Working-Class Youth in the Vanguard: Youth Surveys and their Implications

Universities and their staff came into criticism for their failure to educate the youth. Professors were disproportionately targeted in the initial stages of the Great Terror in Gorky. Philosophical and pedagogical faculties were hit by the purge; in December 1935 and January 1936, 20 pedagogical professors were arrested for failing to teach economic materialism and party history73. These purges predated 27 January 1936, when an article appeared in Pravda that critiqued M. N. Pokrovskii (the deceased head of the Red Professoriate) and launched a purge of history faculty, who "continue to insist on historical definitions and conditions grounded in the well-known errors of Pokrovskii"74. Overall, teachers and professors composed 9.64 percent of purge victims in Gorky, with most of those purged being in VUZes75. Between 1936 and 1938, 77 FZU professors and at least 96 professors at technical institutes were arrested76. The regime also targeted students with questionable class backgrounds. In 1938 alone, the NKVD investigated and arrest- O resheniiakh IV Plenuma TsK VLKSM rezoliutsiia po dokladu tov. Beloborodova // Leninskaia smena. 8 Sept. 1937. P. 1. Byt - eto politika // Leninskaia smena. 14 Sept 1937. P 1. Moral'nyi oblik bol'shevika // Leninskaia smena. 22 Sept 1937. P 2. Material otdela shkol i kul'tprosve raboty gorkoma k otchetu gorkom po vuzam i tekhnikami // GOPANO. F. 30. Op. 1. D. 2136. L. 21-6, 33-4; Spravka otdela shkol i nauki Gor'kovskogo obkoma VKP(b) o prepodavanii obshchestvenno-politicheskikh distsiplin v vuzakh goroda "Pokonchit' s politicheskoi bespechnost'iu na vazhneishem uchastke raboty vuzov // GOPANO. F. 3. Op. 1. D. 304. L. 86-93. "V Sovnarkome soiuza SSSR I TsK VKP(b)" // Pravda. 23 Jan. 1936. P 2. Liagushkina L. Sotsial'nyi portret repressirovannykh v RSFSR v khode bol'shogo terrora (19371938 gg.): Sravnitel'nyi analiz baz dannykh po regional'nym `knigam pamiati'. Moscow, 2016. P. 136-145, 351. Material otdela shkol i kul'tprosve raboty gorkoma k otchetu gorkom po vuzam i tekhnikami // GOPANO. F. 30. Op. 1. D. 2136. L. 21-26, 33-34. ed members from 34 anti-Soviet youth groups in pedagogical institutes, arguing that the groups had "improper attitudes toward hooliganism and drinking"Krivoruchenko V. Molodezh', Komsomol, Obshchestvo 30-kh godov XX stoletiia: k problem repressii v molodezhnoi srede. Moscow, 2001. P. 94..

National and local Komsomols were also subject to purging. In July and August 1937, over 70 percent of the Komsomol's Central Committee was removed and arrested, leaving hard-liner Kosarev and a group of his closest allies as the only high-ranking Komsomol leaders remainingGordeeva L. Repressivnyi mekhanizm politicheskoi vlasti // Obshchestvo i vlast': rossiiskaia provintsiia, 1917-1980-e gody. Vol. 2 / ed. by A. Sakharov. Nizhnii Novgorod, 2002. P. 267.. The Komsomol purge targeted passive cadres, hooligans, and "Trotskyist degenerates" - drunks, philanderers, and reprobates, who used their positions to corrupt the youthOtchet gor'kovskogo obkoma VKP(b) o rabote v 1936 g. // GOPANO. F. 3. Op. 1. D. 34. L. 147-152.. Given the level of drinking among the Komsomol leadership, there was no shortage of enemies; even Kosarev - a notorious drinker - issued a self-critique entitled "On my drinking bouts"Bernstein S. Raised under Stalin. P. 104..

The imprisonment of the Gorky Komsomol occurred in two stages, the first of which took place before the purge of the national Komsomol. The uncovering of "Trotskyist degenerate," V. Sorotkin, among the Gorky Komsomol leadership, led Kosarev to launch a mass checking of the Komsomol in spring 1937Krivoruchenko V. Molodezh', komsomol, obshchestvo. P. 91.. Mass removals of high-ranking Komsomol leaders occurred over the next year beginning with the removal of K. Beloborodov, the head of the Gorky Komsomol, and his closest allies. The purge focused on Komsomol agitators in military organizations, who allowed immoral behavior to proliferate in the army, and led to the arrest and execution of 91 high-ranking Komsomol agitators. B. Flaksman, Beloborodov's replacement, soon came under increased criticism and was cited for running a synagogue in his apartment, but his tight knit group of allies in the Komsomol enabled him to weather the accusation, despite much evidence against himOtchet otvetstvennogo sekretaria oblastnogo soveta Soiuza voinstvuiushchikh bezbozhnikov Braude v gor'kovskii oblasti za vremia s IV kraevoi partiinoi konferentsii (za 1934, 1935, 1936 gg. i 3 mesiatsa 1937 g.) // TsANO. F. 3074. Op. 1. D. 320. L. 148.. It was not until Kosarev launched a renewed assault on the Gorky Komsomol that Flaksman and his allies were arrested. Kosarev himself attended the Third Plenum of the Gorky Komsomol in May 1938 to ensure that Flaksman and his allies were removed. The attack began with an article in the Gorky paper, which asserted: "Flaksman is not merely a collaborator, but an enemy. A collaborator is a special condition, but an enemy of the people is the unequivocal enemy of our party grouped with Trotskyite-Bukharinists and other scum"Krivoruchenko V. Molodezh', komsomol, obshchestvo. P. 91.. Kosarev's rebukes at the plenum were not just directed at Flaksman, but at the entire organization. He scolded them asserting "The party punishes people for hiding enemies... What kind of leaders are you, if you do not see what is going on right under your noses"Ibid. P. 92-93.. The meeting led to a renewed assault on Komsomol cadres in Gorky: over the course of 1938, the party and the NKVD arrested Komsomol workers in 55 organizationsIbid. P. 94.. All in all, over 70 percent of representatives at the 4th Gorky Komsomol Conference in March 1936 were removed from the Komsomol's ranks by the 6th conference in February 1939Gordeeva L. Repressivnyi mekhanizm politicheskoi vlasti. P. 267..

Komsomol purges and expulsions disproportionately targeted older Komsomol members, or "pererostki," (overgrown members). Due to a moratorium on party membership from 1933 onwards, the average age of Komsomol members increased from 19.36 in 1933 to 21.75 in 193 6Bernstein S. Raised under Stalin. P. 232.. Aging membership restricted young members' advancement within the Komsomol as well: whereas 42.7 percent of those with voting rights at the 1931 9th Komsomol Congress were younger than 23, only 14.5 percent with voting rights at the 1936 10th Komsomol Congress were younger than 23Ibid. P. 113-114.. Younger workers' interest in the Komsomol also waned: "The problem" one Sormovo Komsomol member claimed "is that the youth do not consider the Komsomol to be an organization that works in their interests"Vystuplenie sekretariata Gor'kovskogo obkoma VKP(b) AN Burova na IV plenume obkoma VLKSM ot 18 fevraliia 1937 g. // GOPANO. F. 3. Op. 1. D. 48. L. 18.. To combat initiative stifling bureaucratism, the purges disproportionately targeted pererostki: whereas those over 24 years of age made up 30 percent of Komsomol membership, they made up 50 percent of Komsomol members who were purgedBernstein S. Raised under Stalin. P. 118.. An examination of attendees at the 5th, 6th, and 7th Gorky Oblast Komsomol Conferences illustrates the purge's impact on older high-ranking members in the Komsomol, and the opportunities the purges created for Komsomol youth, who had previously found their advancement stymied by older cadres (Tab. 20, 21).

Table 20. Age of Delegates at Gorky Komsomol Conferences, in percent

* 10-14 Oct. 1937; ** 11-16 Feb. 1939; *** 28-30 Sep. 1940.

Table 21. Tenure of Delegates at Gorky Komsomol Conferences, in percent

* 10-14 Oct. 1937; ** 11-16 Feb. 1939; *** 28-30 Sep. 1940.

Source: Osokin V Sostav delegatov V Gor'kovskoi oblastnoi konferentsii VLKSM. URL: http://serg.e- stile.ru/page4521/ (accessed: 27.08.2018); Osokin V. Sostav delegatov VI Gor'kovskoi oblastnoi konferentsii VLKSM. URL: http://serg.e-stile.ru/page4524/ (accessed: 27.08.2018); Osokin V. Sostav delegatov VII Gor'kovskoi oblastnoi konferentsii VLKSM. URL: http://serg.e-stile.ru/page4527/ (accessed: 27.08.2018).

While the regime's response to the survey brought unjust bloodshed, it also directed state attention to areas in much need of support. The party democratized access to higher education. A greater percentage of those without working-class backgrounds were enrolled in universities: whereas 34.02 percent of all VUZ students were from non-working-class families in 1934, by 1938, 66.1 percent of VUZ students were from non-working-class backgroundsKul'turnoe stroitel'stvo SSSR. P 114.. No longer was Komsomol membership essentially a prerequisite to study at VUZes: 54.18 percent of students in the Gorky Province were Komsomol or party members in 1936, but by 1939 only 25.08 percent were Komsomol or party membersOtchet o rabote tekhnikumov goroda za period iiun' 1938 g po aprel' 1939 god // GOPANO. F. 30. Op. 1. D. 2136. L. 171-2.. Despite the decline in Komsomol representation among university students, the Komsomol and its influence grew immensely from 1936 to 1941. Whereas 12 percent of youth between 15 and 24 years of age were in the Komsomol in 1936, 30 percent were in the Komsomol by 1940. Komsomol membership broadened as well; in 1933 workers had the largest representation in the Komsomol, but by 1940 students, kolkhoz workers, and white-collar workers all enjoyed greater representation than workersBernstein S. Raised under Stalin. P. 231.. Workers' GTE scores rose significantly as well: 45.61 percent of Gorky workers failed the GTEs in 1936, but only 4.1 percent did so in 1939Otchet o rabote tekhnikumov goroda za period iiun' 1938 g po aprel' 1939 god. L. 176; Itogi reida proverki sostoianiia tekhnicheskoi ucheby rabochikh po predpriiatiiami NKTP gor'kovskoi oblasti // GOPANO. F. 30. Op. 1. D. 1694. L. 3.. The party also devoted more attention to sports circles and military training among the youth. In Sormovo alone, the party built 3 sport halls, 2 ski areas, and a park between 1936 and 1940. In 1935, under 1,000 young Sor- movoites participated in sports societies, but by 1939, Sormovo had 35 sport societies with 9,803 members, over 5,000 of which were under 25Material otdela shkol i kul'tprosve raboty gorkoma k otchetu gorkom po vuzam i tekhnikami // GOPANO. F. 30. Op. 1. D. 2136. L. 45..

A greater focus on cultural and infrastructural development in working-class districts caused life in those regions to improve. The regime devoted significantly more resources to construction in working-class districts. The paving of Komintern street, which connected downtown Sormovo and working-class districts, made supply between the two much easier. The development of regular bus lines between working-class districts and factories made getting between work, home, school, and cultural institutions simpler. The party also funded the construction of theatres, clubs, stadiums, libraries, bath houses, and banks in working-class districts. It also constructed exemplary educational institutions in working-class districts; by 1939, the districts surrounding Sormovo had three of the best performing schools in the province (nos. 77, 82, and 84)Ibid. P. 30.. Not all areas saw such improvement. Despite investment, housing continued to be a major problem; in 1939, the amount of living space per person in Sormovo fell to 3.13 sq. meters, a figure that was likely higher among white-collar and ITR personnel and lower among common workers. The continued decrease in living space was not the result of neglect, but rather of the factory housing a greater portion of workers: whereas the factory housed 47 percent of its employees in April 1936, by January 1939, it had housed 98 percent of the its workforcePerspektivnyi plan zhilishchnogo stroitel'stva zavoda Krasnoe Sormovo PARVAGDIZa // GOPANO. F. 4523. Op. 1. D. 167. L. 161; Gody stalinskikh piatiletok // Krasnyi sormovich. 1939. No. 276. P. 1..

Conclusion