Изменения во внешней политике авторитарного государства в условиях санкций: кросс-национальный анализ

Изменения во внешнеполитических и внешнеэкономических показателях государства, произошедшие в условиях санкционных экономических и политических ограничений. Факторы и условия, влияющие на изменения во внешней политике авторитарных стран под ограничениями.

Рубрика Политология
Вид дипломная работа
Язык русский
Дата добавления 10.12.2019
Размер файла 563,5 K

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