The effect of biggest sporting events on small business performance in Russia
Studying the impact of large-scale international sporting events on business development in the Russian Federation. The issuance of state contracts for the construction of infrastructure and stadiums to prepare for the 2018 World Cup in Russia.
Рубрика | Экономика и экономическая теория |
Вид | дипломная работа |
Язык | английский |
Дата добавления | 01.12.2019 |
Размер файла | 125,6 K |
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For a qualitative research method, it is necessary to check the concept to identify certain results, so this is a deductive approach. The purpose of the study of this article is also deductive. This method will refer to the existing theory and show how to evaluate the impact of the World Cup on the development of the enterprise, using dependent and independent variables.
For a quantitative method, it is necessary to use an econometric regression model and use the OLS estimation method to determine the impact of government orders on the development of small and medium-sized businesses. "OLS (ordinary least squares) - regression analysis methods for estimating the unknown parameters of regression models from sample data" (Wooldridge, 2015). The regression model is a kind of hypothesis that will have a statistical test throughout the study. This model is a parametric function group and is displayed as:
,
where are the parameters,
- is an independent variable space,
- is a dependent variable space.
In the formula, - acting as an independent variable, will be presented as a volume of state order, the amount of government contracts (rubles), - acts as a dependent variable, will characterize the indicator of development of small and medium enterprises. Y of this work are revenue figures for 2013, 2014 and 2015, and revenue growth figures for 2013-2014 and 2014-2015. Using these variables, a regression will be constructed that will determine the dependence of these variables. The regression model is the most convenient tool for conducting this study, since it contains many universal functions necessary to solve the problems posed in the work. Do-file with an independent variable the amount of state orders - in Appendix 1, with an independent variable the number of state orders in Appendix 2.
e) Description of the methods and procedures used to analyses data and of the statistical software used to analyses data.
An empirical analysis of the collected data was performed in the STATA program. First of all, regressions will be constructed in which the independent variables are the number and amount of government contracts, and the dependent ones are the revenues of small and medium-sized enterprises in 2013, 2014 and 2015 and the revenue growth rate for 2013/2014 and 2014/2015 using the formula: growth rate revenue = ln (revenue of companies in 2014) - ln (revenue of companies in 2013) and revenue growth rate = ln (revenue of companies in 2015) - ln (revenue of companies in 2014). All regressions are ordered by type of construction activity and city of registration of small and medium enterprises. After the conclusions are made on the basis of the data obtained. The regression parameters should be checked for the multicollinearity of the parameters with the help of the correlation of variables and the VIF - test. "VIF-test - method of detecting multicollinearity using the study of factors of inflation dispersion" (Wooldridge, 2015). It is also necessary to build descriptive statistics to check for normal distribution. All these operations will be made according to the companies that performed the state contract in 2013, 2014 and 2015.
f) Limitations of the data and methods
The lack of data on private contracts of small and medium enterprises is the most important limitation in this work. Having the necessary information, it was possible to conduct a better analysis comparing the conditions, quantity and quality of private and public contracts.
To continue this work, it would be possible to investigate the percentage of failed government contracts and find out the reason why many small and medium-sized companies do not take up government orders or cannot fulfill them and break the contract. Using a quantitative data collection method, you can take information from official government procurement portals for failed and successfully completed contracts for certain years in several regions of Russia.
Description of the results
The practical part of the study is to conduct a regression analysis in which the impact of the number of government contracts, the amount of government contracts (rubles) and the average cost of a contract for revenues and the rate of revenue growth will be assessed. For this, it is necessary to use the program STATA and the method of the OLS to estimate the parameters. For a more accurate analysis, all government contracts executed in the construction sector for 2013, 2014 and 2015 were added to control variables such as total assets as an indicator of company size, the type of construction activity and the city of registration of the company hosting the state order. The first variable was grouped by such activities as: construction of residential and non-residential buildings, construction works (finishing works, installation, demolition of buildings, etc.), architectural works, engineering works and production works (production of material necessary for construction). The second control variable was sorted by such regions as: Moscow, St. Petersburg, the Republic of Tatarstan, Krasnodar Region, Nizhny Novgorod, Rostov-on-Don, Sverdlovsk Region, Volgograd, the Republic of Mordovia, Samara Region and Kaliningrad. All cities have hosted the World Cup 2018 in Russia. After designing regressions, it is necessary to check all the variables for multicollinearity and construct descriptive statistics. To test for multicollinearity will be constructed correlations and VIF-tests.
Government contracts for 2013
At this stage, data are collected for all construction small and medium enterprises in Russia for 2013. Regressions were constructed, as dependent variables - revenue of companies for 2013, 2014, 2015 and the revenue growth rate for 2014/2013 and 2015/2014. As independent variables - the amount of state contracts (RUB) and the number of state contracts.
Table 1
Analysis of the impact of the number of state contracts on revenue and revenue growth rate
VARIABLES |
Revenue 2013 |
Revenue 2014 |
Revenue 2015 |
Revenue Growth rate 2014/2013 |
Revenue Growth rate 2015/2014 |
|
Amount of government contracts (RUB) |
0.0633*** |
0.0506*** |
0.0651*** |
-0.0888*** |
-0.111*** |
|
(0.0132) |
(0.0134) |
(0.0174) |
(0.0174) |
(0.0160) |
||
Saint Petersburg |
-0.0969 |
-0.0935 |
-0.125 |
0.115 |
0.126 |
|
(0.0684) |
(0.0835) |
(0.0843) |
(0.0832) |
(0.0820) |
||
Republic of Tatarstan |
-0.251* |
-0.182 |
-0.0700 |
0.200 |
0.238 |
|
(0.151) |
(0.191) |
(0.287) |
(0.170) |
(0.188) |
||
Krasnodar region |
-0.220** |
-0.186 |
-0.00474 |
0.0426 |
-0.0121 |
|
(0.0882) |
(0.115) |
(0.163) |
(0.109) |
(0.127) |
||
Nizhniy Novgorod |
0.0273 |
-0.108 |
-0.137 |
-0.124 |
0.0823 |
|
(0.146) |
(0.226) |
(0.215) |
(0.153) |
(0.279) |
||
Rostov on Don |
-0.223** |
-0.387*** |
-0.0880 |
0.306*** |
0.237* |
|
(0.0951) |
(0.114) |
(0.135) |
(0.111) |
(0.123) |
||
Sverdlovsk region |
-0.633*** |
-0.399** |
-0.234 |
0.754*** |
0.425** |
|
(0.226) |
(0.200) |
(0.166) |
(0.259) |
(0.208) |
||
Volgograd |
-0.282** |
-0.204** |
0.00917 |
0.429*** |
0.367** |
|
(0.129) |
(0.104) |
(0.130) |
(0.160) |
(0.153) |
||
Republic of Mordovia |
-0.637** |
-0.307* |
0.122 |
0.735*** |
0.315* |
|
(0.257) |
(0.170) |
(0.216) |
(0.278) |
(0.176) |
||
Samara Region |
-0.212 |
-0.0911 |
-0.112 |
0.133 |
-0.0544 |
|
(0.129) |
(0.124) |
(0.177) |
(0.127) |
(0.113) |
||
Kaliningrad |
-0.670 |
-0.120 |
-0.466 |
0.800 |
0.193 |
|
(0.537) |
(0.195) |
(0.421) |
(0.535) |
(0.182) |
||
Construction works |
0.0292 |
-0.0740 |
-0.0447 |
0.0395 |
0.0501 |
|
(0.0571) |
(0.0683) |
(0.0787) |
(0.0674) |
(0.0705) |
||
Architectural works |
-0.208*** |
-0.289*** |
-0.182** |
0.275*** |
0.165** |
|
(0.0739) |
(0.0738) |
(0.0854) |
(0.0839) |
(0.0788) |
||
Engineering works |
0.120 |
0.0844 |
0.185 |
-0.172* |
-0.150 |
|
(0.0894) |
(0.107) |
(0.137) |
(0.0988) |
(0.113) |
||
Production works |
0.152 |
0.169 |
0.100 |
-0.134 |
-0.248 |
|
(0.142) |
(0.144) |
(0.200) |
(0.182) |
(0.163) |
||
Total Assets 2013 |
0.723*** |
|||||
(0.0176) |
||||||
Total Assets 2014 |
0.704*** |
-0.593*** |
||||
(0.0187) |
(0.0218) |
|||||
Total Assets 2015 |
0.690*** |
-0.575*** |
||||
(0.0258) |
(0.0236) |
|||||
Constant |
4.577*** |
5.061*** |
4.776*** |
-3.530*** |
-3.469*** |
|
(0.271) |
(0.274) |
(0.382) |
(0.314) |
(0.337) |
||
Observations |
1,149 |
1,240 |
1,241 |
1,075 |
1,122 |
|
R-squared |
0.781 |
0.717 |
0.662 |
0.686 |
0.673 |
|
Robust standard errors in parentheses |
||||||
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 |
a) If the amount of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue in 2013 will increase by 6 percent, considering all other things being equal.
b) If the amount of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue in 2014 will increase by 5 percent, considering all other things being equal.
c) If the amount of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue in 2015 will increase by 7 percent, considering all other things being equal.
d) If the amount of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue growth rate 2014/2013 will decrease by 9 percent, considering all other things being equal.
e) If the amount of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue growth rate 2015/2014 will decrease by 11 percent, considering all other things being equal.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics variables used in the regression
Variable |
Obs |
Mean |
Std. Dev. |
Min |
Max |
|
Amount of contracts (RUB) |
965 |
14.49536 |
2.5202 |
.0009995 |
23.12901 |
|
Revenue 2013 |
965 |
1.93e+08 |
7.36e+08 |
134000 |
1.78e+10 |
|
Revenue 2014 |
965 |
2.06e+08 |
7.99e+08 |
145000 |
2.02e+10 |
|
Revenue 2015 |
965 |
1.88e+08 |
8.58e+08 |
34000 |
2.34e+10 |
|
Revenuу growth rate 2014/2013 |
965 |
-14.64319 |
1.663548 |
-20.43372 |
-9.223356 |
|
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
965 |
-14.71358 |
1.689574 |
-20.55732 |
-9.176053 |
Table 3
Multicollinearity analysis of regression indicators with independent variable amount of contracts (VIF-test)
VIF value |
||
Revenue 2013 |
1.11 |
|
Revenue 2014 |
1.1 |
|
Revenue 2015 |
1 |
|
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
1.11 |
|
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
1 |
Result: Multicollinearity not detected. None of the values exceed 5.
Table 4
Multicollinearity analysis of regression indicators with independent variable amount of contracts (correlation)
Amount of contracts (RUB) |
Revenue 2013 |
Revenue 2014 |
Revenue 2015 |
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
||
Amount of contracts (RUB) |
1.0000 |
||||||
Revenue 2013 |
0.5160 |
1.0000 |
|||||
Revenue 2014 |
0.4683 |
0.8381 |
1.0000 |
||||
Revenue 2015 |
0.4528 |
0.7714 |
0.8332 |
1.0000 |
|||
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
-0.5180 |
0.9993 |
-0.8179 |
-0.7631 |
1.0000 |
||
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
-0.5113 |
0.8622 |
-0.9993 |
-0.8118 |
0.8458 |
1.0 |
A multicollinearity regression analysis was performed. According to the results - all revenues and all revenue growth rates have an average dependence on the amount of state orders.
Table 5
Analysis of the impact of the number of state contracts on revenue and revenue growth rate
VARIABLES |
Revenue 2013 |
Revenue 2014 |
Revenue 2015 |
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
|
Number of government contracts |
0.104*** |
0.0660** |
0.00935 |
-0.157*** |
-0.115*** |
|
(0.0299) |
(0.0335) |
(0.0359) |
(0.0354) |
(0.0315) |
||
Saint Petersburg |
-0.112 |
-0.106 |
-0.156* |
0.140 |
0.173** |
|
(0.0694) |
(0.0844) |
(0.0849) |
(0.0850) |
(0.0845) |
||
Republic of Tatarstan |
-0.169 |
-0.121 |
0.0304 |
0.0895 |
0.0799 |
|
(0.151) |
(0.196) |
(0.292) |
(0.179) |
(0.206) |
||
Krasnodar region |
-0.209** |
-0.177 |
-0.0108 |
0.0115 |
-0.0300 |
|
(0.0920) |
(0.117) |
(0.171) |
(0.117) |
(0.134) |
||
Nizhniy Novgorod |
0.0578 |
-0.0902 |
-0.107 |
-0.160 |
-0.00695 |
|
(0.143) |
(0.229) |
(0.227) |
(0.142) |
(0.296) |
||
Rostov on Don |
-0.208** |
-0.387*** |
-0.112 |
0.294*** |
0.246* |
|
(0.0982) |
(0.116) |
(0.138) |
(0.112) |
(0.131) |
||
Sverdlovsk region |
-0.674*** |
-0.425** |
-0.205 |
0.823*** |
0.407* |
|
(0.221) |
(0.199) |
(0.165) |
(0.247) |
(0.214) |
||
Volgograd |
-0.309** |
-0.246** |
-0.0897 |
0.480*** |
0.491*** |
|
(0.132) |
(0.113) |
(0.134) |
(0.166) |
(0.164) |
||
Republic of Mordovia |
-0.624** |
-0.312* |
0.0787 |
0.719** |
0.339* |
|
(0.257) |
(0.177) |
(0.212) |
(0.282) |
(0.187) |
||
Samara Region |
-0.206 |
-0.0931 |
-0.136 |
0.125 |
-0.0491 |
|
(0.129) |
(0.125) |
(0.176) |
(0.125) |
(0.113) |
||
Kaliningrad |
-0.641 |
-0.112 |
-0.493 |
0.761 |
0.191 |
|
(0.526) |
(0.204) |
(0.420) |
(0.518) |
(0.200) |
||
Construction works |
0.00681 |
-0.0902 |
-0.0724 |
0.0745 |
0.0934 |
|
(0.0577) |
(0.0680) |
(0.0784) |
(0.0687) |
(0.0719) |
||
Architectural works |
-0.255*** |
-0.325*** |
-0.236*** |
0.340*** |
0.242*** |
|
(0.0737) |
(0.0737) |
(0.0856) |
(0.0843) |
(0.0804) |
||
Engineering works |
0.157* |
0.112 |
0.200 |
-0.227** |
-0.191 |
|
(0.0882) |
(0.106) |
(0.136) |
(0.1000) |
(0.119) |
||
Production works |
0.0558 |
0.0837 |
0.0216 |
0.00509 |
-0.140 |
|
(0.130) |
(0.139) |
(0.197) |
(0.160) |
(0.159) |
||
Total Assets 2013 |
0.753*** |
|||||
(0.0156) |
||||||
Total Assets 2014 |
0.728*** |
-0.635*** |
||||
(0.0164) |
(0.0188) |
|||||
Total Assets 2015 |
0.722*** |
-0.624*** |
||||
(0.0231) |
(0.0217) |
|||||
Constant |
4.937*** |
5.359*** |
5.197*** |
-4.036*** |
-4.208*** |
|
(0.274) |
(0.283) |
(0.403) |
(0.327) |
(0.376) |
||
Observations |
1,149 |
1,240 |
1,241 |
1,075 |
1,122 |
|
R-squared |
0.777 |
0.714 |
0.657 |
0.678 |
0.656 |
|
Robust standard errors in parentheses |
||||||
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 |
a) If the number of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue in 2013 will increase by 10 percent, considering all other things being equal.
b) If the number of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue in 2014 will increase by 6 percent, considering all other things being equal.
c) If the number of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue growth rate 2014/2013 will decrease by 16 percent, considering all other things being equal.
d) If the number of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue growth rate 2015/2014 will decrease by 12 percent, considering all other things being equal.
Table 6
Descriptive statistics variables used in the regression
Variable |
Obs |
Mean |
Std. Dev. |
Min |
Max |
|
Number of contracts |
965 |
.6767848 |
.8489094 |
0 |
4.634729 |
|
Revenue 2013 |
965 |
1.93e+08 |
7.36e+08 |
134000 |
1.78e+10 |
|
Revenue 2014 |
965 |
2.06e+08 |
7.99e+08 |
145000 |
2.02e+10 |
|
Revenue 2015 |
965 |
1.88e+08 |
8.58e+08 |
34000 |
2.34e+10 |
|
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
965 |
-14.64319 |
1.663548 |
-20.43372 |
-9.223356 |
|
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
965 |
-14.71358 |
1.689574 |
-20.55732 |
-9.176053 |
Table 8
Multicollinearity analysis of regression indicators with independent variable number of contracts (VIF-test)
VIF value |
||
Revenue 2013 |
1.07 |
|
Revenue 2014 |
1.06 |
|
Revenue 2015 |
1.07 |
|
Revenue Growth rate 2014/2013 |
1.07 |
|
Revenue Growth rate 2014/2013 |
1.06 |
Result: Multicollinearity not detected. None of the values exceed 5
Table 7
Multicollinearity analysis of regression indicators with independent variable number of contracts (correlation)
Number of contracts |
Revenue 2013 |
Revenue 2014 |
Revenue 2015 |
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
||
Number of contracts |
1.0000 |
||||||
Revenue 2013 |
0.2465 |
1.0000 |
|||||
Revenue 2014 |
0.1957 |
0.8381 |
1.0000 |
||||
Revenue 2015 |
0.1556 |
0.7714 |
0.8332 |
1.0000 |
|||
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
-0.2439 |
-0.9993 |
-0.8179 |
-0.7631 |
1.0000 |
||
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
-0.2118 |
-0.8622 |
-0.9993 |
-0.8118 |
0.8458 |
1.0000 |
A multicollinearity regression analysis was performed. According to the results - all revenues and all revenue growth rates have a weak dependence on the number of state orders.
Government contracts for 2014
At this stage, data are collected for all construction small and medium enterprises in Russia for 2014. Regressions were constructed, as dependent variables - revenue of companies for 2013, 2014, 2015 and the revenue growth rate for 2014/2013 and 2015/2014. As independent variables - the amount of state contracts (RUB) and the number of state contracts.
Table 9
Analysis of the impact of the amount of state contracts on revenue and revenue growth rate
VARIABLES |
Revenue 2013 |
Revenue 2014 |
Revenue 2015 |
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
|
Amount of government contracts |
0.0480** |
0.120*** |
0.0990*** |
-0.0439* |
-0.127*** |
|
(0.0207) |
(0.0182) |
(0.0295) |
(0.0249) |
(0.0159) |
||
Saint Petersburg |
-0.161 |
0.0940 |
0.0332 |
-0.0973 |
-0.0363 |
|
(0.182) |
(0.137) |
(0.414) |
(0.245) |
(0.118) |
||
Republic of Tatarstan |
0.317 |
0.212 |
0.358 |
-0.750*** |
-0.143 |
|
(0.234) |
(0.198) |
(0.435) |
(0.279) |
(0.163) |
||
Krasnodar region |
-0.239 |
0.187 |
0.763* |
-0.205 |
-0.197 |
|
(0.316) |
(0.361) |
(0.424) |
(0.329) |
(0.288) |
||
Nizhniy Novgorod |
-0.344 |
-0.0639 |
0.101 |
0.138 |
0.0126 |
|
(0.228) |
(0.157) |
(0.423) |
(0.289) |
(0.135) |
||
Rostov on Don |
-0.277 |
-0.236 |
0.125 |
0.149 |
0.247 |
|
(0.227) |
(0.173) |
(0.434) |
(0.286) |
(0.168) |
||
Sverdlovsk region |
-0.0167 |
0.0451 |
0.151 |
-0.188 |
-0.0828 |
|
(0.198) |
(0.144) |
(0.420) |
(0.264) |
(0.131) |
||
Volgograd |
0.0704 |
-0.142 |
0.154 |
-0.124 |
0.0846 |
|
(0.221) |
(0.167) |
(0.442) |
(0.281) |
(0.156) |
||
Republic of Mordovia |
-0.368 |
0.0638 |
0.125 |
0.257 |
-0.0595 |
|
(0.269) |
(0.164) |
(0.444) |
(0.347) |
(0.152) |
||
Samara Region |
-0.215 |
-0.139 |
-0.0165 |
-0.212 |
0.170 |
|
(0.195) |
(0.150) |
(0.420) |
(0.262) |
(0.140) |
||
Kaliningrad |
-0.337 |
-0.302 |
-0.0399 |
0.360 |
0.263 |
|
(0.222) |
(0.235) |
(0.483) |
(0.307) |
(0.218) |
||
Construction works |
-0.0306 |
-0.0528 |
0.0792 |
0.0805 |
0.0980 |
|
(0.0950) |
(0.0766) |
(0.0923) |
(0.119) |
(0.0790) |
||
Architectural works |
-0.288** |
0.00403 |
0.0440 |
0.290* |
0.0785 |
|
(0.125) |
(0.0968) |
(0.118) |
(0.161) |
(0.102) |
||
Engineering works |
0.214* |
0.203** |
0.230* |
-0.391*** |
-0.273*** |
|
(0.113) |
(0.0990) |
(0.123) |
(0.130) |
(0.104) |
||
Production works |
0.323** |
0.215** |
0.197 |
-0.383** |
-0.148 |
|
(0.149) |
(0.108) |
(0.202) |
(0.159) |
(0.134) |
||
Total Assets 2013 |
0.759*** |
|||||
(0.0335) |
||||||
Total Assets 2014 |
0.649*** |
-0.676*** |
||||
(0.0267) |
(0.0365) |
|||||
Total Assets 2015 |
0.696*** |
-0.606*** |
||||
(0.0292) |
(0.0226) |
|||||
Constant |
4.075*** |
4.700*** |
3.871*** |
-2.202*** |
-2.448*** |
|
(0.442) |
(0.375) |
(0.629) |
(0.535) |
(0.353) |
||
Observations |
602 |
726 |
758 |
574 |
682 |
|
R-squared |
0.778 |
0.774 |
0.690 |
0.647 |
0.760 |
|
Robust standard errors in parentheses |
||||||
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 |
a) If the amount of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue in 2013 will increase by 4 percent, considering all other things being equal.
b) If the amount of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue in 2014 will increase by 12 percent, considering all other things being equal.
c) If the amount of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue in 2013 will increase by 10 percent, considering all other things being equal.
d) If the amount of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue growth rate 2014/2013 will decrease by 4 percent, considering all other things being equal.
e) If the amount of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue growth rate 2015/2014 will decrease by 13 percent, considering all other things being equal.
Table 10
Descriptive statistics variables used in the regression
Variable |
Obs |
Mean |
Std. Dev. |
Min |
Max |
|
Amount of contracts (RUB) |
543 |
14.6262 |
3.109957 |
-6.907755 |
22.20569 |
|
Revenue 2013 |
543 |
1.43e+08 |
3.85e+08 |
14000 |
4.51e+09 |
|
Revenue 2014 |
543 |
1.49e+08 |
3.54e+08 |
154000 |
3.45e+09 |
|
Revenue 2015 |
543 |
1.34e+08 |
2.89e+08 |
44000 |
2.32e+09 |
|
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
543 |
-14.32998 |
1.805016 |
-19.14129 |
-7.066525 |
|
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
543 |
-14.62406 |
1.554606 |
-18.90248 |
-9.099525 |
Table 12
Multicollinearity analysis of regression indicators with independent variable amount of contracts (VIF-test)
VIF value |
||
Revenue 2013 |
3.15 |
|
Revenue 2014 |
2.99 |
|
Revenue 2015 |
3.33 |
|
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
3.25 |
|
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
3.26 |
Result: Multicollinearity not detected. None of the values exceed 5
Table 11
Multicollinearity analysis of regression indicators with independent variable amount of contracts (correlation)
Amount of contracts (RUB) |
Revenue 2013 |
Revenue 2014 |
Revenue 2015 |
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
||
Amount of contracts (RUB) |
1.0000 |
||||||
Revenue 2013 |
0.3404 |
1.0000 |
|||||
Revenue 2014 |
0.4390 |
0.8535 |
1.0000 |
||||
Revenue 2015 |
0.3785 |
0.7294 |
0.8397 |
1.0000 |
|||
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
-0.3523 |
-0.9996 |
-0.8387 |
-0.7282 |
1.0000 |
||
Revenue growth rate 2015/2013 |
-0.4403 |
-0.8572 |
-0.9992 |
-0.8174 |
0.8431 |
1.0000 |
A multicollinearity regression analysis was performed. According to the results - all revenues and all revenue growth rates have a weak dependence on the amount of state orders.
Table 13
Analysis of the impact of the number of state contracts on revenue and revenue
VARIABLES |
Revenue 2013 |
Revenue 2014 |
Revenue 2015 |
Growth rate 2014/2013 |
Growth rate 2015/2014 |
|
Number of government contracts |
0.0196 |
0.0344** |
0.0384** |
-0.0160 |
-0.0355*** |
|
(0.0134) |
(0.0136) |
(0.0155) |
(0.0162) |
(0.0128) |
||
Saint Petersburg |
-0.202 |
0.0496 |
-0.00813 |
-0.0712 |
-0.0323 |
|
(0.189) |
(0.131) |
(0.415) |
(0.245) |
(0.125) |
||
Republic of Tatarstan |
0.271 |
0.197 |
0.344 |
-0.718** |
-0.169 |
|
(0.239) |
(0.194) |
(0.437) |
(0.279) |
(0.174) |
||
Krasnodar region |
-0.273 |
0.175 |
0.766 |
-0.184 |
-0.237 |
|
(0.296) |
(0.398) |
(0.482) |
(0.302) |
(0.445) |
||
Nizhniy Novgorod |
-0.431* |
-0.191 |
0.000428 |
0.208 |
0.0975 |
|
(0.234) |
(0.155) |
(0.424) |
(0.289) |
(0.143) |
||
Rostov on Don |
-0.298 |
-0.154 |
0.173 |
0.168 |
0.114 |
|
(0.237) |
(0.189) |
(0.438) |
(0.286) |
(0.187) |
||
Sverdlovsk region |
-0.0614 |
0.0185 |
0.130 |
-0.159 |
-0.113 |
|
(0.202) |
(0.140) |
(0.421) |
(0.263) |
(0.138) |
||
Volgograd |
-0.0243 |
-0.271 |
0.0479 |
-0.0473 |
0.170 |
|
(0.229) |
(0.165) |
(0.442) |
(0.283) |
(0.157) |
||
Republic of Mordovia |
-0.447* |
-0.0816 |
-0.00464 |
0.337 |
0.0417 |
|
(0.263) |
(0.166) |
(0.451) |
(0.340) |
(0.165) |
||
Samara Region |
-0.231 |
-0.0864 |
0.0282 |
-0.214 |
0.0667 |
|
(0.201) |
(0.146) |
(0.420) |
(0.262) |
(0.148) |
||
Kaliningrad |
-0.367 |
-0.336 |
-0.0520 |
0.385 |
0.252 |
|
(0.225) |
(0.232) |
(0.480) |
(0.303) |
(0.221) |
||
Construction works |
-0.0700 |
-0.153* |
-0.000876 |
0.117 |
0.211** |
|
(0.0939) |
(0.0793) |
(0.0966) |
(0.117) |
(0.0818) |
||
Architectural works |
-0.332*** |
-0.135 |
-0.0666 |
0.322** |
0.232** |
|
(0.120) |
(0.101) |
(0.116) |
(0.157) |
(0.104) |
||
Engineering works |
0.212* |
0.185* |
0.225* |
-0.390*** |
-0.265** |
|
(0.113) |
(0.103) |
(0.125) |
(0.129) |
(0.110) |
||
Production works |
0.267* |
0.120 |
0.124 |
-0.333** |
-0.0521 |
|
(0.144) |
(0.101) |
(0.203) |
(0.152) |
(0.122) |
||
Total Assets 2013 |
0.783*** |
|||||
(0.0271) |
||||||
Total Assets 2014 |
0.715*** |
-0.701*** |
||||
(0.0227) |
(0.0289) |
|||||
Total Assets 2015 |
0.750*** |
-0.677*** |
||||
(0.0220) |
(0.0200) |
|||||
Constant |
4.438*** |
5.424*** |
4.460*** |
-2.468*** |
-3.141*** |
|
(0.504) |
(0.429) |
(0.630) |
(0.574) |
(0.382) |
||
Observations |
607 |
730 |
764 |
578 |
686 |
|
R-squared |
0.777 |
0.757 |
0.681 |
0.647 |
0.736 |
|
Robust standard errors in parentheses |
||||||
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 |
a) If the number of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue in 2014 will increase by 3 percent, considering all other things being equal.
b) If the number of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue in 2015 will increase by 4 percent, considering all other things being equal.
c) If the number of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue growth rate 2015/2014 will decrease by 4 percent, considering all other things being equal.
Table 14
Descriptive statistics variables used in the regression
Variable |
Obs |
Mean |
Std. Dev. |
Min |
Max |
|
Number of contracts |
543 |
.8415014 |
2.364124 |
-6.907755 |
14.46263 |
|
Revenue 2013 |
543 |
1.43e+08 |
3.85e+08 |
14000 |
4.51e+09 |
|
Revenue 2014 |
543 |
1.49e+08 |
3.54e+08 |
154000 |
3.45e+09 |
|
Revenue 2015 |
543 |
1.34e+08 |
2.89e+08 |
44000 |
2.32e+09 |
|
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
543 |
-14.32998 |
1.805016 |
-19.14129 |
-7.066525 |
|
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
543 |
-14.62406 |
1.554606 |
-18.90248 |
-9.099525 |
Table 16
Multicollinearity analysis of regression indicators with independent variable number of contracts (VIF-test)
VIF value |
||
Revenue 2013 |
3.23 |
|
Revenue 2014 |
2.96 |
|
Revenue 2015 |
3.24 |
|
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
3.22 |
|
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
3.23 |
Result: Multicollinearity not detected. None of the values exceed 10
Table 15
Multicollinearity analysis of regression indicators with independent variable number of contracts (correlation)
Number of contracts |
Receipts 2013 |
Receipts 2014 |
Receipts 2015 |
Growth rate 2014/2013 |
Growth rate 2015/2014 |
||
Number of contracts |
1.0000 |
||||||
Receipts 2013 |
0.0648 |
1.0000 |
|||||
Receipts 2014 |
0.0837 |
0.8535 |
1.0000 |
||||
Receipts 2015 |
0.0745 |
0.7294 |
0.8397 |
1.0000 |
|||
Growth rate 2014/2013 |
-0.0665 |
-0.9996 |
-0.8387 |
-0.7282 |
1.0000 |
||
Growth rate 2015/2014 |
-0.0783 |
-0.8572 |
-0.9992 |
-0.8174 |
0.8431 |
1.0000 |
A multicollinearity regression analysis was performed. According to the results - all revenues and all revenue growth rates have a weak dependence on the number of state orders.
Government contracts for 2015
At this stage, data are collected for all construction small and medium enterprises in Russia for 2015. Regressions were constructed, as dependent variables - revenue of companies for 2013, 2014, 2015 and the revenue growth rate for 2014/2013 and 2015/2014. As independent variables - the amount of state contracts (RUB) and the number of state contracts.
Table 17
Analysis of the impact of the amount of state contracts on revenue and revenue
VARIABLES |
Revenue 2013 |
Revenue 2014 |
Revenue 2015 |
Growth rate 2014/2013 |
Growth rate 2015/2014 |
|
Amount of state contracts (RUB) |
0.0410** |
0.0658*** |
0.0803*** |
-0.0638*** |
-0.0733*** |
|
(0.0163) |
(0.0152) |
(0.0137) |
(0.0228) |
(0.0182) |
||
Saint Petersburg |
-0.0206 |
0.185* |
0.0776 |
-0.0739 |
-0.214** |
|
(0.116) |
(0.0954) |
(0.0679) |
(0.147) |
(0.103) |
||
Republic of Tatarstan |
-0.0215 |
-0.189 |
0.0484 |
-0.00864 |
0.162 |
|
(0.196) |
(0.215) |
(0.196) |
(0.223) |
(0.251) |
||
Krasnodar region |
0.161 |
0.0859 |
-0.0359 |
-0.184 |
-0.202 |
|
(0.154) |
(0.141) |
(0.118) |
(0.188) |
(0.131) |
||
Nizhniy Novgorod |
-0.161 |
-0.180 |
-0.138 |
0.312 |
-0.00470 |
|
(0.216) |
(0.137) |
(0.120) |
(0.279) |
(0.156) |
||
Rostov on Don |
0.291* |
-0.0697 |
-0.0451 |
-0.273* |
-0.0456 |
|
(0.152) |
(0.137) |
(0.125) |
(0.152) |
(0.187) |
||
Sverdlovsk region |
-0.314* |
-0.207 |
-0.0890 |
0.436* |
0.0479 |
|
(0.167) |
(0.146) |
(0.124) |
(0.238) |
(0.172) |
||
Volgograd |
-0.00405 |
-0.136 |
0.0339 |
0.176 |
0.0859 |
|
(0.178) |
(0.129) |
(0.137) |
(0.233) |
(0.153) |
||
Republic of Mordovia |
-0.349** |
-0.344** |
-0.372* |
0.399* |
0.231 |
|
(0.149) |
(0.150) |
(0.195) |
(0.218) |
(0.241) |
||
Samara Region |
-0.107 |
-0.0305 |
0.198 |
-0.0239 |
-0.193 |
|
(0.143) |
(0.154) |
(0.159) |
(0.184) |
(0.183) |
||
Kaliningrad |
-0.00613 |
-0.0632 |
0.145 |
0.200 |
-0.141 |
|
(0.210) |
(0.191) |
(0.191) |
(0.248) |
(0.233) |
||
Construction works |
-0.0385 |
-0.154** |
-0.0169 |
0.0675 |
0.0272 |
|
(0.0886) |
(0.0767) |
(0.0586) |
(0.110) |
(0.0933) |
||
Architectural works |
-0.254* |
-0.357*** |
-0.133 |
0.133 |
0.124 |
|
(0.139) |
(0.123) |
(0.116) |
(0.193) |
(0.145) |
||
Engineering works |
0.170 |
0.140 |
0.0240 |
-0.166 |
-0.423*** |
|
(0.120) |
(0.0996) |
(0.0979) |
(0.182) |
(0.104) |
||
Production works |
0.0866 |
0.0687 |
0.177 |
0.276 |
-0.119 |
|
(0.162) |
(0.150) |
(0.145) |
(0.295) |
(0.178) |
||
Total Assets 2013 |
0.806*** |
|||||
(0.0233) |
||||||
Total Assets 2014 |
0.759*** |
-0.712*** |
||||
(0.0235) |
(0.0348) |
|||||
Total Assets 2015 |
0.744*** |
-0.693*** |
||||
(0.0169) |
(0.0263) |
|||||
Constant |
3.388*** |
3.873*** |
3.820*** |
-1.534*** |
-1.633*** |
|
(0.363) |
(0.342) |
(0.248) |
(0.518) |
(0.408) |
||
Observations |
703 |
910 |
1,058 |
668 |
872 |
|
R-squared |
0.780 |
0.754 |
0.801 |
0.598 |
0.627 |
|
Robust standard errors in parentheses |
||||||
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 |
a) If the amount of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue in 2013 will increase by 4 percent, considering all other things being equal.
b) If the amount of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue in 2014 will increase by 7 percent, considering all other things being equal.
c) If the amount of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue in 2015 will increase by 8 percent, considering all other things being equal.
d) If the amount of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue growth rate 2014/2013 will decrease by 6 percent, considering all other things being equal.
e) If the amount of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue growth rate 2015/2014 will decrease by 7 percent, considering all other things being equal.
Table 18
Descriptive statistics variables used in the regression
Variable |
Obs |
Mean |
Std. Dev. |
Min |
Max |
|
Amount of contracts (RUB) |
643 |
14.71618 |
2.503242 |
-6.907755 |
21.24681 |
|
Revenue 2013 |
643 |
2.06e+08 |
8.23e+08 |
14000 |
1.78e+10 |
|
Revenue 2014 |
643 |
2.29e+08 |
8.93e+08 |
99000 |
2.02e+10 |
|
Revenue 2015 |
643 |
2.60e+08 |
1.04e+09 |
312000 |
2.34e+10 |
|
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
643 |
-14.60017 |
1.878414 |
-20.43372 |
-6.883409 |
|
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
643 |
-14.93209 |
1.649728 |
-20.55732 |
-8.945708 |
Table 19
Multicollinearity analysis of regression indicators with independent variable amount of contracts (VIF-test)
VIF value |
||
Revenue 2013 |
1.11 |
|
Revenue 2014 |
1.11 |
|
Revenue 2015 |
1.1 |
|
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
1.13 |
|
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
1.11 |
Result: Multicollinearity not detected. None of the values exceed 5
Table 20
Multicollinearity analysis of regression indicators with independent variable amount of contracts (correlation)
Amount of contracts (RUB) |
Revenue 2013 |
Revenue 2014 |
Revenue 2015 |
Revenue growth rate 2013/2014 |
Revenue growth rate 2014/2015 |
||
Amount of contracts (RUB) |
1.0000 |
||||||
Revenue 2013 |
0.4132 |
1.0000 |
|||||
Revenue 2014 |
0.4564 |
0.8142 |
1.0000 |
||||
Revenue 2015 |
0.5075 |
0.7335 |
0.8226 |
1.0000 |
|||
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
-0.4162 |
-0.9995 |
-0.7957 |
-0.7283 |
1.0000 |
||
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
-0.4447 |
-0.8155 |
-0.9995 |
-0.8047 |
0.7973 |
1.0000 |
A multicollinearity regression analysis was performed. According to the results - all revenues and all revenue growth rates have an average dependence on the amount of state orders.
Table 21
Analysis of the impact of the number of state contracts on revenue and revenue
VARIABLES |
Revenue 2013 |
Revenue 2014 |
Revenue 2015 |
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
|
Number of state contracts |
-0.0116 |
0.0164 |
0.0210* |
0.0246 |
-0.0151 |
|
(0.0253) |
(0.0149) |
(0.0112) |
(0.0377) |
(0.0194) |
||
Saint Petersburg |
-0.0561 |
0.154 |
0.0170 |
-0.0153 |
-0.181* |
|
(0.117) |
(0.0989) |
(0.0704) |
(0.149) |
(0.107) |
||
Republic of Tatarstan |
0.0264 |
-0.105 |
0.141 |
-0.0672 |
0.0777 |
|
(0.199) |
(0.225) |
(0.210) |
(0.226) |
(0.259) |
||
Krasnodar region |
0.123 |
0.0160 |
-0.111 |
-0.130 |
-0.132 |
|
(0.158) |
(0.150) |
(0.118) |
(0.194) |
(0.130) |
||
Nizhniy Novgorod |
-0.204 |
-0.261* |
-0.222* |
0.374 |
0.0664 |
|
(0.212) |
(0.136) |
(0.124) |
(0.268) |
(0.157) |
||
Rostov on Don |
0.263* |
-0.0832 |
-0.0297 |
-0.236 |
-0.0606 |
|
(0.154) |
(0.128) |
(0.125) |
(0.156) |
(0.182) |
||
Sverdlovsk region |
-0.307* |
-0.209 |
-0.0832 |
0.436* |
0.0463 |
|
(0.166) |
(0.148) |
(0.128) |
(0.235) |
(0.176) |
||
Volgograd |
-0.0500 |
-0.197 |
-0.0210 |
0.244 |
0.143 |
|
(0.184) |
(0.146) |
(0.141) |
(0.239) |
(0.169) |
||
Republic of Mordovia |
-0.396*** |
-0.442*** |
-0.483** |
0.473** |
0.333 |
|
(0.144) |
(0.147) |
(0.194) |
(0.216) |
(0.236) |
||
Samara Region |
-0.141 |
-0.0856 |
0.128 |
0.0422 |
-0.145 |
|
(0.141) |
(0.154) |
(0.160) |
(0.168) |
(0.183) |
||
Kaliningrad |
-0.0241 |
-0.100 |
0.119 |
0.241 |
-0.106 |
|
(0.209) |
(0.176) |
(0.203) |
(0.254) |
(0.226) |
||
Construction works |
-0.0598 |
-0.178** |
-0.0284 |
0.0965 |
0.0432 |
|
(0.0885) |
(0.0776) |
(0.0602) |
(0.111) |
(0.0941) |
||
Architectural works |
-0.296** |
-0.416*** |
-0.172 |
0.195 |
0.179 |
|
(0.141) |
(0.122) |
(0.117) |
(0.195) |
(0.145) |
||
Engineering works |
0.128 |
0.0835 |
-0.0370 |
-0.0878 |
-0.362*** |
|
(0.121) |
(0.102) |
(0.100) |
(0.181) |
(0.107) |
||
Production works |
0.0868 |
0.0491 |
0.172 |
0.287 |
-0.103 |
|
(0.158) |
(0.145) |
(0.139) |
(0.284) |
(0.178) |
||
Total Assets 2013 |
0.824*** |
|||||
(0.0211) |
||||||
Total Assets 2014 |
0.795*** |
-0.749*** |
||||
(0.0205) |
(0.0303) |
|||||
Total Assets 2015 |
0.794*** |
-0.739*** |
||||
(0.0146) |
(0.0235) |
|||||
Constant |
3.715*** |
4.250*** |
4.170*** |
-1.898*** |
-1.935*** |
|
(0.370) |
(0.356) |
(0.254) |
(0.534) |
(0.416) |
||
Observations |
703 |
910 |
1,058 |
668 |
872 |
|
R-squared |
0.778 |
0.748 |
0.791 |
0.593 |
0.619 |
|
Robust standard errors in parentheses |
||||||
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 |
a) If the number of the state contract increases by 1 percent, we expect that revenue in 2015 will increase by 2 percent, considering all other things being equal.
Table 22
Descriptive statistics variables used in the regression
Variable |
Obs |
Mean |
Std. Dev. |
Min |
Max |
|
Number of contracts |
643 |
.4123722 |
1.787342 |
-6.907755 |
17.24462 |
|
Revenue 2013 |
643 |
2.06e+08 |
8.23e+08 |
14000 |
1.78e+10 |
|
Revenue 2014 |
643 |
2.29e+08 |
8.93e+08 |
99000 |
2.02e+10 |
|
Revenue 2015 |
643 |
2.60e+08 |
1.04e+09 |
312000 |
2.34e+10 |
|
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
643 |
-14.60017 |
1.878414 |
-20.43372 |
-6.883409 |
|
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
643 |
-14.93209 |
1.649728 |
-20.55732 |
-8.945708 |
Table 23
Multicollinearity analysis of regression indicators with independent variable number of contracts (VIF-test)
VIF value |
||
Revenue 2013 |
1.08 |
|
Revenue 2014 |
1.07 |
|
Revenue 2015 |
1.06 |
|
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
1.08 |
|
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
1.07 |
Result: Multicollinearity not detected. None of the values exceed 5.
Table 24
Multicollinearity analysis of regression indicators
Number of contracts |
Revenue 2013 |
Revenue 2014 |
Revenue 2015 |
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
||
Number of contracts |
1.0000 |
||||||
Revenue 2013 |
-0.0517 |
1.0000 |
|||||
Revenue 2014 |
-0.0080 |
0.8142 |
1.0000 |
||||
Revenue 2015 |
0.0132 |
0.7335 |
0.8226 |
1.0000 |
|||
Revenue growth rate 2014/2013 |
0.0540 |
-0.9995 |
-0.7957 |
-0.7283 |
1.0000 |
||
Revenue growth rate 2015/2014 |
0.0117 |
-0.8155 |
-0.9995 |
-0.8047 |
0.7973 |
1.0000 |
A multicollinearity regression analysis was performed. According to the results - all revenues and all revenue growth rates have a weak dependence on the number of state orders.
Results
Based on the results of the regressions in Table 1, we can conclude that from companies that signed a government contract in 2013, we expect that with an increase in the amount of government contracts by 1 percent, they will receive a percentage of revenue more in 2013 than in 2014, all other things being equal. However, the growth rate of revenue with an increase in the amount of government contracts is 1 percent lower for the period 2015/2014 than for the period 2014/2013, since the percentage of their revenues in 2015 with an increase in the amount of government contracts is 1 percent higher than in 2013 and for 2014.
If we consider as an independent variable the number of government contracts that companies took in 2013, then we see that when the state contracts increase by 1 percent in 2013, we expect that the company will receive more revenue than in 2014 and in 2015, all other things being equal. The growth rate with the increase in government contracts is 1 percent lower for the period 2014/2013 than for the period 2015/2014, all other things being equal.
Considering the most important result for us - the companies that fulfilled the state order in 2014, we can conclude that with an increase in the amount of government contracts by 1 percent in 2014, we expect its revenue (12%) to be higher than in 2013 (5%). ) or 2015 (10%). The growth rate of revenue with an increase in the amount of government contracts by 1 percent will be several times higher for the period 2014/2013 than for the period 2015/2014, all other things being equal.
Taking as an independent variable the number of state orders, we can conclude that with an increase in the number of government contracts in 2014 by 1 percent, we expect 1 percent more revenue in 2015 than in 2014.
Considering the small and medium-sized enterprises that performed the state order in 2015, we can conclude that with an increase in the amount of the state order by 1 percent, we expect that the company's revenue in 2015 will be higher than in 2013 and in 2014, all other things being equal. The growth rate of revenue with an increase in the amount of government contracts by 1 percent will be higher in the period 2014/2013 than in the period 2015/2014 ceteris paribus.
Taking as an independent variable the number of state orders signed in 2015, we can conclude with an increase in the number of state orders by 1 percent, the only revenue for 2015 has a significant coefficient.
Conclusion
According to the results of the implementation of final qualifying work can be concluded. An analysis of the literature was conducted, which demonstrated the experience of taking the biggest sporting events such as the Olympic Games and the World Cup. Basically, the holding of these competitions has affected the host country positively because it contributed to improving the infrastructure, building new stadiums, attracting investment, increasing the level of tourism and a number of positive effects that could boost the country's economy. However, there are drawbacks - since the holding of the biggest sporting event is expensive, many countries have driven themselves into debt trap and for years to come take the country out of the economic crisis. There is also a legacy problem, because after a sporting event, sports facilities built specifically for the World Cup or the Olympic Games lose their relevance and demand, and the government has to pay for the maintenance of these facilities from the state budget.
A separate comment should be given to the impact of such events on the construction market, which takes on the greatest importance for their conduct. Many sports facilities are under construction, infrastructure is being improved to accommodate guests from other countries and to finish and reconstruct buildings to attract tourists. During the writing of the thesis, the specificity of the construction industry and its development were studied. The cooperation of the state with small and medium construction business was also studied, the main problems and advantages of fulfilling state contracts were considered.
The system of state regulation of small and medium-sized businesses through the implementation of state contracts has become one of the most important parts of the thesis. It is also an indicator of business development in Russia and an indicator of the development of the country's economy. The main problems of fulfilling the state order, their advantages and potential were considered. Based on data on state contracts for 2013, 2014, 2015, a study was conducted that showed the dependence of the revenue of small and medium enterprises on the amount of contracts executed and their number.
Based on the results of the work done, it can be concluded that the hypothesis about the positive impact of major sporting events on the development of small and medium-sized businesses can be confirmed because with an increase in the volume of government contracts in 2014 (the year of signing major construction contracts to prepare for the World Cup) in Russia) we expect revenue to increase by 12% this year, and in 2013 we expect revenue to grow only by 5%. We also expect a significant increase in revenue in 2014 and 2015 compared with 2013, with an increase in the number of government contracts. The same thing happens with the companies that signed the state order in 2014 and in 2015 - with an increase in the amount or quantity of the state order by 1 percent, we expect that the revenue of the companies in the year of signing the state order will be higher than in the year without the state order. Consequently, by fulfilling government orders a small and medium-sized enterprise can get more revenue and develop more quickly. Since the work considered years of preparation for the World Cup, it can be concluded that the most sporting events had a positive effect on the development of small and medium-sized businesses in Russia. Of course, there are many external factors that also contributed to the increase in revenues of these companies, but show the results of work, companies should receive more revenue in the same year when they fulfill government orders.
Summing up, it can be said that this work could have an impact on the decision of managers of small and medium-sized enterprises who are thinking about work or prospects for working with government contracts and those who are thinking about working with the state in terms of the country's adoption of the biggest sporting events.
List of references
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Appendix 1
Do-file:
Independent variable - amount of state contracts (RUB) and average price of contract - ln_NN ; ln_average_g
Dependent variable - revenue 2013, revenue 2014, revenue 2015, revenue growth rate 2014/2013 and revenue growth rate 2015/2014 - ln_revenue_13, ln_revenue_14, ln_revenue_15, ln_revenue_2013_2014, ln_revenue_2014_2015. Control variables - type of construction activity,region, total assets 2013, total assets 2014 and total assets 2015 - num_dey ; num_adress; ln_TA13, ln_TA_14, ln_TA_15
quietly reg ln_revenue_13 ln_average_g i.num_adress i.num_dey ln_TA_13, r
outreg2 using coursework, excel replace
quietly reg ln_revenue_14 ln_average_g i.num_adress i.num_dey ln_TA_14, r
outreg2 using coursework, excel append
quietly reg ln_revenue_15 ln_average_g i.num_adress i.num_dey ln_TA_15, r
outreg2 using coursework, excel append
quietly reg ln_revenue_13 ln_NN i.num_adress i.num_dey ln_TA_13, r
outreg2 using coursework, excel replace
quietly reg ln_revenue_14 ln_NN i.num_adress i.num_dey ln_TA_14, r
outreg2 using coursework, excel append
quietly reg ln_revenue_15 ln_NN i.num_adress i.num_dey ln_TA_15, r
outreg2 using coursework, excel append
quietly reg ln_revenue_13_14 ln_NN i.num_adress i.num_dey ln_TA_14, r
outreg2 using coursework, excel append
quietly reg ln_revenue_14_15 ln_NN i.num_adress i.num_dey ln_TA_15, r
outreg2 using coursework, excel append
Appendix 2
Do-file: Independent variable - number of state contracts (RUB) and average price of contract - ln_GG ; ln_average_g
Dependent variable - revenue 2013, revenue 2014, revenue 2015, revenue growth rate 2014/2013 and revenue growth rate 2015/2014 - ln_revenue_13, ln_revenue_14, ln_revenue_15, ln_revenue_2013_2014, ln_revenue_2014_2015. Control variables - type of construction activity,region, total assets 2013, total assets 2014 and total assets 2015 - num_dey ; num_adress; ln_TA13, ln_TA_14, ln_TA_15
quietly reg ln_revenue_13 ln_average_g i.num_adress i.num_dey ln_TA_13, r
outreg2 using coursework, excel replace
quietly reg ln_revenue_14 ln_average_g i.num_adress i.num_dey ln_TA_14, r
outreg2 using coursework, excel append
quietly reg ln_revenue_15 ln_average_g i.num_adress i.num_dey ln_TA_15, r
outreg2 using coursework, excel append
quietly reg ln_revenue_13 ln_GG i.num_adress i.num_dey ln_TA_13, r
outreg2 using coursework, excel replace
quietly reg ln_revenue_14 ln_GG i.num_adress i.num_dey ln_TA_14, r
outreg2 using coursework, excel append
quietly reg ln_revenue_15 ln_GG i.num_adress i.num_dey ln_TA_15, r
outreg2 using coursework, excel append
quietly reg ln_revenue_13_14 ln_GG i.num_adress i.num_dey ln_TA_14, r
outreg2 using coursework, excel append
quietly reg ln_revenue_14_15 ln_GG i.num_adress i.num_dey ln_TA_15, r
outreg2 using coursework, excel append
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