European Union and migration

Researchers from the University of Sheffield made a social media research on `how those photos of Aylan Kurdi were discussed within a European context in relation with the changing public opinion. They agree that “the image produced a `seismic shock' in terms of change of opinion (from being inimical to `migrants' to empathic to `refugees') which could be seen as a change in media, public opinion and civil society as well. However, this stream of change through social media towards a positive image of refugees was affected following terror attacks in Paris in November, especially when it was reported that a passport belonging to a Syrian refugee was found at the scene.

Dr Vis claims in the report that “this prompted many UK newspapers to run a headline that swayed the rhetoric once again towards `defence of the borders'. Indeed, it looks more likely that the softening of attitudes to refugees which the image of Aylan Kurdi gave rise to will be to a greater or lesser extent undone.” (Vis, 2015) The following change in the public discourse and political implications will be held in chapter III.

In this chapter, the immediate action that was proposed and implemented between April 2015 and March 2016 will be analysed through the institutional interests and the European values.

2.2 General Overview: EU Policy Response

Considering the socio-political developments in North Africa, Sub Saharan Africa and Middle East, the escalated pressure of migration flow towards Europe has not been a surprise in last decade. Yet, no political actors within the EU approached to the issue with decisively, until the death toll at Mediterranean has become alarming on the media. In April 2015, which is considered as the deadliest month in 2015, nearly 1,250 migrants died, when their overcrowded vessel capsized off the coast of Libya. Seventy-seven per cent of the deaths occurred in the Central Mediterranean route in 2015, while this compares to 97 per cent of migrant deaths recorded along this route in 2014. IOM Data; available at https://www.iom.int/news/iom-counts-3771-migrant-fatalities-mediterranean-2015

Since mid 2015, due to the pressure of high numbers of arrivals pose to the asylum systems in these countries; several local, national and also union level measures have been carried out as part of the response. Especially after two incidents of boat shipwreck on Mediterranean, subsequently, the European Council released a press statement consist of 10 step of actions upon a special meeting on 23^rd April 2015. See the report in; http://ec.europa.eu/news/2016/02/20160210_en.htm An emergency meeting of European Council took place on 23^rd April to request the Commission to respond to `prevent further loss of life at sea and to tackle the root causes of the human emergency'. Though the immediate priority was identified as `preventing more people dying at sea', the proposed actions as a guidance for the EU for following response was perceived controversial in terms of means-goals-values perspective.

“We have therefore decided to strengthen our presence at sea, to fight the traffickers, to prevent illegal migration flows and to reinforce internal solidarity and responsibility. Given that instability in Libya creates an ideal environment for the criminal activities of traffickers, we will actively support all UN-led efforts towards re-establishing government authority in Libya. We will also step up efforts to address conflict and instability as key push factors of migration, including in Syria.”(Statement, EU Council April 2015) Special meeting of the European Council, 23 April 2015 - statement, 23.04.2015; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/23-special-euco-statement/

Just a few days later, the European Parliament followed the same path, adopting a resolution to urge both the EU and the Member States to `build on the existing cooperation in the Common European Asylum System and prevent the loss at sea'. European Parliament, “Resolution on the latest tragedies in the Mediterranean and EU migration and asylum policies, 2015/2660(RSP)” <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2015/2660(RSP)> An emphasize was made on `solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, and to take a comprehensive European approach'. European Parliament's resolution was relatively more holistic and well designed to refer to the root causes, but more importantly, to ensure safe legal channels for migrants without putting lives in danger.

Accordingly, the European Agenda on Migration including a package of implementing measures `to tackle the crisis' was presented by the European Commission in May 2015. European Agenda on Migration http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf It was a cornerstone, as well as a ground for the following measures in pursuing a `consistent and clear common policy' for migration presented as a `new approach'.

The agenda was presented with three main goals; setting up an immediate action plan compiled of various emergency immediate measures, indicating the root causes of migration by upholding the international obligations, and repairing the existing policy on asylum to build a permanent common asylum policy for Europe.

Under the provision of these goals; the European Commission tabled series of proposals designed to equip Member States with the tools necessary to manage the large number of arrivals, many of which have already been adopted by the European Parliament and the Council. The list of measures can be extended from tripling the search and rescue presence at sea through relocation asylum seekers from the frontline countries to other Member States via bringing also Hotspot approach for registration of asylum seekers. In terms of prospective measures for the internal EU asylum policy the more stringent application of CEAS rules, and revision of the Dublin Regulation European Union, Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person [2013] (hereinafter: the Dublin Regulation) 31-59. and were also included in the Agenda.

Furthermore, two important extraterritorial measures have been also pointed; a new coordination and cooperation framework for the Western Balkan countries; and partnership with Turkey to return refugees back from Greece. (European Commission, 2016) The deal between EU and Turkey has been especially criticized due to taking the refugees as a matter of bargain to request Turkey to accelerate readmission of refugees from Greece in return of 3b€ additional budgetary support. This topic will be evaluated in detail in next chapter.

Agenda identified six `immediate (short-term) EU policy actions' or proposals: https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/EU%20Response%20to%20the%202015%20Refugee%20Crisis_0.pdf

1) Tripling the financial and technical capacity of the EU External Border Agency (Frontex) for joint border control and surveillance operations `Triton' and `Poseidon' in the Mediterranean to save the lives

2) A temporary and emergency-driven relocation mechanism for asylum-seekers to support the member states confronting higher pressure (right now only Italy and Greece), based on a new redistribution key criteria for determining responsibility for assessing asylum applications; and claiming of a legislative initiative for a permanent system. In addition, a resettlement mechanism for 20,000 refugees from non-EU countries to EU member states, and an extra €50 million budget for supporting the scheme

4) Setting up a new `hotspot approach' in which EU agencies such as Frontex, Europol and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) would work on the ground to support `frontline' member states in identifying, registering and fingerprinting processes of new arrival migrants. Allocation of €60 million to frontline countries from emergency funding

5) Strengthening Europol's joint maritime information operation in the Mediterranean to deal with migrants' smuggling via CEPOL (European Policy College)

6) Establishing a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Operation in the Mediterranean to dismantle traffickers' networks and the `business model' of smugglers, so as to identify, capture and destroy vessels used by smugglers In addition to these `immediate' actions, understood as more `medium-term' in nature, the European Agenda on Migration outlined the following four key `pillars' or `levels of action' for an EU migration policy: reducing the incentives for irregular migration, saving lives and securing external borders, creating a strong common asylum policy and a new policy on legal migration.

2.2.1 Saving Lives at Sea OR Saving Borders of the EU

While the central problem was presented as increasing number of death at the Meditterenean, after the emergency meeting of Member States leaders', the action plan presented a `solutions' that were mainly focusing securitization measures and border control rather than rescue of people in distress. The prospective measures in consent with the leaders were grouped in four topics. The topics are pretty much interrelated with each other, but what is more obvious is the common feature of all is securitization strategies embedded in all courses of action.

“Strengthening our presence at sea” is the first of those measures, underlined with `humanitarian duty' to take action to prevent further loss at sea. The word choice of `strengthening presence at sea' is actually very dubious in terms of defining the type or presence and instruments to employ. Although the effort to triple the funds and capacity of Frontex operations `Triton and Poseidon to allow to increase the search and rescue possibilities within the mandate of FRONTEX' was listed as priority, preserving the existing operational structure and code of conduct for Frontex inherently implies that the scope of operations would continue to be security motivated rather than humanitarian. I believe, it is worth to note that Frontex was never intended to have an humanitarian mandate to save lives or rescue operation, but mainly control and surveillance of external borders in coordination with border authorities of Member States. Frontex, Mission and Tasks, http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/mission-and-tasks/ Neither among its pre-defined mission and tasks nor in the Council Regulation allowing establishing Frontex any responsibility regarding `search for distress people at sea' or any rescue mandate is not established, in fact not even mentioned once in the texts.

The operations for search and rescue on Meditterrenean were done by Italy alone -from October `13 to October'14- under the project called Mare Nostrum, rescued over 110,000 refugees and costs 9 million euro per month. However, in October 2014, after the highest number of death at sea this year, Italy stated that they end the Mare Nostrum project and call for joint action on the EU level. The sea rescue project was then replaced with the EU funded projects which was planned to have a budget of 3 million euro per month. However, downsized budget was not the only restriction but also the operational mandate was restricted and not rescue oriented but rather with border security and monitoring focus. http://ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/855-operation-mare-nostrum-to-end-frontex-triton-operation-will-not-ensure-rescue-at-sea-of-migrants-in-international-waters.html

The first intervention of emergency support partially worked for decreasing the death toll on Mediterranean, especially during summer 2015. Some of the member states also dispatched six big ships, 12 boats, three airplanes and two helicopters to patrol the Mediterranean from May until September (Sunde, 2015). Moreover, many NGOs and international organizations such as MSF or UN also deployed rescue operations during this period.

The figures, taken from Missing Migrants Project of International Organization of Migrants are presented in figure1, below.

A detailed analysis of relation between the immediate action and fatalities on Mediterranean is a topic for another research, but two points need to be highlighted. First is that the decline of death, or from the other perspective, the success of humanitarian intervention does not provide a consistent and continuous performance. After the tragedies of April 2015, we observe a positive decline to first 95 in May and then to 10 deaths in the month of June. However, following months the number has increased rapidly again, and since September the overall numbers are over the previous year's figures.

There is no need for debate about positive contribution of extra measures on Italian and Greek coasts after witnessing the success of rescue missions during two months decline. However, lack of continuous achievement actually implies that the temporary rescue missions were not sufficient to cope with such a long term issue. Therefore, even though the number of death has never reached to April`15 figures again (IOM, 2015) the recent increase in April 2016 has actually proved that the emergency response of the EU to save lives was a temporary measure while the humanitarian crisis is permanent. In fact, Medecins Sans Frontier had to start 2 search and rescue projects back again after four months of suspension in the beginning of 2016, and the President Joanne Liu stated that;

“This time last year, as MSF launched our first search and rescue operation, we called the Mediterranean Sea a mass grave - and little has changed since then. As crises and conflicts across the world continue to cause people to flee in their millions, the absence of a global solution to the current refugee crisis, and the European states' policies of deterrence, as well their refusal to provide alternatives to the deadly sea crossing, continue to kill thousands. As humanitarians, we again refuse to look on from the shore.” (MSF Press Release, April 2016)

Second detail in the figure is the escalation-decline dynamics of crisis between two years. The 2014 numbers clearly prove that loss of lives occurred with rapid increases in a similar escalation trend of this year. In fact, while adding the UNHCR monthly arrival figures to the picture, it is actually quite clear that `2015 sudden inflow' was not really sudden or unexpected, but rather came through an escalation wave of a long lasting crisis. Especially considering EU withdrawal of support from Mare Nostrum project, and its replacement with Triton project in 2014 when the arrivals and deaths were overreaching the past records, it is not really surprising to have a dramatic increase in death toll following the inflow.

On the other side, the same trends of increase could be detected between 2013 and 2014. According to Frontex reports in 2014, more than 170 000 migrants arrived in Italy alone in an irregular manner, representing an increase of 277 % compared to 2013. A steady increase was also witnessed by Greece with more than 50 000 irregular migrants reaching the country, representing an increase of 153 % compared to 2013.

The massive number of both survivors and deaths on Mediterranean is, in any case, able to legitimize humanitarian aspect of the crisis and recognize the importance of emergency measures to save lives at sea. However, addressing the issue as an emergency brings the assumption of a newly emerged, temporary and extraordinary problem that the existing capacity cannot response. According to the figures, the existing mechanisms to save lives on the sea, which is the Frontex rescue program and border management, had already remained desperate against the deaths since it was implemented in late 2014. Besides, the numbers are increasing in dramatic magnitude for the last 5 years on Mediterranean already.

Sцnke Schmidt, FEPS Senior Advisor on Migration and Asylum, admits the necessity of rights protection based long term approach in addressing the problem in Mediterranean:

“Progress is seen in stabilising the Central Mediterranean refugee pathway, but the situation remains intolerable, and the EU needs to replace operations with a sustained permanent policy that ensures EU interventions in the long run with a strong humanitarian dimension and with utmost respect for human rights.” (Schmidt, 2016)

According to a survey resultst by Ifop, the research that was titled as “European face the migrant crisis' indicated a strong tendency to `feel Europe has a duty to help those trying to escape conflict and misery'. The same research also showed that the majority of people in five of the seven countries attended to the survey (Germany, France, UK, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and Denmark) believe that most people arriving are seeking asylum because they are fleeing war or are being persecuted in their countries of origin. http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2015/oct/30/european-attitudes-towards-refugees-poll-eu

2.2.2 Military Involvement in the Crisis

Besides of saving lives at sea and establishing marine control through Frontex, another action targeting illegal networks of smugglers and human traffickers in Mediterranean was identified in the Agenda, as well. Therefore, EUNAVFOR Med, a military operation belongs to the EU was launched first time, in order to track the smugglers and identify with military technology More Details available in; http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-med/pdf/factsheet_eunavfor_med_en.pdf .

The mandate was expanded also to include `to undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels as well as enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers' by October 2015. The operation does not deploy or create the EU's own military assets but currently 24 Member States are contributing to the efforts. (AUT, BEL, BGR, CYP, CZE, ESP, EST, FIN, FRA, GER, GBR, GRE, HUN, ITA, LAT, LIT, LUX, MAL, NED, POL, POR, ROM, SLO, SWE)

EUNAVFOR Med is not the only military presence in the crisis. Following a request from Germany, Greece and Turkey, in February NATO took action to assist the security authorities in Greece and Turkey by deploying a maritime force in the Aegean Sea to `conduct reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance of illegal crossings, in support of Turkish and Greek authorities and the EU's Frontex agency.'

Though, it was not pointed in the Agenda specifically, Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2) also started conducting reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance of illegal crossings in the Aegean Sea with its maritime and air assets by patrolling in the Aegean Sea in the area between Greece and Turkey. Information sharing with the Greek and Turkish coast guards, and cutting the lines of illegal trafficking and illegal migration in the Aegean Sea, as mandated by the North Atlantic Council are its prior mandates. NATO is also mandated sharing any information related to refugee movements in real-time with Frontex. More details available in; http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_128657.htm

As far as, I am informed by a member of `Search and Rescue Association' in Bodrum, whom I had chance to interview during internship, the code of conduct is mostly based on information sharing about the reufgee movements. Especially, after the EU-Turkey deal has been initiated, the Turkish coast guard changed the strategy from monitoring and reducing the crossings of refugees towards `preventing' and diminishing any crossing activities on Aegean sea. From this perspective, when the NATO vessels identify a movement of refugees (or a boat in distress) between Turkish-Greek coasts, they immediately inform Turkish Coast who is mandated to `prevent' the refugees to cross the Aegean Sea.

However unlike the strong tendency of militarization in the EU migration management, since the beginning of the crisis the polls have shown public discontent for military measures.

According to Ifop survey results in October 2015, which was one of peak times of refugee arrivals, the highest favorable vote was from France which was a third of voters in the country. In the following 20% in the UK, Italy, the Netherlands and Denmark, 15% in Germany and fewer than 10% in Spain said tougher controls were of the upmost importance. Ifop polled 1000-1100 people online aged 18 or above in France, Germany, the UK, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Denmark. Samples were representative of national populations. http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2015/oct/30/european-attitudes-towards-refugees-poll-eu

2.2.3 `Hotspot Approach' for Reception of Refugees

The European Commission also proposed to a new approach for reception of migrants when they reach to the Eurozone. It is called the “Hotspot” which is designed as part of the immediate action to assist frontline Member States in meeting the challenges as an outcome of high migratory pressures at the EU's external borders. (Statewacth, 2015)

Frontline Members States are proposed support on the ground to swiftly identify, register, fingerprint (or return, if the application is denied or inadmissible Inadmissible application issue appeared especially after the EU-Turkey deal was put forward in March 2016, it will be assessed in detail in 3^rd chapter) the new arrival migrants and asylum seekers. In other words, Hotspot can be simply described the EU-run reception centres in frontline member states like Italy and Greece to identify and fingerprint migrants and refugees. The support to the states was planned to be provided by mainly Frontex, and also the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) “EASO provides or coordinates the provision of operational support, inter alia through the deployment of asylum support teams to support Member States in particular with expert knowhow in the different steps of the asylum process and to facilitate the analysis of asylum applications under examination by the competent national authorities, for example, through 2 joint processing. Currently a number of Member States receive assistance coordinated by EASO through Operational Support Plans (Italy, Greece, Bulgaria and Cyprus).” Statewatch Report, 2016; access in http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/jul/eu-com-hotsposts.pdf , the EU Police Cooperation Agency (Europol) “Europol supports Member States by providing secure information-sharing opportunities, expertise, strategic and operational analysis relating to cross-border serious and organised crime and terrorism. Europol offers support on the spot including forensic assistance to the authorities of the affected Member States and cooperation with other services involved (e.g. EUNAVFOR MED).” Statewatch Report, 2016, access in: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/jul/eu-com-hotsposts.pdf and the EU Judicial Cooperation Agency (Eurojust).

From the perspective of guaranteeing fundamental rights and refugee protection, the `hotspot' approach has been one of the most speculated policy tool that the EU has put forward so far. The main reason of the speculation was extremely ambiguous description -or better to way no description of the instrument on regulations. Indeed, the Agenda does not provide a definition or any legal reference of a “Hotspot” but rather describes how the “Hotspot approach” is to be applied. Accordingly, in such a Hotspot approach:

“the European Asylum Support Office, Frontex and Europol will work on the ground with frontline Member States to swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants. The work of the agencies will be complementary to one another. Those claiming asylum will be immediately channelled into an asylum procedure where EASO support teams will help to process asylum cases as quickly as possible. For those not in need of protection, Frontex will help Member States by coordinating the return of irregular migrants. Europol 3 and Eurojust will assist the host Member State with investigations to dismantle the smuggling and trafficking networks.” (European Agenda, 2015)

The intention was to set up Hotspots in all Member State, on the frontline, dealing with the high numbers of inflow (Italy, Greece, Hungary, and Croatia). Although, they started to be (or at least partially) operational in Italy and Greece by September 2016, Hungary and Croatia refused the implementation based on political concerns. Due to the politically sensitive connotation of being referred to as a hotspot area, and rejecting the idea that they are the first country of refugees arrival in the EU both of them have not let the EU operates through the hotspot approach. On the practical side, they actually rejected being a country of `registration and distribution centre' for tens of thousands of refugees which have actually happened in Greece today.

Today, there are eleven Hotspots (6 in Italy, 5 in Greece) are supported by the EU with staff and technical support. Both tables in the appendix show the capacity and number of staff (national and belonged EU Agencies) in Hotspots in both countries. (See Appendix I-II)

What is striking most is the uneven difference between EASO and FRONTEX staff numbers. EASO, which is the core institutional arrangement for Common European Asylum System and its monitoring in the Member States remained dull compairing to the Frontex capacity in the Hotspots. This uneven situation has been also mentioned many times during my field research by different actors who have been in the hotspot points before. In any case, they seem quite deficient to work out thousands of applicant's procedures including two interviews with every individual asylum applicant, and plus fingerprinting, monitoring, surveillance, and many other mandates.

Another important data that is not reflected in this table is the real numbers of the `camp' populations. A very well-known camp in Lezvos, which is called Moria -this is the facility where the EU agencies' staff located for the procedures as well- has been already overcrowded with sometimes more than double capacity for a longtime. According to a (internal) situation report from the MSF team working on Lezvos, the number of people in Moria was reported as unclear, but the military was providing 2500 meal (x3 in a day) in the camp in the beginning of April. Recently, one activist that I met during the field research has also told that `though the numbers are very unclear because of rapid changes every day, the average number of people in Moria is estimated around 3000 by the beginning of May. Another MSF report from March reported that Samos Hotspot total capacity remained at 280 (before increased capacity in April) when more than 900 people are staying inside the camp. Tents are places inside up to a point that there is no more space to put any single more.”

The overloaded camp capacity indicates two major problems in this context. The provision of humanitarian aid and survival support for refugees cannot be sufficient for everyone. That means that due to the limited resources, the vulnerable groups (minors, old people, sick people, alone woman, etc) might be under the risk to be neglected. In fact, MSF also started to run a camp, which was a transit facility in the beginning of the crisis for the new arrival refugees in Lezvos, in order to provide immediate health care and survival needs. However, after the increased -and unmet- needs of children and woman increased MSF has changed the facility into rather a camp where only children, woman and chronic patients are accepted and treated in dignity. “The `hotspots' are arguably not properly considering the asylum applications of many asylum-seekers who are not due for relocation” (Peers, 2016)

An activist reported the following situation from one of the main hubs and hotspots in Greece, Lezvos Island in April 2016:

“Since the registration centre turned into a detention centre/prison the tensions have been rising. They continued rising as people have not had access to lawyers to represent their cases, minors (under 18s) who should be moved to secure housing within 2 weeks are still in 'prison like' accommodation over a month later and people go hungry regularly as there is not enough food. The toilets are disgusting and the whole experience is far from dignified or humane.” During the field research, I made an interview with an international activist who spent more than 6 months in Greece. We met in Izmir, when she came for a meeting with NGOs that are operational on the Turkish coast.

2.2.4 Relocation and Resettlement Mechanisms

On 14 September 2015, reflecting the specific situations of Member States, the first decision on relocating 40 000 persons in clear need of international protection from Greece and Italy was adopted Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015, available in; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AJOL_2015_239_R_0011 . Over a period of 2 years, 24 000 persons will be relocated from Italy and 16 000 persons from Greece. The first decision on relocation was based on voluntary commitment of the Member States

On 22 September 2015, the Council adopted 2^nd Decision (EU) 2015/1523, which provided additional 120 000 capacity to relocate the asylum seekers from same two countries COUNCIL DECISION (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015, available in; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32015D1601 .

A second implementation package includes following steps:

- “An emergency relocation proposal for 120,000 persons in clear need of international protection from Greece, Hungary and Italy;

- A crisis relocation mechanism to be inserted into the Dublin Regulation;

- A common European list of Safe Countries of Origin;

- Making return policy more effective through a common Return Handbook and an EU Action Plan on Return;

- A Communication on Public Procurement rules for Refugee Support Measures;

- A Communication on addressing the external dimension of the refugee crisis;

- An Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.”

The EU commission introduced the policy mechanism as a `duty to for solidarity and burden sharing' within the European Union. And also claimed that;

“The European Agenda on Migration is based on a simple principle: help migrants in need of international protection and return migrants that have no right to stay on EU territory. To implement this European migration policy, it is essential that all Member States fully implement the common rules on asylum and irregular migration that were agreed at EU-level.” The EU Commission Fact Sheet; 9 September 2015; available in http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5597_en.htm

As a restatement of an existing EU law obligation of fingerprinting all asylum applicants over 14 or anyone found crossing the external border without permission, the relocation can only include the asylum seekers who have been fingerprinted pursuant to Eurodac Regulation.

How has the distribution key for relocation been calculated for Quota allocation?

The distribution key is based on:

a) the size of the population of the country (40% weighting),

b) the total GDP of the country (40% weighting),

c) a corrective factor based on the average number of asylum applications over the previous four years (10% weighting with a 30% cap of the population and GDP effect on the key to avoid disproportionate impact)

d) a corrective factor based on the unemployment rate (10% weighting with a 30% cap of the population and GDP effect on the key to avoid disproportionate effect).

(See the Appendix III: Emergency Relocation for Italy, and Greece) Source: Council Decision establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, Council of the EU, 12098/15, 22 September 2015

The EU has also dedicated a budget of €780 million to support the implementation of the scheme. The receiving Member States will get €6000 per relocated person, including a 50% pre-financing rate to ensure that national authorities have means to act very swiftly. On the other side, Italy and Greece will receive €500 for each person relocated to cover transport costs.

Until 18 March (second progress report) the total number of formal pledges by Member States of relocation amounts to 4,516 (1,573 to Italy and 2,943 to Greece) 2.82% of total (160000). Austria, Croatia, Hungary and Slovakia have still not submitted any pledge. Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovenia have not yet delivered on their pledges. Total number of persons relocated has reached to 1,145 (615 from Greece and 530 from Italy) in the first 6 months of the implementation.

2.2.5 Challenge to human dignity and fundamental rights

According to the Council decisions EU agencies including EASO, Frontex, and Europol will help national officials in Greece and Italy to identify, fingerprint, screen and register asylum applicants, and then organize their relocation to other member states according to the (quota) relocation decisions. The increased attention over identification, screening and fingerprinting has contributed to the concerns about securitization oriented of asylum policy in which the refugees becomes a matter of government and security, no longer a private affair but an object of policy.

“Based on this information, Italy and Greece shall, with the assistance of EASO and, where applicable, identify the individual applicants who could be relocated to the other Member States and, as soon as possible, submit all relevant information to the contact points of those Member States. Following approval of the Member State of relocation, Italy and Greece shall, as soon as possible, take a decision to relocate each of the identified applicants to a specific Member State of relocation, in consultation with EASO, and shall notify the applicant in accordance with Article 6(4). The Member State of relocation may decide not to approve the relocation of an applicant only if there are reasonable grounds as referred to in paragraph 7 of this Article.” http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2015.248.01.0080.01.ENG

Despite positing a significant step for solidarity among member states and frontline countries the preference or choice for country of relocation, the elements of objectification of the refugee can be observed through the regulation. The asylum seekers are completely reduced to a passive position. The regulative power over the body of refugee is consolidated through different means such as depriving from the economic incentives or restriction of freedom of movement.

“..during the period of the examination of applications for international protection, as provided for in the asylum and Schengen acquis, except for serious humanitarian reasons, Member States should neither provide applicants with national travel documents, nor give them other incentives, such as financial ones, which could facilitate their irregular movements to other Member States.” http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2015.248.01.0080.01.ENG

Another issue is related the fundamental human rights and freedom of movement as a challenge waiting for the refugees within this policy mechanism. Although there are some of the aspects introduced are to be welcomed, for instance condition for member state authorities to take into account the potential of the applicants to fit in the social and cultural life on the country through their language skills and family, cultural or social ties, still the authority to decide on asylum provision is merely granted to the Member state without the preferences of the asylum applicant. (Carrera & Guild, 2015) It is clearly stated that who benefit from the process (for instance, Syrians, Iraqis and Eritreans, according to current statistics) will be allocated on a no-choice basis (although family unity must be respected), (Webber, 2015) Afghans are one of the most worrying group in this picture because although they represent around %20 of total refugee arrival in Europe in 2015, they are notably absent from the list due to getting refugee status is well below the 75-percent threshold according to the statistics.

The relocation mechanism does not provide any option to the asylum seekers but only offers on way ticket to the pre-defined location. The overall control over the migrant's body through relocation and deportation policies actually pushes him into a dilemma where none of the options provides a desired life for the future. In the absence of any attempt to consider the asylum-seekers' preferences, there will be an increase of secondary movements and Member States fell back upon the idea of punishing them in this case.

Maarten den Heijer and Thomas Spijkerboer describe the difficulty with an alternative offer:

“It is problematic to compel asylum-seekers to move to a country that they do not wish to be in, since this has already proved unworkable in the original Dublin context. It would have been preferable at least to give asylum-seekers the opportunity to express a (non-binding) preference (with reasons) for particular Member State, or perhaps a list of several preferred Member States.” (Heijer & Spijkerboer, 2016)

In addition to the newly proposed distribution criteria, any new relocation system should take asylum-seekers' preferences into account as far as possible. While the new EU relocation system does not grant full freedom for asylum-seekers to go wherever they wish once they have arrived on EU soil, it does require national authorities to take into account the reception and material support that an applicant can expect to be extended by their new home state. Accordingly, their “language skills and family, cultural or social ties will also have to be considered in any decision.” (Carrerra, 2015)

Although the restriction on secondary movements are quite controversial, and the Dublin system has not worked well at ensuring that asylum-seekers always remain in the State which is responsible for their application, nevertheless the undesired relocation of refugees will possibly fuel up the secondary movements of those who are relocated to undesired countries. Combined with several reasons such as lack of integration policies, economic opportunities or high level of xenophobia in many countries especially in East Europe, it is very likely to have intensive mobility towards migrant magnet countries such as Germany or Sweden as secondary movement.

Aral Kakl, a Syrian refugee who was waiting to be relocated (after the decision of relocation was made) for the last 48 days in a hotel room. On the interview on Iris News agency's webpage, he says “those who do qualify for relocation often wait for weeks, only to be told they will be sent to, for example, Cyprus or Bulgaria - countries they know nothing about. Many subsequently opt to leave the hotel and make their own way to a country of their choice. In the morning, some people get accepted to a country they don't like; by night they will have gone. Every night the same story." (Connelly, 2016)

2.2.6 Insufficiency of the mechanism to respond to the needs

The second issue that is more essential the previous problems is the decisions' total inaptitude to serve their purpose. Even assuming that all Member States would comply and implement the decisions in law and in fact, which means initiating sufficient facilities with accelerated procedure to ensure complete integration of each asylum seeker relocated, though it doesn't sound realistic within the existing structures of member states, nevertheless this mechanism as a temporary intervention with very small capacity would not be a solution for `unprecedented' numbers of refugees.

A solution for the problem of accommodating the massive number of refugees across Europe in order to relieve frontline Member States also requires realistic capacity to respond to the problem. Estimated over a million refugees' needs for accommodation and legal protection currently in the EU zone, the number designated through the EU policy is very low and in fact impotent; considering 160.000 persons to be reallocated in the territory of a 500 millions people, 25 states (Ireland, UK and Denmark are not included).

Irene Wieczorek, researcher at the Institute for European Studies, links the main reason of this problem of inadequacy with the with the sole aim of taking into account the interests and the perspective of Member States rather than perspective of refugee protection and humanitarian solution. She also adds that the EU policy process has only focused on Member States' interests and preferences, which are mainly driven by anti-immigration sentiments, to design its policy mechanisms, while depriving individual asylum seekers of any agency in the decision of where to seek for international protection. (Wieczorek, 2016)

2.2.7 (Un)Willingness to Share the Burden and Missing Element of Solidarity in the EU

The immediate action against the migration crisis was uphold a support for two countries; Italy and Greece, though Hungary was also in the list in the second decision, but was removed upon own request. (Peers, 2015) In both decisions this support was clearly presented;

“In view of the situation, further provisional measures to relieve the asylum pressure from Italy and Greece should be warranted." (Council Decision 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015)

Undoubtedly, as Marco Borraccetti describes, it represent `an important step in the implementation of the principle of solidarity, as well as comprehending the need for cooperation, burden and responsibilities sharing in the EU action'. As he describes in his article, the more solidarity and cooperation based policies towards the crisis can decrease the individual role of the member states, and so it can enable a coherent, common European approach in asylum regime. (Borraccetti, 2015) From this perspective, the relocation mechanism can we welcomed positively.

Promotion of economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States is also one of the main objectives of the Union to create its policies. Such an action aiming to share the burden will serve for the main objective and realize the founding principle of the Union. While the frontline countries are facing serious economic and social challenges stem from the massive inflow, insisting on applying Dublin rules, which has no incentive in terms of sharing the burden by other members, would only deteriorate condition more, as well as the union principles.

Besides, article 80 TFEU applies to both the Union institutions and the Member States concerning all matters falling within the policy area of borders, asylum and immigration, with solidarity as a general notion and sharing of responsibilities being an expression of solidarity. So, referring to Article (80), which emphasizes the need for solidarity and burden-sharing among Member States as regards asylum, in both decisions are quite valuable for the EU action. Solidarity measures are to be included “[w]henever necessary,” relating to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. One could argue that policymaking in these areas requires double scrutiny: 1) establishing whether or not Union measures are required in the particular field (Articles 77 to 79 TFEU); and 2) determining whether or not Member States will be able to implement them by themselves and whether additional solidarity measures are necessary. The Member States' expected loyalty in implementing EU policy appears not to be sufficient; if solidarity is needed, then Union action may be required. And in the case of Italy and Greece the solidarity is more than required

The solidarity and collective action to manage the crisis is not only due to European Union regulations or law but also a strong will of people who live in Europe. An important indicator can be derived from European Parliament opinion poll results in 2016. Nearly two thirds of Europeans think decisions on migration should be taken at EU level rather than nationally, according to a Eurobarometer survey commissioned by Parliament. In addition eight out of ten people polled said asylum seekers should be “better distributed among all EU member states”, while there is already an established consent on `common European policy on migration' according to Eurobarometer results (%68 for, %24 against to a common policy) since 2013.

However, the degree of willingness to share responsibility and burden is not really same among each member. In fact, the priorities, agenda and interests in regards with such a crisis are obtained independently by each member, while it requires a more common policy response. Even though the urgent needs are accumulated (and more visible) on the coasts of Italy and Greece or on the doors of Eastern Europe, the crisis effects all Euro zone through the Schengen agreement. Yet, as Carrerra mentions, the `refugee quota plan' has been strongly criticized by several EU member states, in particular by Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia, ever since the Juncker Commission first proposed it last May (Carrerra, 2015). The common policy response has been also opposed by Belgium, UK and some other member states. But actually cannot be realized without full consent and contribution of member states. Right after the second decision was adopted in September, European Commission Vice President Frans Timmermans said, “Our common European asylum system can only function if everyone plays by the rules.”

Redistribution of 160000 refugees among Member States has not been respected by most of the states in practice, and so it is difficult to observe any accomplishment towards sharing burden objectives and solidarity principle. Hungary, Slovenia and Austria opposed to the proposal and then also changed the number that they allocated. Denmark and the UK opted out from the beginning, and lastly overwhelmed Sweden has reversed its involvement, asking to be a in the `emergency' category and sending country rather than a host for new refugees.

This obvious lack of commitment of Member States indicates a deeper contradiction in the heart of the EU. Beyond the unwillingness of States for the solidarity action, the failure of relocation implementation might prospectively constitute a very dangerous precedent in terms of disregard of the rule of law. The possible derogations from the EU regulations might challenge the fundamental existence of the EU and also jeopardize the rights provision of refugees and asylum seekers in each Member States.

Referring to the solidarity call of President Juncker in October 2015, Sцnke Schmidt, emphasize the prior importance of respecting rule of law and fundamental rights rather than emphasizing merely solidarity.

“As Immanuel Kant in 1795 already stipulated in “Perpetual Peace”, universal hospitality and Human Rights have to be at the centre of every evolving asylum and refugee policy. Upholding European values starts with the unambiguous acknowledgement for refugees and asylum seekers of legal obligations under international conventions ratified by the EU and its Member States. Beyond calling for more Union, more solidarity and responsibility sharing, in line with the letter and spirit of the Lisbon Treaty is needed.” (Schmidt, 2015)

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The overview of the response in this chapter illustrates how so far the priority has been given to policy responses driven by security, border and military concerns and interests of the EU and its member states. The main indicators include the predominance given to measures covering the fight against smuggling, combating against illegal migration, measures on removal and relocation of migrants and as well as measures aiming to reinforce border controls (Carrera, 2016).Since the `state of emergency' on Mediterranean was declared, the goal of saving lives has been sought in two ways: (1) by preventing migrants from starting dangerous journeys, and (2) by using surveillance capabilities to rescue migrants in distress (Guild 2009, Carling & Hйrnandez-Carretero 2011).

However, the latter has been remained idle and insufficient whereas it was sought to be the humanitarian interest and objective of the whole `state of emergency' at the EU. The increased militarization, uneven deployment of Frontex comparing to EASO, increased measures for identification but less investment on asylum processing mechanisms have actually proved that the institutional interest of the EU and Member states have mainly concentrated on securitization and deterrence mechanisms. Therefore, the protection of migrants or humanitarian imperative to save lives might be regarded as both a policy objective and also a rhetorical method of justifying control measures and securitization.

This has led to the marginalization and disregard of possible other non-security, asylum facilitation focused policies that consider the people's movement not as a `security issue' or threat but rather normal events of today's world. This marginalization also undermines long term planning in compliance with the European values and international law.

Furthermore, while detention is possible only as a last resort and for a period 'as short as possible' in the EU law, the new hotspot approach brought the possibility that asylum-seekers may be kept in detention centers for longer periods or even in prisons if there is no specialised detention facilities are available. This implementation contradicts with the fundamental human rights and refugee protection.