Orel offensive operation (12 july - 18 august, 1943): success and failures of the Red army command regarding the armored and mechanized troops use

The enemy, taking advantage of the slow advance of the right wing of the Central Front, hastily withdrew its units to the northern bank of the Kroma River and to the western bank of the Nezhivka River, where it moved to the defense to prevent breakthrough of the Red Army troops in the northern and north-western directions. K. K. Rokossovsky, the Commander of the Front of the General Army, trying to thwart the enemy's plan, ordered Army 48 and Guard Tank Army 3 on the morning of August 1 to resume the offensive and to perform the previously set tasks, and Army 70 and Tank Army 2 simultaneously to go on the offensive and bypass Orel group of the enemy from the South (Daynes, 2009, p. 396).

At the end of the day on July 30, the Central Front troops advanced only to a depth distance of 40 km. J. Stalin, observing the development of events in Orel direction, was dissatisfied with the actions of the commander of the Central Front. At 2.40, on August 1, he sent him a directive: “Recently, due to the offensive of the troops of Briansk and the left wing of the Western Front, the enemy group has got significantly weakened in the zone in front of the Central Front, withdrawing five tank divisions, two motor divisions and up to two or three infantry divisions”.

At the same time, the Central Front was significantly strengthened by tanks, having received Tank Army 3 under the command of Rybalko. “All this led to an improvement in the position of the troops of the front and created favourable conditions for the decisive offensive action. However, these conditions are still insufficiently used by the front command” (Russian archive, 1996, p. 185).

The Supreme Command Headquarters set the tasks for the front commander to immediately prepare and strike a decisive blow immediately with the forces of Army 70 and Tank Army 2 in the direction of Chuvardino, Chervona Roshcha, and Apalkova. At the same time Army 13 had the task to break through the enemy's defenses west of Koroskovo, preparing the conditions for the introduction of a breakthrough of Guard Tank Army 3 until the moment of its concentration.

Guard Tank Army 3 was to locate until August 5 in the area south of Koroskovo with the task of developing success of Army 13 and striking in the direction of Kroma to reduce the enemy's defenses on the west bank of the Oka River and thus help Army 48 move forward.

Subsequently, Tank Army 2 and Guard Tank Army 3 had to be ready to bypass Orel from the West, helping Briansk Front in defeating Orel enemy group and capturing the city of Orel (Russian archive, 1996, pp. 185-186).

Having received the order from the Supreme Command Headquarters, the Commander of the Central Front, taking into account the current situation, clarified the tasks for the front troops:

for Army 48 - to stop the attack and get ready for the defense in the positions occupied;

for Guard Tank Army 3 - to withdraw troops from the battle and arrive in the area of Rybnytsya by the morning of August 3 (24-25 km to the southwest);

for Tank Corps 9 from the evening of August 1 to begin the pursuit of the enemy and not give him the opportunity to gain a foothold on the river Kroma (Daynes, 2010, pp. 304-305).

On August 4, Army General K. K. Rokossovsky clarified the task of the troops of the right wing of the front. Army 70 units were to intensify the hostilities, and Tank Army 2and Tank Corps 9 were to strike at the enemy's rear in the general direction of Kolka, Chervona Yagoda and help Army 70 troops in curtailing the enemy's defenses. The Commander of Guard Tank Army 3 received the task at 13 o'clock to start the attack, forcing the river Kroma in the area of Kolka, Chervona Roshcha, and then to strike in the general direction of Khmelevo, Hnyle, Khotkovo, to cut off the enemy's retreat to the West and South-West from the area of Kroma, Orel, Naryshkino. The Commander of Army 13 was given the task to support artillery fire and to provide a crossing of Guard Tank Army 3 across the Kroma River, further using its success, to move forward rapidly and at the end of the day on August 4 to reach the border of Maryinsky, Chervonyi Orach, Chervona Nyva, Dolzhenki (Daynes, 2009, p. 397).

The order of the Commander of the front was received by the headquarters of Guard Tank Army 3 with a delay. The Army units went on the offensive at 3:30 p.m., on August 4. The troops of Guard Tank Army 3 carried out the offensive under heavy artillery fire and air strikes, only at the end of the day were able to reach the southern bank of the river Kroma, but could not capture the crossing at once. Only the next day at 11 o'clock the motorized infantry units of the mechanized brigades 18, 34 (MBR) of Infantry division mechanized corps (MK) 7 forced the river Kroma near Novotroitsky and captured the bridgehead on the opposite bank, but could not move deeper. The Parts of Guard Tank Army 6 and 7 captured Hlynky, but could not hold the position under a strong enemy pressure and were forced to cross to the southern bank of the river Kroma. Only by the end of the day, on August 5, Tank Brigade 88 of Guard Tank Corps 7 managed to capture the crossing in the area of Kutafino and on the night of August 6 to begin the crossing of tanks to the northern bank of the Kroma river (Daynes, 2010, p. 372).

At this time, the troops ofArmy 3 and Army 63 ofBriansk Front liberated Orel on August 5. The Supreme Command Headquarters, seeking to consolidate the achieved success, by its directive № 30159, ordered Briansk Front commander, on August 6, to focus the main efforts on the rapid capture of Khotynets and Karachev. The Commander of the Central Front was given the task to use Tank Army 2 and Guard Tank Army 3 to strike in the direction of Shablykino in the interaction with the right wing of Briansk Front to destroy the enemy, the troops of which were retreating from Orel to the west. The task was given to involve all Briansk Front and Central Front aircraft to perform this task (Russian archive, 1996, p. 186).

At the beginning of August, the general situation in the area of Orel ledge was characterized by the fact that Briansk Front troops captured the city of Orel, but the Central Front troops were still on the approaches to Kroma until August 4 - Army 13 and Tank Army 2 fought on the bank border of the Kroma River. Analyzing the situation, the Command of the Army Group “Center” understood that due to fatigue and reduced combat capability of the troops it was impossible to stop the attack of the Red Army troops, it wass necessary to leave Orel ledge as soon as possible (Bukeyhanov, 2013, p. 249).

In pursuance of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Lieutenant-General P.S. Rybalko was given the task to pursue the enemy in the direction of Khmyliov, Mytske, Shablykino and to capture: Shablykino, Novosiolki, Herasymovo, Volkovo, Robye. The troops of Tank Army 2 - to chase the enemy in the direction of Hnezdylovo, Veselyi Kut, Rabotkovo, Berezivka, Hnezdylivka and capture Rabotkovo, Borodino, Lyse (Shein, 2009, p. 187). But the tank armies failed to accomplish the task. The fierce resistance of the enemy, whose soldiers clung to the accidental, unprepared frontiers, sought to delay the offensive of the Red Army troops and thus to ensure the systematic withdrawal of Orel group, did not allow the Red Army troops to reach the boundaries, specified in the order of the front commander. The low rate of attack of tank formations caused sharp dissatisfaction in the Headquarters of the Central Front.

The Army General K. K. Rokossovsky, in his order to the commanders of the tank armies, expressed dissatisfaction with their actions. He demanded from Guard Tank Army 3, on the morning of August 7 to break through the enemy defense in the area of Krasny Orach, Dolzhenko and, developing the strike to Maslovo, Soskovo, at the end of the day to capture the area of Troitsky, Soskovo, Zvyagintsevo, Maslovo. K. K. Rokossovsky required the use of the tank formations and motorized infantry during the attack in a massive way, not attacking by small scattered groups. He ordered to bring to strict responsibility, even the trial of commanders of the units and formations that do not perform the tasks (CAMD RF, f. 62, d. 329, ref. 23, pp. 234-236).

It should be noted that the orders given by the commander of the Central Command troops for the period from July 30 to August 6 indicate his intention to achieve the fastest fulfillment of the tasks set by the Supreme Command Headquarters.

Were there any accusations against Guard Tank Army 3 fair? The Army units lacked ammunition and artillery. Interaction with motorized infantry units and units was not properly developed. This led the tankers combat without the support of motorized infantry, the tankers independently broke through the enemy's defenses. And the task of tankers was to develop an attack after the breakthrough of the enemy's defenses. After all, the offensive must be carried out with full force, at a high pace, continuously day and night, under all weather conditions, with close cooperation of units of all types of troops and security. The shortcomings of the Central Front headquarters regarding the general management of the operation are viewed. In addition, during the last three days of the hostilities on the banks of the Kroma River, the army losses were: almost 2,5 killed and wounded, 104 tanks and SAU (Shein, 2009, p. 187).

Despite the measures taken, the attack of the Central Command troops was slow. On the right wing, they advanced only for 10 km. The troops of Army 65 and Army 70 with the support of Aircraft Army 16 liberated Dmytrovsk-Orlovsky on August 12. The unit of Army 13 on the same day, having met the organized resistance of the enemy from the west bank of the rivers Vodocha and Lokna, was forced to start the defense.

The advance of the units of Guard Tank Army 3 was slow. The parts of Guard Mobile Corps 7 managed to seize the area of Troitske only at the end of the day on August 9. At the same time Tank Army 6 occupied Khmeliove, and Guard Tank Army 7 was stopped on the outskirts of Soskov. The enemy, relying on a prepared defensive line, made a fierce resistance. At the end of the day, on August 10, Guard Tank Army 3 lost about 60 tanks. The German units of Divisions 383 and 6 also suffered heavy losses and began retreating to the Vodocha River (Daynes, 2010, p. 373).

Large losses of the troops of Guard Tank Army 3 were negatively treated in the General Headquarters of the Red Army. The General Headquarters reacted immediately and sent Directive to the commanders of the Central Front and Guard Tank Army: “According to the General Headquarters, Guard Tank Army 3 in the amount of 110 tanks 10.8 in battles for height 264, 6 lost 100 tanks, that is, in fact, was destroyed by the enemy. That happened during in the general withdrawal of the enemy and the lack of a prepared defense. At the same time, our tank group was destroyed by the enemy, penetrating only for 2-3 km into enemy's territory, that is, the tank group could have been given all possible help and support. The destruction of such a large number of our tanks within a few hours indicates not only the complete lack of interaction of Guard Tank Army 3 and Army 13, but also the inaction of these commanders, who abandoned the tanks at random without any support. For the report to the People's Commissar for Defense, I ask you to begin investigation and report the results to the General Headquarters Staff”.

During the hostilities from July 28 to August 12, the loss of Guard Tank Army 3 troops was 7729 people, including 2061 killed, 350 tanks, 5 SAU, or 42% of the total number of combat vehicles (CAMD RF, f. 315, d. 4440, ref. 33, p. 7). According to other data, the army lost 60,3% of T-34 tanks and 72,9% of T-70 tanks (Daynes, 2010, p. 374). The commander of the Central Front, because of the heavy losses of troops Guard Tank Army 3, decided to withdraw it from the battle and concentrate in the area of Sukhe, Torokhov, Apalkov. At 2 o'clock, on the night of August 12, the army headquarters received an order to subordinate to the Commander of Army 13 (Rokossovskiy, 1988, p. 277).

Guard Tank Army 3 suffered significant losses and according to the Directive of the General Headquarters № 40202 on August 13 (without Guard Mobile Corps 7) Guard Tank Army 3 was withdrawn from the Central Front to the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters. All tanks and SAU remained in the Central Front, and Guard Tank Corps 7 years was transferred to Tank Army 2.

This ended the participation of the troops of Guard Tank Army 3 in Orel attack campaign. By September 1, it was planned to add to its staff personnel, tanks, weapons, vehicles and all kinds of supplies

The peculiarities of Guard Tank Army 3 participation in the operation “Kutuzov” were: repeated change of its combat missions; frequent regrouping; making a breakthrough in the enemy defense alone or in cooperation with general armies.

On Briansk Front, the events unfolded as follows. On August 6, Infantry Division 11 started the attack. At the same time, Tank Corps 1 was advancing in the direction of Vysoke. From Peshkovo district the main forces of Tank Army 4 advanced to Melove, bypassing Khotynets from the East, and Tank Corps 25 advanced to Bunina. Together, they defeated Khotynets group of the enemy and liberated Khotynets. Tank Corps 1developed the attack on Karachev, and Tank Army 4 - further to the South.

By August 18, Briansk Front, Western Front, and Central Front troops had reached the front lines of the pre-established German defensive line “Hagen” and were stopped on the line to the East of Lyudinovo, 25 km to the East of Briansk, to the West of Dmytrivsk- Orlovsk. This was the end of Operation “Kutuzov”, during which the troops of the three fronts advanced for 150 km, eliminating the enemy's Orel bridgehead (Daynes, 2010, p. 470). Orel operation lasted for 38 days.

After the end of Orel offensive operation Tank Army 4 did not join the hostilities for a long time.

The results of the Battle of Kursk were quite disappointing for the Soviet Union in terms of the ratio of losses. The total losses of the Soviet troops in Orel operation, according to some calculations, reached429,890 people, including irreversible - 112,529, sanitary - 317,361; average daily - 11,313 people (Krivosheev, 1993, pp. 188-189), 2 586 танків (Daynes, 2010, p. 308). According to other data, 860,000 people. The total losses of the Soviet troops during the attack campaign, the Battle of Kursk are calculated at approximately 1,677,000 killed, captured, wounded and sick, as compared to approximately 360,000 in the Wehrmacht troops (Smirnov, 1979, p. 289).

The Conclusions

As a result of Orel operation, the Red Army liquidated Orel bridgehead, inflicting a significant defeat on the Wehrmacht group and pushing its troops into Bri- ansk area. The liquidation of Orel bridgehead of the Germans in July-August 1943 required incredible efforts and enormous sacrifices.

Significant forces of armored and mechanized troops were involved in the counterattack near Kursk. For the first time since the beginning of the German-Soviet war, three tank armies were used, as well as seven separate tank corps, seven tank brigades, twenty-seven tank regiments, and fifteen self-propelled artillery regiments in one offensive operation.

Significant drawbacks were made during the operation. During the preparation for the operation, the Supreme Command Headquarters was hasty in determining the time of its beginning. As a result, the troops went on the offensive without finishing the preparation, no more powerful group was created on the left flank of the Western Front. The troops of Briansk Front had to overcome the deeply echeloned defense of the enemy with a frontal strike. The front-line aircraft could not completely solve the problem of isolating the combat area from the approach of the enemy's operational reserves. As a result, instead of a rapid strike, the operation became protracted. The enemy, in fact, was slowly squeezed out of Orel ledge, which allowed him to regroup the troops and withdraw them in an organized manner from Orel area.

The tank armies became the main means of developing success of the fronts, and tank and mechanized corps - of general armies. But they were often used to break through several enemy defensive lines, which sharply reduced their ability to develop an offensive at an operational depth. Tank Army 2 was used for a frontal strike, and it would be more appropriate to use it on the flank, at the junction between Army 70 and Army 65, which would significantly accelerate the solution of the problems of the Central Front. Quite incompetently there was used Guard Tank Army 3 on Briansk and Central fronts. Often changing the tasks, unjustified by the situation, the army commander was unable to focus on a powerful strike, because the tank corps were scattered on the front. This caused great losses of personnel and tanks in the army. Tank armies were used for the first time in a counterattack without infantry.

Separate tank brigades, regiments and battalions, as well as self-propelled artillery regiments and divisions (from the beginning of Orel offensive operation), which were added to the infantry divisions, were used as tanks of a direct support of infantry in breaking through the enemy's positional defenses, their density increased as compared to Stalingrad Battle - 20 tanks and SAU per 1 km of the front. But during the breakthrough of a highly deep-echeloned enemy defense, such densities were insufficient. The peculiarity of the use of tank brigades was that they were not crushed or added to the infantry regiments, but acted in the direction of the main strike of the infantry division. From the added tanks in the division, an infantry support group was created, which received tasks directly from the division commander.

The supply of artillery to the tank armies during the battle was insufficient due to the lack of army artillery. This was one of the reasons for the significant combat losses of tanks.

Tank armies, tank and mechanized corps were most successful only in close cooperation with all-military units, artillery and aircraft.

In Orel offensive operation, an example was initiated when a brigade (TBR 159), which acted as an advanced detachment and acted in isolation from the main forces of the corps (Tank Corps 1), began the counterattack with operational reserves suitable not only for capture and retention of a favourable frontier for the deployment of the main forces of the corps, but also in order to force the enemy to deploy their troops prematurely in the combat order, to inflict a strong initial strike, to inflict defeats and to ensure successful combat operations of the corps.

In the perspective of a further research issue, the authors will consider the peculiarities of the use of armored and mechanized troops during the preparation and conduct of Kursk Strategic Defense Operation (July 5-23, 1943).

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