Ukraine - Poland: quest for the past

Having concluded an alliance with radical nationalists and populists (Kukiz 2015), the Law and Justice Party once again suggested making July 11 the Remembrance Day of Victims of the Genocide of Poles (certainly, the keyword here was “genocide”). According to the members of the party, the Polish victims of these events were not honored enough; in particular, their extermination did not receive the right name--genocide (wPolityce.Pl 2016). Michat Dworczyk, an MP representing the Law and Justice Party, read a letter from 200 Polish parliamentarians in a live broadcast of the Ukrainian television channel Espresso TV. The letter contained reproaches to the Ukrainian leadership for the glorification of organizations and persons with a “specific reputation” (meaning OUN-B and UPA). Polish parliamentarians said that the resolution on the day of remembrance of the victims of genocide being prepared in the Polish Sejm was not directed against Ukraine and Ukrainians (Den 2016). On July 7, 2016 the Polish Senate voted 60-23 to recommend that the Sejm adopt a resolution containing the term “genocide” (Rzeczpospolita 2016).

One more important event which happened on the previous day has not yet been publicly discussed: on July 6, a group of Polish MPs submitted to the Sejm a draft law on amendments to the law concerning the Polish Institute of National Memory. The authors of the draft law proposed a special commission of the institute to investigate crimes perpetrated by Ukrainian Nationalists and other Ukrainian organizations collaborating with the Third Reich. Before that, the list included “crimes of Nazism and Communism.” The legislators also proposed expanding the ban on propaganda of Communism and Fascism and other forms of totalitarianism (a criminal offense) by mentioning the crimes of Ukrainian nationalists (Sejm 2016)

The draft law provides a list of grievances against the Ukrainian side, designed to demonstrate a need for the approval of the new law. These grievances included the glorification of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN and UPA) even at the legislative level, the adoption of the date of creation of the UPA (October 14) as the "Day of Defender of the Fatherland", the inclusion of the leaders of the OUN and UPA in the official national pantheon and perpetuation of their memory in street-naming, the use of the ethos of

Banderite wartime structures for the organization of voluntary battalions and for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the neglect for the burial places of the victims of the Volhynian tragedy (Sejm 2016).

Meanwhile, a letter was written on the Polish side by those who had already stopped making decisions. Retired presidents and statesmen including Lech Walesa, Aleksander Kwasniewski, and Bronislaw Komorowski also asked forgiveness for the harm done by Poles to the Ukrainians in the past (Istorychna Pravda 2016a).

On July 22, 2016 the Polish parliament adopted a resolution that proclaimed July 11 the Remembrance Day of the Victims of Genocide Perpetrated by Ukrainian Nationalists Against Polish Citizens in the Eastern Lands of the Second Polish Republic in 1943-1945" (442 MPs voted in favor, 10 MPs abstained, none against). The OUN, the UPA, the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (1st Galician), and other groups that collaborated with the Nazis were named responsible for the murders of 100,000 Poles (and citizens of other nationalities as well). The resolution paid homage to those Ukrainians who saved Poles. The resolution of the Sejm emphasized that only complete historical truth would lead to mutual forgiveness and reconciliation. The “complete historical truth”, apparently, meant qualifying the mass murders of Poles in Volhynia as genocide (Sejm 2016b).

The reaction of the Ukrainian side was easy to predict. President Petro Poroshenko expressed his regret and preferred not to go into further detail.(Zakhid.Net 2016). The International Relations Committee of the Verkhovna Rada condemned the “one-sided action” of the Polish legislators as “anti-Ukrainian,” “politically unbalanced and juridically incorrect” (Rada 2016). Borys Tarasyuk, head of the parliamentary group on interparliamentary relations of Ukraine and Poland, stepped down from office, proclaiming that the decision of the Sejm was anti-Ukrainian (Radio Svoboda 2016). Volodymyr Viatrovych, the head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, called the decision of the Sejm a natural result of anti-Ukrainian hysteria in Poland (Viatrovych 2016). Piotr Tyma, the head of the Union of Ukrainians of Poland, indicated that the supporters of reconciliation only addressed the topic of Volhynia by following the calendar (on “round dates”), while the supporters of the confrontational genocidal version never stopped promoting it. He also pointed to an obvious (to his opinion) misbalance in the actions of the Polish side: the absence of any real attempts to discuss mass murders of Ukrainians by the units of the Home Army and other Polish military formations (Tyma 2016).

A similar discussion flared up in the Ukrainian mass media. Nationalists and national democrats cried for a symmetric response. Liberals suggested deploring the actions of the Polish parliamentarians but urged avoiding confrontation. Everyone agreed that the conflict would be expedient for Russia, where the Communist Party registered a statement expressing solidarity with the Polish Sejm (Dzerkalo Tyzhnia 2016).

In response, the Verkhovna Rada registered a project of resolution honoring the memory of the victims. Its wording was almost a mirror-like reproduction of the rhetoric of the Sejm, exemplified by the phrase that the truth “should form the basis of harmony and forgiveness between the Polish and Ukrainian peoples.” A commemorative date was proposed to be marked as a Remembrance Day of Genocide Perpetrated by the Polish State against Ukrainians in 1919-1951 genocide (Verkhovna Rada 2016a). Stanistaw Karczewski, speaker of the Polish Senate, told the Polish mass media that the adoption of such a resolution may complicate the dialogue between Poland and Ukraine (Deutsche Welle 2016).

On August 30, 2016, an address of “well-known Ukrainians” to the Ukrainian parliament was published in the press. The authors accused Polish MPs of a “breach of agreements” (proving it with reconciliatory declarations from past years), of the deliberate distortion of “historical truth,” and of using politically irresponsible and juridically incorrect formulas. “Well-known Ukrainians” suggested that the Verkhovna Rada adopt countermeasures, officially establishing three commemorative dates: September 23, the Day of Polish Repression of the Autochthonous Population of Galicia (the day when the Pacification of Ukrainians began in 1930); December 25, the Remembrance Day of Genocidal Extermination by the Polish Underground of the Autochthonous Ukrainian Population in the Centuries-Old Ukrainian Land (“It was on this day in 1942 that the Polish chauvinists began the mass murder of the Ukrainian population, as they sang carols on the corpses of the martyrs”); and, finally, April 28, the Remembrance Day of Ukrainian Victims of Deportation by the Polish State (Evropeiska Pravda 2016).

The debate was additionally fueled by the film Volhynia, a historical thriller made by the popular Polish director Wojciech Smarzowski. The film, detailing the atrocities of the UPA and reproducing the old stereotype of the “Ukrainian throat-cutter” curiously coincided with the climax of discussions about the past. The film has never been screened in Ukraine.

The influence of the past on the present seemed to peak and finally, both sides of the process came to their senses, especially as they recognized that their conflict about the past could benefit a third party, namely Russia. On 20 October 2016, the Verkhovna Rada and the Polish Sejm adopted a mutual declaration of memory and solidarity, which was also supported by the Sejm of Lithuania. The declaration stated for the need for “impartial historical research” and for the “containment of the forces that lead to argument in our states.” The declaration pointed at the common enemy, Russia, and at the necessity of reaching consensus when facing the latter (Ukrainska Pravda 2016).

This declaration notwithstanding, aggressive sentiments soon started to be heard again on both sides. In December 2016, Witold Waszczykowski, the Polish minister of foreign affairs, urged the Ukrainian side to mutual constructive actions in the sphere of remembrance of the past, citing the example of Yad Vashem and of Polish-German reconciliation. In particular, he hinted that the national glorification of the UPA (its anniversary was approaching) might hamper the route towards mutual understanding (Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych 2016). In January 2017, western regions of Ukraine started to prepare the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the establishment of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. In February, the UINP declared the start of the “national information campaign for the commemoration of the UPA.” (UINP 2017). This news provoked a nervous reaction on the Polish side. Jarostaw Kaczynski, speaking to Gazeta Polska about his meeting with Petro Poroshenko, said he told Ukrainian president directly: there is no chance to get to Europe with Bandera. A choice should be made: either integration with the West and break with the tradition of the UPA, or an integration with East and everything such a choice entails (Wiadomosci 2017).

In another interview, Kaczynski told the readers of the weekly Do Rzeczy that Ukraine was creating a people's cult who perpetrated genocide against Poles, surpassing Germans in their cruelty. Unsurprisingly, these loud statements provoked a reaction in Ukraine, though not as high in profile. Volodymyr Viatrovych used his Facebook page to describe the declarations of the Polish politician as “imperialism with complications;” a Svoboda activist, for unknown reasons, reminded the “old Polak Kaczynski” of the partitions of Poland; and Bohdan Chervak, leader of the OUN in Ukraine, declared that Kaczynski's position did not differ from that of the Kremlin (Politeka.Net 2017). However, none of these declarations left the domain of social media. And the most important politicians kept silent.

Between 2017-2018, the conflict reached a new dimension. The war of memory was enhanced by the war of the cemeteries. Polish authorities started to remove the memorial plates and monuments dedicated to UPA soldiers that were erected without formal permission. According to official statements, about forty places of memory lacked legal status. The Ukrainian side responded with their own figures: according to data from the UINP, no less than 100 Polish sites of memory had not received official permission to be arranged. After deconstruction of the memorial to UPA soldiers in Hrushovychy in April 2017, the UINP suspended issuing permissions for Polish exhumation works in Ukraine. As a result, the Polish-Ukrainian forum of historians, reestablished in 2015, was stalled.

By the end of 2017, Ukraine Minister of Foreign Affairs Petro Klimkin regretted the excessive politicization of Ukrainian-Polish relations and lamented the Polish position: according to him, Ukrainians had apologized for acts of vandalism while Poles did not (Evropeiska Pravda 2017b). Polish President Andrzej Duda, in turn, exclaimed that he did not object to the installation of Ukrainian tombs in Poland, but he claimed that this should be done only after exhumation and clear identification of the remains (Evropeiska Pravda 2017a). Polish authorities claimed that UPA soldiers had never been buried in the tomb at Hrushovychy, for instance. Presidents of both countries subsequently exchanged standard formulas about the necessity of mutual understanding of the problems of the past at a meeting in Kharkiv on December 13, 2017 and promised to revive the work of the intergovernmental commission created for this purpose (Novynarnia 2017).

Nevertheless, in the winter of 2018 the struggle for the “`true past” restarted in both countries. The Sejm approved changes to the Law on the Institute of National Memory proposed two years earlier. Apart from other dubious norms that provoked international scandal (which were in fact aimed at Holocaust revisionism), the law contained mention of the “Ukrainian nationalists” whose crimes against Polish people were lined up with the crimes of Nazis and Communists. Article 55 prohibited public denial of these crimes and introduced criminal prosecution for it, a fine or imprisonment for up to three years (Sejm 2018). In Poland, the amendments were predictably protested by the liberals and the opposition. In Ukraine, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed concern.

The same feeling was publicly shared by President Poroshenko. The Ukrainian parliament asked the Polish president to veto the law. A kind of bitter irony attached itself to this situation: the Polish law declared “Ukrainian nationalists” (i.e., the OUN and UPA) criminals and prohibited any public expressions of an alternative point of view, while Ukrainian law in April 2015 had declared them national heroes; had obliged everyone, regardless of nationality, to respect them; and prohibited any forms of public disrespect to them.

In July 2018, the Ukrainian and Polish presidents broke the tradition of common statements devoted to Volhynia-43. Duda visited the Ukrainian village Olyk to praise the memory of Poles killed in 1943. Poroshenko stopped at the memorial of Sahryn, where Ukrainian villagers were eliminated by Polish partisan forces in 1944. The Polish president called events of 1943 “ethnic cleansing” and routinely appealed to the “historical truth.” The Ukrainian president called for the same truth and mentioned that the conflict “between Ukrainian and Polish peoples is of benefit to a third party--“Muscovy”--with whom these people fought together in the past” (Ukrainska Pravda 2018). Poroshenko expressed hope that the amendments to the Polish law would be dropped.

In January 2019, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal stipulated that formulations like “Ukrainian nationalists” or “Eastern Little Poland” (Malopolska Wschodnia) could not be used as legal terms and therefore did not comply with the constitution. The Tribunal compelled lawmakers to introduce correct formulations (Wiadomosci 2019).

Some signs of normalization became visible after the presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2019. During his visit to Warsaw on 31 August-1 September 2019 the newly elected president Volodymyr Zelensky promised to lift the ban on works exhuming the graves of the Polish victims of the violence of the 1940s. The Polish and Ukrainian presidents once again agreed to create a bilateral commission on historical issues. At the end of September 2019, Ukraine cancelled the ban (Polskieradio.pl 2020) and the Polish side started exhumation works in Lviv oblast. In January 2020, the new director of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory Anton Drobovych at the meeting with the Polish ambassador in Ukraine Bartosz Cichocki expressed hope that the Polish side will undertake concrete steps in restoration of the Ukrainian sites of memory destroyed in previous years (Istorychna Pravda 2020). Simultaneously, the Kyiv City Administration unfurled a huge banner with the portrait of Bandera exactly on the front of it building, thereby marking the anniversary of the birthday of the head of OUN

Conclusions

The “history story” in the relations of Ukraine and Poland is especially instructive, especially from the vantage point of the conflict potential of historical politics. Regardless of the political orientation of the forces at the helm, the ruling classes of both countries consider friendly and partner relations with their neighbor a top priority. Poland and Ukraine managed to find solutions acceptable for both countries in practically every sphere of relations, whether economic, political, or cultural. There is only one exception to this rule: the sphere of historical memory. Years and decades of reconciliatory efforts by political top managers, public intellectuals, and civic leaders lack efficiency and seem condemned to a kind of “endless cycle.”

The fundamental reason most likely lies with the rivalry of two similar exclusivist ethnocentric versions of the national/nationalist memory narrative, and, to make matters worse, of their radical variants. Additionally, the Ukrainian side often mimics the practices and the discourse forms of the Poles, from the creation of an institute of national memory, to the replication of such patterns as equating Communism and Nazism. The dueling, memetic narratives, each promoted by a mirrored reserve of memory warriors (right conservatives, right-wing nationalists and populists) produce similar modes of conduct and interpretations of the image of the Other. Both sides deployed the language of negation in their assessment of the claims of their rivals. Accordingly, this “much ado about nothing” reaches the level of supreme importance, problems of the past being used to construct a gloomy present.

The Other is the mirroring projection of the Self, of one's own phobias, concerns and anxieties. This explains the out-sized role of non-state memory agents: Kresy and veteran organizations in Poland, and right-wing political parties and movements without real representation in top political bodies in Ukraine. The aggravation of the conflict coincided with the accession to power of these agents of historical politics.

In Poland, those who supported the revival of ethnocentric Polish identity based on an exclusivist national narrative obtained their influence both in the parliament and in the presidency, while their ideological twins in Ukraine controlled the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory and some other agencies (for instance, State Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting). The Svoboda Party, which lost its place on party lists in the parliament of 2014, gained more importance at the local level. For instance, Svoboda was behind decisions of local councils to rename streets after Bandera in central Ukraine and to display the OUN flag together with the national flag at public places on certain commemorative dates (see: Kasianov 2018) an action which definitely did not aide in the normalization of Polish-Ukrainian relations.

This type of ethnocentric reading of the past dictates the presentation of the debates as an ethnic conflict between Ukrainians and Poles or even as an international conflict, between Ukraine and Poland as states. Both parties are interested in speaking on behalf of the whole nation. In Poland, these claims might be better grounded; however, the opposition to this kind of politics is still strong. In Ukraine, the right-wing and right- conservative political and ideological segment which claims national representation is even narrower. In this case, the extent of public interest in the debate is deliberately exaggerated and sensationalized. In reality, those who politically benefit from the conflict represent a relatively small portion of political spectrum of Ukraine who have situationally reached power and influence by appropriating some state institutions.

By all means then the Ukrainian - Polish conflict over the past should be considered an extension of the massive revitalization and rise of ethnocentrism in the world. This Is the result of a number of factors, beginning with the conflict between cultural globalism and nationalism and ending with reemergence of tribalism in its most primitive forms.

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