As a reaction to the Magnitsky Act, Russia introduced its own anti-American piece of legislation under the form of the Dima Yakovlev Law. The law banned Americans from adopting Russian children, and mirrored the Magnitsky Act as it established similar sanctions against U.S. citizens responsible for the violation of human rights and freedoms of Russian citizens. The law, similarly to the Magnitsky Act, was named after a martyr, in this case a Russian toddler who was adopted by an American. This Russian retaliation casted a poor image of both the United States and the Russian Federation, as both states were seen as `sordid' (L. Pennie, 2012), and acting `in no one's best interest' (Amnesty International, 2012). Altogether, the United States and Russia were both acting shamefully and foolishly, as what had initially been planned to be a positive advancement in the US-Russian relationship, by establishing normal trade relations between the two, materialised in the deterioration of the relationship. Once again, one must emphasise how this course of events could have easily been avoided, in the case the United States had not introduced negativity and anti-Russian sentiment within the repeal of the Jackson Vanik Amendment.

3.3 - Conflicting Understandings of RESET

Moving on, the reasons for a deterioration of the US-Russian relationship do not limit themselves to Hillary Clinton's comments on Russian domestic politics and the Magnitisky act. Primarily, the Russian Federation and the United States had very conflicting understandings of RESET since its outset. Whereas the Obama administration had sought cooperation with Russia in order to renew American leadership throughout the globe and restore the American image abroad (D. Chollet, 2016: Chapter 3), Moscow viewed RESET as an opportunity for Russia to be recognised by the United States as a world power (Suslov, 2019). The Russian logic had not changed since 1990, as Russian elites still saw the international system as a multipolar structure. In that view, they deemed that RESET would establish a relationship based on mutual respect between two of many global powers (Suslov, 2019). If both parties did not share the same view on RESET, many argued that RESET had no concrete chance of being sustainable.

Secondly, the reasons that motivated the reset policy had been achieved in the American perspective, meaning that further cooperation was not essential. Following these notable achievements, Obama and his supporters did not have much left on their agenda that could stimulate US-Russian relations, in other words, the agenda for possible cooperation was shrinking. Andrew Kuchins resumed the situation adequately, by citing a Russian interviewee he does not name, the latter once stated: `Once the New START Treaty, WTO accession, the US-Russian Civilian Nuclear Power Agreement, the Iran nuclear deal, and the Northern Distribution Network were accomplished, the reset ran out of its mission. Neither side had the imagination to go beyond the older model of relations' (A. Kuchins, 2016:21) Despite this, there remained one last subject which could be deepened, nuclear arms reduction. But once again it seemed that certain red lines that made further cooperation on the matter impossible had been crossed. For instance the US had refused a discussion on the nuclearisation of space as they held an advantage in that area, whilst Russia did not wish to negotiate strategic disarmament. Concerning Afghanistan, the momentum was no different. As time passed, it became clear that the US were not making significant advancements against the Taliban, and would therefore remain in the country within the foreseeable future. Russia had thought that Obama would manage to gain the upper hand and establish a more or less stable regime prior to withdrawing American troops. When it became clear that American troops would remain on the ground, Russia adopted a new stance which consisted in criticising the US prolonged presence in the country. Furthermore, the Russian government was deeply concerned that drug-trafficking in Afghanistan had not been diminished. As a matter of fact, the United States had refused the Russian proposition that a NATO contingent could destroy poppy fields, as they deemed the farming of the ressource to be a strategic asset in the region. Indeed, local populations as well as the Afghani elite would not be too pleased if a significant and consistent income would be destroyed. It is commonly known that many high ranking government officials are directly affiliated with the drug trafficking and any impediment on their business would complicate the United States' negotiations with them. As a result, the harvesting of poppies continues and even increases year by year. Moscow, who's primary objective in the region had been to diminish the trafficking in order to solve their heroin addiction amongst young Russians, was deeply disheartened and started to realise that their national interests would not be backed up by the United States if the latter had no advantage in doing so.

3.4 - The Arab Spring

Having clarified that the reasons that engendered RESET had not been able to sustain it, this paper can now apprehend the events that further deteriorated the US-Russian relationship. In addition to Hillary Clinton's comments on Russian protests, the ratification of the Magnitsky Act and the realisation that prior areas of cooperation did not engender continuous output, the US-Russian relationship was deeply affected by a major geopolitical chain of events referred to as the Arab Spring. First of all, Moscow and Washington held very different positions vis a vis the democratic uprisings occurring within the greater Middle East. The United States, fully incorporating the democratic peace and perpetual peace theories (J. Bentham, 1789; I. Kant, 1795), viewed the Arab Spring as a chance to stabilise the Arab world following its democratisation. Hillary Clinton, in an effort to illustrate the American approach to the Arab Spring, declared that `democracies make for stronger and stabler partners. They trade more, innovate more and fight less (...) For all these reasons opening political systems, societies and economies is not simply a matter of idealism, it is a strategic necessity.' (H. Clinton, 2011) All in all, the American strategy of 2012 was predictable and aligned with its predecessors, as democratising the Middle East, according to the Obama administration, would not only stabilise the Arab world in the long term, it would also align many states with the West. On the other hand, Moscow believed the opposite. In Putin and Medvedev's point of views, the protests and uprisings had to be suppressed in order to achieve instant stability. This strategy also reflected the ones carried out beforehand, as Russia always viewed regime change and revolutions as very damaging (Suslov, 2019). Before going any further, it is essential to emphasise the fact that the Arab Spring impacted many countries - among which Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen and Egypt - and that the United States did not exactly carry out the same strategy for every concerned nation. Indeed, rather than promoting democracy in a general sense, they favoured the democratic uprisings in the nations in which they had more to gain and nothing to lose. For example, the revolutions of Bahrain and Yemen threatened the Saudi sphere of influence. Saudi Arabia being a traditional ally to the United States, the latter did not react to, nor condemn the harsh treatments they received from the governments under threat, and stayed away from negotiations when Yemenite President Salih was forced to resign to the profit of his Vice President. Nonetheless the Obama administration was very keen to support the rebellious forces of Libya and Syria. Concerning the case of Libya, a NATO led coalition was rapidly put in place in 2011 in the aim to facilitate the success of the Libyan Revolution. Before the coalition was formed, a no fly zone over Libyan territory was established through United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, and allowed the Western forces to provide air superiority to the armed rebellion in the future. The reasons that motivated Russia to abstain this UN resolution appear unclear at first, as a simple veto would have benefited Gaddafi greatly. However, experts, among whom Nikolas Gvosdev, argue that the decision not to veto the vote was `based on its understanding that the U.S. and Western powers would create safe areas for civilian refugees, and not become co-belligerents alongside the rebels to overthrow Gadhafi' (N. Gvosdev, 2016) Along the same lines, Suslov argues that Medvedev - who was still in office at the time - was duped by the Americans, as they promised him that no regime change would occur in Libya (Suslov, 2019). If this is to be true, one can really question how Medvedev could believe such a thing. Indeed, many figures in the West had already vocalised their support for leaders of the Libyan Revolution, who had signaled their intent to continue their rebellion until Gaddafi would be caught dead or alive; meaning he would have to win the war, or abandon power. Nonetheless, if Medvedev was effectively duped by Obama and his Secretary of State, the United States are to be blamed further damaging the US-Russian relationship. Many Russians, among whom Vladimir Putin, viewed the US sponsored regime change in Libya as the point of no return in US-Russian relations, as this showed that American policy continuously and systematically enables regime change whenever it fits its national interests (E. MacAskill & R. Norton-Taylor, 2011). According to Dmitry Suslov, a distinguished member of the Valdai Club, when the secretary general of NATO announced that the goal in Libya was effectively regime change, he marked the end of peaceful US-Russian relationships (Suslov, 2019). The Russian Federation would from now on be more cautious and would prevent all other Western attempts of regime change through the United Nations veto system (N. Gvosdev, 2016).

As a result the Syrian case was dealt with frontally by the Russian Federation. In addition to vetoing every major UN resolution which aimed to destabilize Bashar al-Assad politically, militarily or economically, they made it clear from the start that Syria would not suffer the same results as Libya. In early June 2011, Foreign Minister Serguei Lavrov warned that the international community `should not permit any provocations aimed at securing regime change' in Syria (S. Lavrov, 2011). All in all, Russia supported the Asad government to the bitter end with the results we know of today. It did so not only to preserve its arms contracts, oil investments and naval base in Tartus, nor was it just concerned that the removal of Asad would imply Syria's potential shift towards the United States, but because Russia was genuinely alarmed that the downfall of Asad could give way to the rise of a Sunni fundamentalist movement (W. Englund, 2012: A20). Ultimately, the cases associated with the Arab Spring, who despite having not been orchestrated by any of the two countries, deeply deteriorated the US-Russian relationship. Both governments shared very conflictual opinions on the situations, and acted accordingly. RESET seemed to have been concluded faster than it had been implemented. The United States and Russia were now openly counter balancing each other's influence in order to gain strategic advantages. One of the main consequences of this, is that the Russian Federation initiated further discussions and rapprochements with other non-Western countries like China, India or even Middle Eastern countries. Not only was the United States alienating itself from Russia, it was allowing the non-Western countries to come closer together. Despite this being alarming for the United States, as the World Order they wish to perpetuate could end up being highly threatened by a union of such countries; the Obama administration could only blame themselves.

Chapter 4: Crisis and Point of No Return

4.1 - The Ukrainian Crisis

By 2012, the reset policy had failed. In an attempt to stop the US-Russian relationship from deteriorating even further, the Obama administration who was still naively hopeful, attempted one last push. The respected American expert on Russia Angela Rent was invited to the White House by President Obama in order for them to formulate the American strategy. Ultimately, they came up with the `post-reset status quo', which essentially would promote a status quo with Russia. An amelioration was out of the question, therefore working hard to ensure a status quo was the best option on the table. Stent believed that Ukraine and Georgia would not reveal themselves to be contentious issues, as the countries Euroatlantic aspirations would not be fulfilled (Stent, 2012:135). Furthermore, Obama, as shown in his 2014 State of the Union address, also did not realise how the situation in Ukraine would soon escalate to become an indirect conflict between the United States and the Russian Federation. During his address, Russia was not mentioned by the President despite the fact that the pro-Russian Yanukovych regime had been under pressure from the Euromaidan protests for weeks. Obama only commented that the US stood `for the principle that all people have the right to express themselves freely and peacefully, and have a say in their country's future' (Obama, 2014) Moreover, not only did the Presidency downplay the Ukrainian crisis prior to its eruption, the Pentagon's 2014 Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) did not envision a Russian annexation of Crimea in the coming months. Actually, the QDR portrayed an overall friendly view of Russia. Indeed, the document informed that the US was willing to undertake cooperation with Russia on matters of security, further nuclear reduction, missile defence and in the context of North Korea (Hagel, 2014). However, there was one criticism present in the QDR, it consisted in the concern the United States had over the Russian military modernisation and `actions that violate the sovereignty of its neighbors', and would reveal itself to be an accurate prediction (Hagel, 2014:6) Apart from that last line, the Pentagon, the Presidency and other American agencies remained hopeful that Russia would not aggravate the Ukrainian conflict.

As we know Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014, up to then a region of sovereign Ukraine. During the course of the same month, the Crimean Status Referendum was held, its official results unanimously went in favour of Crimean Russian integration. This was to be the point of no return for the US-Russian relationship. In reaction to the events, the United States and most of the international community condemned and sanctioned Russia for its illegal annexation of the region. The results of the referendum were disputed by many, among whom Andrey Illarionov, a former Russian government advisor. The latter stated that the referendum was a `grossly rigged falsification' and that the outcome was `cynically distorted' (Illarionov quoted in D. Donaldson, 2014). Obama's 2015 State of the Union speech highly differed with the one of 2014. Indeed, Obama condemned Russia at several occasions and affirmed that the United States would uphold `the principle that bigger nations can't bully the small, by opposing Russian aggression, and supporting Ukraine's democracy, and reassuring our NATO allies.' (Obama, 2015) Obama then warned Russians that this would render them `isolated with their economy in tatters' (Obama, 2015). In a stark contrast to the policies led by Obama until now, the United States then announced that they would reassure their allies, `by backing their security commitments and increasing responsiveness through training and exercises, as well as a dynamic presence in Central and Eastern Europe to deter further Russian aggression.' (Obama, 2015) Finally, Hillary Clinton famously went as far as to compare Vladimir Putin with Adolf Hitler at a private fundraiser, she stated that the Russian President's justifications for his actions in Ukraine, were ultimately similar to the ones given by Hitler when annexing Czechoslovakia and Romania (H. Clinton, cited by The Guardian, 2016). By then RESET was a part of history. Dempsey claims that the United States never believed Russia to be seeking direct military confrontation with the United States and its allies, but that these measures were taken in order to signify to Moscow that any further aggressions throughout the globe could lead to more serious repercussions. (Dempsey, 2015:2) Whether Dempsey is accurate or not, from then on two things were certain; firstly RESET was now a part of history, secondly no US-Russian cooperation would take place in the foreseeable future.

Whereas the US-Russian relationship prior to the Crimean crisis was mainly deteriorated due to the United States' anti-Russian policies and American interventionism during the Arab Spring, the complete breakdown in relations following 2014 can be blamed on the Russian Federation. Indeed, when Vladimir Putin orchestrated the annexation of the Crimean peninsula, he was well aware of the impacts it would generate between Russia and the international community. Quite frankly, international law condemns such actions (annexations), and therefore Russia was held accountable through a wave of sanctions and exclusions from certain supranational entities such as the G8 which became the G7, and consequently the US-Russian relationship was further deteriorated. Whilst the Western narrative attributes the annexation to Russian imperialist aspirations (J. Bodie, 2017; J. Rogoza, 2014; A. Grigas, 2016), and/or the will to reconquer the territories lost by Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union (H. Coynash & A. Charron, 2019; J. Rogoza, 2014; A. Grashkin, 2019), the Russian officials advance a very different point of view. Indeed, the Kremlin described its primary incursion in Crimea as a necessity to ensure the safety of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers amidst the Euromaidan protests (J. Ball, 2019; V. Putin cited by R. Coalson, 2014) Moreover, they deem that Crimea was in no way annexed, meaning taken by force, and that consequently the Russian Federation respected international law (E. Leonaite & D. Zalimas, 2016). Subsequently, the Russian government, invoked the right to self-determination for the Crimean people in what some deem to be a re-interpretation of the definition of self-determination (E. Leonaite & D. Zalimas, 2016: 30) Finally, Russia argues that the Crimean region is historically Russian, and was only ceded to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic by the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic, after Nikita Krushchev wished to symbolically reward the Ukrainians for their role in helping the Soviet Union deal with famine, whilst marking the 300th anniversary of Ukraine becoming a part of Tsarist Russia (J. Keating, 2014; K. Calamur, 2014). At that time, the transfer of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine did not have many repercussions as both Republics were part of the same Federal Union, meaning no one could have predicted the effects such a decision would have on the future.

More importantly, Russia deemed that if the United States' was able to fund uprisings and back regime changes like they did in Syria and Libya in total impunity, then they could allow themselves to act in the same way, at least in their own spheres of influence (Suslov, 2019). This reasoning is probably the most important and responsible for the annexation of Crimea, and is in a sense, justifiable. Indeed, considering the fact that the international system is nowadays of a multipolar nature, and that certain states like the United States, France and the United Kingdom, are not condemned by supranational organisations when waging illegal wars (Libya, Syria and even Iraq); then why would Russia be so passive and not carry out its own agenda. International relations are most often conducted through the scope of Realism; in this case, the Realist rationale clearly dictates that Russia should seize Crimea, as the consequences the Russian Federation will endure will be more positive than negative. Indeed, Sebastopol is a strategic naval base, therefore controlling it is crucial to have rapid access to the Middle East, and claiming Crimea has boosted Putin's approval ratings domestically, whilst the economic sanctions imposed on Russia do not affect them as much as the West would have liked them to. Altogether, Russia has emerged from the Ukrainian crisis stronger. Finally, and in the Russian Federation's defence, no one can seriously step forward and argue that the United States would not have carried out the same strategy in Russia's place. In that view, Russia is not to be blamed for the deterioration of US-Russian relations, as they only mirrored the past actions of the United States, to a lesser degree, as Crimea is legitimately part of the Russian geographical zone of influence.

4.2 - The Aftermath of the Ukrainian Crisis

Following the Ukrainian crisis, the relationship between Washington DC and Moscow was overwhelmingly confrontational. At home and in Europe, Obama was strongly criticised for initiating RESET. Many among whom former Secretary General of NATO George Robetson, claimed it had `allowed Putin to jump back on the world stage and test the resolve of the West' (G. Robertson cited by S. Erlanger, 2016). The crises of Syria and Ukraine are seen as geopolitical disasters whose legacies will last in the West (G. Robertson cited by S. Erlanger for the New York Times, 2016). In Russia, many academicians and policy makers see the United States as a malevolent actor in international relations, ready to go as far as causing chaos and instability throughout the globe in order to pursue its interests. Realistically, both parties' beliefs are appropriate. Due to such beliefs, the US-Russian evolved into a platonic one, as both sides continuously criticise each other for their actions. Whereas some speak of a New Cold War (R. Legvold, 2016; J. L. Black, 2016), others reject the claim but recognize the seriousness of the situation (Sakwa, 2019; D. Trenin, 2014). Whichever way one wishes to qualify the current situation of the US-Russian relationship, the fact is both sides regard each other as adversaries (Carter, 2015), actively campaign against each other, and even calculate their national interests in opposition to each other. Moreover, both sides are convinced of the fact they are on the right side of history, meaning none will back down. In other words, the relationship is frozen, petrified, as both countries deem that the opposition is the one who should take steps to initiate diplomacy again. Ultimately, the US-Russian relationship remains fractured to this date, mainly because no significant changes have occurred, and no real opportunities for improvement have been grasped by either side. At first, Trump did seem like he was interested in reviving the relationship (M. Eckel, 2020), but growing domestic concern about the Russian role in the US Presidential election led him to caution, as to not invigorate those who claimed he was secretly in an alliance with Putin . Trump's arrival at the White House could, and maybe should have been the spark the relationship needed, but the Helsinki bilateral summit between him and Putin delivered too little, and no hopes were nurtured. Ultimately, the relationship remains at a standstill.

Conclusion

To this date the US-Russian relationship remains fractured, and the reset policy initiated by the Obama administration is a remnant of the past. Prior to our analysis of the US-Russian relationship during the Obama Presidency, competing interests and opposed values had been identified as the main obstacles to cooperation and realignment by the Liberal and Realist theories. Now that this paper has addressed the implementation of RESET, Putin's return to power, the Arab Spring, the controversies associated to the Magnitsky Act, and the Crimean crisis, it is in a position to affirm that both the Liberal comprehension and the Realist understandings of the relationship are valid. However, studying the Washington-Moscow axis solely through the angle of either of these theories of international relations, would render any conclusions incomplete. Indeed, in order to have a comprehensive and exhaustive understanding of US-Russian relations during Obama's Presidential years, one must study the relationship whilst incorporating both points of views. If not, one would inevitably downplay the relevance and the importance of national interests, or alternatively, of values and ideals in the evolution of the relationship.

To reiterate, RESET was initiated for two major reasons. The first was linked to the fact that the United States' national interests set by Obama, were unachievable without any level of cooperation between Moscow and Washington. The second, was that Dmitri Medvedev, the President of the Russian Federation in 2009, possesses strong Neoliberal convictions, which undeniably convinced the Americans that cooperation with Russia was achievable. In other words, the alignment of both the interests and values of both countries, facilitated the reset policy possible. Consequently, the deterioration of the US-Russian relationship was caused by similar factors. Indeed, when Putin returned to the Presidency, Russia reincorporated the aspirations of establishing itself as a great power within the international system, meaning it could no longer align its interests with those of the United States; who simply viewed Russia as a `regional power' (B. Obama, 2014). Moreover, Putin's grasp on the Russian political system is much firmer and authoritarian than the one exerted by his predecessor Medvedev, ultimately, this `values gap' between Russia and the US caused the Obama administration to be more distant (B. Lo, 2015:175). Additionally, the competing interests both sides had in the Middle Eastern theatre sparked tensions and further harmed the weakening relationship. Finally the Crimean crisis and its consequences condemned all hopes of further rapprochement between both nations. Once again, their competing interests prevented any cooperation, rather they engendered a new era of opposition between them, as both officially recognised themselves as `antagonists' (Carter, 2015).

Finally, in its attempt to designate responsibility for the deterioration of the US-Russian relationship, this paper has established the fact that both parties are to be held accountable. However, the Obama and Putin administrations are guilty of endangering the relationship at different times. Due to this factor, this article has been enabled to highlight how the United States are to be blamed for being the first of the two actors to have harmed the relationship to the extent of threatening the survival of RESET. Undeniably, American interventionism in both Libya and in Syria has profoundly affected the momentum of trust that had surfaced from 2009 to 2011, and constitutes the first reason for the deterioration of the relationship. Whether Putin's return is to be held against him or not, the actions he undertook when in power, can simply be justified by the fact that they were a reaction to the ones carried out by Obama prior to his election. Moreover, the ratification of the Magnitsky Act by Obama, is an absurdity in itself. When revoking the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, the primary intention was to favour Russian and American realignment on the basis of a common trading policy; therefore, including anti-Russian measures such as the sanctions against Russian officials was highly counterproductive, as it harmed Russia's image within the United States, and shamed the country for its endemic corruption. One could easily have predicted how the news would be received within the walls of the Kremlin, and thereby deduce how the US-Russian relationship would be affected in consequence. Despite the fact that Putin should be blamed for his controversial annexation of Crimea, one could argue that the relationship was already condemned by that point, and that Putin did well to take advantage of the little amount of trust Washingtonian and European institutions still placed in him. Ultimately, Putin violated international law in order to gain himself and his country a decisive advantage in the Crimean region, which could never be annulled without a frontal war between the West and the Russian Federation. In his defence, his actions mirrored those of the United States, the only difference being, the amount of international power and support both countries enjoy. As a result, the Russian Federation was sanctioned and called out by the majority of the international community, and rightfully so, as should have been the United States following the wars of Iraq, Libya, and Syria.

To conclude, the relationship was doomed to fail for several reasons. Firstly, both entities did not share the same definitions and understandings of what RESET was to be, since the very start of the realignment. Secondly, both nations are without a doubt expansionist, as opposed to imperialist. Indeed, both the Russian Federation and the United States despite having incorporated the idea that territorial expansion cannot be abused in the way it once was due to the nature of the international system of the 21st century; have not renounced their spheres of influence, and more importantly, actively plot to extend the latters. As a result of the fact that their spheres of influence geographically border, nay juxtapose each other in some cases, both countries have opposing interests.in certain areas of the world. Ultimately, the US-Russian relationship will remain in crisis until one nation profoundly modifies its approach to its foreign policy to the point of relinquishing its expansionist aspirations.

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