Transformation of commemorative practices in Ukrainian historical discourse

“An attitude is definitely positive. Such an institution is necessary, perhaps not in the executive branch, but in the legislative branch. At the same time, it should not only conduct professional historical expertise, but also be able to veto any laws, decrees or other decisions of the legislative and executive branches (both central and local) that are contrary to Ukraine's interests or distort historical events in which Ukraine is directly involved. I believe that the UINM should be constantly represented at the international level, for example, by introducing positions of advisers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine” (man, 40 years old, Zaporizhzhia).

“I would say that the institute of national memory does not “eat” a lot of money, so it does little damage. I personally would not create such an institution, but it suits me perfectly in the format as it exists today. What happened under the previous directors of the UINM, i.e. the opposite strategies, sometimes outrageous ones, shows that much depends on the leader. In particular, the conflict with the Poles I mentioned is partly the fault of the former director of the Institute, Volodymyr Viatrovych. The current director is pursuing a more balanced policy. It is not necessary to close the institution due to the fact that someone once made mistakes. My attitude to UINM is rather positive. I am ready to support it with my taxes” (man, 50 years old, Kyiv).

Conclusions

Summarizing the results of the study, we would like to draw the following conclusions:

All experts have demonstrated a high level of awareness of the forms and content of commemorative practices in modern Ukraine. They have noted the increase in civil society activity in the realm of historical memory after 2014, the use of commemoration elements in the process of establishing the collective identity of Ukrainians, in forming a national narrative, drawing historical parallels and even fighting political opponents. The vast majority of experts give a positive assessment of the directions of the state policy of memory and the activity of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory within the executive power.

Commemorative practices are based on appropriate memory models. The remnants of the Soviet-style totalitarian worldview have led to the popularity of the model of memory in which the state's monopoly on history prevails. The past is a kind of symbolic resource, the use of which contributes to the legitimization of Ukraine as an independent state. Today, many decision-makers have received higher education and made a career either in the Soviet era or in the early years of independence, when commemorative practices were aimed at forming and serving a single narrative. The official view of historical events may have contributed to the objectives of patriotic education, but did not provide for different interpretations. Plural model of memory, which recognizes the existence of several alternatives, “interpretations, experiences as a fundamental principle, where 'own' and 'correct' is not so obvious” (Політика і пам'ять, 2018, с.226), has not still received proper spread. The idea that national memory consists of many particular commemorations, such as Jewish, Crimean Tatar, Polish, Hungarian commemoration, etc., or proletarian or aristocratic (noble) commemoration, is accepted with difficulty even by interviewed experts.

The transformation of commemorative practices in modern Ukraine indicates a certain inertia of their forms compared to the content. According to one respondent, “Ukrainian history has been enriched with new content, but its memory is preserved in old forms”. Along with fundamentally new forms, primarily related to Internet technologies and social networks, commemoration in Ukraine, as in the Soviet period, is focused on honoring heroes and victims. At the same time, there is a radical reassessment: the heroes of the Soviet era have become villains, and villains have become heroes. All this points to the “hybrid nature” of commemorative practices with an emphasis on the martyrological-victim component and the trauma of the social psyche of Ukrainians.

The dominant motive of commemorative practices in modern Ukraine is the “nationalization” of historical narrative. The noticeable Ukrainophile renaissance, manifested in the popularization of the names of many undeservedly forgotten figures in Ukrainian history, the return to national symbols and religious rituals, is strengthened by the need for ideological confrontation with Russian hybrid aggression. Leading topics in this regard are the Cossacks, the liberation struggle of 1917-1921, the activities of the OUN-UPA, the dissident movement, the Revolution of Dignity, the modern Ukrainian-Russian war. The tragic events of the Holodomor of 1932-33 are acquiring ethnic tint. However, alternatives to the Ukrainian narrative of memory, such as the Holocaust of the Jews during World War II, are difficult and ambiguous for society, as evidenced by the recent debate over the Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial.

Experts noted a certain decrease in tension around another trend in the dynamics of commemorative practices, namely around decommunization. After the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a package of decommunization laws in April 2015, the spontaneous process, which has been slowly developing in most regions of Ukraine since 1991, has been regulated at the legislative level. The calendar of Soviet holidays and anniversaries has been revised substantially, the pantheon of heroes has been changed, monuments to Soviet leaders have been dismantled, and the communist regime has been assessed as criminal. Ukrainian society reacted relatively calmly to these measures, which, according to experts, indicates the readiness of the majority of the population to abandon Soviet values and the “overripe” nature of Ukrainian decommunization. Even the Victory Day over Nazism, which is the most sacred for the entire post-Soviet memorial space, is no longer perceived as “our” holiday in Ukraine.

In general, changes in commemorative practices indicate that Ukrainian society has become more homogeneous since 2014. Regional differences in assessments of past events no longer look radically opposite. Experts from the southern and eastern regions and cities sometimes take a more nation-centric and patriotic stance than representatives of the western and central regions of Ukraine. Apparently, the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Donbass have catalyzed the process of “nationalization” of the historical memory, and commemorative practices have played a role in mobilizing the population around patriotic forces to resist Russian aggression.

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