Assessing the conundrums of the Cuban economy under the revolution (1959-2019)

5.7 The magnitude of the ongoing crisis and that of the 1990s crisis

The combination of the Venezuelan crisis and Trump's sanctions are already causing significant damage to the Cuban economy, which would worsen if Venezuela's political regime were to fall or the economic deterioration deepen. Despite the worrying effects analyzed above, however, as posed in Hypothesis 3, the crisis in Cuba probably would not be as strong as that in the 1990s because of changing conditions (see Table 6): more diversified trade partners; lower main-partner share of Cuba's total trade deficit; higher and more diversified foreign investment; much higher hard-currency revenue from tourism; considerably more foreign remittances; lower dependency on imported fuels; a much bigger private sector; and lower overall economic dependency.

All the above factors, however, may be shaken by Trump's sanctions. In addition, Cuba in 1985-1989 had its best economic-social performance, whereas now the economy is in its worse situation since the 1990s. The crisis would be politically more difficult to manage because Fidel Castro is gone and Raul Castro's structural reforms raised high expectations that they would improve the economy and living standards, which did not materialize.



6. The probability of either Russia or China replacing Venezuela

Hypothesis 4 sustains that there is a low probability that either the Russian Federation or the Peoples' Republic of China will fully replace Venezuela, although these two countries could help Cuba with trade and economic aid, as explained below.

Table 6. Comparison of Cuba's economic dependence on the USSR and Venezuela

Factors in the economic dependence	USSR 1987-1989	Venezuela 2018
Greater diversification in commercial partners (% of trade volume)	72	29
Lower concentration of the trade deficit (% of total deficit)	82	28
Higher diversity in foreign investment (mln doll. US)	1a	7,676b
Higher hard-currency exports of professional services (mln doll. US)	0	8,861
Higher hard-currency revenue from tourism (mln doll. US)	168	2,903
Higher hard-currency revenue from remittances (mln doll. US)	0	3,500
Less dependence on imported fuels (% of total)	92	60
Bigger private sector (% of labor force)	6	26
Overall dependence (% of GDP)	28	8

Note. a -- The USSR was the only investor, although for some projects there were associations with Eastern European partners. It was not possible to estimate the amount of Soviet investment; b -- this information refers to all projects [Diaz- Canel, 2019b], but in the Mariel Special Development Zone (ZEDM), while some 400 proposals have been mentioned, only 43 foreign investment projects seem to have crystallized, 19 projects already in operation and 23 in process of approval, for a cumulative 2.1 mln doll. US in the six years since the creation of ZEDM, vis-а-vis a target of15 mln doll. US for the period [Pйrez Villanueva, 2019]. Besides, this information provided to the author from E. Morales by e-mail, August 30.

Based on: USSR from [Mesa-Lago, 2000], Venezuela from [ONEI, 2009; Mesa-Lago, Vidal, 2019].



In 2018 the Russian Federation was Cuba's seventh trading partner, its trade of goods reached 3.3 % of the total, its deficit in the trade balance of goods amounted to 430 mln doll. US, the largest since the Russian Federation was created (Cuba imported 440 mln doll. US and only exported 11 mln doll. US) and Russia does not buy Cuban professional services. However, in 2017 the trade of goods with Russia had risen 95 %, after a four-year decline and stagnation -- the increase was only 20 % over 2007 [ONEI, 2019]. In November 2018, Havana signed several agreements with Moscow concerning: modernization of electricity production and steel; rail transport; exploration of bituminous oil deposits; and recovery of citrus production. The amounts of these projects were unknown and several of them had been agreed before. Early in October 2019, Russian Prime Minister Dmi- trii Medvedev visited Cuba and signed eight agreements -- some of them related to the previous ones -- providing some data on the amounts: renovation of the railroad system including selling 75 locomotives -- 51 has been delivered already (2,000 mln doll. US, but 200 mln doll. US by 2020); oil prospecting in land by Russian company Zarubezhneft (100 mln doll. US), application of atoms to medicine in agriculture (not energy), and selling military equipment (43 mln doll. US) (Granma, editions 7 to 18 October 2019). The revealed sums of short-term aid total 343 mln doll. US; although this aid is important to Cuba at this difficult juncture, it accounts to 14 % of the 2,500 mln doll. US in foreign investment that the island needs annually and to 4.3 % of the 8,000 mln doll. US provided by Venezuela. Russia has supplied oil to Cuba, but partly paid for by Venezuela. It is virtually impossible for Cuba to pay for the value of Russian imports because, as have been proven herein, production of sugar, nickel, citrus, tobacco and fisheries -- which constituted Cuban exports to the USSR in the 1980s -- have declined sharply, and it is unlikely that Cuba will compensate Russian oil with exports of doctors and other professionals, who would have to learn the language. In addition, Venezuela pays Cuban doctors up to seven times more than an average Venezuelan doctor. Finally, Russia's current economic slowdown makes it harder for her to fully replace Venezuela.

China could be another potential replacement: it is Cuba's second trading partner, with a 16 % share in total goods trade, but in 2018 said exchange was 1 % below the 2017 level and 23 % below the 2016 level. The trade deficit with China was 1.088 mln doll. US (Cuba imported 1.544 mln doll. US and exported only 456 mln doll. US), tantamount to 23 % of Cuba's total trade deficit, the largest after Venezuela's [ONEI, 2019]. Relations between Beijing and Havana have strengthened in recent years, with an agreement signed in 2017 worth 164 mln doll. US to acquire Chinese construction equipment and a 129 mln doll. US donation for cybersecurity. However, these sums are minute when compared to huge Chinese investments in Latin America, especially in large countries that produce raw materials needed by China. By contrast, Cuba has virtually no products to export to China -- except 400.000 tons of sugar that must be sent annually -- and it is even more difficult for it to export professional services, for language and cultural reasons. Finally, China is going through a period of slowing economic growth -- the 2018 growth rate was the lowest since 1990 -- and Trump's rise in tariffs also has an adverse effect on the Chinese economy in 2019. It seems unlikely therefore that China could fully replace Venezuela.



7. Cuban government strategies and policy alternatives

Raul Castro's economic reforms in 2007-2017 were well oriented but too slow, not deep enough, and subjected to many restrictions, disincentives and taxes; because of those factors said reforms did not achieve an economic improvement as shown in section 3 [Mesa-Lago, 2018; Mesa-Lago et al., 2018]. In his closing speech to the National Assembly in April 2019, Raul Castro warned: “We have to be alert and aware that we face additional difficulties and that the situation could worsen in the coming months (due to the crisis in Venezuela and Trump's policies), even if it is not returning to the situation of the special period in the 1990s, because today we have another panorama in terms of the diversification of the economy. But we have to prepare ourselves for the worst scenario”.

President Miguel Diaz-Canel has promised continuity, which is incongruous to confront the deteriorating Venezuelan economy, Trump's punitive measures and the absence of countries capable and willing to replace Venezuela. The strategy adopted by Cuban legislators in April 2019 was more long- than short-term, for instance: one of the targets of the 2030 plan is to secure 30 pounds of tubers, vegetables, beans and fruit per day to the population. The long-term plan to 2030 is divided in three stages: 2019-2021, 2022-2026 and 2027-2030, but no details have been given for each of these stages. It is vaguely said that the 2019-2021 stage will set the bases for future transformations through advances such as the implementation of a new management and administration model. The measures announced for 2020 (not for 2019) are also imprecise, such as to concretize projects for increasing exports, to incorporate into the plan investments that stimulate oil extraction, to seek new product lines to replace imports, and to ensure the production of goods and services that meet domestic demand, food in particular. The plan reiterated old unsuccessful policies and goals, and continued to place emphasis on the central plan and state enterprises as the key economic tools, with little mention of the necessary acceleration and deepening of the reforms.

Economics Minister Gil [Gil, 2019a] identified six strategic sectors that are key to confront the looming crisis: tourism, biotechnology-pharmaceuticals, food production, electricity and energy, exports of professional services and construction. According to him, the growth in exports in the six cited activities (especially in the first three) represent more than 90 % of the projected export increases by 2030 and 65 % of the replacement of imports projected for that year. However, Gil acknowledged that exports do not grow with the required dynamism, foreign investment levels are low and poor use of energy products and non-compliance with the import plan persist. He added that internal measures (belt tightening) would need to be employed.

Several Cuban economists pointed out problems in the government strategy: the huge and urgent problems that Cuba faces; a response marred by excessive caution, and lack of imagination, daring and quickness to confront the challenges; the absence in the discussion of the long-standing, broad consensus on needed economic reforms; the absence in the plan of policies regarding the private property and micro-enterprises which should be given priority; and the widespread scarcity of essential food items [Mesa-Lago, Vidal, 2019].

Perhaps prompted by the above reactions or by the realization of the magnitude and urgency of the crisis, in June 2019 Diaz-Canel announced new policies, the most concrete and widely discussed being the increase by 37 % in the wages of employees in the budgeted sector of the economy, as well as of pensions. The Cuban president also acknowledged important economic problems such as: increasing foreign debt due to insufficient revenue from exports, unpaid debts to suppliers, an import mentality that contravenes initiative and creativity, widespread corruption, and very low level of savings. To confront these problems, he proposed the following measures [Diaz-Canel, 2019a]:

planning system: move away from current inefficient material allocation of resources towards economic and financial allotment;

state enterprises: decentralize and grant them real autonomy; clearly define state functions as owner and administrator; replace current administrative controls by indirect regulatory mechanisms, such as economic and financial incentives; eliminate state subsidies to enterprises;

local government: provide it with more autonomy, authority and decision-making power;

foreign investment: put in place additional guarantees to investors regarding settlement of their obligations (e.g., repatriation of enterprise profits); pay the current debt from retained profits by such gains in Cuban currency at favorable exchange rates, hence allowing the foreign company to pay expenses in national currency; expedite supplies of inputs for import- substitution operations; provide financial stimuli in direct investment agreements to promote exports and disincentivize imports; support insertion of foreign-invested operation in value chains (e.g., chains of hotels and restaurants); create a new entity under the Council of Ministers to promote foreign investment; and allow Cubans abroad to invest in the island;

non-state sector: enact an enterprise law that eliminates barriers and grants authorization to micro-businesses; eliminate redundant and unnecessary regulations; establish a national agency to oversee cooperatives, and convert some of them into micro- and medium-size enterprises At the time this paper was being finalized, new regulations for non-agricultural and services cooperatives were enacted that banned the creation of new ones [Decretos-Leyes 366 y 356, 2019].;

exchange rate: continue the devaluation process (actually it has not started yet, save for some experiments in the past); redesign the monetary system;

foreign trade: decentralize it;

prices: make them more flexible, set them by agreement between the parties;

salaries: the wage increase in the budgeted sector is the first step of a process of integral reform of the salary system;

food supply: stabilize the supply of essential foods, which were quite scarce in the first half of 2019 (some measures have been announced); and

multinational financial institutions: seek avenues to join them.

The above measures are appropriate but there are some caveats: First, several of them have been tried before in Cuba and then disregarded, e. g., enterprise autonomy and decentralization as well as allocation of resources through financial-economic indicators rather by administrative tools (self-financing) were the subject of discussion in the economic policy debate of 1961-1966; they were attempted in the 1980s and Raul's reforms included decentralization of state enterprises but these policies were not implemented. Hence it is essential to wait if they are actually enforced. Second, they are still mere proposals (some schematic) that require more elaboration, debate, testing, first efforts at evaluation of their effects and implementation. Third, some measures are contradictory, for instance, the capping of prices in the private sector in August 2019 -- to avoid inflation induced by the big wage increase -- is an administrative action, opposite to the proposed indirect regulatory mechanisms, such as economic and financial incentives.

Fourth and the most important, the list above does not address key needed measures to accelerate and deepen the reforms which are endorsed by several well-known Cuban economists The opinions of a dozen prominent Cuban economists are summarized in [Mesa-Lago, 2019].:

consider the successful Sino-Vietnamese model, under the Communist party, especially in agriculture;

implement unification of the exchange rate and of the dual currency;

carry out a comprehensive price reform;

infuse more flexibility in the non-state sector, particularly private, so that it grows and contributes more to the economy;

authorize professionals to work as self-employed, eliminate excessive barriers to self-employment, and replace the current list of authorized activities by one specifying which are the ones banned and giving freedom on the rest;

end the experimental stage for non-agricultural and services cooperatives, approve more of them and create second degree cooperatives;

eliminate the compulsory sale of crops by farmers to the state, at prices set by the government below the market price (acopio) allowing farmers to plant what they want and sell all their crops to whoever they please at prices set by supply and demand;

establish wholesale markets that supply needed inputs to the non-state sector; and

allow foreign companies to contract and pay directly to their employees.

In the 1990s, Fidel Castro introduced modest economic reforms that contained the severe crisis, todays leadership should follow his approach to confront the current crisis in Cuba.



Conclusions

The four hypotheses in this study have been proven with abundant primary sources and robust evidence: mainly official statistics, the work of several Cuban scholars and our own analysis.

Although somewhat reduced in the last two decades, external economic dependence persists making the island vulnerable to crises endured by the foreign partner over which Cuba lacks any control. Cuba's economic relationship with the USSR totaled 65,000 mln doll. US in 1960-1990 and about 107,000 mln doll. US with Venezuela in 2007-2017; a significant part of which consisted in price subsidies to exports of raw materials and professional services, as well as to oil imports. Under Soviet aid, Cuba enjoyed a booming period in the 1980s, whereas in the case of Venezuela the best economic years were 2005-2007, GDP rates didn't recover such growth thereafter despite the rising Venezuelan aid in 2009-2014; with the decline in the relationship since 2016 Cuban GDP stagnated.

Despite the substantial external aid, Cuba's inability to finance her imports with her own exports continues (exports in 2018 were 48 % of those in 1989 whereas imports were 41 % above). Such structural conundrum has been aggravated, domestically, by an inefficient economic model of central planning, not substantially transformed by the economic reforms of 2007-2017 and the current continuity in policies, and externally by the US embargo/blockade significantly tightened by Trump's punitive policies. As a result, economic performance has been inadequate: GDP has been stagnant in the last four years; gross capital formation is about one third of both what it was in 1989 and of the government growth target; inflationary pressure is approaching the worst years of the 1990s crisis; the fiscal deficit shows a rising trend; with few exceptions, output in agriculture, fishing, mining and manufacturing have declined in the last decade and in most cases is below the 1989 level; tourism is the best performer but net revenue is 40 % of gross revenue (due to high cost of imports for tourists) and declined in 2019 due to Trump's sanctions.

The crisis in Venezuela has led to an equivalent loss of 14 percentage points off of Cuba's GDP, mainly due to a 30 % decrease in the value of exports of professional services and a 70 % decline in oil imports; if the current relationship ends, it will cost Cuba another 8 percentage points of GDP. It was not possible to measure the cost of Trump's measures against Cuba, but they are already provoking a loss of tourist revenue of about 1 mln doll. US, obstructing the supply of oil from Venezuela (aggravated by a decrease of 17 % in domestic oil output), and probably freezing foreign investment. There is a low probability that either Russia or China will fully replace Venezuela; Russian agreements in 2019 account to 4 % of the total value of Venezuela's relationship. It is expected, however, that the ongoing crisis should have lesser magnitude that the one in the 1990s because of several factors that have improved, most of them external (trade-partner diversification, remittances, tourism and investment), but Trump's sanctions make all of them vulnerable.

The first wave of government policies to confront the crisis was at best inadequate; a subsequent second wave of rough proposals are more appropriate but with important caveats. Cuban economists have suggested more profound reforms that so far are not contemplated in the official program but are fundamental to take Cuba out of the current abyss and provide hope for a better future.



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Carmelo Mesa-Lago -- PhD, Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus

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