked by Russia but no information was shared to the public. Most of Russia's cyber-attacks are conducted by groups of hackers that are not officially part of Russia's intelligence or of the military community but they are severely suspected of having strong ties with the FSB, GRU or SVR (Jeangиne Vilmer, Escorcia, Guillaume, Herrera, 2018).

Russia is also using the cyber space for its conventional wars. Indeed, it has been reported that NATO soldiers in the Baltics have received threatening messages on social media from Kremlin-linked hackers. In addition, Ukrainian soldiers in Donbass have received messages to tell them that they are encircled and that they should surrender. Families of these soldiers also have reported receiving messages that their relatives on the frontline have been killed or wounded. The French intelligence services claim that when Ukrainian families call their relatives all at the same time to check their health after having received such messages about their death, the Russians utilize the concentration of signals to locate the soldiers to ultimately bombard them (Jeangиne Vilmer, Escorcia, Guillaume, Herrera, 2018)..

Russia has also developed tools to take advantage of the power of social media. On 55 Savushkina Street in Saint Petersburg is located a company called “Internet Research Agency” also known as the “troll farm”. Their modus operandi consists in publishing messages from thousands of fake accounts on the main social media to spread pro-kremlin propaganda on topics such as the war in Ukraine, war in Syria or on different political elections. This company also have clear ties to the Kremlin notably through Oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin (Jeangиne Vilmer, Escorcia, Guillaume, Herrera, 2018).

b. Non-Coercive Instruments

Russia has, on the other side of the spectrum, successfully developed non-coercive tools to diffuse its point of view on the world and to convince people that it is the right one. As we said previously, the Kremlin created Russia today in 2005 to counter-balance the spread of the Western ideology in post-soviet countries which some have shifted in the western camp since the collapse of the Soviet Union such as Georgia, Ukraine and the Baltics. Today, Russia expanded its reach to provide a counter to western media in practically the whole World. As a matter of fact, RT can be watched in Europe, Asia and in the Americas, in German, English, French, Arab and Spanish. In 2017, during Putin's visit in France, Macron, commenting its presidential campaign said during a joint press conference that: "Russia Today and Sputnik did not behave as media organisations and journalists, but as agencies of influence and propaganda, lying propaganda - no more, no less" (Macron, 2017). RT and Sputnik were even banned for one year from 2017 to 2018 in all official Macron's events (The Moscow Times, 2018). Yet, in Western countries, RT and Sputnik are very popular because they give speech to political streams that are under-represented in mainstream mass media. Political correctness is less present and you can often see debates between far-left and far-right activists on air. In addition, during the yellow vest protests in France, journalists from RT were the only ones that were able to take interviews and walk among the protesters without being molested (l'Express, 2019). Indeed, RT in France particularly followed the Yellow Vest movement and was one of its main canal of expression. Surprisingly, to many in France, RT and Sputnik incarnate the last canals of freedom of speech (l'Express, 2019). This situation is a huge achievement for Russia because a big proportion of the people in the West do not trust their elites anymore and have lost faith in philosophical and economic liberalism and now turn to Russia to get the kind of information they want.

However, while many in Europe or in America see Russian media as friendly canals that help their cause and ultimately their country, in Africa and in Latin America, Russian media spread anti-western and anti-former colonialist speech (Jeangиne Vilmer, Escorcia, Guillaume, Herrera, 2018).

As Russia's help in Italy has illustrated, one of Russia's main foreign policy goals is to enhance its image in the West and particularly in Europe. To some constructivist thinkers, Russia's foreign policy has always been developed vis-а-vis its relation with Europe (Berryman, 2018). Brzezinski quoting Mackinder wrote in his book “the Grand Chessboard” that whoever controls Eurasia controls the world (Brzezinski, 1997). Now that Russia secured a good partnership with China and relatively with India, it only needs to secure good relations with Europe to be in a very good position on the Eurasian continent and thus in the world. In the same book, Brzezinski wrote in the 90s that one of the biggest geopolitical threat in Eurasia for the US would be an alliance between France and Russia (Brzezinski, 1997). Alternatively, Mackinder in the 20^th century wrote that, an alliance between Germany and Russia would secure supremacy in Eurasia for good for these two powers (Berryman, 2018). With this in mind, it is not surprising that Russia tries by any means possible to polish its image in the West. It is playing on all fields possible, for example, between the two rounds of election in France during the 2017 presidential election, Putin invited Marine Le Pen to the Kremlin, who is rather pro-Russia (The New York Times, 2017). At the same time Putin tries to have as good as possible relations with France and with Macron. It is precisely France who pushed within the European Union for Russia to be accepted back in the council of Europe after being expelled because of the Ukrainian crisis (The Financial Times, 2019). Russia is also seeking to ameliorate its relations with Germany, the country in which Putin gave its famous speech promoting multi-polarity against full US dominance. Nevertheless, Russia also looks to enhance its relations with the US. It is in this sense that from 2006 to 2014, Russia's hired the American firm Ketchum to enhance its public relations, notably with Europe and with the US (Jeangиne Vilmer, Escorcia, Guillaume, Herrera, 2018). It is thanks to this partnership that Russia's president, Vladimir Putin was able to publish an article written by himself A Plea for Caution from Russia in the New York Times to speak directly to the American audience on the 11^th of September 2013, to convince the American people that a US military intervention in Syria would cause more harm than good (Putin, 2013). Interestingly, it seems that Russia looks more to increase its relations with European governments whereas in the US it is more oriented to improve its relations with the people as if Russia lost hope to change the US foreign policy. In Oliver Stone's “Putin interviews” Putin said: “American presidents change but the policy does not” (Keeley, 2017).

As General Gerasimov pointed out, even if the world is for its most part in a situation of peace, there is nevertheless a fierce competition in every domain. Russia is in the West, accused of conducting both coercive and self-promotion operations. Because of this spotlight on Russia, one could think that Russia is the most aggressive in the sphere of the war of information. Yet, it is worth reminding that other great powers such as China but especially the US are active in this area. Indeed, on the first part when it comes to coercive means, it is estimated that the US intelligence agencies and its allies “the five eyes” have suck up the data from 200 under-water internet cables (Arte, 2018). More, the US hacked the phone of several European leaders including Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and French president Franзois Hollande (Mediapart, 2015) (The Guardian, 2015). Also, other countries than Russia are suspected to have conducted massive cyber-attacks. We can here mention the US-Israel operation against Iran's power plants, North Korea who infected the whole world with its “WannaCry” malware or China's repeated attacks on the US for industrial espionage (Arte, 2018). Lastly, thanks to Edward Snowden, we know that the US conducted for years a program named “Prism” that spied the whole world and even US citizens (Le Monde, 2013). It is also worth noting that a big part of the war of information is conducted for economic purposes rather than for defence ones (Mediapart, 2015). On the second part, on self-promoting operations, Russia is catching up rather than leading. When RT, was only created in 2005, other channels of “propaganda” existed for years or even decades before such as CNN and Al Jazeera. Others were created exactly at the same time such as France 24 and others later such as I24 (Israel).

Russia has still a very long way to go before it could compete with tools of soft power that the West have in possession such as Hollywood or western multi-national companies which have a real power of influencing ideas and discourse. The same is true for coercive instruments, Russia cannot compete with the US. Indeed, the US' budget for its intelligence agencies was in 2018 cumulating at 81.5 Billion Dollars, approximately 25% more than the whole Russian defence budget (SIPRI, 2019; Lagneau 2018).

Chapter 3: Economic Tools

a. Petro-Carrots and Petro-sticks in Russia's near abroad

As we said previously, Russia has a weak economy with regards to its political importance in the world, cumulating at a GDP of approximately 1.8 trillion of dollars (Nominal) (IMF, 2019). However, thanks to its enormous territory, Russia is a raw material superpower. As a matter of fact, Russia is the second or third largest producer of oil and gas depending on the year and by far the biggest in Europe. Russia is the largest exporter of grain in the world and has enormous riches in diamond, coal, timber, uranium and etc. (Geohistory, 2019). In Addition, Russia is very technologically advanced and has a rare or even unique savoir-faire in some domains such as space, nuclear and military industry that allow it to have economic giants which are able to conduct huge projects in Russia and abroad (RIAC, 2019). Russia uses its economic assets to achieve its foreign policy goals in different ways.

In its “near abroad” region, Russia takes advantage of its hegemonic situation in Europe of main oil and gas producer and takes advantage of the network of pipelines that it inherited from the Soviet Era (Newnham, 2011). Furthermore, Moscow also takes advantage of the former subsidizing Soviet policies towards its former republics and former satellite states in the sense that because these countries had access to cheap oil and gas, they developed large industries that are still used today and vital to their economy but which are heavily dependent on Moscow's fossil energy (Newnham, 2011). Moscow uses the policy of “carrots and sticks” to punish or reward these countries depending on their alignment with its policies. Russia subsidises countries that are its allies like Belarus, Transnistria, Abkhazia or Ukraine in the past by selling them cheap gas but on the other hand increases the price for countries that rejected Russia such as Georgia, the Baltics or Ukraine now (Newnham, 2011).

As we can see from this table, the prices differ completely depending on the country and on the evolution of its friendliness towards Russia throughout time.

Figure 1 Extracted from Newnham, R., (2011). Oil, Carrots, and Sticks: Russia's Energy Resources as a Foreign Policy Tool. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 2(2), pp.134-143. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1016/j.euras.2011.03.004

To illustrate, during the time of the pro-Russian president in Ukraine Leonid Kuchma from 1994 to 2005, the country was benefiting from cheap gas prices at around $50 per TCM and from favourable payment terms (Newnham, 2011). However, after the Orange revolution in 2004, the prices gradually increased. Russia has a formidable leverage of pressure over its near abroad countries because they are in an almost situation of dependency towards Russia but for Russia, the Baltic or the Georgian market represent only a small portion of its profits each year which means that imposing sanctions on these countries costs very little to Russia but costs a lot to them. These countries are in a position of “asymmetrical interdependence”. For example, in 2007, Belarus imported 99% of its gas from Russia, the Baltic States 89%, Georgia 88% and Ukraine 69% (Newnham, 2011).

Imposing “petro-sanctions” on these countries forces their governments to be very careful not to displease Russia and if they do, high oil and gas prices degrade the economic situation in such a way that it increases the popular discontent towards its government and sometimes can lead to a change of government through elections or a revolution because for example : “Every Ukrainian Hryvnia sent to Moscow for gas is one that cannot be spent on popular programs such as health, education or public works” (Newnham, 2011). To illustrate, higher oil and gas prices have surely contributed to the return of Yanukovich in Ukraine which virtually erased the doings of the Orange revolution and temporarily returned Ukraine in Russia's sphere of influence. In our part on the information war, we talked about a Russian Cyber-attack on Estonia in 2007, the reason of this attack was that a former memorial of the Soviet Union in the centre of Tallinn was to be moved in a remote park. Russia not only cyber-attacked Estonia but also stopped delivering oil for several days to Estonia, severely impacting Estonia's economy (Newnham, 2011). However, when it comes to ally countries, Russia is overly kind with them. For example the small separatist republics of Transnistria and Abkhazia enjoy cheap gas and even the re-routing of some pipelines in order to deliver them gas.

b. Russia's economic presence in the World

Outside of the Post-Soviet space but still concerning oil and gas, Russia tries diversify its clients and in this sense built new pipelines recently. To get further access to the Balkans and to Turkey, Russia launched in 2017 the construction of Turkstream and in 2020 Erdogan and Putin inaugurated its opening. This pipeline has the advantage of bypassing Ukraine for Russia. It is estimated that Ukraine will lose $3B dollars annually because by being bypassed, it will not enjoy transit fees (Euronews, 2020). In addition, Russia is meant to finish the enlargement of North Stream with its North Stream 2 project by the end of 2020 or early 2021. This new pipeline is supposed to answer to the increase in demand for gas on the European market and in Germany. America has violently opposed this project and even demanded the cancellation of it because it is afraid that Germany and a part of Europe will become too dependent on Russia's energy imports (Deutsche Welle, 2020). It is crucial for Russia that these projects succeed because it is a way to create an area of cooperation with the Europeans with the final hope of the cancellation of the sanctions and normalization of the relations. In the Far-East, Russia sent gas for the first time the 2^nd of December 2019 to China through its new “Power of Siberia” pipeline (Forbes, 2019). Furthermore, Russia has a new leverage to influence the oil prices thanks to its participation in the newly created OPEC+ format in 2016. In addition, Russian companies such as Lukoil, Tatneft and Gazpromneft are conducting projects in several countries of the world to develop and exploit oil and gas fields (RIAC, 2019).

Oil and gas are not the only resources of strategic importance that Russia can export. As a matter of fact, Russia is today the biggest exporter of grain in the World. It exports mainly its grain to MENA countries which are particularly dependant on these imports for their food security. These countries are the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Lebanon, Turkey, Yemen, Oman, Saudi Arabia and particularly Egypt. Two-thirds of Egypt's grain imports come for Russia. In this situation, Russia has a huge bargaining power in its negations with these countries. According to the Russian International Affairs council, “A drop in Russian grain exports is believed to have resulted in a rapid increase in grain prices, which, in turn, contributed to the growing social tensions that ended in the Arab Spring” (RIAC, 2019).

Still in the “Middle East and North Africa” geographic zone, Russia is supplying another resource of strategic importance: Nuclear Energy. Rosatom is to build a nuclear power plant for 2028-2029 in Egypt. “Rosatom will supply Russian nuclear fuel, train personnel, and provide assistance in operating the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant” (RIAC, 2019). Moreover, Russia has made deals with Saudi Arabia and Algeria to build power plants in their country.

To sum up, Russia's economic assets that can be used as instruments for its foreign policy lie in the field of weapons, oil and gas, food and nuclear sector. Here again, Russia uses its assets alternatively in a Realist or a Liberal approach depending on the situation. On the one hand, it uses a more realist approach when the balance of power is in its sizable advantage by coercing countries or by overly subsidizing them. It is well illustrated by its “stick and carrots” policy in the post-soviet space regarding oil and gas. On the other hand, Russia adopts a rather liberal strategy when the balance of power is not in its visible advantage. For example, with the Europeans, Turkey and China it tries to adopt cooperative policies and a more win-win approach. A good illustration of that is the fact that Russia insisted to include German capital and the participation of German companies in the North Stream 2 project (Nord-Stream2.com). A good strategy to make sure that the project will go until the end and to persuade the Germans that a partnership with Russia is in their interest.

c. The Eurasian Economic Union

After having reviewed how Russia uses its economic assets as tools for its foreign policy, we are going to analyse another aspect of Russian instruments in the sphere of economy: the Eurasian Economic Union.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is the dominant economic regional integration organization in the Post-Soviet space that counts as members Armenia, Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan. The main goal of this organization is to “help its member states to make the most of intraregional economic ties, modernize their national economies, and forge an environment conducive to improving their global competitiveness” (Vinokuro, 2017). In order to do that, the union aims to reduce barriers for goods, services, capital and persons. The EAEU is the third attempt made by Post-Soviet countries to create such an organization after the vanished CIS and Eurasec. Russia is of course the most economically powerful and most populated country of the Union by constituting more than 80% of the union's GDP (Vinokuro, 2017). Yet, this union is not fully dominated by Russia. Indeed, Russia has only 20% of the voting power at the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEE) and during the Ukraine's crisis, the rest of the EAEU members decided to continue trading with Ukraine unlike Russia. Also, even the idea itself of creating such a union was not firstly promoted by Russia but by the Kazakh president at the time, Nursultan Nazerbayev in 1994. The Eurasian Economic Union holds very humble achievements compared to the European Union but follows the same path as other integration projects such as NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN, Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) and the South African Customs Union (SACU) (Vinokuro, 2017). The Union did not manage yet to fully unify the laws and regulations in every domain but has made substantial progress notably in lifting barriers for the free movement of labour. Workers can move between countries without any visas if they can justify having a job in the country. Russia benefits a lot from this because it attracts a lot of cheap labour from countries like Armenia, Kirgizstan and Kazakhstan. In actuality, the money that some foreign EAEU workers in Russia send to their home countries is a non-negligible part of these countries' populations' revenues (Aleksanyan, 2015).

In a similar vein, the unification of Belarus and Russia is an even more ambitious project that exists. Indeed, the two countries have created the “Union State” organization that originally aimed to one day fully unite the two countries in one entity. However, such an outcome is at the moment out of the question for the near future but progress is being made to fully integrate Russia's and Belarus' economies by homogenizing the customs and labour regulations (Observer Research Foundation, 2020).

At the end, the Eurasian Economic Union favours Russia's geopolitical agenda because it directs member countries towards itself and not towards another organization such as the European Union for Belarus. At the same time it favours economic development and thus stability in the post-soviet space, the role of the Russian language in the area and the economic interdependence of the economies of member states. On top of that, the union is overwhelmingly supported by the peoples that compose it. Indeed, in 2016 a survey was conveyed in all the EAEU countries to understand the approval rate. The result is as follows: the Kirgiz (86%), the Kazakhs (74%), the Russians (69%) and the Belarusians (63%) were vastly supporting the EAEU and only the Armenians were divided with 46% of approval rate (Vinokuro, 2017). It is worth mentioning that these numbers surpass the approval rates of the European countries towards the EU (Vinokuro, 2017).

Conclusion

After having briefly introduced the concept of multi-polarization of the World in the introduction, we tried in this paper to make an inventory of Russia's foreign policy instruments in the context of the New Cold War. In order to do that, we took inspiration from the three main schools of international relations to understand how they each view what can qualify as instruments of a foreign policy. We then applied this framework on Russia. Throughout this dissertation we showed that mainly, Russia's foreign policy tools are encapsulated either in the military, information or economic sphere.

In the first part, we understood that, although the Russian military is arguably the most advanced and developed tool that Russia has at its disposal, it is not the one it uses the most. In actuality, the Russian army has managed to recover quickly from the fall of the Soviet Union and is now particularly modern and efficient. Thanks to this rebirth, Russia is currently one of the few countries which has the capability to intervene alone abroad in a coherent and effective manner to achieve Moscow's geopolitical objectives. This has been particularly brilliantly proved by Russia's successful intervention in Syria which completely reversed the geopolitical situation on the ground. In addition, Russian scientists have designed and given to their country the most capable strategic weapons on Earth which assure the Kremlin that the country is safe for the years to come notably from NATO's anti-missile systems which if they were fully operational would have dangerously modified the balance of power in the World. Thanks to this great successes, the World's image of the Russian armed forces and equipment has clearly improved which benefits a lot to Moscow. Indeed, Russia is increasing its weapon sales in strategic countries notably in the Middle East and these countries seem to view more and more Russia as a serious power that has rivalled the West in some domains. In this new geopolitical competition, some countries can now play on both sides and increase the biddings in order to maximize their benefits. However, when it comes to military partnerships and alliances, Moscow is rather alone. Indeed, even though Russia has managed to put on its side some of the Post-Soviet countries in the CSTO, the military might of these countries is so weak that in a real war, their contribution would be almost negligible. Lastly, regardless of China's and Russia's occasional joint exercises, both powers reject so far the idea of a real military alliance between them.

Later, we reviewed Russia's capabilities in the sphere of the war of information. Russia disposes of both coercive and non-coercive tools in this field to achieve its foreign policy goals. On the one hand, it possesses a wide array of coercive tools. Moscow has the capability of hacking companies, political parties or even the whole internet of certain countries. Furthermore, Russia has understood the turning point that constitute internet and the social media. Russia is using it whenever it can take advantage of it notably with its famous troll fabric. On the second hand, Russia also has non-coercive tools that are operating better and better. The most notable illustrations are the Kremlin's new media: RT and Sputnik. These are broadcasting in virtually the whole World and in the West Moscow's view and discourse with the support of entire parts of western countries' populations. At the end, we argued that unlike what is being said in the West and especially in America, Russia is not the main and most powerful actor of the war of information, neither when it comes to coercive nor non-coercive tools. Indeed, many countries of the World are conducting diverse actions in this sphere and above all the United States whose budget in this domain is immensely superior to Russia's.

In our final part, we took interest in Russia's foreign policy tools in the sphere of economy. We showed that Russia compensates its economic weakness with regards to the other great powers by being a major raw material and energy producer as well as having economic giants with a rich savoir-faire in specific domains. Moscow uses its gas exports to keep its grip on its “near abroad” countries by conducting a “stick and carrots” policy which rewards and punishes countries depending on their alignment with the Kremlin. In addition, Russia has been building new pipelines in every direction to diversify its clients and in order to create new areas of cooperation on a win-win basis particularly with the European Union, Turkey and China.

In addition to being a major producer of oil and gas in the world, Russia is the largest exporter of grain in the world and therefore the food security of several countries depend largely on Russia which gives Russia a big influence and a great leverage for its negotiations. Also, thanks to its cutting edge know-how in nuclear technology, Russia is capable of providing a fully operational nuclear power plant to its allies and partners. Lastly, Russia has managed to foster economic cooperation and integration with a good part of the post-Soviet states through the Eurasian Economic Union. It is another international organization that keeps some Post-Soviet countries in its sphere of influence and where Russia has a big role thanks to its compared economic weight.

To conclude this paper, we can firmly affirm that Russia uses a wide range of tools of different nature to achieve its foreign policy goals. Each tool can be used separately or jointly depending on the situation and on the level of coercion needed. Furthermore, even though Russia can be considered a great power primarily thanks to its military might, we have showed that new efficient tools, both coercive and non-coercive ones, have appeared notably in the economic and information spheres. Thanks to this development, Russia seems to have secured for a long time its rank of major World power in our changing geopolitical World. Russia's position in the World will be even more guaranteed if Moscow continues to develop new foreign policy instruments notably when it comes to satellite technology, AI and capabilities to influence the Arctic region.

In a further paper, it would be interesting to investigate less noticeable foreign policy tools that Russia has already at its disposal and how it uses them to achieve its geological objectives. It could include: the Russian language, the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian minorities in post-soviet countries.

Bibliography

Forbes. (2019) The Strategic Upside Behind Russia's $55 Billion `Power Of Siberia' Pipeline To China. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2019/12/06/is-there-strength-behind-russia-and-chinas-new-power-of-siberia-pipeline/#68b640461faf

France 24, (2020). Trump says US to send medical supplies to Italy, France, Spain. France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/20200330-trump-says-us-to-send-medical-supplies-to-italy-france-spain

France 24, (2020). Brazil's military elite sees France as country's biggest threat, leaked report reveals. France 24.https://www.france24.com/en/20200209-brazil-s-military-elite-sees-france-as-country-s-biggest-threat-leaked-report-reveals

Macron, E. (2017). Macron slams RT, Sputnik news as 'lying propaganda' at Putin press conference. France 24 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gT9sl4Cm3sQ

Freire, M. (2018), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Chapter 26 in in Routledge Handbook of Russian Foreign Policy.

Galeotti, M, (2018). I'm Sorry for Creating the `Gerasimov Doctrine'. Foreign Policy. Https://Foreignpolicy.Com/2018/03/05/Im-Sorry-For-Creating-The-Gerasimov-Doctrine/

GeoHistory. (2019). A Guide to Russia's Resources. https://geohistory.today/resource-extraction-export-russia/

Gerassimov, V. (2013). Ценность науки в предвидении. Voenno-promyshlennyj kur'er. https://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632

Hodgson, G. (2003) Is the Russian bear learning? an operational and tactical analysis of the second Chechen war, 1999-2002, Journal of Strategic Studies, 26:2, 64-91

Ian Anthony, (1998). Russia and the Arms Trade. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Independent, (2020). Trump administration tried to buy coronavirus vaccine `only for the US', report says. Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/coronavirus-vaccine-trump-us-cases-germany-carevac-a9403646.html

International Monetary Fund. (2019). World Economic Outlook Database, October 2019. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=38&pr.y=18&sy=2017&ey=2021&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=922&s=NGDPD%2CPPPGDP%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPPC%2CPCPIPCH&grp=0&a=

Isachenkov, V. (2019). Russia says it is first nation with operational new hypersonic nuclear weapons. Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/russia-says-it-is-first-nation-with-operational-new-hypersonic-nuclear-weapons/

Jeangиne Vilmer, J.-B. Escorcia, A. , Guillaume, M., Herrera, J. (2018). Information Manipulation: A Challenge for Our Democracies, report by the Policy Planning Staff (CAPS) of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM) of the Ministry for the Armed Forces, Paris.

Kant, I. (1795). Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch

Karaganov S. A., Suslov D. (2018). A new world order: A view from Russia, in: Multipolarity: The promise of disharmony. Frankfurt / New York: Campus Verlag, Ch. 5. P. 59-82.

Karaganov S. A. (2018 ) The new Cold War and the emerging Greater Eurasia // Journal of Eurasian Studies.. Vol. 9. No. 2. P. 85-93.

Keohane, R (1990), international Liberalism Reconsidered.

Keohane, R. and Martin, L. (1995). The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. International Security Vol. 20, No. 1 (summer, 1995), pp. 39-51.

Kristensen, H., Korda, M. (2020). Status of World Nuclear Forces. Federation of American Scientists (FAS). https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/

Konyshev, V., Sergunin, A. (2018). Military, Chapter 10 in Routledge Handbook of Russian Foreign Policy.

Lagneau, L. (2018). En 2018, le budget du renseignement amйricain s'est йlevй а 81,5 milliards de dollars, en hausse de 11,6%. Zone Militaire. http://www.opex360.com/2018/10/31/en-2018-le-budget-du-renseignement-americain-sest-eleve-a-815-milliards-de-dollars-en-hausse-de-116/

Laird R. F., (1984), Soviet Arms Trade with the Noncommunist Third World. Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science. Vol. 35, No. 3, The Soviet Union in the 1980s pp. 196-213

Layne, C. (1998). Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century? World Policy Journal, 15(2), 8-28.

Lavrov. (2005). Reports by Uzreports.com on the 28^th of November 2005.

Le Figaro. (2013). Mali : la France met la pression sur les Йtats-Unis. Le Figaro. https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2013/01/23/01003-20130123ARTFIG00315-mali-la-france-met-la-pression-sur-les-etats-unis.php

Le Monde. (2020). La « politique de gйnйrositй » intйressйe de la Chine et de la Russie en Italie. Le Monde. https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2020/03/25/la-politique-de-generosite-interessee-de-la-chine-et-de-la-russie-en-italie_6034433_3210.html

Le Monde. (2013). Prism, Snowden, surveillance : 7 questions pour tout comprendre. Le Monde. https://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/07/02/prism-snowden-surveillance-de-la-nsa-tout-comprendre-en-6-etapes_3437984_651865.html

Liefert, W. (2004). Food Security in Russia: Economic Growth and Rising Incomes are Reducing Insecurity. https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/37133/30604_gfa15i_002.pdf?v=41403

Mearsheimer, J. (2014). The tragedy of great power politics. New York: W. W. Norton.

Mediapart. (2015). Revealed: the massive US industrial espionage against France. Mediapart. https://www.mediapart.fr/en/journal/france/290615/revealed-massive-us-industrial-espionage-against-france?_locale=en&onglet=full

Mediapart. (2015). Revealed: how US tapped phones of three French presidents. Mediapart. https://www.mediapart.fr/en/journal/france/230615/revealed-how-us-tapped-phones-three-french-presidents

NATO, (2019). NATO agrees 2019 civil and military budgets for further adaptation. NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_161633.htm?selectedLocale=en

Newnham, R., (2011). Oil, Carrots, and Sticks: Russia's Energy Resources as a Foreign Policy Tool. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 2(2), pp.134-143. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1016/j.euras.2011.03.004

Nye, J. (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.

Nye, J. (2003). Propaganda Isn't the Way: Soft Power. International Herald Tribune. Retrieved October 1, 2012.

Observer Research Foundation (2020). Russia-Belarus relations: The future of the union state. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/russia-belarus-relations-future-union-state-65288/

Putin, V. (2013). A Plea for Caution From Russia. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html

Putin, V. (2018). Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957

Putin, V (2019). Путин о гиперзвуковом оружии: "теперь догоняют нас" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NeKeLGHrUXA

Reuters. (2010). Belarus leader raps Russia, may snub security summit. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-belarus-russia/belarus-leader-raps-russia-may-snub-security-summit-idUSTRE63O0PT20100425

Sakwa, R (2019). Back to Cold War and beyond. Eurozine.

https://www.eurozine.com/back-cold-war-beyond/

Schuman, R. (1950). The Schuman Declaration. "EUROPA - The Schuman Declaration - 9 May 1950". europa.eu.

SIPRI, (2019). Global arms trade: USA increases dominance; arms flows to the Middle East surge, says SIPRI. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2019/global-arms-trade-usa-increases-dominance-arms-flows-middle-east-surge-says-sipri?fbclid=IwAR1IpIJynNl8ftAccZD8TFjdtcagsObGXE0Q0jOhKzdSQp1ETcJF0Ru472Q

Shiraev, E., & Zubok, V. (2019). International relations.

Surkov N. Y., Zvyagelskaya I. D., (2019), Russian Policy in the Middle East: Dividends and Costs of the Big Game: RIAC Working Paper No. 51/2019/. Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC).

Tenenbaum, E., Paglia, M., Ruffiй, N. (2020). Confettis d'empire ou points d'appui ? L'avenir de la stratйgie franзaise de prйsence et de souverainetй. Focus stratйgique, n° 94, fйvrier 2020. https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/etudes-de-lifri/focus-strategique/confettis-dempire-points-dappui-lavenir-de-strategie

Tian N, Fleurant A, Kuimova A, Wezeman P and Wezeman S. (2019). Trends in World Military. Expenditure, 2018. Stockholm Interna tional Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

The American Interest, (2017). Sympathy for the Kremlin. The American Interest https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/06/22/putin-interviews-sympathy-kremlin/

The Financial Times. (2019). Macron and Merkel risk doing Putin's work. The Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/653cb89f-00bd-4f9b-98de-f0acd796694f

The Guardian, (2020). Coronavirus: anger in Germany at report Trump seeking exclusive vaccine deal. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/16/not-for-sale-anger-in-germany-at-report-trump-seeking-exclusive-coronavirus-vaccine-deal

The Guardian, (2015). This article is more than 4 years old NSA tapped German Chancellery for decades, WikiLeaks claims. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/08/nsa-tapped-german-chancellery-decades-wikileaks-claims-merkel

The Guardian. (2009). The fog of cyberwar. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2009/feb/05/kyrgyzstan-cyberattack-internet-access

The Moscow Times, (2019). Russia Remains Second-Largest Arms Exporter Despite Sales Drop - Think Tank. The Moscow Times. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/03/11/russia-remains-second-largest-arms-exporter-despite-sales-drop-think-tank-a64763

The Moscow Times. (2018). France's Macron Lifts Ban on Access for Russia Today Channel. The Moscow Times. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/11/14/frances-macron-lifts-ban-on-access-for-russia-today-channel-a63488

The Moscow Times. (2009). Lukashenko Plays Coy With Kremlin. The Moscow Times.

The Times of Israel. (2016). Iran gets first missile shipment for S-300 system. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-gets-first-missile-shipment-for-s-300-system/.

The National Interest. (2020). Why Did Saudi Arabia Want Russia's S-400? The National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-did-saudi-arabia-want-russias-s-400-114711

The New York Times. (1991). SOVIET DISARRAY; Yeltsin Says Russia Seeks to Join NATO. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/21/world/soviet-disarray-yeltsin-says-russia-seeks-to-join-nato.html

The New York Times. (2017). Marine Le Pen of France Meets With Vladimir Putin in Moscow. The New York Times. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/world/europe/marine-le-pen-of-france-meets-with-putin-in-moscow.html

Thucydides. (431 BC) History of the Peloponnesian War.

Toft, P. (2005). John J. Mearsheimer: An offensive realist between geopolitics and power. Journal of International Relations and Development, 8(4), 381-408.

Vinokurov, E., (2017). Eurasian Economic Union: Current state and preliminary results. Russian Journal of Economics, 3(1), pp.54-70

Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of international politics. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Wivel, A., (2017). Realism in Foreign Policy Analysis. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics.

Woolf. (1940). Utopia and Reality.

Wendt, A. (1999), Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.1.

Размещено на Allbest.ru